THE TIMUCUAN MISSIONS OF SPANISH FLORIDA
AND THE REBELLION OF 1656

By

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In 1656, the mission frontier of Spanish Florida erupted into rebellion when Lucas Menéndez, principal chief of the Timucua, ordered the murder of all secular Spaniards in the province. Half a century of missionization was abruptly shattered, and seven lay dead as a fortified Timucuan palisade was hurriedly constructed.

New documentary evidence, combined with recent archaeological data, provides details of the process by which Timucua was gradually drawn into the colonial system centered in St. Augustine, and reveals the transformations and stresses which ultimately led to the rebellion. An overview of the region in the late precolumbian period provides a backdrop for early contacts between Spaniard and Indian during the sixteenth century. In the early seventeenth century, entire aboriginal societies were
integrated into the developing colonial system by Franciscan missionaries, resulting in the incorporation of three regional provinces to form the Timucua mission province.

Although an overview of this colonial system reveals only limited structural linkages between Indian and Spanish societies, the colonial labor system, including the yearly repartimiento labor draft, burden-bearing, and the Indian militia, introduced stresses which contributed to the gradual erosion of chiefly power. The unanticipated consequences of missionization—frontier raiding, flight from the labor draft, epidemics, and inter-provincial migration—resulted in major demographic transformations, further exasperating an already devastating situation.

Lucas Menéndez ruled an increasingly disfunctional society, and when the chiefs themselves were ordered to carry burdens during a massive activation of the Indian militia, rebellion ensued. In the aftermath of the capture, trial, and execution or imprisonment of virtually the entire aboriginal leadership of Timucua, a massive program of population relocation transformed Timucua from a dispersed indigenous society into a chain of populated way-stations along the Spanish royal road. The Timucuan Rebellion ultimately represented the culmination of a jurisdictional struggle between aboriginal chiefs and the Spanish military, and its failure only accelerated the integration of Timucua into the colonial system of Spanish Florida.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

**Murder and Retaliation**

"Now the Spaniards die!" With those words, a group of Timucuan Indians flooded into the main house at a Spanish cattle ranch near present-day Gainesville, Florida, murdering an unsuspecting Spanish soldier and two African slaves. The year was 1656, and half a century of comparatively peaceful association between the Timucua province and Spanish colonists in St. Augustine was abruptly shattered with murderous violence. Four others, including two Spanish soldiers, a Spanish servant, and a Mexican Indian, lay dead in other parts of Timucua, and two of the only four remaining soldiers in the interior beat a hasty retreat to St. Augustine with the news: the province of Timucua had risen up in rebellion.

The summer and fall of that year witnessed the construction of a fortified palisade by the Timucuan rebels, the dispatch of sixty Spanish infantrymen into the interior, and the capture, trial, and eventual execution and imprisonment of virtually the entire Indian leadership of the Timucua province. In the wake of the revolt, Timucua
experienced a massive political and geographical restructuring which would transform the province forever. What had begun as an attempt to take control of their own destiny only succeeded in sealing the fate of an aboriginal province experiencing the process of integration into the colonial system of Spanish Florida.

What motivated the principal chief of Timucua to lead his people into an uprising against Spanish authority? Until very recently, the answer was clouded by insufficient historical documentation, and a limited understanding of the Timucua province prior to and during the early years of Spanish colonization in Florida. Substantial new archaeological and historical data on Timucua, combined with the examination of a previously unexplored major documentary source regarding the rebellion itself, permits a more detailed evaluation of the uprising of 1656 as a significant turning point in the history of the Timucua province. Ultimately, the Timucuan Rebellion sheds light on the political consequences of the process of missionization, serving as a case-study of the integration of aboriginal societies into the seventeenth-century Spanish colonial system.

The Timucuan Rebellion

The Timucuan Rebellion of 1656 has long been considered a significant event in the history of the missions of
colonial Spanish Florida. Indeed, it has even been termed "the Great Rebellion" (Bushnell 1978:420; 1981:13), and has been discussed widely in the historical and anthropological literature (e.g. Swanton 1922:338; Gannon 1965:57-9; Matter 1990; Milanich 1978; Pearson 1983; Hann 1986a, 1986b, n.d.). Despite this fact, until 1991 researchers were forced to rely upon only a handful of primary documentary sources regarding the rebellion, representing only a few pages of text. However, the recent investigation of a large amount of documentation contained in the judicial review, or residencia, of the term of the governor during whose administration the rebellion occurred, along with an exhaustive re-examination of old and new historical and archaeological data relative to the Timucua province, has permitted a more thorough understanding of the Timucuan Rebellion.

The uprising of 1656 was one of three major revolts among the mission Indians of Spanish Florida. Each of the three primary Franciscan mission provinces experienced one major rebellion: Guale in 1597, Apalachee in 1647, and Timucua in 1656. There were, of course, many other hostile encounters between Indians and Spaniards, some of which resulted in higher casualties than the three rebellions noted above. Nevertheless, these three uprisings have been considered by colonial Spaniards and modern researchers alike to be the more significant examples of armed
resistance among the missionized aboriginal societies of Florida.

All three may be characterized as hostile uprisings within Indian provinces which had previously permitted the establishment of permanent Franciscan missions within their constituent towns. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the Timucuan Rebellion and both the Guale and Apalachee uprisings. In the latter cases, the rebellions occurred during the early years of the missionization process and were directed against the friars themselves. The Timucuan Rebellion, on the other hand, happened after half a century had passed since the establishment of the first missions and it was not directed against the Franciscan missionaries. Indeed, as will be seen, the friars seem to have been specifically excluded from the violence and were even accused of having conspired with the rebels.

The Timucuan Rebellion seems to fall into a different category than other major uprisings in Spanish Florida. It was not a nativistic revitalization movement, for the goal was not the total rejection of the Spanish church and crown. Instead, the uprising of 1656 reflects a jurisdictional struggle between the aboriginal leadership of Timucua and the Spanish military government of St. Augustine. At stake was the political control of the aboriginal society of Timucua, and the overall political structure of the colonial
system of Spanish Florida. The Timucuan Rebellion did indeed settle that question, although not in the direction preferred by the rebels. Ultimately, the rebellion represents the last gasp of indigenous aboriginal political control in Timucua, and as such marks a significant, if only subtly perceived, landmark in the integration of Timucua into the developing Spanish colonial system.

Sources of Evidence

As noted above, this study is fundamentally based on a substantial body of historical documentation which has remained effectively unknown to modern researchers. Primary among these sources is the residencia of Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, which has languished in the Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla, Spain for centuries. The reasons for this are several: first, the stack of documents compiled during this judicial review was not placed among the other residencias of the Governors of Florida, in the section named Escribanía de Cámara, but was instead filed among the accounting records for Florida in the section entitled Contaduría, a perenially under-utilized source of historical information.

Perhaps for this very reason, no researchers seem to have examined its pages prior to the 1920's, when a disastrous fire in the Archivo nearly resulted in its complete destruction. Following this fire, the charred
remnants of legajo 963 were accidentally mixed with eighteenth-century accounting records in legajo 964, compounding the inaccesability of the residencia. Furthermore, the bundle of documents was severely damaged by the fire, leaving what remained of the pages in extremely fragile condition. Even a cursory examination of the documents today results in the further deterioration of the charred edges of each page.

As a consequence of the factors discussed above, there is no evidence from the secondary historical literature that the Rebolledo residencia has ever been even viewed, much less fully mined for the information within. It is entirely possible that the notebooks created during the judicial review of Rebolledo's administration have not been opened since shortly after they were shipped to Spain in the 1660s\(^2\). Even though the existence and location of the residencia have been known for several years\(^3\), it was not until February of 1991 that its contents were examined by this author, revealing a gold mine of information within. Based on the fact that no published transcripts or translations exist for these documents, the primary appendix to this volume consists of translations for the testimony which formed the basis for understanding the Timucuan Rebellion. Other material is either cited, paraphrased, or translated within the text of the chapters.
While the Rebolledo residencia forms the core of documentation regarding the rebellion, the present study draws on a considerable amount of historical and archaeological information, much of it new or re-evaluated, relating to the Timucua province prior to and during the early historic period. Historical research has proceeded using originals or microfilm copies of the manuscripts within the Archivo General de Indias, primarily because most of the secondary historical and anthropological literature has traditionally employed only a portion of the documents which actually exist regarding Timucua. Furthermore, much of the archaeological data used in this study are quite recent and largely unpublished.

As a result, this volume represents a re-evaluation of our past understanding of the Timucuan Rebellion in particular, and the province of Timucua in general. The approach used for this study has been an integrative one, concurrently employing both historical and archaeological information. Consequently, the text of this volume incorporates both sources of evidence using a thematic approach to develop a line of argument. The problem at hand—namely the Timucuan Rebellion, its origins, and its aftermath—remains the focus of the study. The various evidentiary sources, both documentary and archaeological, are drawn on where appropriate, without regard to the separation of either the "history" or the "archaeology" of
Timucua. In this sense, the distinction between these bodies of information seems largely an artifact of academic subdivisions, and serves more to confuse than to clarify.

**Textual Organization**

Inasmuch as the focus of this study is the early historic period transformation of the Timucua mission province as a political entity, the volume will begin with a consideration of the character of the aboriginal societies which ultimately formed the Timucua province during the late precolumbian period, or more specifically, prior to intensive contact with Spanish colonists. Chapter Two presents an overview of the archaeological and documentary evidence for the sociopolitical character of North and North-Central Florida during the early sixteenth century, including a discussion of the aboriginal societies observed by the members of the Hernando de Soto expedition in 1539, and an examination of early colonial interaction with the Potano Indians.

Having established a benchmark with which to compare later developments, the next four chapters examine the process by which the aboriginal societies of these regions were gradually integrated into the Spanish colonial system, and how this process impacted the various Indian groups involved. These four chapters are heavily interrelated, and thus any one cannot be taken out of the context of the rest.
Chapter Three examines missionization as the specific catalyst for drawing the aboriginal societies into the developing colonial system. Chapter Four provides an overview of the structure of that colonial system as it related to Timucua, Chapter Five focuses on the colonial labor system, and Chapter Six explores some of the unanticipated consequences of integration, setting the stage for the rebellion of 1656.

The next two chapters focus on the Timucuan Rebellion itself, employing a largely narrative treatment of the events of the rebellion in an effort to provide greater insight into its nature. Chapter Seven centers on the events which sparked the rebellion, leading up to the retaliatory expedition dispatched from St. Augustine. Chapter Eight focuses on this expedition, providing details of the negotiations which led to the capture, trial, and punishment of the rebels.

Chapter Nine examines the aftermath of the Timucuan Rebellion, presenting the political and geographical restructuring of the Timucua province during the late seventeenth century. Finally, Chapter Ten presents conclusions based on Chapters Two through Seven, exploring the implications of the Timucuan Rebellion within the broader context of aboriginal integration throughout the Spanish colonial world.
Notes

1. Descriptions of the Timucuan Rebellion itself are quite scarce, and include two letters by fray Juan Gomez de Engraba, dated March 13 and April 4, 1657 (Engraba 1657a, 1657b), two letters by the Council of the Indies, dated June 15 and July 7, 1657 (Council of the Indies 1657a, 1657b), a long letter by the Franciscan friars of Florida dated September 10, 1657 (San Antonio, et al. 1657), and two letters by Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, dated September 18 and October 18, 1657 (Rebolledo 1657e, 1657g).

2. It is difficult not to imagine the reaction of the notaries who labored so carefully to record this information were they to realize that their work would lie effectively dormant for nearly three and a half centuries.

3. For the location of the residencia I am indebted to Bruce Chappell, archivist for the P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, who not only directed me to Contaduria 963, but also played an active role in sending me to Sevilla to examine it (see the Acknowledgements).
CHAPTER TWO

TIMUCUA IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Precolumbian Roots of Timucua

The regions of North and North-Central Florida, home to the Timucua mission province of the seventeenth century, were inhabited by aboriginal societies long before the first Spanish explorer set foot on the shores of North America. The developmental history of these societies lies within the realm of archaeological endeavor, for there are no documents available to inform our understanding of this remote past. The remains of over twelve millenia of human occupation in Florida continue to be unearthed by archaeologists today, providing a record of cultures long since transformed and forgotten (e.g. Milanich and Fairbanks 1987). The present study, however, will focus on the last aboriginal societies recognized to exist in North and North-Central Florida prior to Spanish contact, using this as a starting point for an examination of the transformations of the colonial period.

While archaeological research has been ongoing in these regions for nearly half a century, only recently has a more complete chronological and geographical understanding of the late precolumbian cultures of both North and North-Central
Florida been attained. Broad-scale archaeological survey, along with intensive excavations at several sites, has permitted the preliminary description of two related cultures predating the colonial era. This information provides a foundation for understanding the aboriginal societies which ultimately comprised the Timucua mission province.

Evidence is rapidly accumulating that the aboriginal cultures which existed in North and North-Central Florida at the point of first Spanish contact possess considerable time depth, extending back to A.D. 900 at the latest. As has been suspected for years (e.g. Milanich et al. 1984), the late prehistoric culture of North Florida seems to be related to the earlier and better-known Weeden Island culture predating the tenth century (Johnson and Nelson 1990; Johnson 1991; Worth 1990, 1992b). Nevertheless, during the last six centuries before Spanish contact, both these regions were home to two related aboriginal cultures which form somewhat of an anomaly among contemporaneous cultures of the southeastern United States (Figure 1).

The Alachua culture of North-Central Florida originated in the eighth century, and seems to have persisted until the time of Spanish contact (Milanich 1971, 1990; Milanich and Fairbanks 1987). Distinguished principally on the basis of aboriginal ceramics, the Alachua culture ceramic assemblage was characterized by a set of decorative techniques
including cord impressions, corncob impressions, and random punctations on a limited range of simple vessel forms. Alachua subsistence seems to have included maize horticulture, as well as hunting and fishing, and the gathering of wild plant foods. Domestic architecture seems to have been limited to thatched circular structures. Burial mounds are known for the Alachua culture, although this is the only form of earthen public architecture currently recognized.

The Suwannee Valley culture\(^1\) of North Florida, originating by the end of the tenth century, seems to share many of the cultural characteristics described above for the Alachua culture (Johnson 1991; Worth 1992b). The primary distinction between the two regional archaeological cultures is based on aboriginal ceramics. In addition to the decorative techniques noted above (in distinct proportions), Suwannee Valley ceramics display high percentages of roughened, or scraped and brushed, decoration, along with several minority decorations descending from the earlier Weeden Island ceramics of North Florida (Worth 1992b). Vessel forms are similarly limited in scope. Subsistence and architecture seem consistent with that noted for the Alachua culture (Worth 1992b), and burial mounds associated with the Suwannee Valley culture have been provisionally identified (Milanich et al. 1984; Keith Terry, personal communication, 1990).
In an overall perspective, based on our current archaeological understanding of the Suwannee Valley and Alachua cultures, the late prehistoric aboriginal inhabitants of North and North-Central Florida did not share in the Mississippian cultural transformation which swept across most of the rest of the southeastern United States after A.D. 900. These regions of interior northern Florida remained essentially non-Mississippian cultures even as late as the sixteenth century, in contrast to most contemporaneous neighboring cultures (such as Fort Walton, Lamar, Safety Harbor, and even St. Johns\(^2\)), which generally display at least some elements of the Mississippian cultural phenomenon. Lacking platform mounds, Mississippian symbolic paraphernalia, and the typically more elaborate and diverse ceramic assemblages of other Mississippian and Mississippian-related cultures, Suwannee Valley and Alachua cultures remained effectively isolated from the cultural revolution which eventually influenced groups nearly all around them.

What makes this distinction relevant to the present volume is the sociopolitical significance of the term Mississippian. As presently conceived, the Mississippian transformation represented a shift in sociopolitical complexity, or more specifically the widespread emergence of chiefdom-level societies (e.g. Peebles and Kus 1977; Steponaitis 1978; DePratter 1983; Griffin 1985; Smith 1987;
Williams and Shapiro 1990). Explicitly defined as ranked redistributional societies with an hereditary leadership office (Service 1962), chiefdoms possess characteristics which distinguish them from other forms of sociopolitical integration. As a consequence, the characterization of the Suwannee Valley and Alachua cultures as non-Mississippian may well have sociopolitical implications, of interest to the present study. Furthermore, evidence for the transformations of the colonial period, and particularly inter-societal demographic flow, hinges on the distinction between Mississippian and non-Mississippian material culture assemblages, as will be seen in Chapter Six.

The geographic dimensions of the Suwannee Valley and Alachua cultures are only beginning to be more fully understood, largely as a result of regional archaeological survey (Johnson 1991). The distribution of aboriginal settlement across North and North-Central Florida seems to reflect a combination of factors, relating to both the physical and sociopolitical environment. As its name implies, the Suwannee Valley culture seems to be distributed along the Suwannee River drainage basin, including the Suwannee and Santa Fe rivers, many of their tributaries, and the highland interriverine district between these rivers (Johnson 1991; Worth 1992b). The Alachua culture, on the other hand, is distributed across the interior lowland lake
district southwest of the Santa Fe/Suwannee and St. Johns River drainage basins (Johnson 1991).

While microenvironmental variations within each of these areas are common, a general distinction might be made between the Alachua and Suwannee Valley regions on the basis of riverine vs. lacustrine adaptations. Such a distinction may have less to do with the subsistence and resource base of each culture than the structural possibilities for sociopolitical integration offered by either region. This could have implications with regard to settlement location and distribution, networks of travel, transportation, and communication, and zones of social interaction. Indeed, the sociopolitical character of each region (i.e. the relative degree of regional integration) might well be argued to reflect just such differences in the physical environment (see below).

On a smaller scale, individual archaeological sites of the Suwannee Valley and Alachua culture are not distributed evenly across the landscape, but are instead concentrated in "site clusters" (Johnson 1991). Recent archaeological survey in North and North-Central Florida has identified some twelve of these clusters, seven within the Suwannee Valley region, and five within the Alachua region (Johnson 1991). These clusters are composed of between two to seven archaeological sites each, several or all of which are argued to have been occupied contemporaneously during
various periods. In effect, then, settlement distribution thus incorporates at least two levels of analysis: the distribution of sites within each cluster, and the distribution of clusters within each region\(^3\). This fact will ultimately prove important for an examination of the sociopolitical structure of the Timucua mission province (Chapter Four).

In summary, during the last six centuries prior to European contact, the regions of North and North-Central Florida were inhabited by the Suwannee Valley and the Alachua cultures. Throughout this period, aboriginal settlements were distributed in a small number of spatially discrete clusters, the locations of which seem to have largely persisted throughout the late pre-columbian period. Regrettably, due to the nature of the archaeological record, our ability to perceive any levels of sociopolitical integration between that of the site cluster and that of the culture is quite limited. Fortunately, documentary evidence provided by the chroniclers of the Hernando de Soto expedition reveal a more complete portrait of the sixteenth-century aboriginal societies of northern Florida.

**The Hernando de Soto Expedition**

In 1539, an army of over six hundred Spaniards under the command of Hernando de Soto marched inland from the west coast of Florida, penetrating both North-Central and North
Florida. This event marked the first direct contact between Spaniards and the aboriginal societies forming the Alachua and Suwannee Valley cultures in the interior of northern Florida. While the encounter was relatively brief, it was a presage of the colonial era to come, and represented the first and last glimpse by European eyes of these aboriginal societies in a relatively pristine state. As a consequence, the documentary record of this expedition, though maddeningly brief, is an invaluable tool for understanding the character of the sixteenth-century societies which would eventually be known as Timucua.

During late August and September of 1539, Soto's army marched through the region which would ultimately be known as the Timucua mission province nearly a century later. Four written accounts of this portion of the journey are extant⁴, and details within these texts provide clues as to the sociopolitical structure of the aboriginal societies of northern Florida in precolumbian times (Milanich and Hudson n.d.). Within the lowland lake district of North-Central Florida, in the area of the Alachua archaeological culture, the Soto chroniclers make note of a number of Indian towns during their passage through this region, but little more information than their names is given. Biedma (n.d.) notes only that "we passed some towns in the five or six days that we traveled", but Ranjel (Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés 1944) and Elvas (1866) list the towns of Itaralaholata/Ytara,
Potano, Utinamocharra/Utinama, Mala-Paz (a Spanish name given the town), and Cholupaha (also given the name Villafarta by the explorers), all spaced about a day's march apart, prior to arriving at the town of a powerful Indian chief named Aguacaleycuen (or Caliquen).

Based on the recently postulated locations for these towns (Johnson 1991; Milanich and Hudson n.d.), all but the last seem to have been located in archaeological site clusters of the late precolumbian Alachua culture. As a consequence of its location on the Santa Fe River drainage, the material culture of Cholupaha seems to have been related to the Suwannee Valley culture rather than Alachua. Regardless of their apparent similarity in material culture, however, historical evidence provides no hint of this fact.

In no instance were these towns implied to be politically connected or integrated, and there was no mention of a province or alliance between caciques in this area. While the absence of such information is not conclusive, the contrast between the descriptions of these North-Central Florida towns and those of North Florida is striking, inasmuch as the Soto chroniclers make no mention of the kind of regional political integration witnessed farther north. Considering the importance of regional politics for the members of the Soto expedition, who typically imprisoned paramount caciques to insure safe-passage through their territory, it seems reasonable to
conclude that any degree of regional sociopolitical integration in North-Central Florida was weak or nonexistent, particularly compared with the societies of North Florida. Although this seems to have changed in the decades following Soto's march, the towns of the Alachua culture of North-Central Florida were given little notice by Spanish observers in 1539. It was not until the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century that the town of Potano, probably located at the Richardson site (see below, and Chapter Three), seems to have risen to regional political preeminence.

North Florida, on the other hand, appears to have been organized into two comparatively centralized aboriginal societies, ruled by caciques named Aguacaleycuen and Ucachile. Once again, recent archaeological work has suggested possible locations for the various towns visited by Soto's army (Johnson 1991; Milanich and Hudson n.d.), but due in part to the indefinite nature of many of these identifications, the present discussion will primarily focus on the sociopolitical dynamics of this region as revealed by the documents.

The first of these two societies encountered by Soto was ruled by a cacique named Aguacaleycuen, or Caliquen. The principal town of Aguacaleycuen was located just north of the modern Santa Fe River, to the east of either the Ichetucknee River or Olustee Creek (Milanich and Hudson
n.d.). The geographical extent of his political control is difficult to identify, but it is significant that once the Spaniards had captured Aguacaleycuen, Soto declared that he was desired as a hostage all the way to the principal town of the next aboriginal society, Uçachile (Elvas 1866). Since the Spaniards typically released such hostages at the boundary of their territories, this suggests that Aguacaleycuen was either on equal political status with Uçachile, or subordinate to him⁶.

Other lines of evidence imply the former possibility. Uçachile was said to be a kinsman of Aguacaleycuen, although this may only have been a fictive relationship (Milanich and Hudson n.d.). Furthermore, very soon after the Spaniards departed from the principal town of Aguacaleycuen in search of Uçachile, they began to encounter messengers and allies of Uçachile, wishing to have the cacique of Aguacaleycuen set free. Not counting various delays, there were a total of six days of travel between the principal town of Aguacaleycuen and that of Uçachile, through land described as "more populated and better supplied" than land up to that point (Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés 1944). Only two days travel from Uçachile, at the town of Napituca, "seven caciques from those districts, with their people, joined together", claiming to be subjects of Uçachile who had come at the request of Aguacaleycuen to negotiate for an alliance
against their common enemy to the west, Apalachee (Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés 1944).

It was at Napituca that a fateful battle took place, in which the Indians attempted to liberate the hostage cacique. The Spaniards won a definitive victory, and ultimately all the caciques who conspired in the affair were executed by being "riddled with arrows", presumably including Aguacaleycuen (Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés 1944). Continuing on their way, Soto's army was presented with gifts of deer sent ahead by the cacique of Uçachile, but when the Spaniards arrived at his town a day's march west of the Suwannee River, it had been abandoned. Finding it wiser to avoid further contact with the Spanish conquerers, Uçachile seems to have been the only major cacique to survive the encounter.

In broad perspective, the allied societies of Aguacaleycuen and Uçachile seem to have occupied opposite ends of a comparatively well-populated region in North Florida. Soto's army camped at aboriginal towns each night of their journey across this area, including Uriutina, Many Waters (a name given by the Spaniards), Napituca, and Apalu/Hapaluya, along with several unnamed towns (Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés 1944; Elvas 1866). Archaeological survey suggests that these probably correspond to site clusters scattered throughout middle Columbia County and northern Suwannee County (Johnson 1991; Milanich and Hudson n.d.).
Neither documentary nor archaeological information currently make it possible to identify any sort of political or cultural boundary between the two societies, if such a division even existed at this time. The entire region seems to exhibit a similar material culture during the late precolumbian period, although archaeological survey in the northwestern portion of the Suwannee River drainage basin is quite limited.

Conclusions regarding the sociopolitical structure of aboriginal societies in North Florida during the early sixteenth century must be tempered with an understanding of the limited documentary and archaeological evidence available. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that in 1539, the Suwannee Valley culture of North Florida was organized into two regional societies, one centered in the southern drainage of the Suwannee River basin, and another in the northwestern region. Of these two, Aguacaleycuen was politically decapitated following the Soto expedition, while Uçachile⁷, the cacique of which survived, probably experienced the greatest demographic impact resulting from the battle of Napituca.

The chronicles of the expedition of Hernando de Soto provide a rare and tantalizing glimpse of the regional sociopolitical dynamics of the interior of northern Florida. At the same time, however, they mark the beginning of irrevocable societal transformations which would only become
more pronounced in coming decades. The two principal aboriginal societies of North Florida seem to have persisted, under different names, well into the seventeenth century, and indeed ultimately formed the core of the Timucua mission province. Among the scattered towns of North-Central Florida, however, one town, that of Potano, seems to have risen in political status and military power during the years preceding the establishment of the Spanish colony at St. Augustine, and would ultimately figure more prominently in the documentary record of the late sixteenth century.

Early Colonial Interaction: Frontier Wars

The beginnings of sustained European contact with the Indians of what would later become the Timucua mission province dates to the years 1564-1567, when both French and Spanish colonists mounted several incursions into the interior from their newly established colonial bases at Fort Caroline and St. Augustine on the east coast of Florida. In the summer of 1564, following the construction of Fort Caroline at the mouth of the modern St. Johns River by French colonists under René Laudonnière, Captain Vasseur was dispatched upriver in search of a soldier left there on an earlier trip. Arriving at the town of Molona, Vasseur learned of an alliance of Indian chiefs subject to King Olata Ouae Outina, a powerful aboriginal leader of the
interior. At Molona, Vasseur was first made aware of a powerful Indian chief, named Potavou, some two days march from Outina\(^8\) (Laudonnière 1975:76-7).

This aboriginal leader, undoubtedly the Potano of later Spanish accounts, regularly warred with Outina, and was described as "a fierce man in war." In September of that year, another party, including Lord d'Arlac and Captain Vasseur, was sent to the town of Outina to return several Indian prisoners, and during this visit, the French accompanied Outina on an attack against Potavou (Laudonnière 1975:91). A party of two hundred Indians traveled to the town of Potavou under cover of darkness, surrounding the town and assaulting at dawn. Aided by French soldiers with guns, the battle was a rout, and the Potavou Indians fled. Outina entered the town, capturing the men, women, and children who remained.

Early in 1565, Outina requested the assistance of French soldiers for yet another assault on Potavou. Thirty men armed with guns were dispatched by Laudonnière under command of Lieutenant d'Ottigni, joining a party of three hundred Indian warriors in the expedition (Laudonnière 1975:117-21). On the second day of the expedition, having marched to within three leagues of the Potavou village, an advance party startled a group of Potavou fishermen on a lake. Two of the Potavou escaped; the third was shot with arrows, scalped, and mutilated. Although Outina's sorcerer
advised that Potavou would now be awaiting them with two thousand warriors, the French Lieutenant convinced Outina to proceed. The war party discovered the Potavou ambush where predicted, and in the ensuing three-hour battle many Potavou warriors were killed with the French guns, resulting in the flight of the remaining Potavou and a narrow French/Outina victory. Against the protestations of Lieutenant d'Otiggni, Outina withdrew, content with the victory. A dozen French soldiers were left in Outina's town following the raid to protect against any immediate retaliations by Potavou.

Following the arrival of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés in September of 1565, and the subsequent rout of the French colony at Fort Caroline (Lyon 1976), the Spanish colonists followed the French in establishing an alliance with the chief of Autina, still at war with surrounding Indian groups. In late July of 1567, Captain Pedro de Andrada was dispatched into the interior with eighty soldiers to provide military assistance for Autina against, among other allied chiefs, Potano (López de Mendoza Grajales 1567). On their way to assault the town of Potano, the group was ambushed by a group of Potano warriors, and Andrada and a number of his men were killed (Lyon 1976:198-9). The disaster was described nearly twenty years later in reference to the punishment of an Ensign on the expedition:

...as 80 soldiers went to make war on a cacique named Potano, upon the retreat after the assault, his Captain commanded this [Ensign] to come in the rearguard, and as he saw the natives shoot arrows
through there, he deserted it and went away, fleeing to the advance guard, and thus he was the cause that they killed there his Captain and twenty soldiers (Méndez 1584).

The Potano victory seems to have ensured their relative immunity to Spanish reprisals, for seventeen years seem to have passed before the town of Potano was once again visited by Spaniards.

The Potano were almost certainly a constant thorn in the side of Spanish colonial endeavors during the intervening years, for in 1584, in retaliation for the depredations of the Potano, another major armed expedition was dispatched into the interior to deal with the threat (Argüelles 1598; Junco 1605; Márquez 1606; Sánchez Judrero 1608). This War of Potano, as it was later called, involved a force of some thirty-three Spanish infantrymen gathered from the garrison at Santa Elena, and was led by Gutierre de Miranda, alcalde of Santa Elena. These soldiers were accompanied by a number of Indians serving as bearers, carrying their packs and food, and led by Pedro Márquez, cacique of San Sebastian and Tocoy and long-time ally of the governors of Spanish Florida.

At the direction of Governor Pedro Menéndez Márquez, Miranda seem to have traveled by boat up the river of San Mateo (the St. Johns), perhaps disembarking near present-day Palatka. From here, the squad of soldiers, armed with guns and swords, marched overland with their Indian allies on a journey which lasted seven days out and back, during which
time the town of Potano was assaulted and destroyed. In what was described as a "slaughter", some twenty Indians were killed, the houses of the town were burned, and their cornfields were cut. Only a few Spanish soldiers were wounded, and the force returned with the remaining Indians as prisoners. Based on a variety of lines of evidence (see Chapter Three), this burned town may have been located at the Richardson site (8A1100), approximately fourteen leagues inland from the St. Johns river.

The specific impetus for this military action is unknown, although witnesses describe the Potano as rebellious and warlike, having committed many undescribed offenses. What seems clear, however, is that the intent of the expedition was to decimate the power of the Potano, not only killing and imprisoning them, but also destroying their means of sustenance. The Royal Accountant Bartolome de Argüelles later cited this raid on Potano as an example of the success of such a strategy, proposing the same for the province of Guale after the disastrous revolt of 1597 (Argüelles 1598). Later evidence reveals that the burned town was abandoned, and the surviving Potano relocated farther to the west (see Chapter Three). Although the cacique of Potano survived the raid, it would be thirteen years before he was motivated to re-establish contact with the Spaniards.
Late Sixteenth-Century Timucua

As discussed above, the Spanish colonists of St. Augustine were well-aware of the warlike Potano during the first decades of the colony's existence. By this time, Potano seems to have become a major figure in the balance of aboriginal political power in the interior of northern Florida (see Chapter Three). While it would be early in the seventeenth century before the interior would be fully explored by Spanish friars and soldiers, there was at least a vague perception of several other powerful aboriginal societies deeper into the interior of northern Florida. Based on intelligence from their Indian allies, and the reports of several men\textsuperscript{10} sent by Laudonnière to explore the countryside beyond Outina's town in late 1564 and early 1565, the French were aware of two powerful Indian chiefs in the interior: Onatheaqua and Houstaqu (Laudonnière 1975:77, 87, 95-6, 116). Both of these provinces were said to lie near the Appalachian mountains, and were believed to be sources of valuable stone and metal deposits. They were also universally perceived by the French-allied Indians along the St. Johns River to be enemies along with Potavou.

Houstaqu is almost certainly the Yustaga province of both the earlier Soto era and the later mission period, and Onatheaqua may refer to the region controlled by chief Aguacaleycuen in 1539 (Johnson 1991; Milanich and Hudson n.d.), later to be known as the Timucua province at the turn
of the century. Intriguingly, the chief of Hostaqua made several overtures to the French, sending gifts and proposing an alliance in order to win joint control of the interior (Laudonnière 1975:95-6,116). There is no evidence that this relationship went any farther than Laudonnière's sending of clothes and several iron tools, perhaps due to the imminent arrival of the Spanish under Menéndez.

In the mid 1570's, Hernando de Escalante Fontaneda, who had been a captive of the south-Florida Indians during the 1550's and 1560's, composed a list of Florida caciques which included, among others, Potano and Ostaga, the latter of which was stated to possess pearls (Escalante Fontaneda n.d.). While he might have learned of these caciques during his captivity, it seems far more likely that this information was gleaned from the Spanish colonists at St. Augustine after Escalante was rescued. In any case, the Spaniards seem to have been at least somewhat cognizant of the deep interior of northern Florida during the late sixteenth century, although this region would not be explored until the early decades of the seventeenth century.

Significantly, it was during this very time period that most of the aboriginal societies along the middle course of the St. Johns River drainage, so amply documented during the mid-1560's, essentially vanished from the historical record. Chief Outina was never mentioned again, and the territory he seems to have occupied was a vast and unoccupied desert by
the turn of the century, and continued to be so throughout most of the mission period. Indeed, it was not until nearly a century later that Spanish officials decided to deliberately create a mission town in this vicinity to remedy the long march over unoccupied lands (see Chapter Nine). Whether the disappearance of these Spanish-allied societies resulted from disease, flight, or assimilation into newly formed Indian settlements near St. Augustine\textsuperscript{11}, it was the formerly hostile and poorly known societies of the interior which survived to be missionized by Franciscan friars in the early 1600's.

Notes

1. The Suwannee Valley culture (Weisman 1992; Worth 1992b) is roughly equivalent to the Indian Pond complex originally defined by Johnson and Nelson (1990), although there are disparities in methodology and definition between the two archaeological concepts (see the discussion by Worth (1992b)). For clarity in the present discussion, Suwannee Valley will be the term employed to describe the late precolumbian aboriginal culture of North Florida, with citations drawing on equivalent concepts in other sources (principally Johnson (1991) and Milanich and Hudson (n.d.)).

2. See Milanich and Fairbanks (1987) for synthetic overviews of these Florida cultures, and Williams and Shapiro (1990) regarding the Lamar culture to the north.

3. Johnson (1991) focuses largely on the level of the archaeological site, examining site size and compaction with respect to the physical environment, and over time. The internal spatial organization of each site cluster, and the distribution of clusters across the landscape, is less fully explored.

4. Only three of these texts --- by Luys Hernández de Biedma (n.d.), Rodrigo Ranjel (Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés 1944), and the Gentleman of Elvas (1866) --- are based on
essentially firsthand accounts written by actual participants in the expedition. The fourth, by the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega (1962), was assembled by an outsider from interviews with various survivors, and is replete with errors and fanciful embellishment. Consequently, the relations of Biedma, Ranjel, and Elvas will be the principal sources for the present discussion.

5. The Fig Springs site was the political center of the later province of Timucua, where mission San Martín was established in 1608, and thus may be a likely candidate for Aguacaleycuen (Weisman 1992; Worth 1992b). A sixteenth-century glass chevron bead was recovered at the Mill Pond site just south of Fig Springs, possibly relating to the Soto expedition (Weisman 1989).

6. Had Aguacaleycuen been preeminent over Uçachile, Soto probably would have required his presence as a hostage after passing through Uçachile's principal town.

7. Based on the accounts of the Soto expedition, the town of Agile (also known as Aquile or Axille), later associated with the province of Yustaga within the Timucua mission province, seems to have been politically aligned with its neighbor Apalachee. Ranjel (Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés 1944) explicitly states that Agile was subject to Apalachee, and Elvas (1866) indicates that following the army's departure from Uçachile, they traveled two days before surprising the inhabitants of Agile, who had no forewarning of Soto, despite the battle in the province of Uçachile. Biedma (n.d.) simply notes that Agile bordered Apalachee, with a river dividing the two provinces. The weight of evidence suggests that Agile was not a part of the Uçachile province.

8. Milanich and Hudson (n.d.) provide the most comprehensive overview of locational and sociopolitical information contained in French and Spanish accounts of northeastern Florida in the 1560's. Based on an analysis by Johnson (1991), they locate Outina's principal town in northwestern Putnam County, perhaps in the vicinity of Georges Lake (Milanich and Hudson n.d.:197-203). This location is roughly thirty miles (or twelve leagues) from the projected site of Potano (see Chapter Three), but Laudonnière's (1975:91) distance of 25 leagues between the two towns is almost certainly exaggerated. His description of a two-day march between Outina and Potavou (Laudonnière 1975:76,119) fits the 12 league distance quite well.

9. Among the 33 Spanish soldiers and an unknown number of Indians on the 1584 expedition to Potano were the following persons:
Gutierre de Miranda, alcalde of Santa Elena
Bartolomé de Argüelles, contador after 1590
Ensign Francisco de Ecija
Ensign Juan Ramírez de Contreras, interpreter
Juan Sánchez Judrero, soldier
Francisco Morgado, soldier
Pedro Márquez, cacique of San Sebastian/Tocoy

The great majority of the information known about this expedition derives from the service records of Juan Ramírez de Contreras (Junco 1605), Pedro Márquez (1605), and Juan Sánchez Judrero (1608), along with a letter from Bartolomé de Argüelles (1598), and thus the names of other participants are listed in order to assist in locating further documentation.

10. In early November of 1564, Laudonniere (1975:95-6) sent La Roche Ferrière into the interior to explore beyond Outina for five or six months. Early the next year, he seems to have been joined by a man named Grotauld, who returned after two months (Laudonnière 1975:115-6).

11. For example, Pedro Márquez, the cacique of Tocoy on the St. Johns River opposite St. Augustine, consented to relocate his people to form the town of San Sebastian next to St. Augustine (Márquez 1606).
The Rendering of Obedience

The first stage in the eventual integration of aboriginal societies into the Spanish colonial system by the process of missionization was the formal "rendering of obedience" (as phrased by the Spaniards). This process generally involved the visit of one or more aboriginal leaders from an Indian province to the city of St. Augustine, where they were given an audience with the current Governor. It was during these meetings that formal relations were established, and, perhaps more significantly, gifts and rations were given to the Indian leaders in direct return for their allegiance. This practice had considerable precedent, but the expenses were not formally legitimized until 1593, when the crown officially sanctioned the giving of "clothes and iron tools and wheat flour" to the neighboring caciques who came to St. Augustine with news (Prado 1654).

Urging moderation at this time, it was not until 1615 that the crown placed upper limits on the amounts of such expenses, and how they were to be distributed. In this
decree, the King made note of the custom of "clothing and regaling the Indian caciques who, with zeal to convert to our holy faith, come to render me obedience" (Royal Cédula 1615). While the act of rendering obedience to the Spanish crown was often assumed to be tied to religious zeal to convert to Catholicism on the part of the Indians, the existence of a substantial number of Indian provinces which had rendered obedience but perpetually refused missionization suggests that other motivations were in operation.

Events beginning in the closing years of the sixteenth century indicate that the rendering of obedience to the Spanish crown was in fact a political decision on the part of the aboriginal leaders. Indian caciques who chose to establish relations with the Spaniards in St. Augustine were not so much prostrating themselves beneath their new European neighbors as they were bolstering their own political power within their respective provinces. Considering the obvious power represented by the presence of Spaniards on the east coast of Florida after 1565, aboriginal leaders seem to have willingly acted as "power brokers", maintaining and augmenting their own political standing within aboriginal society by initiating and effectively regulating the flow of power between Spaniards and Indians.
While Indian caciques were theoretically losing political supremacy, the argument might be made that this was already a recognized fact among the Indians of interior Florida, particularly following the 1584 decimation of the previously irrepressible Potano. Once any aboriginal provinces had allied themselves with the Spaniards, the failure of neighboring provinces to follow suit could be disastrous (such as in the case of the Potano). There seems good evidence that a sort of "bandwagon" effect prompted numerous aboriginal leaders to render obedience to the Spanish crown.

Indeed, while this act resulted in the willing subordination of Indian caciques under the Spanish King, one immediate benefit of such action was the receipt of exotic Spanish clothing and tools as symbols of the new alliance. Arguments have often been made that European trade goods initially served as legitimization of chiefly authority and rank (e.g. Knight 1985:169-83; Hudson 1989:134-40; Hann n.d.). The fact that the great majority of such gifts to Indian caciques were highly visible items such as clothing, with only an occasional utilitarian iron axe or hoe, suggests that the intended purpose of these items was ostentatious display, and not the distribution of useful goods to common Indians.

Assuming, then, that the rendering of obedience to the Spanish crown (through the Governor of St. Augustine)
represented an attempt to reinforce or augment personal political power, it is only natural that Indian caciques arrived *en masse* once the process was begun. To fail to follow suit was to permit other leaders and provinces to gain the upper hand in regional politics. Furthermore, one might argue that interaction between Spaniards and the common Indians of any given province was theoretically inevitable, and that the early contacts by Indian caciques represented a sort of preemptive move to regulate such contact. In this sense, it was in the chief's own interest to act as a power broker between the new external power and the Indians within each province.

There is no reason to assume that such a pattern was novel, for the making and breaking of such tributary relationships seems a common pattern among the late precolumbian chiefdoms of the southeastern United States (e.g. Anderson 1990; Hudson 1989:134). It has even been argued that external political power served as a magnet for migration between chiefdoms (Williams and Smith 1989). The arrival of the Spanish colonists simply represented a new locus of political power on the Southeastern landscape, and the reactions of aboriginal political leaders simply followed precolumbian patterns, at least initially.

The summer of 1597 witnessed the arrival of a more than twenty Indian caciques in St. Augustine to render obedience to the Spanish crown through the newly installed Governor
Gonzalo Méndez de Canzo (Mugado 1597; Méndez de Canzo 1598). The reasons why such a large number of aboriginal leaders, nearly a third of whom had resisted such visits for years, chose 1597 to establish relations is unclear (see Hann n.d.). Nevertheless, among their number were leaders from two interior provinces who had never before come in peace: Potano and Timucua. On July 6, the brother of the cacique of Potano, and heir to his title, arrived with nine other Indians. During their stay of eight days they were given a ration of wheat flour, and the heir and two principal Indians with him were given blankets as gifts. This visit was considered significant by the Spaniards, for in years past the cacique of Potano "always had been at war, and never had wanted to come" (Mugado 1597).

On the twentieth of that month, a larger party arrived from the province of Timucua, including the brother and heir of "Timucua, cacique mayor, who for many times before now had been called, and who with requests or threats had not wanted to come" (Mugado 1597). This group had been summoned successfully by the Indian Juan de Junco, an interpreter of the Timucua language from mission Nombre de Dios just north of St. Augustine (Mugado 1597; Alvarez de Castrillón 1597). The heir, along with nineteen mandadores and principals, remained in St. Augustine for ten days, during which they were not only given rations of wheat flour, but also a long list of items for the making of eight Spanish-style suits
for the relatives of the cacique and four mandadores; the list included cloth, trim, thread, shoes, and hats. This party was given the greatest amount of gifts of all the caciques who arrived that summer, and the fact that Timucua was the only leader described as cacique mayor suggests that the Spaniards recognized Timucua as an important and powerful ally.

During a second visit to St. Augustine by the heir of Potano and 48 Indians on September 12, no more gifts were distributed, although the group was given rations for their brief stay of four days (Alvarez de Castrillón 1597). This visit probably related to a request for Franciscan missionaries, discussed below.

Early in 1601, a delegation from Potano once again arrived in St. Augustine, and the account of this visit is quite informative regarding the motivations for such early contact with the Spaniards:

In the city of St. Augustine, provinces of Florida, on the thirteenth day of the month of March, sixteen hundred and one, being in the houses of the dwelling of Gonzalo Méndez de Canzo, Governor and Captain General of these provinces for the King our lord, at about four in the afternoon, a little more or less, a quantity of Indians entered in the house of the said señor Governor, and making their respect and applause according to their usage², the said señor Governor questioned them through interpreter Juan de Junco, an Indian from Nombre de Dios, where they were from and why they came, and they responded in their language through the said Juan de Junco, who explained it in our Spanish language, that they were from the province of Potano, which is about thirty leagues distant from this city, a little more or less, and that they
brought there a cacique who was the cacique of Potano, a town which Governor Guitierre de Miranda, by order of General Pedro Menéndez Márquez, had burned with a quantity of Spaniards, and killed in it a quantity of people, and that at the time of the war, this cacique remained a young boy, and has been in the company of the cacique, his uncle, camautina of the said province, until now. Being cacique now, he wished to come to see the said señor Governor through having heard that many other caciques, his neighbors, had come, and in order to render obedience like the rest of the friendly caciques, and the señor Governor told the said Juan de Junco that he should tell him that in the name of His Majesty, he was very grateful that he came to see him from his land, and even more being as young as he was, and that in the name of His Majesty he received him as a friend and would give him what might be needed, and the said cacique, who would be of the age of up to fifteen or sixteen years, a little more or less, according to how he appeared in his aspect, stated through the said interpreter that from now onward he and all of his vassal Indians would attend to this city whenever he might advise them for something, and that he asked the said Governor that, seeing that since the Spaniards burned his town of Potano they had withdrawn from it and had not settled it again, he should give him permission to settle it and live in it, by being closer to this city for what he might command, because without his permission they did not wish to settle or live in it. Having seen the request of the said cacique, the señor General said that he conceded the said permission to settle the said town, and that from now onward he and his Indians should take care to attend to this city when they were called upon by the said señor General for something in the service of His Majesty, because as he had said in the name of His Majesty, he received him from then on as a friend. The said cacique stated through the said Juan de Junco that he would do it thus, and the señor General commanded him [Junco] to say that when he had to return to his land, he would give him something in the name of His Majesty, and he would command food to be given to him for the road, and he commanded him and his Indians to seat themselves, and commanded that food be given to them, and with this ended the conversation (García de la Vera 1601).
In a cover letter sent to the King with the above testimony, Governor Méndez cited the 1567 murder of Captain Andrada and his soldiers and the 1584 raid by Governor Miranda, noting that "before now, through being warlike, [the town of Potano] was very difficult to attract, and cost much blood" (Méndez de Canzo 1601). On this occasion, however, the Governor described them as "straightforward and quiet", and affirmed that they acquiesced to all that he ordered, for which he gave them permission to return to the burned town.

The testimony from the 1601 visit of the cacique of Potano is quite revealing. Presuming that the cacique who dispatched his brother to St. Augustine in 1597 was the same cacique whose nephew arrived in 1601, then it is reasonable to conclude that this older cacique had been leader of the Potano at the time of the Miranda raid of 1584, and had recently died in 1601. Perhaps as a direct function of that change in leadership, the young cacique, possibly in an effort to consolidate his own political power, entered into a closer relationship with the Spaniards in St. Augustine soon after inheriting the position. Noting that he had heard of the visits of many neighboring caciques to St. Augustine, the new cacique of Potano offered to "attend to" the city of St. Augustine in return for permission to resettle the burned town.

Whether the cacique's offer reflected an attempt to establish a firm alliance between himself and the Governor,
or was simply motivated by a desire to resettle valuable lands abandoned seventeen years earlier, is unclear from the documentary sources. Nevertheless, the result was the same: the young leader effectively opened the door for the repartimiento labor draft in Potano. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this action marked yet another step toward the structural integration of the province of Potano into the Spanish colonial system.

Early Missionary Activity

Following the rendering of obedience to the Spanish crown by the provincial caciques of interior Florida, the next step in their integration into the expanding colonial system was missionization. The documentary record is replete with examples of aboriginal leaders repeatedly petitioning the Spaniards for missionaries, and with caciques traveling to St. Augustine for baptism. While the motivations for such actions are rarely discussed directly in the documents (and then emphasizing primarily the theme of divine inspiration), a detailed examination of the process by which mission provinces were established leads to the conclusion that the acceptance of resident friars and the conversion to Christianity were integrally linked with aboriginal politics.

More specifically, the process of missionization was not carried out on an individual basis, but rather on a
societal level. The Franciscan friars who ventured alone into the deep interior did not convert the Indians one by one, gradually winning over the majority of each province. Conversion was, instead, a specifically political act in which missionaries acted through aboriginal leaders, generally beginning with provincial caciques in an effort to sweep entire villages, localities, and regions into the realm of Catholicism. Conversion proceeded by leaps and bounds, with entire societies following the lead of aboriginal chiefs.

In this context, the act of conversion, and the subsequent establishment of permanent missions, would seem at its inception to be yet another example of Indian leaders maneuvering for political power through contact with the Spaniards. Instead of waiting for individual Indians to be drawn into Christianity on their own, caciques once again took the initiative in requesting or merely acquiescing to the presence of friars. Furthermore, the incorporation of friars within aboriginal societies ultimately provided caciques with more immediate and direct access to the Spaniards, presumably resulting in an augmentation of their own internal political power. As will be seen below, the process of missionization gave aboriginal leaders another opportunity to act as brokers, regulating interaction between the Spanish authorities and their own Indian subjects.
From early on, the cacique of the province of Timucua expressed interest in being sent missionaries. The account of the items given to the heir of Timucua on his first visit to St. Augustine in 1597 includes an additional reference to his request for a friar in the principal town of Timucua:

By the town being withdrawn [desbiado] from this presidio, in order to send a religious to serve in it, it was necessary to make a church in which to celebrate the divine worship and instruct them in the Christian doctrine, and so that it might be done with brevity, two axes and a hoe were sent to the said cacique so that they might cut the wood and make the said church and a house where the said father would reside (Mugado 1597).

This request was evidently acted upon immediately, for Fray Baltasar López, a ten-year veteran of Florida residing at the coastal mission of San Pedro de Mocama, later recounted that he returned in the company of the Timucua leader who had come to ask for a missionary. López lived in this Timucuan town, described as fifty leagues inland from San Pedro, for three months preaching and instructing the Indians in Christian doctrine (López 1602).

López related that the cacique of Potano also came to request a missionary, perhaps referring to the second visit of the heir in September of 1597, while López was still in Timucua (Alvarez de Castrillon 1597). Although there were no more friars available, López himself visited the principal town of Potano twice from Timucua, ten leagues distant. Due to the shortage of friars after the murder of five in the province of Guale in September during the 1597
rebellion, López was forced to return to the coast that fall, but he related that the cacique of Potano subsequently traveled the thirty leagues to St. Augustine requesting baptism, which he received prior to López' 1602 declaration. This may refer to the 1601 visit of the new cacique of Potano, or to some other undocumented visit, perhaps by his uncle prior to his death.

The establishment of peaceful relations between St. Augustine and the interior provinces of Potano and Timucua marked the beginning of their long process of integration into the colonial system of Spanish Florida, and evidence from this period provides a rare glimpse of these aboriginal societies immediately prior to full-scale missionization. Baltasar López seems to have been the first Spaniard to personally visit the principal town of the province of Timucua (the Fig Springs site) since the army of Hernando de Soto passed through the region nearly sixty years earlier (possibly stopping in the same town under the name Aguacaleyquen). López was also probably the first to arrive in Potano under peaceful circumstances, although the principal town he visited in 1597 was almost certainly in a different location than that abandoned after the 1585 raid. This new center of power was farther to the west, probably at the Fox Pond site, where the mission of San Francisco was founded nine years later (see below).
By the time of the advent of missionary activities in the interior of northern Florida, there are several statements which may be made regarding the sociopolitical dynamics of this region in the late sixteenth century. Perhaps the most significant is the apparent independence and autonomy of the two provinces of Potano and Timucua. Although López (1602) estimated the population of Potano at just over a thousand people distributed in five towns, making it somewhat less than the fifteen hundred noted for five Timucua towns, most accounts from this period suggest that Potano and Timucua were on relatively equal political footing.

This would seem to contrast with the sociopolitical landscape encountered by Soto's men earlier in the century. As noted in Chapter Two, the region later described as the Potano province (which roughly corresponds to the northern limit of the archaeological distribution of the precolumbian Alachua culture) was described by Soto's chroniclers simply as the location of four apparently independent towns, only one of which was named Potano. There is no evidence of regional integration, nor any suggestion of a "province" of Potano. Only to the north, in the region later known as the province of Timucua, was there any indication in the Soto accounts of sociopolitical integration, under the cacique named Aguacaleyquen. Apparently, the emergence of the Potano "province" post-dates the Soto expedition, perhaps
resulting from the incorporation of several of the towns of
the Alachua archaeological culture into a sociopolitical
entity under the name of Potano.

It may have been this very rise of the town of Potano
to regional political preeminence during the mid-sixteenth
century which sparked or augmented hostilities between
Potano and its eastern neighbors, such as the Outina of the
1560's. Contrarily, the development of regional political
integration in Potano may have instead been a consequence of
French and Spanish interaction with Indian groups along the
St. Johns river drainage during the 1560's, perhaps formed
in direct response to those new European/Indian alliances.
In any case, the mutual antagonism between Spanish-allied
Indians on the St. Johns and the interior province of Potano
ultimately led to armed conflict with the Spaniards, and the
destruction of Potano's principal town. This event must
have dealt a severe blow to the Potano province, for we
learn later that in the aftermath, the center of political
power had been moved west, away from St. Augustine.
Nonetheless, Potano remained a force to be reckoned with
into the early years of the seventeenth century, when it was
the first of these interior provinces to be missionized by
Franciscans.

What is most important to realize here is that
political power and regional integration were by no means
static features of the social geography of northern Florida
during the early colonial period. Indeed, the pace of such changes were only to accelerate after the foundation of permanent missions in the interior. It is precisely this dynamic quality of the process of integration into the colonial system of Spanish Florida which created strains on aboriginal societies, and which would ultimately lead to further bloodshed in the frontier.

Following the brief visit of Baltasar López to Timucua and Potano in 1597, there is little evidence for further Franciscan activities in this interior region until nearly a decade later. Fray López fell ill sometime in 1599, and was still effectively bedridden as late as 1601 (Móntes 1601). Nevertheless, the process which had begun in 1597 ultimately led to the foundation of the first missions in Potano.

The Missionization of Potano

In July of 1605, Governor Pedro de Ybarra reported that the Indians of Potano were once again requesting missionaries, and that when the cacique arrived in St. Augustine to render obedience to the new governor (perhaps in early 1604), he requested baptism (Ybarra 1605). On a return visit, the cacique and his mandador were housed in Ybarra's house, where two Franciscan friars instructed and ultimately baptized both. They were given gifts upon their departure, and promised to return during the following Lent to complete their instruction as Christians (Ybarra 1605).
This return visit may well have taken place, for on the tenth of April of 1606, Fray Martín Prieto embarked with another friar on what was to be the establishment of the first mission province in the interior of modern northern Florida (Oré 1936).

There is evidence for some missionary work among the Potano prior to the arrival of Prieto, for in October of 1605, Captain Alonso de Pastrana testified that the Indians of Potano "have their friar who indoctrinates them" (Pastrana 1605). While this friar may have simply ministered to the Potano Indians working in the cornfields at St. Augustine (as per their 1601 agreement with Governor Méndez), it is possible that a friar was dispatched on a temporary basis to Potano following the baptisms noted by Ybarra in 1605. Nonetheless, the following year, permanent missions would be established in the interior.

The 1606 entrance of Fray Martín Prieto into the province of Potano is well-described, and represents a classic tale of missionary success among the Florida Indians (Oré 1936:112-9). Prieto founded three missions in Potano during the spring and summer of 1606, all within a short distance of one another (Figure 2). Following the construction of a church at the first mission, named San Francisco, Prieto moved on to found two other missions, San Miguel and Santa Ana, before his companion at San Francisco
Figure 2: The Missionization of Timucua
Key to Figure 2

Missions of Timucua

1 - San Francisco de Potano
2 - San Miguel de Potano
3 - Santa Ana de Potano
4 - San Buenaventura de Potano
5 - San Martín de Timucua/Ayacutu
6 - Santa Fé de Teleco
7 - San Juan de Guacara
8 - Santa Cruz de Tarihica
9 - Cofa
10 - San Pedro de Potohiriba
11 - Santa Elena de Machava
12 - San Francisco de Chuaquin
13 - San Augustín de Urihica
14 - Santa Maria de los Angeles de Arapaja
15 - Santa Cruz de Cachipile
16 - San Ildefonso de Chamile
17 - San Matheo de Tolapatafi (?)
18 - San Miguel de Asile

Other Locations

19 - Santiago de Ocone
20 - Hacienda of La Chua
21 - Hacienda of Asile
was forced to return to St. Augustine in the face of Indian hostility.

Alone for the next five or six months, Prieto lived in San Miguel, walking a daily round to San Francisco (one and a half leagues distant), Santa Ana, and finally back to San Miguel. During this time Prieto reported great success in converting the Indians of Potano, although he had to overcome the initial resistance of the cacique of Santa Ana, who had been imprisoned as a boy by Hernando de Soto. During June of this year, the province of Potano was mentioned by the Bishop of Cuba Juan de las Cabezas Altamirano, but due to bad weather it was not included in his 1606 visitation (Dávila 1606). Prieto was soon joined in his efforts by Fray Alonso Serrano, and at some point during 1607 or early 1608 Fray Francisco Pareja, custodio of the Franciscans in Florida, dispatched another, unnamed priest to establish a fourth mission in the Potano province, named San Buenaventura. This last mission was evidently founded on the recently reoccupied site of the town burned in 1584, "where in times past the Spaniards had killed many people" (Oré 1936:114). In 1607, the Franciscans reported that between November of 1606 and October of the following year, "more than a thousand adult Indians (outside of the innocents) have been Christianized in the provinces of Potano" (Pareja and Peñaranda 1607).
At this point it is instructive to examine the Potano province in detail, for within a decade it would effectively disappear as a sociopolitical entity, ultimately merging within the broader designation of the Timucua mission province. Based on locational information contained in a variety of later documents, it is possible to locate the missions founded within the Potano province (specifically, San Francisco de Potano) in the heart of the inland lake region of the Alachua archaeological culture (see Chapter Two). Further information regarding the geographical distribution of the Alachua culture confirms that all of the locations within the historically described Potano province were almost certainly a part of that Alachua culture, and that locations noted as being within the Timucua province do not share this material culture. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the archaeologically defined Alachua culture corresponds to the Potano province of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.

This is not to say that all contemporaneous archaeological sites of the Alachua culture were part of the Potano province; on the contrary, the Alachua culture as currently defined seems to have a much broader distribution to the south and southwest (see Milanich and Fairbanks 1987:169-80; Milanich and Hudson n.d.). The historical evidence suggests simply that the province of Potano represented an aboriginal society comprising several towns
and villages of the Alachua culture. Whether or not this level of regional integration extended back into the precolumbian period is unknown, but the Potano province seems to have been formed out of one portion of a broader region of culturally-related peoples whose sphere of social interaction had persisted for more than eight centuries (see Chapter Two).

Unambiguous archaeological evidence for the material culture of the Potano Indians during these first years of missionization is scant, primarily due to the fact that the majority of mission sites investigated to date were occupied well into the mid-seventeenth century, and thus bear evidence of many of the changes in material culture which accompanied the dynamics of aboriginal incorporation into the Spanish colonial system (see Chapter Six). One site in the Potano province, the Richardson site, contains European artifacts which date to the first years of missionary activity, and as such represents a unique glimpse into this early period (Milanich 1972).

What is perhaps most important to note is that the material culture of the Indians living at this site is essentially identical with the late precolumbian manifestation of the Alachua culture, termed the Alachua phase (Milanich 1971, 1972; Williams and Shapiro 1990:76). Indeed the evidence for Spanish contact comprises only a handful of artifacts in the midst of an essentially pure
Alachua culture assemblage (Goggin 1968; Milanich 1972). Based on an average majolica seriation date of 1615, it is likely that the twenty sherds of Spanish tableware, 123 olive jar sherds (probably from storage vessels), two glass beads, and a single iron spike were items brought by a Spanish friar for use in a mission at or near this site. The identity of this site is not certain, but several lines of evidence suggest that it was the mission of San Buenaventura⁵, which seems to have been abandoned soon after 1613⁶.

The three missions founded by Prieto in 1606 probably constituted a group of towns corresponding to the archaeologically documented site-cluster associated with the Fox Pond site near modern Gainesville, or that cluster and a similar cluster around Moon Lake immediately to the south (Symes and Stephens 1965; Milanich 1971; Johnson 1991). Only one of these survived as an important town in the Timucua mission province: San Francisco. San Miguel disappeared from the historical record within a few years after 1606, and while Santa Ana seems to have persisted throughout most of the seventeenth century, it was apparently subordinate to its close neighbor San Francisco. Indeed, all three of Prieto's first missions were probably located reasonably close together and under central political leadership at San Francisco (see Chapter Four). There is evidence for the existence at this time of another
town, named Apalo, somewhere between San Francisco and the St. Johns river (it is shown to the northeast of Potano on the LeMoyne map (Lorant 1946:34-5) and Fray Oré (1936:121) passed the doctrina of Apalo during his 1616 visitation), but it too vanished after this period.

Given the geographical distribution of Potano missions, then, it is possible to postulate that by 1606, the Potano province comprised four to five large towns in two or three clusters. This description corresponds well to López's mention of five Potano towns in 1597 with more than a thousand inhabitants (López 1602). It is difficult to judge whether the settlement distribution between 1597 and 1606 had changed significantly from that of the 1560's (and earlier), but later documentary evidence reveals that the Potano province experienced a massive demographic decline over the next few years (see Chapter Six).

The Missionization of Timucua

Although Baltasar López made Timucua the focus of his three-month stay in 1597, visiting Potano only twice during that time, the establishment of missions within the Timucua province began only after the foundation of the Potano missions. From his base in Potano, Martín Prieto made repeated overtures during 1607 to the "great cacique of Timucua, very renowned and feared in all the land of Florida" (Oré 1936:114). Delayed due to an ongoing war with
the province of Apalachee to the west, the cacique of Timucua finally acquiesced in 1608, traveling to St. Augustine to request missionaries for his province. Returning with the cacique, Fray Prieto arrived on the first of May at the cacique's town (the Fig Springs site), where he burned twelve idols in the plaza, and was then led on a visitation of all the towns subject to the cacique of Timucua. In each of these remaining four towns six idols were likewise burned, and the cacique expressed the desire for the conversion of all his land.

Prieto initially described the province of Timucua as containing more than twenty villages subject to the great cacique, and yet only noted a total of five villages where images were burned during his visitation of the entire province (Oré 1936:114-5). This latter description agrees with López's (1602) tally of five towns containing 1,500 inhabitants, suggesting that Prieto's reference to twenty villages may incorporate both major towns and satellite villages around each. Indeed, as noted in Chapter Two, the archaeological record reveals a pattern of site clusters distributed across the historically described Timucua province, and as will be treated at length in Chapter Four, later historical records reinforce such a pattern. Consequently, it is likely that Fray Prieto visited five of these clusters, including the residence of the principal cacique, and that he burned wooden figurines in the
principal town of each. These towns probably became the primary missions of the Timucua province proper (see below).

During the next few years, some four new missions were founded in the Timucua province, probably all prior to 1611 (Figure 2). At some point following the establishment of San Martín de Timucua at the Fig Springs site, a new mission was founded between this principal Timucua town and the Potano province: Santa Fé de Teleco. This mission was most probably located at the Shealy site, near the modern Santa Fe River (Johnson 1991). Although this mission has for years been assumed to be within the Potano province, documentary and archaeological evidence strongly suggest that it was instead a Timucua town. In the same period, another, more westerly mission was founded; this was San Juan de Guacara, almost certainly at the Baptising Spring site (Loucks 1979). By the 1616 visitation of Fray Oré, both of these new missions had achieved the status of convento, while the third and last, Santa Cruz de Tarihica, was still a guardianía, having been founded in 1611. This latter mission was probably located at the Indian Pond site (Johnson 1991).

Another mission seems to have been founded at a town named Cofa prior to 1611, for in that year a group of seventeen Indians were murdered on the River of Cofa (the Suwannee) while bringing supplies to a friar (Díaz de Badajoz 1630; also see Chapter Six). This town seems to
have been located on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, at the mouth of the Suwannee River. The archaeological culture of Suwannee Valley does extend into this region (see below), suggesting that Cofa may have been at least culturally, and perhaps politically, related to the inland province of Timucua.

Based on the probable locations for these missions, it is possible to present a portrait of the Timucua province during these first years of missionization. The first mission, San Martín de Timucua, was established at the political center of the entire province, although not at the closest town to the Potano missions (Santa Fé). Within three years, missions were founded in the surrounding region at Santa Fé de Teleco, San Juan de Guacara, and Santa Cruz de Tarihica, and also at the mouth of the Suwannee River in the town of Cofa. These towns may represent the five visited by Martín Prieto in 1608, and thus seem to comprise most of the towns immediately subject to the cacique of the Timucua province. This is supported by the apparent rapidity of the missionization of these towns in only three years, suggesting that the caciques subject to the principal leader of Timucua quickly followed his lead (mirroring the foundation of Potano missions in under two years). As a sociopolitical entity, this province covered a broad region, including at least four major site clusters within the Suwannee River drainage.
Archaeologically, this province seems to correspond to a large portion of the geographical distribution of the Suwannee Valley archaeological culture (Johnson 1991; Worth 1992b), the Alachua culture's northern neighbor. There is evidence that like the Alachua culture, the precolumbian Suwannee Valley culture persisted as late as the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and was thus the material culture of the inhabitants of the Timucua province missionized between 1608 and 1611. Excavations at the Fig Springs site (San Martín) have suggested the persistence of Suwannee Valley into the early mission period (Weisman 1992:36-8; Worth 1992b), and there are some pure Suwannee Valley sites with Spanish artifacts from the mission period (Keith Terry, personal communication). This evidence fits similar conclusions regarding the Richardson site in the Alachua region (see above).

Four of these early missions have been subjected to archaeological investigation, confirming both precolumbian and subsequent mission-period occupation in and around the sites of San Martín, Santa Fé, San Juan, and Santa Cruz (Loucks 1979; Johnson 1991; Weisman 1992; Worth 1992a). The location of the fifth mission, that of Cofa, has not been investigated in the light of new documentary evidence, but examination of ceramic collections at the Florida Museum of Natural History indicates that sites of the Suwannee Valley culture do extend along the lower reaches of the Suwannee
Valley culture\textsuperscript{13}. Based on this evidence, the five Timucua missions established between 1608 and 1611 seem to have comprised an aboriginal society covering a significant portion of the geographic extent of the precolumbian Suwannee Valley culture. Given the postulated locations for these sites, this society may roughly correspond to the society ruled by Aguacaleycuen during the Soto expedition in 1539.

In November and December of 1616, Fray Oré visited four of the above-mentioned towns, passing through the conventos of San Francisco de Potano, Santa Fe de Teleco, and San Martín de Timucua, where he held a regional chapter (Oré 1931:121-2). In addition to the friars stationed at the three convents above, three other friars arrived from the convents of San Juan de Guacara, Santa Cruz de Tarihica, and the more distant convent of Cofa. The direct riverine connection between San Martín and Cofa would have facilitated the latter's presence at Oré's 1616 chapter.

Following the chapter, Fray Oré moved on to visit both San Juan and Santa Cruz, at the last of which he reported 712 Christians, a few of which could already read after only four years of instruction. Passing to the north in an arduous shortcut to the coastal province of Guale, Oré came across a group of unconverted Indian towns, where at the town of Taraco he reported their desire to become Christian (Oré 1931:123). Naming the town Santa Barbara, he
dispatched a letter to the resident friar at Santa Cruz de Tarihica, instructing that a Christian Indian be sent to begin their instruction. There is no record that this town ever became a mission, but due to its apparent proximity to Tarihica, the inhabitants may have merely become a visita of Santa Cruz.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{The Missionization of Yustaga}

Within a few years after the visitation of Fray Oré, missionaries began to make overtures to the cacique of the aboriginal province bordering Timucua to the northwest. The first Franciscan to visit this region had been Fray Martín Prieto in the summer of 1608. Soon after having conducted a visitation of the province of Timucua, Prieto convinced its cacique to accompany him to the neighboring province of Apalachee in order to make peace (Oré 1936). While their stay in Apalachee will not be discussed here, the details of their journey provide important information regarding the aboriginal province between Timucua and Apalachee. Departing from the principal town of Timucua (the Fig Springs site), Prieto and the cacique of Timucua traveled six days before arriving at Cotocochuni, "a large village neighboring (convecino a) Apalachee." Here two captives from Apalachee were found, and Prieto sent them ahead to announce their intentions. Prieto describes Cotocochuni as twelve leagues from Apalachee, stating that during the
journey, "I took the caciques of the towns through which I had passed, bordering on [comarcanos de] Apalachee, so that together with the great cacique and those from Apalachee, they would make peace" (Oré 1936:115).

Using the known location of the easternmost town of Apalachee, Ivitachuco, which is where Prieto's party met the caciques of Apalachee, it is possible to locate the town of Cotocochuni to the west of the Suwannee River, somewhere south of Madison, Florida. Based on later documentation, this location falls within what was later known as the Yustaga province, a regional subdivision of the Timucua mission province (see Chapter Four). Prieto seems to have begun gathering caciques while passing through this province, implying a number of significant possibilities. These caciques between Cotocochuni may not have been fully subject to the great cacique of Timucua, for they were brought in addition to the cacique of the Timucua province so that all could make peace. Indeed, there is no clear indication in 1608 that this region was a part of the Timucua province, or more than simply a group of towns bordering the enemy province of Apalachee. This suggestion is supported by the limited number of towns visited by Prieto in his visitation of what he considered the entire Timucua province.

In 1608, the Cotocochuni/Yustaga province may have been a true borderland, disrupted by the state of war between
Apalachee to the west and Timucua to the east. While
earlier and later evidence (both historical and
archaeological) suggests a cultural and linguistic
affiliation with Timucua, the conflicts of the early
seventeenth century may have made Yustaga less a province
than a frontier, a situation which was remedied by the peace
which Prieto helped create during the summer of 1608. The
apparent shift in inter-regional political power between the
Yustaga region and the Timucua region (see Chapters Two and
Four) might perhaps have been occasioned by the devastation
of Yustaga during these hostilities. The relatively equal
political status of Uçachile and Aguacaleyquen in 1539 may
have been altered by the border wars with Apalachee
(apparently ongoing throughout the sixteenth and early
seventeenth century), during which time the cacique of
Timucua rose to power as a consequence of a variety of
factors. As with everything else in the early historic
period, however, this balance would soon shift again.

Nonetheless, in 1623, two friars embarked on the
conversion of the region northwest of the established
Timucua missions. In his account of the missionization of
Apalachee, Fray Francisco de Ocaña (1635), noted that:

The province and nation Cotacochono had great
difficulty in its conversion, because its cacique
resisted greatly the entrance of the fathers Fray
Alonso de Pesquera and Fray Gregorio de Mobilla,
who converted it with great labors; and after
having permitted the entrance, he commanded that
no one should be baptized, and he did them such
evil deeds that due to hunger they attempted to
turn to leave. And one day a devout woman, although a gentile, inspired from heaven, brought them each day alms of pumpkins to eat; but the apostolic men, whose charity surpassed all hardships, persevered so that with the virtue of the divine word, they converted the cacique and a daughter of his, and at his example the rest, the first who wished to be baptized being the pious woman who brought them food. And with having commenced this conversion of twelve years in this place, more than thirteen thousand souls have been baptized already, and [the conversion] by the religious continues with great labors (Ocaña 1635).

This evidence suggests that the Yustega province (during this period named Cotocochuni\textsuperscript{15}) was indeed a separate sociopolitical entity than that of Timucua, and that its missionization was not begun until some fifteen years following the province of Timucua. The Ocaña relation places the conversion of the cacique in 1623, immediately before the lead friar in this effort (Pesquera) sailed to Spain to request more missionaries for Florida (Pesquera, et al. 1623).

It is important to note that the entire province resisted the entry of missionaries until the principal cacique agreed to conversion in 1623. Only with his example did the rest of the province under his political control follow suit. This evidence clearly indicates that Cotocochuni/Yustaga was at least partially autonomous during this period, although it would later be described as subject to the cacique of the Timucua region to the southeast. The exact date at which missions were formally established in this region is unknown, but the lack of friars during this
period may have hindered expansion until three years later. Upon Fray Pesquera's return with seventeen new friars in 1626, the mission effort may have proceeded in earnest. At least three of them were distributed to convents across Florida (including one to San Martín in Timucua) as a result of the Franciscan chapter of January 8, 1628, when the missionization of Yustaga was already underway (Guadalupe 1628).

Among the convents in the western interior listed during this meeting, not only did the previous missions of San Francisco de Potano, San Martín de Ayacutu (its earliest appearance under this name), and Santa Cruz de Tarihica appear, but also a new mission: San Pedro de Potohiriba, known to have been located in the Yustaga province. This may have been the town earlier named Cotocochuni (based on Prieto's location for it), although the change in names may reflect a minor shift in location for the political center of the region. Although San Pedro already had a resident friar, it seems likely that this mission had been recently established, and if the pattern for the Yustaga province followed that of the Potano and Timucua regions, this mission may only have been the principal town among several regional missions founded within a very short time following San Pedro (Figure 2).

The composition and geographical extent of the province of Cotochuni/Yustaga in the 1620's is difficult to identify,
based on only limited documentary evidence and almost nonexistent archaeological data for this region. The scattered documentary references of the early 1630's must be supplemented by data from the mid-1650's, and even then, it is difficult to determine the sociopolitical affiliations of some of the more remote missions. Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that most, if not all, of the missions in the vicinity of San Pedro de Potohiriba were established prior to the foundation of the long-coveted Apalachee mission province in 1633.

A 1630 petition by Fray Francisco Alonso de Jesús (1630a) mentions several of the more remote missions in need of horses at that time, and this list includes not only San Martín de Timucua, Santa Cruz de Tarihica, and San Pedro de Potohiriba, but also the missions of Urihica and Arapaha. This latter town was also noted in a contemporaneous set of testimony assembled at the request of this friar by Governor Don Luis de Rójas y Borja in 1630. The descriptive overviews provided by several old and experienced soldiers provide a remarkable glimpse of the social geography of Spanish Florida during a little-known period.

Following a description of the provinces of Guale and Santa Elena along the coast of modern Georgia and South Carolina, one fifty-six year old soldier proceeded to describe the interior regions to the west and southwest.

...and with these two provinces [of Guale and Santa Elena] borders that of Tama, to the west,
and it is some fifty leagues distant from them, a little more or less, and this [province] of Tama, which has its location in the middle of the land, borders with that of Santa Ysavel, to the southwest, some thirty leagues distant from Tama, and this [province] of Santa Ysavel borders with that of Harapaha, a land of Christians, to the west, another thirty leagues to the west, and all flat land, and from the [province] of Arapaha one goes to the province of Apalachee, which is of pagans, fifteen leagues to the west...and to the south this province borders with that of Timucua, which is of Christian Indians, twenty leagues of wilderness land distant, and the [province] of Pohoy borders with this, running always to the south, some thirty leagues to the south...The province of Harapaha is some seventy leagues distant from this presidio [of St. Augustine] to the northwest, and that of Apalachee is some eighty leagues from St. Augustine to the west (Fernández de San Agustín 1630).

Taken within the context of the overall description, and considering the known and probable locations of other missions and provinces, the mission of Arapaha would seem to have been located in deep southern Georgia along the modern Alapaha River (which almost certainly derived its name from the earlier mission town). The fact that this soldier and others testifying at the same time separated Arapaha from the province of Timucua may be a reflection of its remoteness, but it may also reflect some degree of political autonomy.

No other contemporaneous references to the missions founded during the late 1620's and early 1630's have been located, although early in 1633, Fray Francisco Alonso de Jesús noted that the as yet unmissionized Apalachee province was only "about 4 leagues from the last doctrina".
suggesting that missions had already been established in the Yustaga region west of San Pedro (Jesús 1633). Nevertheless, information from a 1655 mission list (Díez de la Calle 1659) and the Rebolledo residencia (Ranjel 1660a, 1660b) provides some assistance in identifying and locating these Yustaga missions.

The 1655 list provides the earliest comprehensive overview of the seventeenth-century missions of Spanish Florida, and outside of the 1616 Oré visitation record (Oré 1936), is the only systematic description of the Timucua mission province prior to the Timucuan Rebellion. Based on internal clues such as the order and distances of the missions in this list, the 1655 overview was almost certainly derived from a direct visitation of all the missions of Florida in 1655. Consequently, the locations described must be interpreted within the context of the route of the visitation.

Nonetheless, based on this information, perhaps eight or nine missions were located in the northwestern drainage basin of the Suwannee River and in the region westward toward Apalachee, and thus it seems likely that most or all of these formed part of the Yustaga or Cotocochuni province in the early 1630's. Beyond San Pedro de Potohiriba, these included Santa Elena de Machava, San Agustín de Urica, San Francisco de Chuaquin, Santa María de los Angeles de Arapaha, Santa Cruz de Cachipile, San Ildefonso de Chamile,
probably San Miguel de Asile, and possibly San Matheo de Tolapatafi (see Chapter Seven). Unfortunately, precise locations for none of these missions can be postulated here, due to the near absence of pertinent archaeological information relating to the pre-rebellion period. Figure 2 presents hypothetical locations for all of these missions.

That the missions of Arapaha and Urihica had been established prior to 1630, along with the location in 1633 of one Timucua mission only four leagues from Apalachee, suggests that most or all of the above missions were founded within the ten years following the initial conversion of the cacique of Cotocochuni in 1623. This would fit the pattern of missionization in Potano and Timucua, where the establishment of missions within each province proceeded quite rapidly following the initial acquiescence of the provincial chief. Yustaga was simply the third province to be incorporated into the expanding mission system, soon to be followed by Apalachee. Ultimately, Potano, Timucua, and Yustaga became the constituents of what was known to the Spanish as the Timucua mission province, the subject of this study.

The Process of Missionization

Missionization was the first step in the process by which aboriginal societies were incorporated into the colonial system of Spanish Florida. While this was always
preceded by the rendering of obedience to the Spanish crown, it was the acceptance of conversion, and the establishment of permanent missions with resident friars, which truly began the process of integration. As noted above, both these actions may be argued to have been related to the maintenance or augmentation of the political power of individual caciques. While both theoretically involved the subordination of aboriginal leaders under external Spanish authority, both secular and ecclesiastical, the end result was an active role for the Indian caciques in brokering political power between Spaniards and Indians.

Missionization seems to have been a political process, inasmuch as the establishment of missions proceeded not along a strictly geographic basis, but within the preexisting aboriginal sociopolitical structure of the societies involved. Missions were founded at the town of the provincial cacique first, and only subsequently in outlying towns within the cacique's jurisdiction. Sound evidence for this process is found in the establishment of mission San Francisco prior to San Buenaventura in the Potano province, and San Martín prior to Santa Fé in the Timucua province. Furthermore, the mission of San Agustín de Urihica was established at a town only six leagues from the 1611 mission of Santa Cruz de Tarihica, but seems to have been founded only after the conversion of the principal cacique of Cotocochuni in 1623, and perhaps only after
establishment of mission San Pedro de Potohiriba before 1628. In all of these cases geographical proximity played a less important role in missionization than did regional politics.

In the initial stages of societal integration, aboriginal leaders of Potano, Timucua, and Yustaga seem to have found it in their own interest to foster such contacts with Spanish secular and ecclesiastical representatives, for as will be discussed in Chapter Four, the degree of structural linkage between St. Augustine and these provinces was quite limited at first, permitting a considerable degree of political autonomy within the aboriginal societies. This condition was not to last, however. The nature of the Timucua mission province's role in the dynamic Florida colonial system soon began to reveal the political consequences of missionization.

Notes

1. Although such expenses were not to exceed 1,500 ducats, there is ample evidence that this limit was routinely exceeded (see Bushnell (1981:66)). This fact, combined with Governor Rebolledo's (1654) later refusal to continue this excess, ultimately contributed to the Timucuan Rebellion (see Chapter Seven).

2. The text reads haciendo su acatamiento y salva segun su usanza, which seems to refer to the typical form of greeting between Indians and the Spanish governor. The term acatamiento indicates esteem, respect, and deference, and salva refers to a salute, or even a round of applause, suggesting that clapping might have been involved in the greeting.
3. It is possible, though not certain, that La Roche Ferrière or other Frenchmen sent into the deep interior by Laudonnéière during 1564-5 could have visited this same town prior to López.

4. This cacique must have been over seventy years old in 1606. That such an aged leader was politically subordinate to the young provincial cacique of Potano who visited St. Augustine in 1601 provides a sound demonstration of the tradition of hereditary leadership (or ascribed status) among the Potano.

5. Fray Prieto noted in his relation that an unnamed friar was sent to found the fourth mission in the Potano province, and that this mission was established on the site of an earlier massacre by the Spanish (Oré 1936:114). The fact that San Buenaventura was not in the daily round of Prieto, and that it was not founded until some time later (during Fray Francisco Pareja's term as custodio of Florida), suggests that it was some distance from the San Francisco-San Miguel-Santa Ana cluster of towns. Furthermore, since San Buenaventura was almost certainly the town burned and abandoned in 1584, there is good reason to believe that the new center of power in the Potano province, visited by fray López in 1597, and probably the site of Prieto's first missions, was to the west of the burned town, away from the Spaniards who nearly destroyed them (also see García de la Vera 1601). This location corresponds well to the presumed location of San Francisco de Potano at the Fox Pond site (8A1272), some seven leagues to the northwest of Richardson. In addition, the location of the Richardson site only fourteen leagues from the St. Johns river fits the account of the seven days out and back from the river during the Miranda raid (Sánchez Judrero 1608). Beyond this, Richardson is the only site at some distance from the San Francisco cluster which displays sound evidence of missionary activity during only the first years after the foundation of the Potano mission province. This description fits the documentary record for San Buenaventura, for it was almost certainly depopulated or abandoned within a few years after its establishment (see below).

6. The last known historical reference to this mission places Fray Martín Prieto at San Buenaventura in 1613 (Milanich and Sturtevant 1972:21).

7. The visitation route of fray Oré remains a primary source of locational information for the missions of this early period (Oré 1936). While his information is not detailed, the archaeology of this region provides only a few likely locations for Spanish mission sites dating to this period, and these fortunately fall within the parameters of Oré's
account. Assuming the locations of San Francisco and San Martín noted above, Santa Fe falls neatly between the two, and based on later information, the Shealy archaeological site seems relatively certain. The site cluster associated with this location represents the only one between the Fig Springs and Fox Pond clusters, and Shealy bears ample evidence for mission activities during this period (Johnson 1991).

8. Johnson (1991) employs archaeological evidence to suggest this connection with the Timucua region (termed Utina by Johnson).

9. The location of San Juan is slightly more problematic than those of San Martín and Santa Fé. Oré (1936:122) placed San Juan de Guacara eight leagues beyond San Martín. Beyond this, there is little doubt that San Juan was located on or very near the modern Suwannee River, for its Spanish name during the first half of the seventeenth century was derived from this mission to create Río de San Juan de Guacara (later anglicized to form Suwannee). Consequently, following the river's course to a point eight leagues from Fig Springs, the Baptizing Spring site is the only viable choice, since it is the only known archaeological site cluster in this vicinity (Johnson 1991). Archaeological investigations at this location reveal sound evidence for a mission contemporaneous with the other known sites of this period (Loucks 1979).

10. The argument for the location of Santa Cruz de Tarihica is far more complex, and draws substantially on evidence from as late as the 1650's. Fray Oré located Santa Cruz eight more leagues beyond San Juan, and indicated that it was the most recently founded mission. Although previous researchers have placed this mission farther west or northwest of San Juan (along the later Camino Real), recently discovered evidence from the Rebolledo residencia indicates that Santa Cruz was not on this route, and instead was to the north of San Martín. While this evidence will not be examined in detail at this point, there is reason to believe that Santa Cruz was on separate trail than San Juan, leading north from San Martín instead of west (see the description of the Pérez route in Chapter Seven).

Beyond this, archaeological data from this region suggests the presence of at least one major early seventeenth-century mission north of Fig Springs and northeast of Baptising Spring: the Indian Pond site (Johnson 1991). Indeed there is no other documented mission which could lie in this location. Indian Pond is eight leagues from San Juan, and while it lies closer to San Martín than San Juan (which Oré visited first), the broader context of Oré's visitation must be considered for his route to make
sense. Considering that his ultimate goal was to cross the interior north of Timucua to arrive in the province of Guale on the modern Georgia coast, the only logical step would have been to swing west of San Martín, visiting San Juan before returning north to visit Santa Cruz. Evidence from the 1655 mission list which supports this interpretation will be discussed below.

11. The name of this town appears in only three known documents, one of which dates to 1635, in which a former village called Cofa was said to have been located at the mouth of the San Martín river (the lower course of the Suwannee), and was described as a town of Christian Indians (Horruytiner 1635). Testimony dating to 1630 includes a reference to the "River of Cofa", and identifies the region of the mouth of the Suwannee (20 leagues south of Apalachee and 30 leagues north of Pohoy) as being within the Timucua province (Rójas y Borja 1630; also see below).

12. The distribution of archaeological sites in the region of the probable location of Cofa is poorly known.

13. Based on the documentary evidence for the abandonment of the mission of Cofa prior to 1635 (Horruytiner 1635), the archaeological site of this town might provide further demonstration for the persistence of the Suwanee Valley culture into the early seventeenth century, inasmuch as it is the only known mission of the Timucua province founded and abandoned at an early date (and could, like the Richardson site, lack evidence for the later transformations in material culture).

14. Oré subsequently crossed a broad uninhabited region some fifty leagues in breadth before arriving at the mission of Santa Isabel de Utinahica. This seems to have comprised a large zone forming the northern frontier of the Timucua province, probably extending from the upper reaches of the modern Suwannee River on the west side of the Okefenokee Swamp to the forks of the Altamaha River in southern Georgia. Using documentary evidence from Oré's 1616 trip, and a 1630 description of this region (see below), mission Santa Isabel was most probably located on the Altamaha, within the archaeologically defined Square Ground Lamar culture of the early seventeenth century (Snow 1990). Based on its location directly upriver from the Guale province on the Georgia coast, the similarity of the material culture of this region to the Lamar-related Guale, and the fact that mission Santa Ysabel was included in the 1636 repartimiento labor draft for the Guale province (Horruytiner 1636), this interior mission town was probably culturally and perhaps politically related to Guale. As a consequence, despite the apparently Timucuan name of Utinahica, Santa Isabel did not
directly relate to the Timucua province except as a stepping stone in Oré's shortcut to Guale, contrary to some earlier suggestions.

15. The name Yustaga was applied to this region east of Apalachee by Luys Hernández de Biedma (n.d.) during the 1539 Soto expedition, suggesting that Cotocochuni was either an alternate denomination, or reflected an ephemeral change in political leadership.

16. Given that colonial Spanish perceptions of directions in the deep interior were commonly skewed, the province of Tama was probably located at the Fall Line region of the Oconee River drainage in Georgia (Worth n.d.), and mission Santa Isabel seems to have been at the forks of the Altamaha River (as indicated by Oré's (1936) relation). The reference to the province of Timucua twenty leagues to the south of Apalachee (across uninhabited land) and thirty leagues north of the province of Pohoy (at Tampa Bay; see Chapter Six) indicates that the soldier included the region at the mouth of the Suwannee River (at the town of Cofa?) as within the province of Timucua.

17. The identity of this westernmost Timucua mission is not known with certainty, but it may have been the mission of Santa Elena de Machava, noted in several places in the Rebolledo residencia (Ranjel 1660a, 1660b) to be the nearest town to Apalachee (not counting San Miguel de Asile, which is of uncertain political affiliations, and very close to Ivitachuco).

18. These clues include the fact that in two instances, missions within the same aboriginal province were listed separately, with the first group in ascending order of distance from St. Augustine (Santa Cruz de Tari [54 leagues] through San Miguel de Asile [75 leagues], and San Lorenzo de Apalachee [75 leagues] through San Cosme and San Damián [90 leagues]) and the second group in descending order (San Luis de Apalachee [88 leagues] through San Martín de Apalachee [87 leagues], and San Martín de Ayaocuto [34 leagues] through San Francisco Potano [25 leagues]). This phenomenon resulted from the visitation of the northernmost missions on the westward leg of the journey, and the visitation of the southern missions on the eastward leg. In general, the visitation circuit ran from St. Augustine northward to Guale, and then across the interior mission of Ocone to northern Timucua and Apalachee, and finally through southern Timucua and the southernmost missions along the upper St. Johns River drainage, ultimately returning to St. Augustine.
19. It seems likely that the route pushed westward from the mission of Santiago de Ocone, on the eastern side of the Okefenokee Swamp (see Chapter Six), and around the southern end of the swamp to the northernmost missions in the Timucua province. Unfortunately, while the visitor's perception seems to have been that he was proceeding directly westward into the interior (and thus always farther away from St. Augustine) from Ocone, the fact that the route to northern Timucua swung south and then west around the Okefenokee Swamp placed the next mission visited at only slightly more distant from St. Augustine than Ocone. As a consequence, while the visitor marched some 24 leagues from Ocone to Santa Cruz de Tarica, he actually gained only perhaps five leagues in distance from St. Augustine. As a result, most of the remaining distances given are some 19 leagues larger than the actual distance (as demonstrated using the more well-known locations of the Apalachee missions).

Using the projected location of Santa Cruz de Tarihica at the Indian Pond site (see above), the visitor seems to have proceeded some six leagues further on to San Agustín de Urica (the Urihica of Fray Francisco Alonso de Jesús's (1630a) petition), which would was located along the northern curve of the Suwannee River near the junction of the Alapaha River. From there the visitor proceeded northward along the Alapaha to the mission of Santa María de los Angeles de Arapaha, and then perhaps overland to Santa Cruz de Cachipile, possibly on the Withlacoochee River at roughly the same distance up the river from the Suwannee junction. Returning to this junction, the visitor stopped at San Francisco de Chuauquin, and then either visited or simply recorded the location of San Ildefonso de Chamini ten leagues to the northwest. The visitor then proceeded to San Pedro y San Pablo de Poturiba west of the northwestern curve of the Suwannee River, and then four leagues westward to Santa Elena de Machaba (which was actually only four leagues from Chamile (Argüelles 1660)). Eleven leagues westward brought him to San Miguel de Asile, on the border of Apalachee province.
CHAPTER FOUR
TIMUCUA AND THE COLONIAL SYSTEM

Sociopolitical Structure of the Timucua Mission Province

As a mission province, and thus as a component in the overall colonial system in Spanish Florida, the mid-seventeenth century province of Timucua exhibited a sociopolitical structure reflecting the integration of both aboriginal and Spanish features. The degree to which this structure resembled a purely aboriginal form is far from clear, but substantial documentary evidence for this period provides the basis for understanding both the internal sociopolitical organization of Timucua and its structural integration into the Spanish colonial system of Florida. This last topic is of primary importance in understanding the roots of the Timucuan Rebellion.

Colonial Spanish Florida of the seventeenth century was comprised of essentially three major political entities interwoven in a complex and often confusing manner. Two of these formed together what has been referred to as the "Republic of Spaniards" (McAlister 1984; Bushnell 1989), and as such constituted the European side of the colonial system. Secular authority in Florida rested in the hands of
both the Spanish military (headed by the Governor) and the Royal Officials, although the Governor generally exercised effective power over the colony. Ecclesiastical authority comprised both the secular and regular clergy, although the Franciscans were the principal church representatives outside of St. Augustine during the first half of the seventeenth century.

The third power in Spanish Florida was the so-called "Republic of Indians", made up of the aboriginal mission provinces. In Florida, three principal Spanish administrative districts constituted this "Republic" during the mid-seventeenth century: the provinces of Guale and Mocama (termed San Pedro early in the century), generally lumped into a single district; the province of Timucua; and the province of Apalachee. Each of these provinces was characterized by its own internal sociopolitical organization, and the three seem to have been linked to each other solely through their association with the Spaniards at St. Augustine. A characterization of the structure and function of the colonial system with respect to Timucua will thus begin with the sociopolitical structure of the aboriginal province itself, proceeding to a discussion of the integration of that society with the "Republic of Spaniards" centered at St. Augustine.

Based on a variety of lines of evidence, both ethnohistoric and archaeological, it is possible to
construct a portrait of the internal sociopolitical structure of the Timucua mission province at the point just prior to the Timucuan Rebellion in 1656. While this seems to reflect many features of the prehistoric aboriginal structure, the fact that Timucua was in the process of integration into the colonial system of Spanish Florida (and had been so for nearly half a century) makes any unconditional comparisons with the prehistoric portrait of this same region questionable. Nonetheless, data from this period provides the best evidence currently available regarding the sociopolitical structure and function of Timucua province, and the analytical framework derived for this analysis should prove useful in future research.

In order to facilitate discussion, a simple analytical framework has been devised using the projected sociopolitical structure of Timucua province for the 1656 period. Four levels of sociopolitical integration are postulated, with accompanying numbers and descriptive terms (see Table 1). The lowest level of sociopolitical integration, Level I, is the village, corresponding to the single archaeological site. No attempt is made here to distinguish large from small villages; the operative definition of a village is a restricted settlement of aboriginal residences with a single leader, here termed the village headman. Indeed, the degree of compaction or dispersal of such aggregates of population is difficult to
Table 1: Sociopolitical Organization of Timucua Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Spanish Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>caciquillo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cacique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Locality</td>
<td>Local Chief</td>
<td>cacique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cacique principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Regional Chief</td>
<td>cacique principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cacique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Provincial Chief</td>
<td>cacique principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cacique mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gran cacique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cacique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
characterize, although recent advances have been made in this regard.¹

What is important for this discussion is that the village represents the fundamental unit of sociopolitical organization. The political leader of each village seems to have been classified by contemporary Spanish observers as, at minimum, a caciquillo, or "little cacique", although any given village headman may have additionally served as a higher-level political leader (discussed below). This individual was thus afforded certain privileges owing to his or her status as an hereditary leader.

Based largely on the results of recent archaeological survey in the region of the Timucua mission province, it is possible to state that these villages were not distributed evenly across the landscape, but were instead concentrated in clusters (Johnson 1991). Such clusters seem to have been situated with reference to various elements of the physical environment, and many appear to have considerable time depth (see Chapter Two). These site clusters seem to correspond to the second level of sociopolitical integration, here termed localities. Each Level II locality was composed of a handful of Level I villages distributed within a comparatively restricted area, and linked under a single political leader, termed a local chief.

The Level I leader of one of the villages constituting a locality served the additional function of Level II chief.
As a consequence, one village in any given locality, or site cluster, was home to the local Level II chief. Such leaders were termed by the Spaniards either caciques or principal caciques, the latter used by some individuals to refer to their authority over several minor caciques or caciquillos (village headmen). These local chiefs seem to have been afforded even greater respect by the Spaniards, perhaps because they were leaders of leaders.

The third level of sociopolitical integration represented the incorporation of separate localities into a regional society under a single political leader, here termed a regional chief. Level III regions seem to have been referred to as provinces by the Spaniards, and were known by distinct names. In the North and North-Central Florida area, three regional societies, or provinces, ultimately formed the Timucua mission province. The original provinces of Potano, Timucua, and Yustaga are considered Level III societies, and as such comprised a handful of localities, or site clusters, in a regional unit. Spaniards generally referred to such leaders as principal caciques, or great caciques, or "cacique mayor", although they sometimes simply used the generalized term cacique.

The degree to which Level III regional societies were ever truly united into a fourth level of sociopolitical integration is uncertain. As noted in Chapter Two, the late precolumbian situation in these regions does not
conclusively answer this question, although there is some indication of strong inter-regional alliances, if not incorporation into a single society dominated by one regional chief. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the aboriginal provinces of Potano, Timucua, and Cotocochuni (Yustaga) seem to have been politically independent, based largely on the fact that Franciscan missionaries were forced to negotiate with the principal cacique of each province separately prior to gaining entry. Furthermore, entrance into Timucua did not result in immediate access to the Cotocochuni region, later said to be politically subordinate to the cacique of San Martín. Nevertheless, while these three provinces were evidently autonomous, they seem to have been allied militarily, for during Fray Martín Prieto's expedition to end the war between the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, 150 Indians from both Timucua and Potano accompanied the friar, and in addition to bringing the principal cacique of Timucua for peace negotiations, Prieto gathered the caciques of the towns neighboring Apalachee, including that of Cotocochuni, along the way (Oré 1936:115).

The nature of the political relationship between the Level III aboriginal provinces which ultimately formed the Timucua mission province of the mid-seventeenth century is difficult to characterize. Ample testimony relative to the rebellion era indicates that Lúcas Menéndez, the cacique of
mission San Martín, was the titular leader of the entire Timucua mission province, including the original regional provinces of Timucua, Yustaga, and the remnants of Potano (see Chapters Six and Seven). As such, Lúcas must be classified as a Level IV paramount chief for the purposes of the present discussion. Nevertheless, the character of such a leadership role within the context of the colonial system is difficult to identify.

Was the Level IV leadership position an artifact of the process of missionization, resulting from the Spanish-influenced integration of the three regional provinces of Potano, Timucua, and Yustaga? If so, was this a function of the demographic decline and associated population movements (see Chapter Five)? Or were these three aboriginal societies integrated into a Level IV province during the precolumbian era? And if so, was the nature of this leadership role altered as a result of missionization? Answers to such questions are difficult to obtain, but the fact remains that in 1656, Lúcas Menéndez was universally recognized by all as the paramount cacique of Timucua, at least in name. This status was indeed subject to the dynamics of the colonial system, as will be seen.

Within the analytical framework outlined above, then, it is possible to describe the specific sociopolitical structure of the Timucua province during the middle of the seventeenth century. The great bulk of evidence employed
for this description derives from the testimony of Spanish officers and soldiers regarding the Timucuan Rebellion (Ranjel 1660a, 1660b), although logical inferences have been made using evidence from the earlier decades of the century. As a consequence, the following discussion largely reflects the Spanish perception of the sociopolitical structure of Timucua, though testimony from some Indians is incorporated (see Chapters Seven and Eight, and Appendix C).

Furthermore, the listing of missions and towns in Table 2 cannot be considered complete and comprehensive, but should simply be regarded as the missions and towns whose roles in Timucua politics (including the rebellion) were significant enough for mention by contemporary observers.

Table 2 provides an overview of the current understanding of the sociopolitical structure of the Timucua mission province, listing all known mission and town names for the period immediately preceding the Timucuan Rebellion in 1656. These include all of the missions noted in the 1655 mission list discussed in Chapter Three (Diez de la Calle 1659), and a number of other missions and satellite villages which were not included in that enumeration.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, then, the Timucua mission province seems to have comprised essentially two principal Level III regions under central leadership. The eastern region, termed Timucua, incorporated the original Timucua province of the late sixteenth century and
Table 2: 1656 Political Structure of Timucua Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town Name(^a)</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Potano</td>
<td>Juan Bautista</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Santa Ana</td>
<td>[cacique]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Namo</td>
<td>[cacique]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fé</td>
<td>[cacique]</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Martín</td>
<td>Lucas Menéndez</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz de Tarihica</td>
<td>Benito Ruiz</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan de Guacara(^b)</td>
<td>Molina</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niayca</td>
<td>[cacica]</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arapaha</td>
<td>Pastrana</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3-4 villages</td>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Pedro de Potohiriba</td>
<td>Diego</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Santa Catalina de Ayepacano</td>
<td>Diego Heva</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Pablo</td>
<td>Pedro</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Elena de Machava</td>
<td>Deonicio</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Juan Ebañelista</td>
<td>María</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Lorenzio</td>
<td>[cacique]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Matheo (^c)</td>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Lúcas</td>
<td>Ebañelista</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Ildefonso de Chamile</td>
<td>Lazaro</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cachipile</td>
<td>Francisco</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choaquine</td>
<td>[cacique]</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pachala</td>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Agustín de Axoyca(^d)</td>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asile</td>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Names given are those in common usage in 1656.

\(^b\) The only reference to this town in the 1656 period is its cacica Molina, and the fact that the town was not mentioned by the many individuals passing through its location during the rebellion suggests that it was largely depopulated by 1656.

\(^c\) This town does not appear in documentary references until 1657, but the fact that its probable satellite San Lucas figured in the rebellion suggests that San Matheo was in existence prior to the rebellion.

\(^d\) This town does not appear in any documentary references during the rebellion, but rather as a location on the Camino Real in need of repopulation in 1658, suggesting that the town may have been depopulated by 1656.
the remnants of the neighboring Potano province, which had long since been reduced to a single primary mission town with a few satellites. The western region, termed Yustaga, incorporated what was earlier known as the province of Cotocochuni, but which later became known as Yustaga. These two regions included a number of small clusters of villages, or Level II localities, each with a single central town and several outlying satellites.

The Level III political leader of the Yustaga region seems to have been the cacique Diego of San Pedro de Potohiriba, based principally on the fact that it was Diego and Lúcas Menéndez who jointly co-authored a letter of refusal to Governor Rebolledo on behalf of the entire Timucua province following a meeting of caciques held in San Pedro. This conclusion fits the identification of mission San Pedro, earlier known as the principal town in the Cotocochuni province (see Chapter Three), as the earliest mission in the Yustaga region.

The only other viable candidate for the provincial political leader of Yustaga is Dionicio of Santa Elena de Machava, within whose jurisdiction the Timucuan rebels eventually made a last stand in 1656. Despite the fact that the first provincial Lieutenant of Timucua was stationed in Machava, which continued to be the garrison headquarters during the late seventeenth century, the decision to place him there probably had more to do with Machava's location on
the frontier of Apalachee (and close to the hacienda of Asile), and perhaps its location in a populus region of the Timucua province (see below, and Chapter Six). Although Dionicio seems to have been a powerful leader in Timucua, the fact that he was not hanged with Lúcas and Diego in San Pedro de Potohiriba further suggests that town's political preeminance (see Chapter Eight).

Within the jurisdiction of these two Level III regional chiefs were a number of subordinate Level II caciques, listed in Table 2. Among those missions with a more definite identification as to sociopolitical status, several Level I villages have been identified as subordinate to specific local chiefs. This seems most evident in the case of Arapaha, which was described as "Arapaha and its jurisdiction, which are three or four little villages of few people" (Alcayde de Cordoba 1660). Other named Level I villages include Santa Catalina de Ayepacano, noted to be "next to" San Pedro (Cruz 1660).

More specific information regarding the relationship between Level I village headmen and Level II local chiefs derives from testimony relative to the role of the cacica of the Level I village named San Juan Ebangelista at the time of the Timucuan Rebellion. Inasmuch as the rebel palisade had been constructed on land within her jurisdiction, only half a league from the Level II village Santa Elena de Machava, initial negotiations were carried out by the cacica
of San Juan, accompanied by Dionicio of Machava, who followed her out of the palisade (see Chapter Eight). The most important fact seems to have been that the cacica was "the superior of that land" (Calderón 1660), although she was politically subordinate to Dionicio.

Further information dates five years earlier, but seems quite relevant to the present discussion. In 1651, the cacique of the mission San Miguel de Asile made reference to the existence of five olatas, or aboriginal leaders, in the jurisdiction of Asile. Complaining about the lack of people at Asile, he indicated of these leaders that "the one has ten residents, the other twelve, the other ten, the other eight. The people of this village are very few..." (Manuel 1651). This description mirrors the concept of a Level II locality, or site cluster, since Manuel seems to be the preeminent leader among a group of five village headmen ruling distinct settlements (admittedly heavily depopulated).

Furthermore, referring to his own negotiations with Spanish soldiers, the cacique Manuel indicated that his letter was "from my brothers and nephews and me, and from the olatas and principals. Without everyone being together, I can do nothing" (Manuel 1651). This statement suggests that although Manuel was a Level II local chief, cacique of the principal town of Asile, the character of his leadership was such that he could not act without the consultation and
accord of the rest of the aboriginal leaders associated with Asile and its Level I villages.

Contemporary observers described the political structure of the Indians of Spanish Florida as lacking centralized control. Fray Francisco Alonso de Jesús stated in 1630 that:

For the clear necessity which these poor and miserable people\(^2\) have of natural and human regulation [policía], which in large part they are lacking, although the caciques, who are the natural lords and legitimate counselors, hold, rule, and govern their republics in such a manner and means that most of them live in common and conserve themselves in peace and tranquility, the inferiors respect their superiors, and they serve them and give them tribute without much pressure and violence, for which it is very easy to render obedience to our King and natural lord, and to receive the sacred gospel...(Jesús 1630b)

At the same time, several experienced soldiers testified that "in reference to government ... their caciques and principal people govern them with some kind of regulation [policía], in that manner, without permitting thefts nor other insults" (Fernández de San Agustín 1630).

While it is not the intent of this discussion to probe the specific details of governance for the Timucua province, these brief observations suggest that the nature of aboriginal political leadership was somewhat tenuous, and rarely clear (although this is probably more a function of limited documentation). Whether this was the case during the precolumbian period, or reflects the dynamics of the colonial system, is unknown, but as will be seen in Chapter
Five, a combination of factors ultimately served to further undermine the political power of the caciques of Timucua.

**External Political Linkages**

Having outlined a hypothetical internal sociopolitical structure for the Timucua mission province of the mid-seventeenth century, the task remains to examine the external relationships between the aboriginal society of Timucua and the secular and ecclesiastical authorities of St. Augustine. As discussed in Chapter Three, the initial linkage between the Spaniards in St. Augustine (both military and church officials) and the Indian provinces seems to have been brokered by the aboriginal leaders, and more specifically by the Level III regional chiefs. It was these principal caciques who generally first "rendered obedience" to the Governor of Spanish Florida, either in person or by proxy, and Franciscan friars seem to have gained access to each Indian province only with the permission of such leaders.

This pattern appears to have largely persisted through the early decades of the seventeenth century, although as time went on, direct access to the Spaniards seems to have broadened to include lesser leaders, including Level II local chiefs and Level I headmen, as well as even common Indians (see Chapters Five and Nine). Nevertheless, at least initially, it was the regional chiefs who acted as the
catalysts for linkage between the Republic of Spaniards and the Republic of Indians. During the early seventeenth century, this linkage was in actuality quite limited, particularly between the Spanish secular/military structure of St. Augustine, and the Timucua province.

Prior to the late 1630's, there seems to have been no direct military representative of the Governor within any of the western mission provinces on a permanent basis. It was not until the opening of the port at Apalachee that soldiers began to be stationed in that westernmost province (Rebolledo 1657g; and see Chapter Five), and a formal provincial Lieutenant for Apalachee was not named until 1645 (Hann 1988:15). For the Timucua province, the first resident Lieutenancy was not established until 1649, following the Apalachee Revolt, and even this post had more to do with the training of the Indian militia (see Chapter Five) than as an official representative of the Governor for the province of Timucua. Indeed, apart from the two-year stint of Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia as provincial Lieutenant, Timucua remained virtually free of any resident Spanish military presence prior to the rebellion of 1656.

A letter drafted by the Franciscans in St. Augustine soon after the Timucuan Rebellion provides one explanation for the special military presence in Apalachee:

...why has he [Governor Rebolledo] not put or tried to put a Lieutenant in the provinces of Timuqua and Guale, on the supposition that the same reason [for having one] is as valid in these
as it is for Apalachee, and even more so for that of Guale, where, he confesses, he has a report at present that the enemy is very close to it, fortifying himself. Why then has he not placed a soldier either in this or in any other province? Because in none of these (sir) are there deerskin to barter for, nor the three or four thousand arrobas of maize and beans from which, at little expense, to make three or four thousand pesos each year, that this is the service of Your Majesty that he is looking out for (San Antonio et al. 1657).

This passage has bearing on a number of issues, but for the present it serves to point out a major reason why Timucua was never effectively garrisoned prior to the rebellion. Indeed, the very purpose of a military garrison might be argued to have been less related to the political integration of the mission provinces into the colonial system than to the more efficient exploitation of aboriginal resources for the personal profit of Spanish officials.

In theory, the official mechanism by which the Spanish Governor interacted directly with Indian caciques was the visita, in which each Governor conducted a formal visitation of all the aboriginal towns "at peace" under his jurisdiction, meaning the mission provinces. For the first fifty years after the establishment of the Timucua mission province, however, only a single Governor seems to have personally visited the western interior personally, although several officers were claimed to have been sent to fulfill that purpose. The only formal visitation (for which there is no known documentation) seems to have occurred early in the term of Benito Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla (in 1645),
and the end result of that visita was the establishment of his hacienda at Asile (see below).

For all practical purposes, the only real contact between the Spanish secular/military authorities in St. Augustine and the aboriginal leadership of Timucua comprised the traditional visit by the caciques to St. Augustine to re-affirm allegiance to each incoming Governor (and to receive gifts and official legitimization), and the periodic visits of soldiers dispatched to Timucua by the Governor for official business, such as the delivery of the yearly repartimiento labor draft quotas (see Chapter Five). Apart from these brief contacts, interaction between the residents of St. Augustine and Timucua took place largely between passing soldiers and resident Indians in the aboriginal towns along the Camino Real, and between Indian laborers and their "employers" in St. Augustine. One exception to this was the Indian militia system, discussed in Chapter Five.

During the pre-rebellion period, then, the effective degree of linkage between the Spanish secular/military structure of Florida and the Timucua province was somewhat limited, and generally comprised only periodic contacts between the caciques of Timucua and the Governor or his representatives. Nevertheless, as will be seen in Chapter Six, a variety of factors contributed to an ongoing erosion of chiefly authority in Timucua, ultimately resulting in the rebellion which is the focus of this study.
Linkage between Timucua and the ecclesiastical structure of St. Augustine was accomplished by the presence of resident Franciscan friars within the province. As a general rule, following the establishment of each mission province one friar was distributed to each Level II locality, the principal town of which became a mission, or convento, with a church and convent for the resident missionary. Each friar seems to have ministered from this central town to the outlying Level I towns and villages within the political jurisdiction of the Level II cacique, each of which seems to have become a named visita.

The key to the structural linkage between the Franciscan order and the aboriginal societies comprising the mission provinces lies in the status of the resident friars within the internal aboriginal sociopolitical structure. Specifically, the friars were internal to that structure and seem to have served as religious functionaries under the political domain of the aboriginal caciques. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the Franciscan missionaries simply replaced (or supplemented) the aboriginal religious practitioner within each Level II locality. In this case, the friars may have slipped laterally into Timucuan society, filling a largely pre-existing role in aboriginal society.

While the character and content of such a role certainly transformed under the friars' tutelage, the fact remained that missionaries were politically subordinate to
the existing aboriginal leadership. As stated by the friars themselves, "The Indians (sir) are the masters of the religious" (San Antonio et al. 1657). The friar in each mission did not challenge the authority of the cacique who governed his congregation, but rather worked through the aboriginal leadership in the attempt to effect change within the aboriginal culture. The Franciscans were thus insiders, and in this manner forged a link between Spanish ecclesiastical authority and the aboriginal societies. The peculiar relationship which developed was one which left the aboriginal sociopolitical structure essentially intact, while nonetheless drawing the societies involved under the realm of Spanish Catholicism.

As defacto members of the aboriginal societies within which they were stationed, friars acted as the "cultural brokers" between Indian caciques and Spanish authorities. Perhaps most prominently, the friars served as agents of the caciques, translating and drafting written petitions and complaints to the Governor (e.g. Manuel 1651) and even to the Spanish crown (e.g. Menéndez et al. 1657). In this way friars effectively filled a role typically left officially vacant during the mid-seventeenth century: defender of the Indians (see Bushnell 1981:111-2).

The overall portrait of the structural linkages between the Timucua province (as the Republic of Indians) and the secular/military and ecclesiastical authorities of St.
Augustine (forming the Republic of Spaniards) is discussed at length in Chapter Ten. While at this time Timucua was nominally subordinated beneath the Spanish crown and church, the internal political power of the aboriginal leaders had not significantly changed. In theory at least, Lúcas Menéndez, Diego, and the other caciques of Timucua still governed a largely autonomous society co-existing with the Spanish colony at St. Augustine. The fact that the aboriginal leaders of Timucua interacted with Spanish Governors and friars seems to have had more to do with the maintenance of chiefly power than the passive acceptance of all things Spanish, at least in the early stages of missionization. Nevertheless, there were other structural features of the colonial system which gradually developed, deepening the ties between Timucua and St. Augustine.

**Haciendas in Timucua**

Beyond the official linkages between the aboriginal sociopolitical structure of the Timucua mission province and Spanish secular and ecclesiastical authorities in St. Augustine, there were several other media for interaction between Spaniards and Indians. These included the establishment of ranching and farming enterprises within the territory claimed by the caciques of Timucua. Such outposts, or haciendas, did not involve an official structural linkage, inasmuch as they were operated largely
independent of either Indian or Spanish authority, and were not directly intended as agencies of interaction. Nonetheless, the establishment and operation of such endeavors within the political jurisdiction of Timucua created further opportunities for Spanish/Indian interaction.

The acquisition of land in the interior of Florida by individual Spanish colonists was extremely limited prior to the Timucuan Rebellion, although such economic activity ultimately blossomed during the late seventeenth century (see Chapter Nine). During the first half-century after the initial establishment of mission provinces in the western interior, the inhabitation and exploitation of interior aboriginal lands remained largely in the hands of the Indians. Virtually the only Spaniards residing or traveling outside the colonial town of St. Augustine and within the aboriginal mission provinces were a handful of friars and soldiers, living in and traveling between the established Indian towns. Private economic endeavors by individual Spaniards were extremely limited during this period, but the presence of at least two haciendas in Timucua prior to the rebellion reveals much regarding the developing colonial system.

While Indians did not inhabit or exploit all interior lands, they almost certainly did so in the best and most productive locations in any given region. As a consequence,
it was only with the abandonment of old aboriginal towns and fields that prime lands became available to Spaniards with the means to establish ranches or farms. As discussed in Chapter Six, the Timucua mission province probably began to experience massive demographic collapse at least as early as 1613, only seven years after the establishment of missions in Potano. By 1616, most of these earliest missions seem to have been abandoned, and the missionaries requested permission for the aggregation of remaining population only a year later.

The effects of these early epidemics must have set the stage for the establishment of what may have been the first hacienda in the interior. Sometime during the 1620's or early 1630's, Royal Treasurer Francisco Menéndez Márquez established an hacienda within the largely decimated province of Potano. Located at the place called La Chua (meaning "hole" or "sinkhole" in Timucuan), on modern Payne's Prairie south of Gainesville, this hacienda was ultimately to become an important cattle ranch in Spanish Florida (see Bushnell 1978). While the precise date of its founding is as yet unknown, the means are more clearly understood.

An overview of the career of Francisco Menéndez Márquez reveals a pattern of liberal "borrowing" from the Royal Treasury of St. Augustine, implying that beyond his considerable salary, he had potential (though illegal)
access to considerable capital. Indeed, when the books were finally organized in the 1650's after decades of neglect, Francisco was found to have embezzled more than 16,000 pesos from the Royal Treasury before his death in 1649 (Bushnell 1981). It seems likely, therefore, that at least a portion of these funds were used to establish and maintain the hacienda of La Chua (Bushnell 1978:418-9).

This establishment may date to the first decade of Francisco's career as Treasurer, for in a 1630 description of the products of Florida, Fray Francisco Alonso de Jesús made reference to:

...the livestock which have entered in [the land], although few, cattle as well as horses, [is] the best which is known in this New World, as shown by the horses, cows, young bulls and heifers which they have brought from Timucua[6] to this presidio these years (Jesús 1630b).

Although it is unclear whether this refers to feral livestock, the friar may have been describing the products of Francisco's ranch, which would indicate its foundation prior to 1630.

In any case, seven years later the La Chua ranch was certainly in operation. When in 1637 Francisco was arrested for fraud in collecting the Florida situados of 1631 and 1632, at least a portion of his debts were seized from his hacienda at La Chua[7], suggesting that the establishment or maintenance of the ranch was in some way tied up with the Treasurer's embezzlement (Ponce de León 1637). Nevertheless, the hacienda survived its owner's two-year
imprisonment at that time, and was eventually valued at slightly more than 8,000 pesos after his death in 1649 (Beltrán de Santa Cruz 1655).

A portrait of the ranch at La Chua prior to the Timucuan Rebellion may be gained from limited documentation relating to the 1650's period. When Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia (at that time the first provincial lieutenant of Timucua province) was sent to make a complete inventory of the hacienda of La Chua in September of 1650, nearly a year after its owner's death, he noted "cattle and pigs, property, and slaves" (Fernández de Florencia 1670). Testimony relating to the term of Governor Rebolledo (between 1654 and 1656) further indicates that at the time of the rebellion, the ranch at La Chua included two servants (one Spanish and one a Mexican Indian), two African slaves, and at least two Florida Indians (see Chapter Five).

Frequent references to the haciendas (plural) at La Chua suggest that cattle-ranching operations were not necessarily confined to a single location, but may have been spread out in the general vicinity of modern Payne's Prairie (La Chua). One location, the Zetrouer archaeological site, a few miles east of the prairie, has been archaeologically investigated, and appears to represent the remains of Spanish and Indian occupation associated with the ranch of La Chua (Seaberg 1955). The bulk of the archaeological material at this site seems to date to the later decades of
the seventeenth century, but the presence of some artifacts probably dating to the pre-rebellion period suggests that this may indeed have been associated with the early manifestation of Francisco Menéndez Márquez's cattle ranch\textsuperscript{11}.

Nevertheless, the description of La Chua as being located twenty-four leagues from St. Augustine (Monzón 1660), and only three leagues from the mission of San Francisco Potano (at the Fox Pond site), points to a location on the north side of Payne's Prairie, and perhaps very near the sinkhole later known as the Alachua Sink. This may have been the location of the residential structures of the hacienda, where drama would ultimately unfold in the spring of 1656 (see Chapter Seven).

Regardless of its precise location, the hacienda of La Chua was situated at the gateway to the mission provinces of the western interior, described as being in the "Timucua province in the first place going from this city [St. Augustine]" (Hernández 1660). Located on lands once occupied by the now-decimated Potano province, the Menéndez Márquez cattle ranch was nonetheless the first extension of private Spanish landholdings into the western interior. While it remained on the eastern fringe of the territory claimed by the Indians of Timucua, it was nonetheless a close neighbor to mission San Francisco, and consequently its establishment almost certainly reflected some sort of
agreement between Francisco Menéndez Márquez and the cacique of Timucua, perhaps similar to that detailed below for the hacienda of Asile.

The nature of the relationship between the political leadership of the aboriginal Timucua province and the owners and staff of the hacienda of La Chua is not fully understood, but testimony relating to the rebellion-period suggests that interaction was generally amicable. It seems quite likely that the original owner Francisco Menéndez Márquez was the godfather of the principal cacique of Timucua in 1656, who adopted the Treasurer's surname for his Christian name Lúcas Menéndez. During the term of the despised Spanish Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, Lúcas evidently made fond references to the period before Francisco's death, referring to the "many benefits" which he and his vassals had received from Francisco and his heirs, and stating to Francisco's son Antonio that "After your father died, no attention is paid to us now" (Menéndez Márquez 1660).

What these "benefits" constituted is unclear, but considering the nature of the La Chua hacienda, the Menéndez Márquez clan may have made gifts of some of the products of the ranch, including hides and the occasional pig or cow, to Lúcas and the other leaders of Timucua. Indeed, the low frequency of domestic animal remains at pre-rebellion period Timucuan missions suggests that these represented gifts or
barter, and were not raised in the mission communities themselves\textsuperscript{13}. Cow and pig remains in these early Timucua missions may in fact reflect meals or feasts shared by the Timucuan caciques and the owners of the La Chua ranch.

Interaction between the hacienda and the Timucua mission province may well have gone beyond occasional gifts or meals, and may have involved the use of Indian labor and food. Two of the servants at La Chua were on a journey to retrieve corn from the Apalachee province when the Timucuan Rebellion erupted (see Chapter Seven), and the two Indians working at La Chua at this time might have been from Timucua. What is clear, however, is that the presence of a cattle ranch in the eastern reaches of Timucua served as a catalyst for increased interaction between Spanish soldiers, servants, and slaves originating in St. Augustine and the Indians of Timucua province. Ample testimony relating to the rebellion-period indicates that at the very least, the heirs of Francisco were common visitors to the nearby missions of San Francisco and San Martín, and found themselves privy to many complaints from the Timucuan caciques against Governor Rebolledo (e.g. Menéndez Márquez 1660).

The ranch of La Chua seems to have operated for at least a decade before yet another hacienda was established in the Timucua, this time on the far western fringe of the province. In 1645, following his arrival in St. Augustine,
Governor Benito Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla conducted the only recorded gubernatorial visitation of the western mission provinces prior to the Timucuan Rebellion. During this trip, Governor Ruiz decided to establish a farm between the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, near the mission of San Miguel de Asile. Inasmuch as the site selected was within the jurisdiction of the town of Asile, the Governor was prompted to negotiate with the cacique in order to gain permission to establish an hacienda.

A later letter from this aboriginal leader revealed some details of the negotiations. Complaining that the original terms were never honored, the cacique Manuel related:

What señor Benito Ruiz, who came in place of the King, told me was this, "Loan me a piece of land. Being in this place I will help you and you will help me. I will make the people who have gone away from here to Apalachee return here", but he did not fulfill it. He also told me that upon a ship coming from Spain [?], this village of Asile would be mine. He also told me that all the time that he was in St. Augustine he would help me with axes and hoes, and that all the years he would give me clothing to clothe myself. I have been serving and obeying him, but he did not fulfill this (Manuel 1651).

Apart from promises of Spanish clothing and iron tools, Governor Ruiz evidently convinced the cacique that he could return the fugitives from Asile who were living in Apalachee, presumably in an effort to escape the repartimiento labor draft, as yet unimplemented west of Timucua (see Chapter Five). In a letter accompanying that
of the cacique, Fray Juan de Medina complained that Governor Ruíz had:

...taken away without violence the lands of the said caciques, offering them great reward, and that they would always be owners of everything, because his intention was only to foment the said farm for the supply of this province, with which the said caciques, as incapable and ignorant of the damage which they would acquire, gave consent to the said Governor (Medina 1651).

While these letters were written after the fact, and specifically for the purpose of having the hacienda removed, there seems good reason to believe that Governor Ruíz was perhaps less concerned with the rights of the caciques than personal profit.

Having gained the acquiescence of both the caciques of Asile and the Apalachee town of Ivitachuco (roughly a league from Asile), Governor Ruíz proceeded to equip and set up the farming and ranching operations on a site half a league from both Indian towns, and some six leagues from the Gulf of Mexico (Ponce de León 1651b; Menéndez Márquez 1652). The ranch seems to have been in operation during 1646, and was certainly established prior to February of 1647, when the Apalachee revolt erupted.

Later documentation reveals that from its start, the ranch was typically managed and operated on-site by Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real and four other soldiers at his command (Pérez de Villa Real; Menéndez Márquez 1652). Two African slaves lived on the hacienda, with the rest provided by Indians from the neighboring towns of Asile and
Ivitachuco. Despite promises and arguments to the contrary, few of the Indian laborers were paid daily wages. Indeed, the very nature of Governor Ruíz's hacienda, the principal products of which were wheat and corn, demanded intensive labor, and ample evidence reveals that this burden weighed heavily on the Indians who worked at the farm. According to the cacique Manuel:

...it was not one or two [who labor], but rather it is all men and women, boys and girls, and what we gain from all this has been the fatigue, and no other thing ... All the years we are serving the King, and we do not gain more than the sweat and labor ... The people of this village are very few, and all work without anything being given to us. They say that in this way they do not wish to work, without being paid, and I neither wish that they should work for free (Manuel 1651).

As a consequence of such servitude, many Indians seem to have chosen flight rather than labor, for the hacienda was later said to have been the cause that "many of the Christians, and the greater part of the pagans, have retreated" (Horruytiner 1652).

The complement of Spanish infantrymen at the hacienda of Asile seems to have become the unofficial garrison for the Apalachee province. When the 1647 revolt resulted in the death of Captain Claudio Luis de Florencia, the first official Lieutenant of Apalachee, along with his entire family, some six to ten soldiers were working at the hacienda with then-deposed Governor Ruíz and as a result all of them survived (Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner 1647; Ruíz de Salazar Vallecilla 1647; Menéndez Márquez 1648).
The hacienda was, after all, only half a league from Ivitachuco, the principal town in the Apalachee province.

While the town of San Luis in Apalachee was later the location of the Apalachee garrison (and indeed may have been the site where the first Lieutenant was murdered) (Hann 1988), a 1652 document refers to "Captain Martín Alcayde de Cordoba, Lieutenant of the provinces of Apalachee, who serves in the said hacienda [of Asile]" (Horrurytiner 1652). The fact that the hacienda was regularly manned by four soldiers and an officer during its early years (Pérez de Villa Real 1652), and by two soldiers and an officer (Lieutenant Alcayde) in 1652 (Floresncia and Cañizares y Osorio 1652), implies that during its operation, the hacienda of Asile served as the military garrison for Apalachee. Interestingly, following the Apalachee revolt of 1647, a provincial Lieutenant was named for Timucua between 1649 and 1651, and stationed at mission Santa Elena de Machava, the Timucuan town nearest Asile on the Camino Real (see Chapter Five).

The hacienda of Asile seems to have served multiple functions. As a farm and ranch, it produced foodstuffs which could be sold for profit in the Apalachee port. As a garrison for Spanish infantry, it not only provided a resident military presence on the border between Apalachee and Timucua provinces, but also permitted easy access to the interior Apalachicola province for trading (see Bushnell
Nevertheless, from its inception, the hacienda seems to have been more connected with Apalachee than Timucua, despite its situation on lands principally belonging to the cacique of Asile. Its onerous labor demands, and limited productivity, ultimately resulted in its dismantlement only six years after its establishment.

Following the death of Governor Ruíz on May 14, 1651, Captain Pérez seems to have been withdrawn, leaving the elderly mulatto slave Francisco Galindo as majordomo (Ponce de León and Cigarroa 1651; Manuel 1651). The son of Governor Ruíz, Don Luis, evidently obtained some form of deed to the land from the affected caciques, and quickly offered the hacienda for sale (Bushnell 1981:81-2). Too expensive for private ownership, the hacienda was purchased for more than 4,000 pesos at Royal expense by the interim Governor Nicolas Ponce de León "for the common good", although without prior approval by the crown (Ponce de León and Cigarroa 1651).

At the same time, however, the Franciscans were backing an effort by the caciques of Apalachee, and Manuel of Asile, to have the hacienda removed, and the lands returned to the Indians (Medina 1651). Soon after the death of interim Governor Ponce de León on October 19 of the same year, newly elected interim Governor Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner gathered testimony and data regarding the hacienda, and ultimately ruled in favor of the friars and caciques.
(Horruytiner 1652). The hacienda was ordered dismantled, and following an inventory, the slaves, oxen, and horses were to be brought to St. Augustine as Royal property along with the stored corn, the equipment was either to be sold or retained in the Royal warehouses, and the herd of pigs and several colts were to be distributed on the spot "among the infantry who are found in the said provinces", with appropriate charges to their accounts\textsuperscript{14} (Horruytiner 1652; Heras 1657). Significantly, the Apalachee garrison (consisting at that time of only two resident soldiers under Captain Alcayde at the hacienda) was withdrawn at that time, leaving the interior without any resident military presence until more than two years later.

While the stated reasons for the dismantlement of the hacienda of Asile involved the heavy labor demands on local Indians, and the unjust use of lands claimed by aboriginal leaders, it is important to note that the administration of the farming operation was explicitly transferred to the friars, who were given "benefit of the said plot of wheat", and were instructed to reap and thresh the wheat using paid Indian labor, with the final product being shared among the friars in the mission provinces (Horruytiner, et al. 1652). Some five years later, Governor Rebolledo complained that:

...today, with the example and seed which is conserved from [the haciendas of Asile], the religious and caciques of the said province [of Apalachee] and that of Timucua sow and reap the wheat sufficient for their sustenance, as I have seen in the visitation which I made, without it
being necessary to carry this sustenance from the presidio, as was done on the shoulders of Indians (Rebolledo 1657h).

In effect, then, the "dismantlement" of the hacienda did not halt the growing of wheat on Indian lands, nor the use of Indian labor in that endeavor, but instead simply turned the control of that operation over to the aboriginal leaders and the Franciscan friars.

In broad perspective, the two haciendas established on the borders of the Timucua province were quite distinct from one another, and as a consequence met with varying rates of success. The earlier hacienda of La Chua was a cattle ranch, and did not involve farming, while the hacienda of Asile was a wheat and corn farm, with the incidental presence of pigs. The two operations involved very different levels of labor, for La Chua only required a few servants and slaves to look after the herds, while Asile was a labor-intensive farming operation, requiring a number of Indian laborers in addition to the soldiers and slaves.

In many ways, the hacienda of Asile might be compared with the soldiers' fields outside St. Augustine, worked by Indian laborers under terms of the repartimiento labor draft (see Chapter Five). Indeed, the cacique Manuel might have viewed the contribution of laborers to Governor Ruíz's hacienda as simply another example of the system of mutual interdependence between the aboriginal leaders and the Governor. Perhaps for this reason, there is no evidence of
formal complaints by the caciques or friars during the first five years of its operation. It was only when the Governor's son Don Luis "sold" the land which Manuel had considered only loaned, converting it into property of the Spanish Crown, that the cacique Manuel drafted his 1651 letter of complaint (Manuel 1651).

Years of largely unrewarded labor do not seem to have motivated action against the hacienda by the local aboriginal leadership. Only when there was the threat of losing aboriginal ownership of the land within the cacique Manuel's jurisdiction did he successfully petition the new Governor, writing "I humbly ask that you pardon me this land, which God has given me ... I loaned it, but in no way did I sell it" (Manuel 1651). Although the cacique's letter cited the onerous conditions of servitude for the Indians of Asile, what he asked for in the end was the return of the land to his control. This was effectively done, for by turning the farm over to the management of the friars, Governor Horruytiner placed it within the power of the aboriginal leaders.

The hacienda of La Chua long out-lived that of Asile, surviving through the Timucuan Rebellion of 1656 to become a major ranch during the late seventeenth century (Bushnell 1978). This was probably due to a variety of factors, including the limited need for Indian labor and its location on largely depopulated aboriginal lands. There is also good
evidence that its owners, Francisco Menéndez Márquez and his sons, maintained an amicable relationship with the principal cacique of Timucua Lúcas Menéndez. As is evident from the case of the hacienda of Asile, maintaining such relationships were all-important for the success of these Spanish economic endeavors within the interior mission provinces.

Notes

1. Johnson (1991) has examined settlement distributions within the Timucua and Potano regions of the Timucua mission province, and postulates specific trajectories of change in settlement size during the late pre-columbian and early colonial periods.

2. This description was written prior to the establishment of the Apalachee mission province, and thus probably refers to the Timucua and Guale Indians.

3. Pedro de Ybarra, who governed during the establishment of the first missions in Potano and Timucua, had already conducted his official visitation in 1604. Based on their official residencias, it is furthermore certain that the Governors Juan de Salinas (1618–1624), Luis de Rójas y Borja (1624–1630), Andrés Rodríguez y Villégas (1630–1631), Damián de Vega, Castro, y Pardo (1638–1645), Nicolás Ponce de León (1651), and Pedro Benedit Horruytiner (1651–1654) did not conduct formal visitations of the western mission provinces personally, and Diego de Rebolledo only did so following the Timucuan Rebellion. There is no clear evidence that any of the intervening Governors conducted visitations either, apart from during the term of Benito Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla.

4. Treasurer Francisco Menéndez Marquéz was later disculpated from the charge of failing to conduct a visitation using his expedition to pacify the rebellious Apalachee province in 1647 (Rebolledo 1657d).

5. This role may be roughly equivalent to that of the "sorcerer" described by Fray Pareja in his 1613 Confessionario (Milanich and Sturtevant 1972:40–42).
questions posed to "sorcerers" by Fray Pareja reveal information on some of the the ritual activities of those individuals. Pareja's questions include: In order to take the food out of the storehouse, have you prayed? Have you made the marriage ceremony, praying over them? And if they did not pay you, did you do something evil? In curing someone, have you placed in front of the sick person white feathers and new chamois and the ears of the owl and arrows which are stuck in, and then said that you will take out the evil and sickness?

6. At the same time, a Spanish settler (poblador) testified in response to the friar's letter that between 1624 and 1630, a group of eleven cattle at the mayoa (?) of Santa María (said to be populated by Christian Indians) twenty-four leagues from St. Augustine had multiplied to produce some ninety-six head of cattle (García de Capilla 1630). Although this probably refers to the mission of Santa María, evidently located on Amelia Island in 1602 (López 1602), the distance given at that time is too large for that location, especially considering the fact that other witnesses uniformly placed the mission of San Pedro Tulutéca (just north of Amelia on Cumberland Island) at only twenty leagues north of St. Augustine (Rojas y Borja 1630). Interestingly, twenty-four leagues was the precise distance later given between St. Augustine and the ranch of La Chua (Monzón 1660), though the name Santa María has never been associated with the Potano region. Although mission Santa María was a part of the Timucuan language area, it is more likely that Fray Jesús (above) was referring to the interior province of Timucua, named as such by all the other witnesses called (Rojas y Borja 1630).

7. In a certification of the service of governmental notary Pedro de Ayzpiolea, Accountant Nicolas Ponce de Leon stated on June 27 that notary "went with commission of the said governor [Luis de Horruytiner] as the governmental notary to the place called La Chua, where the Treasurer Francisco Menéndez Márquez's hacienda of livestock is, to make a seizure from them for a quantity of pesos which the said Treasurer owes His Majesty, and the said hacienda is distant from this city four days by road, and the said Pedro de Ayzpiolea went to it at his cost and without earning any salary" (Ponce de Leon 1637).

8. The terms "ganados mayores y menores" refer to the large and small livestock, or cows and pigs. The inventory was turned over to Ensign Matheo Luis de Florencia, the administrator of the hacienda in name of the minor sons of Francisco.
9. The 1656 presence of an Indian named Geronimo from the province of Tabasco in New Spain (see Chapter Seven) suggests that some of Francisco's servants, and perhaps some of the property at Lachua, were obtained during trips to collect the situado in Mexico City. Francisco was, after all, accused of fraud during such trips in the early 1630's.

10. The location of the Zetrouer site on an isolated rise amidst the wetlands east of Payne's Prairie (La Chua), combined with its nearly six-league distance from the presumed site of mission San Francisco at the Fox Pond site (Symes and Stephens 1965) suggests that this was not the pre-rebellion location of the Menéndez Márquez ranch house.

11. Some 43 out of 385 sherds of Spanish majolica are of the type San Luis Blue on White, predating 1650 (Deagan 1987:74-5), and the appearance of some Jefferson (termed "sherd tempered" by Seaberg) and Alachua ceramics amidst a predominantly San Marcos aboriginal ceramic assemblage may relate to a pre-rebellion occupation.

12. This practice was widespread in Florida and the rest of the colonial Spanish world, and served as a major mechanism in cementing social relationships between Indians and Spaniards (see Foster 1953).

13. The faunal assemblage at Fig Springs, the probable site of Lúcas Menéndez's town of San Martín, includes only a single pig jaw (Weisman 1992), and the Baptising Springs site (pre-rebellion San Juan de Guacara) produced bones from at least two cows and three pigs, one partially intact (Loucks 1979). This contrasts with the high percentage of such remains at mission sites dating to the post-rebellion period (e.g. Reitz 1991).

14. A list of the items sold off, compiled during the residencia of Governor Horruytiner (Heras 1657), included two mares, three colts, thirty-four pigs, a Biscayan axe, and a pair of hooks, all of which amounted to only slightly over 500 pesos (not counting, of course, the remainder of the property retained for Royal use). The fact that some eighteen soldiers, including Governor Horruytiner, were listed as having bought some of the livestock, suggests that they were brought back to St. Augustine for distribution.

15. Francisco's father Juan, the previous Royal Treasurer was so well-liked by the friars (and thus probably by the Indians) that the visiting commissary Fray Luis Geronimo de Oré and six Florida friars signed a 1617 petition to have him instated as the next Governor (Oré, et al. 1617). He subsequently became the Governor of Popayan, leaving
Francisco to exercise his duties as Treasurer (Bushnell 1978, 1981).
CHAPTER FIVE
TIMUCUA AND THE LABOR SYSTEM

The Repartimiento Labor Draft

One fundamental feature of the colonial system was the repartimiento labor system. As it developed during the first half of the seventeenth century, this system provided what may be argued to have been the most important (and ultimately detrimental) link between the Republic of Indians and the Republic of Spaniards in colonial Florida. The repartimiento was practiced throughout the New World, and essentially involved yearly drafts of Indians "to employers for specified tasks under an arrangement whereby villages sent assigned quotas serving in rotation" (McAlister 1984:210-2). Indians were paid a daily wage for their labor, generally in the form of trade goods and rations of food (Bushnell 1981). As an institution in Florida, the repartimiento eventually incorporated all mission provinces, as well as Indians from the unconverted frontier.

The labor system of Spanish Florida has been examined in some depth (e.g. Bushnell 1981, 1989; Hann 1988), although many of the details remain less fully explored. Due to a variety of factors, including location, the Timucua
mission province seems to have very early on played a significant role in this system. The relative nearness of Timucua to St. Augustine, combined with the fact that there was no convenient water-route to transport products grown on the missions to the city (see below), made it easier to rely on highly mobile human labor from Timucua (also see Bushnell 1981:11). As a consequence, the Indians from the component provinces of Timucua seem to have been incorporated into the labor system from the earliest years of missionization.

Probably due to the Spanish military conquest of the Potano province in the late sixteenth century, Indians from Potano provided labor in St. Augustine even before their missionization. This involvement in the labor pool probably dates as early as 1601, considering the promise of the young cacique of Potano to "attend to the city" from then on (García de la Vera 1601). The chief even asked for and received permission to resettle the previously abandoned principal town of Potano in order to be closer to St. Augustine, and thus more readily accessible to the Governor (García de la Vera 1601; Méndez de Canzo 1601). In any case, by 1605, the Potano were described as being "of much service to the presidio, because these same Indians come to help the soldiers at the field of corn which is sown" (Pastrana 1605).

The repartimiento labor system in Florida seems to have been effectively initiated during the term of Governor
Canzo, who employed Indians to assist in supplementing St. Augustine's food supply with food grown near the presidio (Arguelles 1598; Méndez de Canzo 1601). The switch from an earlier tributary system, in which food was provided to the Spaniards, to the repartimiento system, in which labor was provided, seems to have been related to various Spanish military conquests, such as the suppression of the 1597 Guale revolt (see Bushnell 1981:97-8). While at this time the repartimiento labor draft was in an undeveloped and less rigid form, the early success of this component of the colonial system in Florida led to an increasing reliance upon Indian labor, as will be seen below.

As it ultimately developed, the labor system in colonial Spanish Florida became far more extensive than simply the yearly repartimiento draft of Indians for temporary service in St. Augustine. The colonial system was in many ways fueled by Indian labor, eventually involving the support of resident priests and soldiers, burden-bearing and courier services, as well as a standing Indian militia. Nevertheless, the backbone of the labor system was the repartimiento, and an understanding of Timucua's role in that system is instructive.

Specific details of the repartimiento system, particularly as it related to Timucua prior to the rebellion, are scarce, but an assortment of relevant documentary evidence permits an overview of the broad
outlines of its operation. Each year, the Governor of Florida drew up orders specifying the number of Indian laborers to be drafted from the mission provinces. One order was directed to the northern mission chain, including the provinces of Guale and Mocama, and two others were directed to the western mission chain, including both the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee. These orders were each carried by a Spanish officer from St. Augustine, generally dispatched in mid to late January.¹

The written orders included a list of the exact number of laborers to be supplied from each town within the province. Within the context of this study, these towns appear to correspond to the principal towns of Level II localities, or more precisely the mission stations in each province (excluding satellite villages). The phrasing of these orders varied only slightly, generally commanding the dispatched officer to "bring the Indians from the province of Timucua, as is customary, for the labor of the gardens and fields of the infantry who serve His Majesty in this presidio" (Guerra y Vega 1665a). The laborers, typically termed gente de cava, or "digging people", were commanded to arrive in St. Augustine no later than a specific date in late February or early March.

The precise numbers of Indians sent from each province (much less from each town) is difficult to determine, particularly for the pre-rebellion period in Timucua and
Apalachee. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a fairly close estimate of the yearly draft from each of the three provinces during the mid-seventeenth century. For Timucua itself, the draft seems to have involved between thirty-two and sixty Indians, generally hovering around fifty after 1655 (Menéndez Márquez 1660; Guerra y Vega 1673). Guale seems to have been subject to drafts of similar size, ranging between twenty-five and fifty-four Indians, again more commonly around fifty (Horruytiner 1636; Guerra y Vega 1666c, 1668, 1669, 1673; Hita Salazar 1677).

Apalachee, on the other hand, supplied by far the lion's share of repartimiento laborers, evidently contributing some two hundred Indians during the middle and late seventeenth century (Gómez de Engraba 1657a; Guerra y Vega 1673). Unlike the other mission provinces, Apalachee had resisted participation in the labor draft for more than a decade following their missionization, but were compelled to do so following the suppression of the Apalachee revolt of 1647 (Hann 1988:18).

The figures cited above do not accurately reflect the dynamic quality of the yearly labor quotas. Since the relative numbers were based on the existing population of each town, evidently using yearly censuses by Franciscan friars (Bushnell 1989:143), the labor quotas presumably reflect the demographic profile of each town and province. As a result, fluctuations in provincial population levels
(see Chapter Five) should be mirrored in the yearly labor quotas (although some Governors, such as Don Diego de Rebolledo seem to have attempted to ignore epidemic population decline). Nevertheless, based on the scattered figures which do exist, the relative contributions of the three major administrative subdivisions of the mission provinces seem to have remained fairly consistent during the middle seventeenth century, with Apalachee contributing roughly four times as many laborers as either Timucua or Guale.

The composition of these groups of repartimiento laborers was almost exclusively male. In theory, only unmarried males were to be sent to St. Augustine, but in practice this rule was not always followed. The yearly quota of laborers was evidently occasionally accompanied by aboriginal leaders, who presumably came to St. Augustine to receive gifts and interact with the Spanish authorities. Indeed, at the outbreak of the Timucuan Rebellion in the spring of 1656, the principal cacique of the entire province of Apalachee, Don Luis of Ivitachuco, was in St. Augustine with the repartimiento labor draft from Apalachee (see Chapter Seven).

Once in St. Augustine, laborers were typically employed for the space of perhaps four to seven months, beginning in late February or early March and ending (theoretically, at least) at the end of June (Guerra y Vega 1673). While
there, Indian laborers from each province seem to have formed small "towns" outside the city (Moreno 1673), and were employed in a variety of tasks, including the cultivation of corn in the soldiers' fields outside St. Augustine, the construction and maintenance of public works, and various other tasks (see Bushnell 1989). Given rations of corn, and wages calculated in cheap trade goods⁴, the Indians ultimately were to return to their homes for the fall and winter.

It should be noted that as initially conceived, the repartimiento was administered through aboriginal leaders, who selected a specified number of laborers from among their subjects (Bushnell 1981:23; 1989:142-4). Nevertheless, several features of the labor system, particularly its potential for abuse by Spanish authorities in St. Augustine, ultimately contributed to the decreasing control of caciques over the local administration of the draft, and the overall erosion of aboriginal political power.

As it developed during the first half of the seventeenth century, the repartimiento labor system rapidly became a fundamental component in the provisioning of the garrison town of St. Augustine. Immediately following the Apalachee revolt of 1647, the Royal Officials, complaining about unrest in Apalachee and Guale, asserted that:

...this presidio cannot be conserved without the service of these natives, through most of its soldiers being married with children and family, who cannot be sustained with only their pay as
soldiers, being so short, and thus they need to have some cultivation of maize for aid in sustenance...(Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner 1647).

The revolt in Apalachee made painfully clear the precarious situation of the Spanish colony at St. Augustine, inasmuch as its very existence hinged on the continued function of the repartimiento labor draft, and by extension the good will or control of the mission Indians. Indeed, this fact alone may have prompted the formalization of the Indian militia system soon thereafter.

While there is little direct documentary evidence regarding the specific details of the effects of the labor system in the Timucua province (apart from general complaints regarding overwork), a letter drafted by the caciques of the province of Guale immediately following the Timucuan Rebellion provides an instructive analysis of the overall impact of the repartimiento. This document details the growing level of corruption in the repartimiento system.

...having been our custom since we became Christians to assist every year, each town according to its possibility, with tilling and digging a large field [sabana], saying it to be of Your Majesty, and having finished their cultivation, the Governors returned to us all the Indian men, sons, and our remaining vassals, and today, señor, this field of Your Majesty has been left, and an infinity of fields have appeared which each married Spaniard cultivates, and the Governor also [with] another very large one, only with the end of selling the corn to Your Majesty, placing it in the provisions, so that they are paid from your Royal Chest at eight Reales per arroba...(Menéndez et al. 1657).
By this time, the repartimiento system, originally designed to provide food for common use, seems to have been appropriated by the Governor and individual Spanish officers and soldiers, who used the cheap Indian labor to produce corn which could then be sold at a profit to stock the Royal warehouses. Given the potential for such profit, abuses of the system naturally ensued.

One such excess was an unofficial augmentation of the yearly labor quotas by the soldiers sent to bring the laborers. As related by the Guale leaders:

The soldiers, señor, who come with the order of the Governor do not show it to us, for which cause if the Governor orders that thirty Indians are taken for the diggings, they take forty from us, and the extras they place in their cultivation and service, and if we aid them with so much, they ask for much more ... and if we tell them to show us the order of the Governor in order to fulfill it, they tell us that they do not wish to (Menéndez, et al. 1657).

These Indians were employed in a variety of tasks, including personal service for the soldiers. Furthermore, the Indians drafted each spring did not always return at the end of the summer, but were often retained in St. Augustine, regardless of which more Indians were demanded the following year. Many may even have died during their stay or on the long marches to and from St. Augustine. Fray Juan Gómez de Engraba (1657a) reported that during the term of Governor Benito Ruiz de Salazar (prior to 1651), only ten out of two hundred Indians\(^5\) sent to St. Augustine from the mission
provinces returned, the rest having died "from the pure hunger with which they died on the trails."

The pattern which evidently developed was one which resulted in a severe demographic drain on the aboriginal societies involved. In the province of Guale, as a result of the detention of laborers, combined with the effects of epidemics:

...we are now without people, and the married women without husbands, and the sons without fathers, and the fathers without sons, since there is a town of ours which does not come to sixteen Indian men, and more than sixty single women, unable to marry, because all the single Indian men (outside of the married Indian men who serve the soldiers) are detained, serving the Governor and Spaniards, and many, by having managed to serve the Spaniards well, they have given the pay of soldiers, against the order of Your Majesty, from which many inconveniences have followed and follow, and others, although they wish to come to their beloved towns, they detain by force, punishing them, a thing which, as our vassals, we regret greatly (Menéndez et al. 1657).

In effect, the repartimiento labor draft appears to have contributed to a demographic transformation which resulted in largely disfunctional aboriginal societies. The mission province of Guale, and most likely that of Timucua as well, became a vast labor reserve for the garrison town of St. Augustine, and various abuses and corruptions of the repartimiento system resulted in an increasing erosion of the human base upon which aboriginal political power rested.

Based on such descriptions, it seems likely that aboriginal towns within the mission provinces were in many instances composed of only the Indian caciques and other
leaders exempt from the labor requirement, and the women, both married and unmarried, and children who were not included in the labor draft. More and more, the productive labor base of aboriginal societies was tapped and appropriated by the Spaniards in St. Augustine, leaving caciques less and less real power. Ultimately, the repartimiento formed only one facet of the multidimensional colonial system, but combined with other stresses, the labor draft may be argued to have been a major contributor to the erosion of chiefly power.

Transport and Communication

Another feature of the labor system of colonial Spanish Florida involved the very real problem of transport and communication between St. Augustine and the mission provinces. In broad outline, the movement of people and goods in Spanish Florida was by both land and water, and thus geography played a pivotal role. St. Augustine itself was a port town, and thus possessed immediate (if irregular and uncertain) maritime access to other ports throughout the New World, particularly those of Havana and Vera Cruz. Its access to the mission provinces within its own jurisdiction was somewhat more complex, however, leading to various problems in the integration of the colonial system with its hub at St. Augustine.
As noted earlier, the actual linkages between the mission provinces and St. Augustine were somewhat limited during the first half of the seventeenth century. Until the 1640's, soldiers ventured into the interior only on a temporary basis, delivering the yearly labor quotas and occasionally chasing down Indian raiders along the deep frontier. From very early on, however, Franciscan friars were stationed on a year-round basis in the interior, and thus required frequent provisioning and contact with St. Augustine. The nature of the Franciscan missionary effort ensured a regular supply of royal limosnas, or alms, for the propagation of the Christian doctrine under royal patronage.

Apart from the supplies required for the foundation of missions, the construction and outfitting of churches within Indian towns, and the celebration of divine worship, each friar was supported with a yearly dole of food and supplies paid for at the expense of the Spanish crown. In practice, these items were provided and distributed by secular Spanish authorities in St. Augustine, necessitating the development of a system for distributing these items to the friars in their distant convents. The amount of supplies delivered to each friar in every year was considerable, and multiplied by the number of friars in various locations, this created real problems of transportation. For each friar after 1641, the yearly ration included 730 lbs of wheat flour, nearly fifty gallons of wine, half a dozen jars of oil and lard, 75 lbs
of vinegar, 150 lbs of salt, and a variety of dishes, pins and needles, paper and pens, blankets, fabric, and sandals (Royal Cédula 1641).6 Considering that at that time there were somewhere in the neighborhood of 35 to 40 friars in Florida, the total amount of wheat flour alone amounted to more than 25,000 lbs for distribution every year.

Situated on the Atlantic seaboard, St. Augustine was within comparatively easy sailing distance of the oldest mission province within its jurisdiction, Guale. The missions of Guale and Mocama were located along the barrier-island chain north of St. Augustine, and thus were accessible along the intracoastal waterway or from the sea itself. The historical record is replete with references to the frequent voyages by ship to re-supply the Franciscan missionaries there during this period, and there is scarcely a military service-record which does not include a direct reference to having participated as an officer or soldier in the yearly voyages to Guale in the frigates stationed in St. Augustine.

The western interior was a different matter altogether. Although the early missions along the upper St. Johns River (the "Agua Dulce" province) were accessible by canoe or boat, the interior west of the St. Johns was not successfully penetrated until the 1606 establishment of the Potano mission province. Even then, the push westward proceeded comparatively slowly, resulting primarily from problems in transportation and communication. Although the Franciscans
had great desires to missionize the province of Apalachee following the establishment of peace between Apalachee and Timucua in the summer of 1608, they recognized that caution was in order.

Soon after Fray Prieto's voyage to Apalachee, Fray Serrano and four or five other friars entered Apalachee, reporting many Indians ready for conversion, and yet the decision was made not to place friars permanently in this westernmost province:

...due to the difficulty in carrying them sustenance from St. Augustine, and through being so far from the presidio of the Spaniards, who protect the ministers, so that the Indians, instigated by the devil, should not wrong them or maltreat them, taking their lives (Oré 1936:117).

This decision reflects the friars' perception of the very real dangers of missionization in the deep frontier, and reveals one of the fundamental features of the colonial system of Spanish Florida: the farther away by land from St. Augustine the Spaniards ventured, the more difficult it became to provide supplies and protection. As will be seen, there were mitigating circumstances which sometimes modified this rule, but in the first years of the seventeenth century, the western mission chain expanded only cautiously.

Although the first colonists in St. Augustine had great desires to discover a water-route across the Florida peninsula (Lyon 1976:141-2), it was not until the early seventeenth century that anything even comparable was identified and explored. Governor Juan Fernández de Olivera
seems to have been the first to initiate the exploration of the Suwannee River as a "route and river which was discovered to go to the coast of Apalachee and inlet of Carlos" (Fernández de Olivera 1612). Although the Franciscans seem to have reached the Timucuan village of Cofa at the mouth of the Suwannee prior to this time, it was not until the 1611 murder of a group of Christian Indians traveling along this river by Indians from Pohoy and Tocopaca that Governor Fernández was prompted to construct a launch and canoes on the river to facilitate their punishment by a squad of soldiers (see Chapter Six).  

The reconnaissance of the lower Suwannee River and the lower Gulf coast was carried out in the summer of 1612 (Fernández de Olivera 1612), but the water-route to Apalachee was not fully explored until after the foundation of missions in that westernmost province. In the meantime, the problems of transportation and communication by land continued to plague the regions of Potano and Timucua.

By 1621, friars' concerns in this regard led to a proposal to the crown, stating with regard to thirty more requested friars that:

...even if Your Majesty sends them, it will be impossible to conserve them, due to their being more than eighty leagues from this presidio, if jointly you do not send thirty or forty men who would assist them, and settle near these provinces, so that the religious might have shelter and retreat, and being farmers, [these men] will be able to cultivate the land, and help this presidio greatly, since it will have from their harvest what now comes by carriage, and at
excessive prices, with which this conversion will go very far forward, and the religious will have comfort, and this presidio will have supplies for its sustenance, because the land is very strong, and good for all seeds (Pesquera et al. 1621).

While a major stumbling block in the expanding mission system was the perennial lack of friars, problems of re-supply and protection hinged on the effectiveness of transport and communication.

Although many of these problems would have been readily solved by the presence of pack animals and mounts, such creatures were quite scarce in colonial Spanish Florida, and those present were not typically used for the more mundane tasks in the interior (Bushnell 1989:143). Petitions for such animals seem to have met with little success, such as the 1630 request by Fray Francisco Alonso de Jesús for seven horses, all to be distributed among the more distant missions of the western interior for the relief of the friars (Jesús 1630a). The system of transportation which developed, and indeed persisted, for the western chain of missions and particularly the Timucua province, was the use of Indians as burden-bearers.

This cannot be considered surprising, for the accounts of even the earliest Spanish expeditions into the Southeast reveal nearly constant demands for burden-bearers from aboriginal leaders along their path. What seems to have begun as the comparatively innocent employment of Indians to carry supplies to the resident friars in the interior only
multiplied with the growing interaction between St. Augustine and the mission provinces. Eventually, all soldiers who ventured into the interior seem to have requested and received Indian bearers for their bedrolls and provisions. Not unexpectedly, as soldiers became more and more frequent visitors, the practice developed abuses, particularly after the opening of trading relationships with Indians in the deep western interior.

The 1633 establishment of the Apalachee province marked a major turning-point for the Timucua province, although the full repercussions of this event would not be felt for years. With the long-anticipated penetration of Apalachee, Timucua was instantaneously transformed from a province on the expanding frontier of Spanish influence into an intermediate step in the trans-peninsular land route to Apalachee. At first, this change in status was hardly significant, and scarcely recognizable. But with the ongoing expansion into Apalachee following 1633, Timucua gradually settled into an increasingly well-defined role in the developing colonial system of Spanish Florida.

The successful missionization of Apalachee did not merely represent the addition of yet another province on the western terminus of Spanish expansion into the interior. Apalachee possessed two major qualities which set it apart from the Timucua province (including the Potano, Timucua, and Yustaga regions): the province was particularly rich in
both human and natural resources (and bordered other rich regions in the interior), and it had access to a port on the Gulf of Mexico (see Hann 1988). Together, these two factors gave Apalachee a crucial importance for the development of the colonial system of Florida, for at last the Spaniards had access to a wealth of resources with the potential for comparatively easy transportation.

Timucua had two major disadvantages in this respect: the region was not particularly rich in resources, and it was far enough into the interior to pose considerable difficulties in transportation and communication. Beyond this, it was essentially land-locked, although the Suwannee River did provide limited access to the Gulf of Mexico. Soon after the establishment of missions in Apalachee, Governor Don Luis de Horruytiner began to explore the possibilities for a water-route to this western terminus.

In the summer of 1635, with as yet only two friars in the Apalachee province, Governor Horruytiner dispatched Sebastian Rodriguez, an experienced ship pilot from St. Augustine, to travel overland with a soldier who knew "the road from here to Apalachee" in order to fully reconnoiter the possibilities for a water-route to Apalachee by finding a suitable port (Horruytiner 1635). The Governor instructed Rodriguez to explore the lower reaches of the river of San Martín (the lower Suwannee), where he had been informed that there might be a navigable river leading to Apalachee. 8
While this lead never panned out (there is no such river), Rodriguez was later said to have succeeded in discovering a suitable port (Horruytiner 1638).

Only two years later a ship departing from Havana reached the new Apalachee port in only eight days (Horruytiner 1637), and by the summer of 1639, the first voyage from St. Augustine directly to Apalachee was made in only 13 days, avoiding the previous stopover in Havana (Vega, Castro, y Pardo 1639). While the opening of the Apalachee port was projected to be "of much utility to the rest of the religious who serve in the doctrinas of this province of Timucua" by being close to Apalachee (Horruytiner 1637), the end result of this water-route to Apalachee was only to increase the amount of transpeninsular traffic in soldiers and Indians. A bustling trade with Havana soon developed, leading to the 1643 placement of soldiers at the port to monitor shipping (Vega, Castro, y Pardo 1643).  

In effect, after 1639, Timucua was the only mission province without easy access to the sea, and even worse, was the primary corridor of land travel between St. Augustine and Apalachee. With the establishment of the hacienda of Asile after 1645 (see Chapter Four), and the simultaneous placement of a Lieutenant with soldiers in Apalachee, the province of Apalachee only gained in importance to the overall colonial system, and Timucua's role became more and
more well-defined. The practice of burden-bearing seems to have proliferated during these years, evidently creating a considerable burden on the Indians (e.g. Royal Cédula 1651).

Beyond the use of Indians as bearers for traveling soldiers, and to carry supplies to the resident friars, on some occasions Indian bearers were employed to carry corn to St. Augustine from the mission towns. While corn was regularly bartered from Guale, Apalachee, and even the unconverted province of Escamaçu, and subsequently shipped to St. Augustine by sea, corn from Timucua had to be carried over land. Although it was generally simpler to bring Indians from Timucua to grow the corn near St. Augustine (Bushnell 1981:11), during the famine years of the early 1640's Governor Damián de Vega, Castro, y Pardo recruited the Indians of Timucua to bring some of their own corn crop for the inhabitants of St. Augustine.

While contemporary documentation is largely lacking, several later descriptions confirm that Governor Vega "conveyed [provisions] from the province of Timucua, bringing a quantity of corn with the native Indians of that province" (Horruytiner 1657). A more detailed account indicates that considerable numbers of Indians were employed in bearing burdens during this time:

...not only did some Indians come to this city, but their villages remained almost depopulated without men, and the roads they traveled full of those who were going and coming, some who brought provisions, through this city perishing, and others who returned (Solana 1660).
The fact that this incident stood out in the minds of later witnesses suggests that it was extraordinary, and indeed there was some suspicion that the province might rise in rebellion at that time, for during the famine "the said Indians were restless and agitated, for which it was presumed that they wished to make some uprising" (Hernández 1660). Nevertheless, the occasion passed without further incident, and the practice of burden-bearing continued.

Given that the Timucua province was the primary corridor of land travel and transport between Apalachee and St. Augustine, there is ample evidence for the use of Timucuan Indians as couriers, carrying letters from town to town. Both friars and soldiers seem to have employed Indians as messengers, and details from the rebellion-period suggest that these runners were able to cover comparatively long distances in short order (see Chapters Seven and Eight). Indeed, the entire system of communications within the mission provinces of colonial Florida seems to have been based fundamentally on aboriginal couriers. Messages between the deep interior and St. Augustine apparently could be transmitted and responded to within the space of only a few days, suggesting that the friars and soldiers in the mission provinces were less isolated than one might expect.
The Indian Militia

An important feature of the colonial labor system in Spanish Florida, and one which has never been fully explored previously, was the use of Indian warriors as a supplement to the limited Spanish infantry forces in St. Augustine. The late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are replete with examples of Spanish military ventures which were accompanied by sometimes considerable numbers of Indians. While early expeditions seem to have employed Indians primarily as burden-bearers, guides, interpreters, and as a sort of generalized escort, there is increasing evidence during the early seventeenth century for the more active participation of Indian warriors as supplementary infantry.

Indians from the Timucua province were evidently drafted in large numbers as early as the late 1620's. Sometime during the term of Governor Don Luis de Rójas y Borja (Oct. 28, 1624 - June 23, 1630), a major threat was perceived to the city of St. Augustine by enemies from the sea, and the governor resorted to the Indians in the existing mission provinces of Timucua and Guale for assistance. This seems to be the first occasion in which mission Indians were drawn from the interior in large numbers specifically for the defense of the city of St. Augustine, and it would set a precedent which played an important role in the later Timucuan Rebellion.
In testimony dating perhaps thirty years after the event, Governor Diego de Rebolledo related that he had been informed that:

...señor Don Luis de Rójas, who was Governor and Captain General of these provinces, called to the Indians of the provinces of Guale and Timucua, and having come with their arms, they were in garrison in this said presidio [St. Augustine] until the suspicion of enemies was assured (Rebolledo 1657a).

This account was confirmed by Sargento Mayor Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, who stated that "on the occasion of news of enemies, he [Governor Rójas y Borja] conveyed to the presidio some Indians of those of these provinces with their arms for what could occur" (Horruytiner 1657). Although neither Rebolledo nor Horruytiner had been in St. Augustine during this period, the Ensign Alonso Solana, born in St. Augustine in 1620, confirmed this information three years later, making note of the Indians who "came to the defense of this port" during Rójas' term (Solana 1660).

Unfortunately, no contemporaneous documentation of this event has yet been located, but correspondence dating to the years 1627-8 suggests that this may have been the period of concern (Rójas y Borja 1628). During his residencia, the governor was charged (but absolved) with having given soldiers' rations of wheat flour and wine to three caciques (the amounts indicate nearly three year's worth of flour and just over a year's worth of wine), and it is possible that this may have been related to their stay in the presidio
(Rodríguez de Villégas 1631). This event may have been the first large-scale activation of the sort of informal Indian militia which probably existed from the first decades of the colony. It almost certainly marks the first time that the interior provinces were involved in defending St. Augustine. As such, the perceived success of Governor Rójas' action may have set a precedent as one manner of overcoming the chronic lack of Spanish infantry in the city (Governor Rebolledo would later use this example in defending his actions with regard to the Timucuan Rebellion).

Although Indians from Timucua seem to have occasionally acted as an informal militia during the first decades after missionization, it was not until the mid-1640's that this feature of the colonial system was effectively formalized. On February 19, 1647, rebellion flared in the western mission province of Apalachee with the murders of three friars. The resident provincial Lieutenant Claudio Luis de Florencia was also slain along with his entire family (see Hann 1988). A Spanish response was quickly formulated, and in the two military expeditions which followed, Indian warriors from the Timucua province played a pivotal role. Indeed, this very fact seems to have prompted the subsequent formalization of an Indian militia in Timucua.

Soon after word of the murders had reached St. Augustine, Royal Accountant Horruytiner (governing with the Treasurer after the deposition of Governor Benito Ruiz de
Salazar Vallecilla) dispatched Captain Martín de Cuevas with a squad of thirty soldiers to investigate and quell the uprising (Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner 1647; Cuevas 1648). After sending a scout ahead "to reconnoiter the roads and villages up to the last of the province of Timucua" (Argüelles et al. 1678), the group proceeded into the interior. At the time of the revolt, deposed Governor Ruiz happened to be at his hacienda near Asile with ten soldiers, and the two groups ultimately joined, probably at or near Asile, the gateway to Apalachee province (Ruíz de Salazar Vallecilla 1647; Menéndez Márquez 1648).

The combined force of over forty Spanish infantry "agreed to gather up five hundred Indian warriors so that with more security for our persons, we might be able to achieve what was most suitable to the service of His Majesty" (Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla 1647). This considerable force of Indians was composed of "friendly Timucuan Indians" (Argüelles et al. 1678), presumably collected hurriedly from the western region of the Timucua mission province in the Yustaga region. The army then marched toward Apalachee, and immediately upon entering the province found themselves "unexpectedly surrounded in a forest by their enemies," the number of which was estimated at between five and eight thousand rebels (Ruíz de Salazar Vallecilla 1647; Cuevas 1648; Argüelles et al. 1678).
The battle raged for an entire day, with the some 2,700 shots fired by the Spaniards, before both sides subsequently withdrew. What is important for the present discussion, however, is the fact that Ruiz and Cuevas were able to draft a massive fighting force of Indian warriors from the Timucua province for the pacification of Apalachee. Considering the ambush awaiting them just past Asile, and the fact that even the combined Spanish/Timucuan army was barely able to hold its own against the rebels, it seems unavoidable to conclude that without the Timucuan warriors, the Apalachee Revolt might have become a much more difficult and drawn-out affair.

Following the arrival of the weary Spanish force in St. Augustine, Treasurer Francisco Menéndez Márquez, recently returned from other troubles in Guale, determined to march into the frontier with only thirteen soldiers, considering the "risk of everything being lost to the enemies, if they had entered among the friendly Indians" (Menéndez Márquez 1648). Joining eight Spanish soldiers already in the interior, Francisco managed to select a force of sixty Indian warriors from the towns in Timucua, with which the force entered secretly in Apalachee and pacified the province, doing justice to the rebel leaders and assisting in the reconstruction of seven burned mission churches.

Assembling a group of Indians who could be spared from spring planting was no simple affair, but the Treasurer must
have been strongly motivated to halt the revolt quickly, considering the potential threat to his own long-standing cattle ranch at La Chua. His task may even have been facilitated by his relationship with the caciques of Timucua (see Chapter Four). Once again, it may be argued that the addition of sixty Timucuan warriors to Francisco's twenty-one Spanish soldiers contributed significantly to the success of the endeavor.

The recent reminder of the dangers of the deep interior, and the obvious advantage supplied by the Timucuan warriors, must have prompted the establishment of a more formal mechanism for similar actions in the future. On December 5, 1648, less than two years after the Apalachee Revolt, the re-installed Governor Ruíz named Ensign Juan Fernández de Florencia to make a visitation of the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, and on February 13, 1649, Fernández was promoted to Captain and named the first provincial Lieutenant and "Captain at War" of the Timucua province:

...for the great experience he has in the affairs of peace and war, so that he should instruct and train the Indians in the affairs of the militia, in order to bring them ordinarily to war with pagan Indians, as well as for if the governor should have need for the aid of that presidio and its provinces, for which effect he ordered him to serve ordinarily in the town of Santa Elena de Machava, in order to serve from there to the remaining provinces, and he gave him power to name a notary to dictate, condense, and terminate the cases which might be offered (Fernández de Florencia 1670).
The stationing of Captain Fernández in the mission of Machava was probably based on two factors: the demographic character of the Timucua province in 1649, and the location of Governor Ruíz's hacienda next to the neighboring town of Asile. Captain Fernández supplemented the new provincial Lieutenant in Apalachee, Captain Agustín Perez (replacing the murdered Claudio Luis), and thus while there is no evidence that he was accompanied by even a small garrison (such as that in Apalachee), the appointment of Fernández marked the first time that both Apalachee and Timucua were given commissioned Lieutenants (see Chapter Four).

Following the Apalachee Revolt, then, a relatively formalized Indian militia system seems to have been instituted in the western mission provinces. This may have involved the bestowing of titular ranks in the Spanish Infantry, as documentary evidence suggests became commonplace during the later seventeenth century.13 Aboriginal leaders such as caciques may also have been given Spanish weapons, such as swords and even firearms, at this time (see Chapter Seven). Nevertheless, when recently elected Governor Pedro Benedit Horruytiner withdrew all soldiers from the western interior in March of 1652, largely dismantling the hacienda of Asile (see Chapter Four), formal instruction of the Indian militia must have ceased.

Newly arrived Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo seems to have preferred the old system, and quickly dispatched a new
provincial Lieutenant and two soldiers to Apalachee in late 1654 (Rebolledo 1657g). Although there is no evidence that soldiers were placed in Timucua, the established Indian militia system would soon be put to the test, for in April of 1656, the militia would be fully activated, with disastrous results.

Notes

1. Currently known orders to Timucua were dispatched on January 15 and 24 (Guerra y Vega 1665a; 1666b). Orders to Apalachee were dispatched January 16 and 24 (Guerra y Vega 1665b; 1666a). Orders to Guale were dispatched on January 10, 16, 17, 21, 27, and February 1 (Horruytiner 1636; Guerra y Vega 1665c, 1666c, 1668, 1669; Hita Salazar 1677).

2. Data from the mid-1670's roughly follows this pattern, for the yearly labor draft quotas seem to generally reflect independent census figures for Apalachee and Timucua. The 1675 population of Apalachee (8,620 persons) was just over six times that of Timucua (1,370 persons), and the labor draft from Apalachee (200 Indians) was nearly four times that from Timucua (50-55 Indians) (Fernandez de Florencia 1675; Guerra y Vega 1673).

3. In the mid-1670's, Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega (1673) reported that the repartimiento Indians from Apalachee arrive on the first of March, and "dig until San Pedro [June 29], when they are given permission so that all may return to their towns." Those from Timucua and Guale were stated to remain in St. Augustine until the end of September (Guerra y Vega 1673).

4. The tremendous abundance of glass trade beads at Spanish missions, only a few of which seem to have been associated with rosaries (and thus probably gifts from friars), may well be a direct result of the colonial labor system, including wages from not only the repartimiento draft, but also burden-bearing.

5. The provincial source of these Indians is not specified in this letter, but the coincidence of the figure of two hundred Indians with the typical yearly draft for Apalachee (see above) suggests that these were Apalachee Indians.
6. The archaeological record of these missions provides ample testimony to the amount of such materials which did in fact reach the frontier. Among the yearly personal supplies listed here, those items which would be preserved include a number of ceramic transport and storage jars ("olive jars"), glazed ceramic plates and bowls (majolica), and numerous pins and sewing needles. As expected, such items are among the more common Spanish artifacts at missions within the Timucua province (e.g. Loucks 1979; Weisman 1992).

7. It is ironic that raids possibly designed to resist Spanish influence and colonization resulted in the effective opening of a water-route to the Gulf of Mexico.

8. This route was described as follows: "...through the mouth of the bar through which the River of San Martín flows into the sea, where there used to be a village of Christians called Cofa, two leagues before arriving at the said mouth of the river is a branch which goes to the said Apalachee, through which I have had relation that the Indians came in canoes to the said village of Cofa" (Horruytiner 1635).

9. There is some evidence that soldiers were stationed there toward the end of Governor Horruytiner's term, for the 1655 service record of Ensign Juan Baupista Terraza makes note of the "Lieutenancy of the port of Apalachee, 80 leagues from the presidio", created by Governor Luis de Horruytiner (Terraza 1655).

10. The repeated failure of the yearly situado to arrive from New Spain with provisions, along with a poor corn crop during 1642, brought the inhabitants of St. Augustine close to what they perceived as starvation, forcing many to dig for roots and gather other Indian foods in order to survive (Vega, Castro, y Pardo 1643).

11. One witness during the residencia of Governor Vega testified that during the period of famine, the Governor insured that "corn was brought from the villages of the Indians" (García de la Vera 1645). Other than this mention, the only evidence for the participation of the Timucua province in this effort dates to the post-rebellion period.

12. Former Governor Horruytiner noted in 1657 that "there has not been a lack in the provision of canoes in the Rivers of Helaca, San Juan de Guacara, Tari, and San Juan del Puerto, which is where cross all those who go and come from the provinces to this said presidio" (Rebolledo 1657d). Three of these four rivers were within or on the boundaries of the Timucua province, confirming its pivotal importance in the system of transport and communication. The crossing point of the St. Johns west of St. Augustine was at San
Diego de Elaca during most of the first half of the seventeenth century, and the Suwannee River was the principal river-crossing within Timucua (the river of Tari must refer to the upper reaches of the Suwannee, near where it flows past Santa Cruz de Tarihica).

13. One gubernatorial order dating to 1680, for example, indicates that the principal cacique of the Timucua province, at that time located at Santa Fe, possessed the rank of Sergeant Major, while a lesser cacique was a Captain (Hita Salazar 1680).
CHAPTER SIX
UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES

Frontier Raiding

As a missionized province within the colonial system of Spanish Florida, Timucua was subjected to many armed incursions by unconverted aboriginal groups living beyond the mission frontier. While some of these attacks may have simply resulted from a precolumbian pattern of intersocietal warfare, frontier raiding ultimately played a highly important role in the disintegration and destruction of the mission provinces during the late seventeenth century. Aggression from neighboring Indians, some of whom appear to have been displaced as a direct result of the European presence, seems to have been a phenomenon inherent to the colonial system, and as such may be viewed as one of the unanticipated consequences of missionization.

Frontier raids against the aboriginal inhabitants of the Potano and Timucua regions occurred during the very earliest stages of missionization. In the summer of 1608, for example, apparently during Fray Prieto's trip to Apalachee, a threat to the Christian Indians emerged in
Potano. Complaining about the lack of soldiers in St. Augustine, Governor Ybarra reported on August 20:

...I have news from the interior from the province of Potano that a great number of pagan Indians are coming upon the Christian natives to make war on them, and so that they will not understand the weakness of people with which I am, with all the best artifices that I can I will come to the rescue of all (Ybarra 1608).

This news followed Ybarra's report of having dispatched a Sargento Mayor with soldiers to quell a revolt by five caciques in Guale, all of which prompted the Crown to issue a Royal Cédula limiting military involvement in the mission provinces, and forbidding friars to be accompanied by soldiers on their exploratory ventures (Royal Cédula 1609). Nevertheless, continuing threats from hostile Indian groups prompted many retaliatory expeditions.

Sometime in 1611, Governor Juan Fernández de Olivera was forced to retaliate against further depredations on the frontier of Potano and Timucua by Indians from the Tampa Bay region. In testimony some eighteen years after the fact, Captain Alonso Díaz de Badajoz, the leader of this expedition, remembered that Governor Fernández:

...sent the said Captain Alonso Díaz with infantry from this presidio to punish the Indians of Pohoy for having killed seventeen Christian Indians who were coming by the river of Cofa with the food and clothing of a religious. With the order which he carried to punish them, he beheaded them all (Díaz de Badajoz 1630).

While there is little contemporary documentation, this testimony suggests that the victims of the Tampa Bay Pohoy
were probably a party of Indians from Potano or Timucua on their way to re-supply the mission at Cofa, evidently associated with the Timucua province (see Chapter Three).

Governor Fernández evidently ordered a "launch and canoes" to be built in the river of Cofa (the lower Suwannee) specifically for the retaliatory expedition, for these were subsequently used during the summer of 1612 to reconnoiter the newly discovered route to the Gulf of Mexico. Immediately prior to this expedition, the Governor:

...sent to say to the heirs of the said caciques [of Pooy and Tocopaca] that from then onward they should not do damage to the towns of Christians, since that punishment was made for the [damage] which their predecessors had done. I also sent them some gifts, offering them peace and amity on the part of Your Majesty, with which, and with the fear of the past, they offered complete [peace and amity] on their part... (Fernández de Olivera 1612).

Ensign Juan Rodríguez de Cartaya carried further gifts for the heir of the executed cacique of Pohoy on his reconnaissance trip to visit the cacique of Carlos (see Hann 1991:9-12), and Governor Fernández reported that fall that the new cacique "remained content and assured."

While there is no evidence that the Pohoy ever troubled Potano or Timucua again, other unconverted Indians continued to menace the Christian Indian towns. Sometime during the term of Governor Juan de Salinas (Aug.2, 1618 - Oct.28, 1624) problems on the frontier prompted the dispatch of yet another military force to punish the aggressors. Summarizing an order given by Governor Salinas, Adrián de
Cañizares y Osorio (a soldier later to play a prominent role during the Timucuan Rebellion) reported that:

...he went to the punishment of the Chisca and Chichimeco Indians, ferocious people who were disturbing and robbing and killing the Christian Indians of the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, who are subjects to the crown of His Majesty, in which he endured likewise many hardships by traveling on foot more than sixty leagues which there are from the said presidio [of St. Augustine] (Cañizares y Osorio 1635).

While no further references to this action have been discovered, there is no reason to question that there was trouble in the western mission provinces during this period. The specific nature of this disturbance is unclear, although this is the earliest known reference to the Chisca Indians in Florida (both the described Salinas order and the Cañizares service record itself predate other references), a group who later served as catalysts for the 1647 revolt in Apalachee (see Hann 1988:16-9). It seems likely that these Chisca, reportedly nomadic, were distinguished by a sort of parasitic existence on the mission frontier, predating on the Christian Indians settled in the missions.

Although the Chisca are not mentioned again until nearly two decades later, the disturbances they created in the expanding western mission chain only served to accentuate the vulnerability of both friars and converted Indian towns in the deep interior. In 1639, Governor Damián de Vega, Castro, y Pardo referred to the Chiscas as "warlike people" who "walk freely through these provinces" (Vega,
Castro, y Pardo 1639). Although Governor Vega had hopes of settling them near St. Augustine, to be employed in recovering fugitive Christian Indians, this evidently never came to pass, and during the early 1650's, the Chisca appeared again in Timucua.

Probably late during the term of Governor Benito Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla, perhaps early in 1651, the Chisca once again attacked the Indians of Timucua. A later recollection reveals that:

The Chisca nation having given assault to the province of Timucua, and killed and carried off many men, children, and women as captives, the said Governor [Ruiz] sent [Ensign Juan Bautista Terraza] as a spy with six soldiers to extinguish and kill the Chiscas he found in the villages of the said province, carrying order and reward [?] to give to the Indians, and they wounded him, and with his help and order they killed many, and the rest fled, leaving the province free (Argüelles, et al. 1678).

The flight of the remaining Chisca seems to have prompted concern that they might subsequently enter the Guale province. To prevent this the succeeding Governor Nicolás Ponce de León (1651a) dispatched Captain Antonio de Argüelles that May to search them out and capture or kill the Chisca, freeing the captive Christian women and children (perhaps including some from Timucua).

In general, frontier raiding during the first half of the seventeenth century was only sporadic, particularly when compared with the many slave-raids following the foundation of Charles Town in 1670 (see Chapter Nine). Nevertheless,
Timucua was subjected to periodic hostility from beyond the mission frontier, resulting in theft, captivity, and death. While there is no evidence to suggest such attacks severely impacted the population of Timucua, these unprovoked raids undoubtedly took their toll, adding injury to an already deteriorating situation.

**Fugitives from Timucua**

Yet another component of the demographic drain on the mission provinces was flight. While perhaps the majority of the inhabitants of aboriginal mission provinces remained within the bounds of the mission provinces (though not necessarily within their native homeland, as will be discussed below), a certain percentage of the Indians within each mission province chose to expatriate themselves, fleeing beyond the easy reach of the Spanish colonial system. The reasons for such flight were undoubtedly varied, but based on the handful of documentary references to fugitives from the mission provinces, the stresses of the colonial labor system may have provided the most forceful impetus for flight.

Due to the very nature of this feature of the colonial system, documentary evidence is scant regarding not only the relative number of fugitives, and, more importantly, where they went. For the Timucua province, however, several documents predating the rebellion provide some details of
this process. On January 27, 1646, Governor Ruíz dispatched a group of infantry into the interior beyond the established mission provinces on a mission to relocate fugitive Indians:

The Indians who are aggregated at the place which is called the lake of Oconi are fugitive Indians from the towns of the province of Timucua and other places, in order not to work, through having, as they have in the said place, the roots, fish, and other fruits; and so that they do not live as barbarians, they have been given a missionary to live with them, and the missionary is very disconsolate, by the said place being as it is more than twenty leagues distant from the nearest doctrina... (Ruíz de Salazar Vallecilla 1646).

Based on documentary evidence from earlier and later sources, the location termed the "lake of Oconi" almost certainly corresponds to the modern Okefenokee Swamp. Although this region seems to have been the home of an indigenous aboriginal society during the early seventeenth century, the above order reveals that by the middle of the century it had become a haven for fugitives from the Timucua province. Whether these fugitives settled in a previously depopulated area, or simply joined the indigenous inhabitants is uncertain.

The 1646 mission to relocate these fugitives to the river crossing at San Diego de Elaca (see above) seems to have failed, for nearly ten years later Governor Rebolledo dispatched a similar expedition. Probably in 1655, in an effort to revitalize the depopulated village of Nombre de Dios just north of St. Augustine, Rebolledo requested the
cacique of Santiago de Ocone to relocate his villages to Nombre de Dios (Alcayde de Cordoba 1660). The cacique acquiesced, but requested time to reap the summer harvest, for which Rebolledo rashly imprisoned the cacique and dispatched a group of soldiers led by the former provincial Lieutenant of Timucua Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia to burn the village.

Presuming that at least a portion of the inhabitants of Ocone were originally fugitives from Timucua province, their reaction to Rebolledo's action is interesting, inasmuch as "the greater part of them fled to the forests, and most of them never again had recourse to the village, except for some who had gone to the village of San Pedro". Another soldier was sent to find "those who are in the forest, and could not reduce them so that they might come under the bell" (Alcayde de Cordoba 1660).

There are no known references to Santiago de Ocone after its burning by Governor Rebolledo. Prior to this period, however, the Okefenokee Swamp region seems to have served as a refuge for fugitive Indians from the Timucua province to the south and southwest. While actually closer to St. Augustine than some of the more distant missions in Apalachee and Guale, the region of Oconi was nonetheless one of the more inaccessible areas along the fringes of the established mission provinces. As a consequence, it must have acted as a magnet for those Indians who chose to move
away from the primary corridors of travel in the Spanish colonial system. Intriguingly, based on the 1646 order above, it seems likely that these fugitives resorted to a foraging existence in the swamps, perhaps largely abandoning intensive agriculture.

Furthermore, Santiago de Ocone, as an aggregation of fugitives, was considered in 1655 to be a part of the province of Mocama (though remote), and was home to a resident friar prior to 1646. The fact that Governors Ruíz and Rebolledo were only subsequently motivated to dispatch soldiers in order to draw these fugitives back into the colonial labor system implies that the inhabitants of Ocone, though successfully re-incorporated into the mission system after their flight, were sufficiently isolated to escape the labor draft until the destruction of the town in 1655.

Thus it appears that at least some of the fugitives from the Timucua province chose not to flee into the deep interior, but rather to maintain an existence on the remotest fringe of the Spanish colonial system. The key factor in such relocation does not seem to have been the presence of missionaries, but rather the stresses of the draft labor system within the heart of the mission provinces. Indeed, there is further evidence that Indians from Timucua fled not beyond the Franciscan friars, but only beyond the reach of the Governor's soldiers, sent each winter to round up the yearly repartimiento labor draft. In
1645, Governor Ruiz promised the cacique of Asile, on the western frontier of the Timucua province, that in return for the loan of a tract of land for his projected hacienda, he would, among other things, "make the people who have gone away from here to Apalachee return here" (Manuel 1651). While the cacique Manuel later indicated that this promise was never fulfilled, the fact that Timucuan Indians from Asile had fled to Apalachee probably has a great deal to do with the fact that Apalachee was not formally incorporated into the repartimiento labor draft until after the 1647 revolt (see Chapter Five).

A 1655 order from Governor Rebolledo reveals another destination for fugitives. Following an epidemic in Timucua and Apalachee provinces, Rebolledo resolved to send soldiers to the largely unconverted province of "Ybiniyutti" for laborers to replace the regular draft from Timucua and Apalachee. Among the "pagan Indians which there are in the said provinces", Rebolledo noted the presence of "some cimarrones who absent themselves from the evangelical word", suggesting that this region also harbored fugitives from the established mission provinces (Rebolledo 1655). The location of this province, also known as Acuera, to the south of the Timucua province implies that some or most of these fugitives were Timucuans. Once again, however, such fugitives from the labor draft seemed to have remained in
contact with Franciscan missionaries, who had established at least two missions there.  

The number of fugitives from the Timucua province during any given period is unknown, but by 1654, the entire towns of San Francisco and Santa Fe seem to have been largely abandoned, for on January 19, Governor Horruytiner ordered Ensign Pedro de Florencia to:

...go to the towns of San Francisco and Santa Fé against the Indians who have absented themselves from them, and look for them in the places where they might be and return them to their towns for fear that they might become depopulated, from which would result great detriment to the service of His Majesty, through being the passage for the remaining provinces (Florencia 1671).

This action seems to have been at least partially successful, for both towns figured prominently in the Timucuan Rebellion just over two years later (see Chapters Five and Six). Nonetheless, the near depopulation of these two towns suggests that the rate of flight from Timucua may have been higher than the documentary record would generally suggest. Fugitives only represented a small portion of the overall demographic decline of Timucua, however.

**Epidemics**

A major feature of the developing colonial system of Spanish Florida was demographic decline. In many ways, demographic decline provided fuel for the more dynamic qualities of the colonial system, particularly as regards the mission provinces. Depopulation among the Indian
inhabitants of the mission provinces was caused by a number of factors, including not only mortality resulting from epidemic diseases introduced by the Spaniards themselves, but also overwork and starvation, occasional raids, and flight from the missions. The end result of such factors was a nearly constant drain on the aboriginal population within the mission provinces. This demographic decline affected, and was affected by, all other features of the colonial system, including aboriginal sociopolitical structure, the mission effort, and the labor system.

Consequently, the developing colonial system in the early seventeenth century was characterized by a highly dynamic quality, and it is this characteristic which provided a fundamental basis for internal stresses which led to the Timucuan Rebellion.

Mortality among the Indians in the mission provinces was perhaps the most significant factor in demographic decline within the colonial system. Epidemic diseases ravaged aboriginal populations throughout the seventeenth century, and a strong case can be made that such plagues were the primary reason for demographic collapse in the mission provinces of Florida. A great deal of research, both historical and archaeological, has attempted to address the question of depopulation due to epidemic diseases in the region of Spanish Florida (Milner 1980; Dobyns 1983; Hann

Much of this work has focused on the derivation of estimates of aboriginal population size during the late precolumbian and early colonial periods, both on a local and regional scale, using documentary and archaeological data. While in some instances such endeavors are possible, in the case of the Timucua province, and indeed for much of Spanish Florida, this technique does not seem justified due to the paucity of available data, as well as the fundamental unreliability of that data. During the early seventeenth century, Spanish estimates of population size for the Indians of Florida were just that: occasional estimates based on limited information. They were not systematic, nor consistent, nor comprehensive, and thus modern researchers are left with an extremely poor basis for judging aboriginal populations during the early historic period.

Archaeologically derived estimates of population size are virtually nonexistent, inasmuch as the fine-grained chronologies and detailed survey and excavation data necessary for societal-level population estimates simply has not been developed on a broad and comprehensive scale (see Johnson 1991). Although burial populations within Timucua missions have begun to be examined (Weisman 1992; Hoshower and Milanich 1991), the limited data available provides
little assistance in deriving overall population figures for Timucua.

Beyond this, the dynamic nature of mission populations would seem to virtually preclude the accurate estimation of the total population of Indians living in any given mission province at one time. Even with access to the long-lost Franciscan records from Florida, presumably including detailed censuses of mission populations, such documentary evidence would tend to gloss over the substantial transient population (primarily laborers), as well as the processes of inter-provincial migration and flight. It seems extremely doubtful that the Governor of Florida, or even the Franciscan friars, had accurate counts of all the Indians within their jurisdiction. The historical record provides hazy glimpses of substantial populations of Indians just beyond the awareness of Spanish colonial authorities, casting a shadow of doubt on even the most detailed of documentary census records.

Within the documentary record, however, there are many references to ongoing epidemics, including several estimates of the overall rate of population decline during each epoch. While these estimates are vague at best, they provide some perception of the scale of demographic decline being experienced within the mission provinces. Historical references seem to make note of only the most severe episodes, and comments throughout the mission period
reinforce the assumption that demographic decline, while not always on an epidemic scale, was a nearly constant feature of mission life. The Timucua province was no exception in this regard.

Demographic collapse appeared very early in the history of the Timucua mission province. During the first decade after the 1606 establishment of missions in the Potano province, two related processes seem to have been in operation: the rapid disappearance of the early missions in the Potano province, and the appearance of a number of new missions in the Timucua province. Although the details of this period are poorly documented, there is reason to believe that missions San Miguel and San Buenaventura largely vanished prior to 1616, and possibly also Santa Ana, although this mission reappeared occasionally through the seventeenth century as a neighbor of the more important mission San Francisco. By the time of the 1616 visitation of fray Luis Gerónimo de Oré, San Francisco de Potano was the only one of these missions in the Potano province distinguished by a personal visit, and during the rest of the seventeenth century, San Francisco was, for all practical purposes, the only representative of the once powerful province of Potano.

One reason for this rapid decline becomes clear in a pair of letters authored in January of 1617 by a group of Franciscan friars in St. Augustine, writing:
...we find that in four years in this place [Florida], due to the great plagues and contagious illnesses which the Indians have suffered, half of them have died (Pareja et al. 1617b).

As a consequence of these epidemics, the friars further reported that:

...because of the great mortality which there has been among the Indians, there have remained some little villages [lugarillos] of little consideration with very few Indians, such as [villages] of ten or eight houses, and in others fewer or none (Pareja et al. 1617a).

Although these reports do not specify which mission provinces (Guale/Mocama, Potano, or Timucua) were affected by the epidemics, the documented disappearance of missions in Potano during the same period suggests that it was among the most severely depopulated.

The effects on the newer missions in the Timucua region of at least four years of heavy epidemics starting in 1613 is unknown, but the fact that all survived through the first half of the seventeenth century suggests that depopulation in Timucua was perhaps not as severe as in Potano. This may have resulted from the fact that the missions of the Timucua province were more recently founded, and were in several cases considerably farther away from St. Augustine (see Chapter Three). Furthermore, two to three of these missions were on the terminal end of the expanding mission trail system, instead of being on the primary road for St. Augustine, as was the case for Potano. All of these factors may have ameliorated the effects of depopulation, although
it is entirely possible that the epidemics only exacerbated the decline of an already weakened Potano province, perhaps destabilized by the wars of the late sixteenth century, and possibly unrecorded epidemics prior to this time.

It is important to realize that while there is no specific documentary evidence for epidemics prior to those noted for the 1613-1617 period, there is no way to gauge the degree of population decline which may have been going on in these interior provinces since the advent of intensive contact with the Spanish. Indeed, the 1617 report by the friars may have been merely the tip of the iceberg, representing the point at which depopulation reached devastating proportions. If the reports are even remotely accurate, the mortality rate in the mission provinces must have been extremely high during these years. Even if it is assumed that the available historical record is relatively complete (which is improbable), the nature of documentary evidence is such that, in many cases, only the most extreme of circumstances prompted Spaniards to take up the pen in correspondence with the crown. Consequently, direct evidence for epidemics must be viewed as only a fragmentary representation of the potential scope of population decline.

During the early 1630's, there is some evidence for further epidemics, because a number of reports indicate that Franciscan friars were dying in considerable numbers at that time. In a 1633 petition to the King, Fray Francisco Alonso
de Jesús reported that even the recent arrival of eleven new friars:

...could not make reparation for the great lack of ministers which [this province] had, for the many which have been lacking from three years in this place through death ... the few religious who have remained continue dying and wasting away (Jesús 1633).

Although contemporaneous reports indicate that some of these deaths resulted from the incessant labors of the priests, and the cold and swampy nature of the land, it is entirely possible that epidemic diseases played some role.

Yet another major epidemic was reported for the years between 1649 and 1651. Two governors (Ruíz and Ponce de León) succumbed during the year of 1651 alone, prompting the popular election of a replacement from among the military officers (see Bushnell 1978:419). The mission provinces were hard hit; contemporaneous reports reveal "the new lack which there is of ministers, through many having died in the plague of the years of [sixteen] forty-nine and fifty" (Moreno Ponce de León 1651).

Interestingly, another major epidemic seems to have begun in 1655, persisting throughout the late 1650's (and during the Timucuan Rebellion). In 1657, Governor Rebolledo made reference to the:

...three provinces where religious serve, which are those of Guale, Timucua, and that of Apalachee, having very few Indians in the first two through continuing to die, and many have died especially with the illnesses of plague and smallpox which have occurred these years, and they
likewise continue dying in the [province] of Apalachee (Rebolledo 1657g).

These epidemics were confirmed at the same time by the caciques of Guale, who reported that "we have had plague for two years, and this province of Guale has remained deprived of human forces on account of so many deaths" (Menéndez et al. 1657). The province of Timucua was likewise devastated, for the principal cacique Lúcas Menéndez reported that during 1655 "there had been a plague, and almost half of the people of the said province of Timucua had died" (Menéndez Márquez 1660).

Although the documentary record of epidemic population decline in the Timucua mission province during the first half of the seventeenth century is indeed scant, there is evidence for massive demographic collapse on at least two occasions. The epidemics of 1613-1617 wiped out fully half of the Indian population (Pareja et al. 1617b), and that of 1655 alone was explicitly stated by the principal cacique of Timucua to have reduced the population of that province by half again. Even if these estimates were somewhat exaggerated, the rate of population decline must have been staggering.

Archaeological evidence for epidemics in the mission provinces, and Timucua in particular, is scant, although recent work has provided some substantiation for the historical record. Large archaeological samples recently recovered from the Guale province suggest a definite
increase in infectious reactions in the mission period (Larsen 1991:276), and recent work in the cemetery at mission San Martín in Timucua has provided some evidence for epidemic disease, including multiple burials (Hoshower and Milanich 1991). Unfortunately, the very nature of epidemic population decline, involving rapid death, generally precludes the preservation of specific evidence on human remains.

Nevertheless, the overall picture provided by the historical and archaeological data is one of dramatic demographic collapse due to epidemic diseases, perhaps largely sporadic, in the Timucua mission province. The societal changes wrought by such decline are difficult to estimate, particularly considering the multiplicity of interrelated processes in operation during the mission period, such as the repartimiento labor draft, inter-provincial migration, and flight from the missions. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that epidemic population decline impacted Timucua as a society.

The death of significant proportions of the very human population upon which the aboriginal sociopolitical structure was based would undoubtedly erode chiefly power (e.g. Smith 1987). Substantial population decline, combined with the gender-selective stresses of the colonial labor system, almost certainly transformed the Timucua province, and may have plummeted it into veritable disfunction as a
society. The comparatively common appearance of female chiefs in the Timucua province during the rebellion-era (see Table 2, and Chapter Seven and Eight) might be one effect of these processes, resulting from disruptions in the normal line of aboriginal chiefly succession. If the Timucua province was anything like that of Guale as described by its caciques in 1657 (Menéndez et al. 1657), there may have been very few males residing in the mission towns on a year-round basis, and the presence of cacicas would be an expected result.

It should be noted here that epidemic population decline cannot be considered in isolation from other facets of the colonial system. Demographic collapse due to disease occurred in an environment influenced by the expanding mission frontier and the colonial labor system, and thus the processes of demographic transformation were not solely determined by the number of Indians who succumbed to introduced diseases. As will be seen below, the very scope and rapidity of such demographic decline demanded ongoing solutions to problems of labor supply and transportation, resulting in a complex and highly interrelated process of societal transformation which characterized seventeenth-century colonial Florida.
Inter-provincial Migration

There is considerable evidence that the aboriginal inhabitants of the mission provinces of colonial Florida did not always live in the same province that they were born into. Inter-provincial migration seems to have been a fundamental feature of the colonial system, and was thus a major catalyst for cultural and societal change within the mission provinces. Although this subject has not generally been given the attention it deserves, a combination of archaeological and historical data reveal a substantial degree of mobility among the resident mission Indians of Florida prior to the Timucuan Rebellion.

As discussed above, the rate of demographic decline, due to a variety of factors, was quite high within the Timucua mission province. Based on several comments from contemporary observers, it might be argued that aboriginal societies experiencing a rate of population collapse of perhaps fifty percent over the course of only a few years could not have survived as viable entities without an influx of new population from elsewhere. Historical and archaeological evidence suggest that this was precisely the case. Although the locations and perhaps the relative populations of most of the major towns in the Timucua mission province may have remained roughly constant during the first half of the seventeenth century, the internal
composition of the population living in these towns does not appear to have remained static.

A large body of archaeological data reveals substantial transformations in the material culture of the aboriginal inhabitants of the mission towns in Timucua between 1606 and 1656. As discussed in Chapter Two, the first Franciscan friars to establish missions in the interior of North-Central and North Florida did so among aboriginal representatives of the Alachua and Suwannee Valley cultures. Based on archaeological work at a number of these pre-rebellion sites, however, these pre columbian cultures seem to have been transformed and largely replaced by a radically different material culture, known as the Jefferson culture,\(^{10}\) during the seventeenth century (Symes and Stephens 1965; Milanich 1971; Loucks 1979; Johnson 1991; Weisman 1992; Worth 1992b).

The timing of this transformation has been the subject of considerable speculation, but very recent excavations indicate that, at least for the Potano and Timucua regions of the Timucua mission province,\(^{11}\) Jefferson material culture replaced the indigenous Alachua and Suwannee Valley cultures sometime between the initial establishment of missions in 1606 and 1608 and the abandonment of many of these sites following the Timucuan Rebellion of 1656 (Weisman 1992; Worth 1992b).\(^{12}\) This places the Jefferson transformation precisely during the period under
consideration here, and suggests that it was in some way linked to the many other changes going on during the colonial era.

The nature of the Jefferson transformation is presently understood primarily in the realm of domestic ceramic assemblages. Sometime during the early seventeenth century, an entirely new assemblage of utilitarian ceramics began to be manufactured in the mission towns of Timucua, ultimately replacing the characteristic ceramics of the Alachua and Suwannee Valley cultures. The extent of this change is quite remarkable, for not only did surface decoration change, but also the entire range of vessel forms, and the techniques of ceramic manufacture (Weisman 1992; Worth 1992b). From a sand-tempered assemblage of simple vessel forms decorated with a variety of largely randomized surface treatments, there emerged a grog, grit, and shell-tempered assemblage of elaborate and complex vessel forms decorated with carved wooden paddles and incised designs.

What is significant about such a change is that it seems to reflect a substantial cultural innovation, and one which is quite unlikely to have simply been the result of cultural diffusion, or the adoption of new ideas from outsiders. Not only did the most visual elements of the ceramic assemblage, such as decoration, undergo innovation, but also the entire method of ceramic manufacture, including tempering materials, vessel wall thickness, vessel shape,
and possibly firing temperature. Such innovations argue for the presence of extralocal potters in the mission villages, who not only began producing a new ceramic assemblage, but also transmitted the specific information regarding its manufacture to the indigenous local inhabitants.

There is indeed evidence that such transmission did take place, for the Jefferson ceramic assemblage did not simply replace the earlier Alachua and Suwannee Valley ceramic types, but instead seems to have blended with the indigenous styles. The appearance of Alachua and Suwannee Valley surface decorations on vessels with Jefferson temper and form, and even occasionally alongside Jefferson decorations, argues strongly for some degree of continuity between the indigenous and introduced cultures (Weisman 1992; Worth 1992b). Nevertheless, the rapid spread and eventual dominance of the introduced Jefferson culture suggests in-migration on a large scale.

The complexity of this transformation in ceramics suggests that this was only one facet of other cultural changes which may have been going on simultaneously. In particular, since ceramics relate to food preparation and storage, such profound changes in the domestic ceramic assemblage might be argued to reflect a shift in such techniques. As noted below, there is some evidence to suggest that the ceramic transformation was only a reflection of more fundamental shifts in food habits.
The key to understanding the Jefferson transformation lies in the origins of the Jefferson culture. More specifically, in identifying where this extralocal culture originated, it becomes possible to examine the processes which might have led to migration and resettlement within the Timucua mission province. Archaeological data from Northwest Florida reveal that the Jefferson material culture had blended with and largely supplanted the indigenous Fort Walton material culture prior to the missionization of the Apalachee province in 1633 (Tesar 1980; Scarry 1987, 1990). Recent excavations at the 1539 winter encampment of Hernando de Soto have further indicated that this transformation had not yet occurred at that time (Ewen 1990:87), placing the Jefferson transformation during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century in the Apalachee province.

While the specific reasons for this transformation in Northwest Florida will not be explored at length here, it suffices to say that by the time of the early seventeenth-century missionary forays into Apalachee, the Jefferson culture seems to have been entrenched in that region. Whether or not this late sixteenth-century transformation in material culture had simultaneously affected aboriginal populations to the west of Apalachee (and thus perhaps in the Yustaga region) is presently unknown, but as noted above, as of the early seventeenth century, it had not spread into the Timucua and Potano regions.
The Jefferson material culture may be classified as a Mississippian-related culture, inasmuch as it possesses clear relationships to the late pre columbian material culture known as Lamar, distributed over a broad area of the lower Southeast (see Williams and Shapiro 1990). As such, both the pre columbian Mississippian culture of Fort Walton and the early seventeenth-century Jefferson culture were Mississippian-related, in contrast to the Suwannee Valley and Alachua cultures to the east (see Chapter Two). Consequently, when the Jefferson transformation reached the Timucua and Potano regions before the middle of the seventeenth century, the associated cultural changes may have had wider dimensions, perhaps including subsistence strategies and other cultural phenomena associated with the Mississippian way of life.

What is important for the present discussion is not so much the content of the cultural transformation which the Timucua mission province experienced during the first fifty years of its missionization, but the reasons for that transformation, and what that implies regarding the colonial system in general. Archaeological evidence argues strongly for a substantial west-to-east demographic flow during the first half of the seventeenth century. Specifically, the material culture of the Apalachee (and possibly Yustaga) region was introduced into the Timucua and Potano regions by a process of inter-provincial migration. Based on the
widespread production of domestic aboriginal ceramics by female potters in the southeastern United States, this migration must have involved the relocation of Indian women, and probably entire families, from west to east.

Such an argument is not new for colonial Spanish Florida, for a nearly identical process has been proposed to explain the replacement of local St. Johns ceramic assemblages in the vicinity of St. Augustine with the northern San Marcos assemblages associated with the Guale province (e.g. Deagan 1991). If the two instances are taken together, a general pattern emerges: during the colonial period, aboriginal ceramic assemblages associated with aboriginal groups near St. Augustine on both the northern and western mission chain were rapidly transformed and replaced with aboriginal assemblages (both from Lamar-related Mississippian cultures) originating on the far terminus of the mission system.

Within the context of the developing colonial system, such a pattern seems best explained by the interrelated processes of missionization, population decline, the colonial labor system, and transport and communication. As the mission frontier expanded, more and more aboriginal societies began to be integrated into the developing colonial system. At the same time, demographic collapse started to affect those societies already within the system, leaving the established mission provinces (nearest to St.
Augustine) increasingly depopulated. Partly as a result of this fact, the mission frontier expanded ever westward, tapping new reserves of aboriginal population for incorporation into the colonial system.

In the wake of the expanding frontier of missionization, however, lay an increasingly depopulated zone between St. Augustine and its major labor reserve. This expanding "shock wave" of demographic collapse forced the continual flow of aboriginal populations from west to east, repopulating the older and more devastated provinces in an effort to maintain the all-important link of transport and communication between St. Augustine and its crucial labor pool. This was particularly the case for the Timucua province, inasmuch as it lay along the primary land-corridor to the important Apalachee province. Within the space of only a few decades, the precolumbian ceramic complexes of North and North-Central Florida were transformed and replaced by the Jefferson complex, originating along the western reaches of the Timucua mission province (perhaps in Yustaga).

Documentary evidence for such a massive process of inter-provincial migration is meager. Nevertheless, a few scattered references demonstrate convincingly that population movements were not uncommon during the first half of the seventeenth century, and that the Timucua mission province was not composed entirely of Indians from within
Timucua. In 1617, prompted by four years of massive epidemics, the Franciscans of Florida requested permission to resettle the Indians, stating:

...the Indians cannot be indoctrinated by the religious, and as Christians, they have little more than the name, by being very far from the religious, from which it follows also that when they advise the religious to administer the sacraments to a sick person, when the minister arrives, [the person] is already dead, and for this cause the religious walk with extremely great labor day and night, very much at cost to their health. We request that Your Majesty is served to command that, provided that these necessities happen, and that the governors are advised by the prelate, these disordered [settlements] should be drawn together [compongan estos desordenes], since there is not one inconvenience, through those that have to join together not being from different families or languages, but rather friends of friends, brothers of brothers, and relatives of relatives beforehand. It is an important and necessary thing for them, since the reason for which so many Indians die is customarily that being few, they cannot help each other in the labors, and thus they carry so much from unavoidable services which they use among themselves, and from those who command them on the part of the presidio, like to row canoes [or] to carry cargos by land, that oppressed under so many labors they are consumed and die (Pareja et al. 1617a).

This request reflects the stresses of rapid depopulation, and marks the probable beginnings of the program of reducción within the mission provinces of Florida. While there is little direct evidence for the operative details of this program (or for that matter whether or not it was pursued in a consistent manner), this 1617 request, combined with historical and archaeological data for the contemporaneous abandonment of most of the early missions in
the Potano province, suggests that the Florida missionaries did indeed implement a limited policy of settlement aggregation, if only occasionally in response to specific episodes. In these early years of missionization, this seems to have been on a limited scale, drawing in depopulated outlying settlements into central mission towns (perhaps within single Level II site clusters at first). But as noted above, there is substantial archaeological evidence that the program of population relocation must have expanded over the next decades, ultimately involving inter-regional migration (certainly between Level III regions).

The relocation of entire towns from one province to another was not unusual during this period. During the late 1620's, Governor Luis de Rójas y Borja moved the Guale town of Tolomato from its original site in the coastal zone of modern Georgia to a site three leagues north of St. Augustine "with the intention of continuing the passage for Mocama, Guale, and the remaining provinces" (Santiago 1658). Furthermore, as noted above, two attempts were made to relocate the town of Santiago de Ocone on the eastern flank of the Okefenokee Swamp, once in 1646 by Governor Ruíz, who intended to repopulate the crossing point of the St. Johns River at San Diego de Elaca, and once again in 1655 by Governor Rebolledo, who wished to repopulate mission Nombre de Dios, just north of St. Augustine (Ruíz de Salazar Vallecilla 1646; Alcayde de Cordoba 1660).
If the documentary record is so scant regarding these attempts to move entire towns, then it is even more so for the year to year migrations of individual Indians or families within and between the mission provinces. Nevertheless, there is evidence that such a process was not uncommon, for testimony dating to the rebellion era provides ample proof for the presence of non-native Indians within the Timucua province. As will be seen in Chapters Seven and Eight, at least two of the seven murders during the Timucuan Rebellion were committed by Indians who had been born and baptized in the province of Diminiyuti (Acuera), and one of the most prominent Indian interpreters of that period was likewise born in Diminiyuti, but raised in the province of Apalachee.

Although these examples do not address the specific case of eastward migration as a response to demographic collapse during the early seventeenth century, they nonetheless provide hints as to the ethnic and linguistic diversity which may well have characterized the mission provinces during this period. The traditional portrait of each mission province as a largely monocultural and monolingual society may ignore the dynamic processes of inter-provincial migration and integration which could easily have operated beyond the view of the historical record. The common Indians, forming the bulk of the aboriginal population in each mission province, rarely show
up in documentation, and when they do, the picture presented is one of considerably greater ethnic complexity than might initially be perceived. Ultimately, the archaeological record provides better evidence for such processes than does historical documentation. Nevertheless, explanations begin to emerge only in the light of the broader context of the colonial system, as revealed by both sources of evidence.

It should be noted that although there is little early seventeenth-century historical evidence for the demographic flow hypothesized above, the period following the Timucuan Rebellion witnessed a considerable acceleration in the migration of aboriginal population within Timucua. As will be seen in Chapter Nine, the pacification of the Timucua province after 1656 provided the opportunity to implement a sweeping program of settlement relocation, resulting in the geographical restructuring of the entire province. The many transformations of the first half of the seventeenth century were but a preface to the post-rebellion era.

Notes

1. The phrase los degollo todos literally refers to beheading or cutting the throat, but Spanish executions typically involved hanging or garroting (the same phrase was applied in one instance to the leaders of the Timucuan Rebellion, who were certainly hanged (see Chapter Seven).

2. Late in 1628 or early 1629, soldiers "brought the captain of that town [of Pohoy], who is the second person of the cacique, so that the señor Governor [Don Luis de Rójas y Borja] might give him gifts, and negotiate peace between them and the Amacanos" (Calvo 1630). Ten years later, the
Amacanos were at war with the Apalachee (Vega, Castro, y Pardo 1639).

3. During Governor Salinas' term, Apalachee had yet to be missionized, although the cacique had rendered obedience to the crown soon after Fray Prieto's visit in 1608. Cañizares may have been correct in his reference to raids on Apalachee at this time, but this statement may be a result of the fact that Apalachee had indeed been missionized less than two years before the writing of his petition.

4. Documentary references to the precise numbers of Indians killed during these raids on the mission provinces are virtually nonexistent, in contrast to comparatively ample documentation relating to the occasional murders of Spanish soldiers and friars.

5. These soldiers were led by Captain Don Martin de Cuevas, and included Ensign Antonio de Argüelles (from whose service record the copied order derives).

6. The earliest known reference to this location appears in the declaration of Fray Francisco Pareja, who in 1602 described the "land which is called Ocony, three days by road from the town of San Juan, and two from the town of San Pedro", the cacique of which requested baptism for "him and his town, with the rest of the neighboring towns" (Pareja 1602). As discussed, the 1646 order locates the "lake of Oconi" 20 leagues from the nearest mission (Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla 1646), and the 1655 mission list describes the mission of "Santiago de Ocone, island" at 30 leagues from St. Augustine (Díez de la Calle 1659). Captain Alcayde (1660) noted that "in the province of Mocama, which is withdrawn from the village of San Pedro, which is the head of the said province, between two lakes / [----] little towns [---] that the largest was Santiago", further indicating that "the said villages are very remote from this city [St. Augustine], and likewise withdrawn from the rest of the provinces." These descriptions place the villages of Ocone in the vicinity of the eastern flank of the Okefenokee, and the reference to the principal town of Santiago de Ocone as being an "island", and as being "between two lakes", suggests that Ocone may have been on an island within the swamp itself.

7. Alcayde de Cordoba (1660) reported that the soldiers were led by Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia, although this officer's later service record only made a brief mention of having been sent "to conduct and take Indians from some towns to others" (Fernández de Florencia 1670).
8. The province of Ibiniute (or Diminiyuti) was identical with Acuera, and seems to have been located in the interior of central Florida, probably along the Oklawaha River in the upper reaches of the St. Johns river drainage. The region had been missionized as early as 1627, for its principal mission of Santa Lucía de Acuera denoted one of the Timucuan language dialects listed by Fray Pareja in his 1627 Catechismo (Milanich and Sturtevant 1972:20). The "province of Santa Lucía, a land of Christians" was described in 1630 as being located in the interior of Florida, within the 50-league distance between St. Augustine and the province of Pohoy (Díaz de Badajoz 1630). Under the name of Ibiniute, the province was included in Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia's 1648 visitation of Timucua and Apalachee provinces (Fernández de Florencia 1670). In 1655, two missions were listed for Acuera: San Luis at 32 leagues from St. Augustine, and Santa Lucía at 34 leagues. Testimony from the rebellion period confirms these missions as being part of the province of Diminiyuti (see below, and Chapters Seven and Eight). The province was evidently never truly incorporated as a formal mission province, although it appeared occasionally on the labor draft orders of the 1660's (e.g. Guerra y Vega 1668).

9. Colonial Spanish observers generally considered female Indian leaders something of an anomaly, and this is consistent with the nature of Southeastern aboriginal societies as currently understood (see Hudson 1976). Nevertheless, in the absence of comparative data, it is entirely possible that the pre columbian societies of interior northern Florida were commonly ruled by female chiefs.

10. The terminology used in this volume will conform to that developed for archaeological excavations at the Fig Springs site in 1989 (Weisman 1992). The relationship between the Jefferson culture as presently conceived and earlier descriptions and names for the same archaeological culture is discussed at length in an appendix to Weisman's book (Worth 1992a), but for the purpose of the present discussion, the Jefferson culture may be roughly equated with the Leon-Jefferson complex first defined by Hale Smith (1949).

11. As noted in Chapter Two, the Yustaga region, in the northwestern drainage of the Suwannee River valley, has received very little archaeological attention in the past, and thus at present there is no way to date the Jefferson transformation in this region (unlike Apalachee to the west).
12. Beyond the chronological data (based largely on Spanish majolica) from many of these sites, which indicates abandonment after the middle of the seventeenth century (e.g. Johnson 1991; Weisman 1992), perhaps the best evidence that the Jefferson transformation predated the Timucuan Rebellion is provided by its broad geographic distribution within the Timucua mission province (see Johnson 1991). As discussed at length in Chapter Nine, the post-rebellion Timucua province was effectively characterized by a largely linear settlement distribution, reflecting the massive program of population relocation following the suppression of the Timucuan Rebellion. Indeed, a major reason for this resettlement was the scattered distribution of aboriginal towns in Timucua, resulting from a largely pre-columbian settlement pattern. The fact that archaeological sites of missions displaying substantial evidence of the Jefferson transformation are widely distributed, and not merely along the Camino Real, confirms that this transformation occurred during the first half of the seventeenth century, and not afterward.

13. The Jefferson transformation in Apalachee is hypothesized to reflect a process similar to that argued to have taken place later in Timucua, namely the influx of a large number of outsiders into the region of Northwest Florida. This may be connected with the collapse of chiefdoms in the interior of Georgia and Alabama following widespread depopulation due to introduced European diseases (see Smith 1987). A similar process of refugee amalgamation has been postulated during the same period for the Oconee River valley in Georgia, and the Wateree River valley in South Carolina (Smith 1989). Scarry (1987, 1990), on the other hand, emphasises cultural continuity across this period of transformation in material culture, suggesting that changes in sociopolitical organization and external relationships, and not population replacement, was responsible.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE TIMUCUAN REBELLION

Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo

Don Diego de Rebolledo, son of the former Treasurer of Cartagena, was granted the Royal title to the Governorship of Florida on March 24, 1653. Just over a year later, he arrived in St. Augustine to take formal possession of the government of Florida on June 18, 1654. By the time of his death five years later, he had earned a reputation which would prompt historians to characterize him as one of the most hated Governors of colonial Spanish Florida. Although Timucua was indeed a province under considerable stress prior to his arrival, it was no coincidence that violence erupted during Rebolledo's term of office. Governor Rebolledo's abuses brought the Timucua mission province to an unprecedented level of tension, and in the end all that was required for the uprising was a spark.

Although Lúcas Menéndez, the principal cacique of the Timucua mission province in 1656, enjoyed amicable relations with his late godfather Francisco Menéndez Márquez and his three sons, he held Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo in particular disregard. Ample testimony documents the fact
that the cacique of San Martín became dissatisfied with his treatment at the hands of Rebolledo, and that there were undoubtedly some feelings of resentment on the part of Lúcas. Unlike his predecessors, Rebolledo ignored long-standing tradition and refused to present the Christian caciques in the mission provinces (particularly Timucua, as will be discussed below) with gifts when they traveled to St. Augustine to render obedience to the new Governor. Indeed, soon after his arrival in June of 1654, Rebolledo and the new Royal Treasurer Don Joseph de Prado composed a detailed argument against such expenses, citing two Cédulas (from 1593 and 1615) which specifically allotted royal funds for gifts only to neighboring caciques bearing news of enemies, or to caciques agreeing to convert to Christianity for the first time (Prado 1654; Rebolledo 1654).

While Rebolledo's arguments cite Royal orders and the lack of funds in Florida as his reason for denying gifts to the mission caciques, there is good reason to believe that this was only part of the story. As later accusations asserted, confirmed by subsequent investigations during his residencia, Governor Rebolledo actively pursued the increase of his own personal wealth during his term, using a variety of illegal means to exploit both soldiers and Indians (Council of the Indies 1657a, 1657b; Ranjel 1660). Beyond operating a store out of the house of Ensign Francisco de Oria -- making personal profit using royal funds to buy
goods from Havana -- Rebolledo maintained trading relations with the Indians of Ais (along the Atlantic coast near Cape Canaveral), bartering iron tools and other goods for amber, which was then sold in Havana without paying royal taxes (see Bushnell 1981).

This amber trade, along with trade for other goods in the rich province of Apalachee, forced the diversion of many items which otherwise could have been used as gifts to Christian caciques. Rebolledo even melted down nails, guns, and an anchor to produce items for barter, leaving the fort and the garrison in poor condition. Not only did this contribute to the lack of military preparedness in St. Augustine in 1656, but it also left the mission caciques with little or nothing in return for their pledge of continued allegiance. This seems to have been particularly the case in the Timucua province, for even Don Luis, the principal cacique of Apalachee, was favored with a rich reception and gifts in St. Augustine, including a fine sword from Toledo (e.g. Sotomayor; Rocha; Hernández; Entonado 1660). Rebolledo evidently saw no immediate profit from good relations with Timucua, and thus broke with half a century of tradition in failing to present its caciques with gifts and food.

The acting Governor of Florida prior to Rebolledo, Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner (son of Luis Horruytiner, Royal Governor during the 1630s), evidently petitioned Governor
Rebolledo several times with respect to this policy, arguing that the two cited Cédulas were out of date, having been issued during the early years of the colony (Horruytiner 1660). Horruytiner argued that he understood the nature of the Indians, who responded not to reason but instead to charm and gifts, and thus appealed that Rebolledo give something to all the caciques, and not simply those who brought amber. This advice was apparently not taken, and thus Governor Rebolledo earned the particular disgust of the caciques of Timucua.

Lúcas Menéndez and other caciques in Timucua evidently complained on many occasions that Rebolledo failed to treat them with the respect that they were due. During Lúcas' visit to St. Augustine to render obedience to the newly installed Governor Rebolledo (probably in late 1654), Captain Martín Alcayde de Cordoba found the cacique eating in the house of the interpreter Estéban Solana, and questioned him why he was eating there. Responding that he had been hungry, and that his "comrade" Solana had done him the mercy of feeding him, Lúcas revealed that Governor Rebolledo refused to give him food, and said that "if he were cacique of Ays, or another infidel, that the Governor would give it [food] to him" (Alcayde de Cordoba 1660).

Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez Márquez, eldest son of Francisco and current owner of the La Chua ranch, also reported that Lúcas had complained that "now he was not
cacique of Timucua, nor was attention paid to him, since having come to this city, in order to return he did not have food to carry for the road, nor [could he buy it?], the cost being barbarous, [and thus] he lacked wheat and corn" (Pérez de Villa Real 1660). Don Juan further reported that an Indian interpreter from Nombre de Dios, named Juan Menéndez, said that Lúcas Menéndez had not gone away content from this first meeting with Rebolledo, "but rather disgusted from the little reception that he had found in the Governor" (Menéndez Márquez 1660).

Having returned to mission San Martín, Lúcas later told Don Juan's brother Antonio that "After your father died, no attention is paid to us now", which Don Antonio understood to be a reference to Rebolledo's treatment of him in St. Augustine (Menéndez Márquez 1660). While in San Francisco Potano, Don Antonio heard similar complaints from its cacique and the caciquillo of Namo regarding the lack of gifts from Rebolledo. Don Antonio furthermore reported that while in his house in St. Augustine, Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares had one day asked Benito Ruiz, the cacique of Santa Cruz de Tarihica, "How are you going, without carrying something for the road?", and the cacique had responded that in three or four visits to the city, he had never been given anything, and said "he would go running in order to arrive quickly at his land" (Menéndez Márquez 1660). Several caciques of Guale complained similarly to another officer.
regarding Rebolledo's failure to distribute gifts, unlike his predecessors (Rocha 1660).

Other statements made by Lúcas Menéndez and the caciques in Timucua are particularly telling, and tend to indict the unrelenting demands of the repartimiento labor system as one component of the decision to rebel. As noted in Chapter Five, Lúcas Menéndez expressed complaints about the administration of the labor draft during Rebolledo's term. Don Antonio Menéndez Márquez related that the cacique of San Martín:

...also complained that the year [----]^2 thirty-two digging Indians who should come to this city for the labors, and afterwards there had been a plague and almost half of the people of the said province of Timucua had died, and that consecutive year he had ordered to pick out fifty or sixty (Menéndez Márquez 1660).

Lúcas was said to have retorted to Don Antonio that "the Indians died and the Spaniards will die", which the Spaniard understood to mean that "upon the Indians dying, the Spaniards would die" (Menéndez Márquez 1660). Another fragmentary statement related by a soldier demonstrates a similar sentiment, suggesting the Indians were of the opinion that "if they had to perish, it was better to rise up" (Calderón 1660).

Rebolledo seems to have followed a similar policy in the province of Guale, which was evidently affected by simultaneous epidemics. In 1657, the caciques of Guale complained of the Governor and his soldiers that:
...although we have had a plague for two years, and this province of Guale has been left deprived of human forces on account of so many deaths, as is on record, today they gather by force more people than ever... (Menéndez et al. 1657)

This passage is remarkably similar to the quote from Lúcas Menéndez of Timucua above, confirming that not only did Rebolledo fail to allow for depopulation in his yearly labor quotas, but he even increased the demand in the midst of a particularly harsh epidemic.

In sum, Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo displayed remarkable insensitivity to the nuances of maintaining good relations with the aboriginal leaders of the mission provinces, and particularly those of Timucua. Lúcas Menéndez and the other caciques of Timucua governed an aboriginal society which had been transformed by the process of integration into the Spanish colonial system, gradually usurping the political autonomy of the province. A combination of factors, including the stresses of the colonial labor system, massive demographic collapse, and inter-provincial migration, left the Timucua mission province an increasingly disfunctional society. Into this clearly unstable situation stepped Governor Rebolledo, whose abuses brought Timucua to the verge of rebellion.

The Immediate Cause

The event which ultimately provided the spark for the Timucuan Rebellion occurred not in Florida, but some eight
hundred miles to the south of St. Augustine in the Caribbean Sea. The British seizure of Jamaica in May 1655 was a severe blow to Spanish interests in the Indies, and reinforced concerns regarding the defense of strategic ports across the Caribbean. Later that same year, intelligence gathered by the Spanish ambassador to England, Don Alonso de Cárdenas, revealed details of British designs on the port of St. Augustine. In a letter to the King dated October 4, 1655, Cárdenas reported a plan overheard by an imprisoned Spanish mariner who had just returned with the British armada. British intentions included:

the conquest of the port of St. Augustine in Florida, judging it the most easy and suited for their intentions, since upon occupying it they would be left owners of all that country which includes the mainland and the Bahama Channel, with which it seems to them that they could impede the passage of the fleets and galleons. The mode of conquest of that fort would not be by entering through the river upon which it is situated, because it does not have enough depth for the ships that they lead, but rather by placing people on land through another place near there in order to occupy it, being assured that they would be able to do so with facility, since that presidio has no more than three hundred men, and is deprived of munitions and lacks many other things (Royal Cédula 1655).

A plan of defensive action was soon formulated, and the Governor of Florida was informed by a Royal Cédula dated November 16. The King feared that although the British armada had returned to England without accomplishing this goal, it could easily pursue such a course of action on its next voyage.
Consequently, another Royal Cédula was dispatched simultaneously to the Viceroy of New Spain instructing that he provide assistance in the form of soldiers, along with gunpowder and other munitions, to Florida (Royal Cédula 1655). He was likewise to instruct the Governors of Havana and Yucatan to provide further aid, being closer to St. Augustine. Timing was considered crucial, and the tone of the cédula indicates that the threat to Florida was considered imminent.

Unfortunately, due to the sluggish pace of communications between Europe and the New World during the seventeenth century, the Cédula did not arrive in Florida until April of the following year. Adding to the urgency of this order, another letter arrived at the same time from the Governor of Havana, Don Juan Montano, relating information extracted from several prisoners from a British armada somewhere off the coast of Cuba at that time (Rebolledo 1657a). Their testimony confirmed the British intentions toward Florida, and indeed suggested that the enemy fleet could descend upon St. Augustine within days or weeks.

There seems little doubt that Rebolledo was caught more or less completely unprepared for such an impending threat. In large part due to the chronic lack of soldiers and supplies in Florida, almost certainly augmented by the various facets of Rebolledo's corrupt Governorship, St. Augustine seems to have been poorly equipped to deal with a
frontal assault by an enemy armada at that time (as indeed the British seem to have been well aware). In the Governor's own words:

In that time this presidio found itself with the fort [largely] on the ground, with gates open, and with more than forty infantry less than the complement [of three hundred], and with no more sustenance than three-hundred arrobas of corn which there were at that time in the royal warehouses in order to give ration to the infantry (Rebolledo 1657a).

Captain Alonso de Argüelles later recalled the pitiful state of preparedness in St. Augustine, noting that:

Its fort was very ruined and collapsed to the ground in many places ... [and] in that occasion this presidio was very lacking in supplies since there was neither wheat nor considerable corn, and [it was decided] that the little that there was should be reserved for the occasion (Argüelles 1660).

Substantial testimony from the Rebolledo residencia confirms the above descriptions. As a result of these conditions, the arrival of the Royal Cédula and Montano's letter in early April of 1656 initiated a series of events which would ultimately ignite the undercurrent of resentment and hostility within the Timucua mission province into murderous violence, threatening not only all previous Spanish expansion into the interior, but also the very existence of the colonial system upon which Spanish Florida was based.

In an effort to comply with the royal order to assure the defense of Florida, Rebolledo was forced to embark on a course of action which would rapidly upgrade the defensive status of St. Augustine. His tasks were threefold: the
crumbling fortifications around the city had to be repaired and expanded, the royal warehouses had to be restocked with additional food and supplies, and the number of infantry in the presidio had to be augmented. Beyond this, the perceived urgency of the situation demanded immediate solutions, and while the British threat ultimately failed to materialize during this time, few options were available to Rebolledo based on the information in his possession that April.

Not daring to wait for reinforcements from Cuba, Rebolledo quickly dispatched Captain Francisco García de la Vera in the frigate Nuestra Señora del Monte to Havana to inform the Governor there of the extreme necessity in St. Augustine for men and supplies, and presumably to encourage the Governor's immediate compliance with the royal order that he send aid to Florida. In St. Augustine, the repairs to the fort began almost immediately, along with the construction of new trenches at the mouth of the port (Ponce de León; Pérez de Villa Real; Argüelles 1660). Rebolledo quickly dispatched a number of officers to begin building the trenches along with the Indians that each one had at that time in his service (presumably as part of the yearly labor draft).

Simultaneously, the Governor called a meeting of infantry leaders and other principal people in St. Augustine, in which he conferred with them regarding the
best course of action (Puerta; Argüelles 1660). Although the names of all those who attended are unknown, it was almost certainly at this meeting that Rebolledo's plan to draft Indians to make up the shortfall in troops was formulated.

Probably in an effort to forestall any later complaints by the Franciscans that they had not been consulted, Rebolledo next traveled to the Indian town of Tolomato two leagues distant in the company of treasurer Don Joseph de Prado and several officers and soldiers in order to confer with the various Franciscan officials there (Rebolledo 1657a; Prado; Rios; Cigarroa; Horruytiner 1657; Puerta 1660). Present at this meeting were Commissary Fray Pedro de Chacon (resident of Tolomato), Provincial Fray Juan de Medina, and three other friars. During the meeting, Rebolledo informed the friars of the news of the British designs on St. Augustine, and discussed his plans to repair the fort, for which he requested the use of some wood which had been previously cut for the purpose of repairing the Franciscan convent. In addition, at this time he revealed the plan which he had formulated in order to remedy the lack of infantry and supplies in the presidio.

Due to the imminent danger of attack from the enemy armada, and due to the suspicion that this attack would come by land, Rebolledo realized that more infantry would be needed to fend off the British troops. Although he had
reason to believe that more Spanish soldiers might be sent from New Spain, Yucatan, or Cuba, this relief might arrive too late, and thus Rebolledo decided upon the one course of action left to him: the immediate activation of the Indian militia within the mission provinces. He made it abundantly clear in his subsequent orders that only the "most valorous" warriors were to be sent, including only those who could be spared from their agricultural fields, since it was planting time (Ponce de León; Argüelles; Hernández 1660). In this manner, Rebolledo would receive the infantry he needed, and the agricultural crops in the mission provinces would not be threatened for that year.

Rebolledo's strategy was simple; as later described by an officer under the Governor's command:

...ordering the said principal Indians was necessary, in that there should not be doubt for the defense of this post if the English were coming, because the infantry, or at least the greater part of them, had to be in the fort, and there was no one who might make opposition to the enemy, and they could enter through the bar and other parts and seize the land, and the said Indians would be able to face up to them with some of the soldiers and not let them disembark on land, because unless there was someone who could do this, it was unavoidable [for the English] to conquer the city and then the fort, having it besieged by land and by sea, with which it would be impossible to be able to sustain themselves in it, nor to have aid for it (Reyes 1660).

Due to the lack of an effective force of Spanish infantry who could be spared from the fort, Rebolledo planned to distribute Indian warriors on land and along the coast in an effort to fend off the expected land-assault by English
troops. Using Indian warriors as complements to the Spanish infantry was a common practice in Spanish Florida, and thus Governor Rebolledo simply followed precedent in augmenting his military reserves (see Chapter Five).

The problem with this plan, however, was the lack of food in St. Augustine. If there was barely enough food for the Spanish soldiers and their dependents already in the city, then the addition of several hundred Indian warriors would surely devastate the food reserves in the royal warehouses (Menéndez Márquez; Entonado 1660). The dilemma lay in the fact that Rebolledo had an urgent need for Indian warriors whom he could not feed. Consequently, the Governor proposed that each Indian be required to carry a quantity of corn with him to St. Augustine for his own sustenance. This corn was intended to suffice for the journey of some eight to ten days on the road (San Antonio et al. 1657), and for a stay of one month in the presidio, while provisions were brought from other places (Puerta; Santiago; Pérez de Villa Real 1660).

According to later witnesses called by Rebolledo (1657a), the friars did not object to his plan, and the only discussion at this meeting related to the amount of corn which would be necessary. The friars, on the other hand, argued in a separate letter that Rebolledo had not called the meeting for their advice, but instead to inform them of a decision already made, as was his usual practice (San
It seems likely that the meeting at Tolomato was largely an effort by Rebolledo to cover himself from future criticism that he had not discussed the matter with the Franciscans. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the friars mounted an active opposition to Rebolledo's plan until learning later of the immediate reaction of the caciques of Timucua (see below).

The snag in Rebolledo's plan, which ultimately would provide the immediate reason for the Timucuan Rebellion, was that the pre-existing militia within the mission provinces almost certainly consisted of the highest-ranking males in aboriginal society, including not only the warriors, but also the caciques and principal leaders, who served as military leaders in both Indian and Spanish society (indeed the caciques and principals evidently held high ranks within the Spanish army, such as Captain and even Sergeant Major). Consequently, by activating the Indian militia, Rebolledo called up all the principal Indian leaders, leaving the bulk of the common laborers to tend the fields.

It was Rebolledo's insistence that each warrior carry his own food which created the problem, for such tasks were never delegated to caciques and principals within Indian society. In a society with sharp distinctions of rank and privilege, common Indians were given tasks of manual labor, such as that associated with the repartimiento draft, and thus Rebolledo's command ignored long-standing institutions
within aboriginal society (and presumably during the early colonial period). Given Rebolledo's situation, however, there was little else that he could do in order to immediately supplement the Spanish infantry with the Indian militia. Based on the extreme lack of food in St. Augustine, every individual who came to the city had to carry enough food to sustain himself, and thus there could be no provision for leaders who brought burden-bearers to carry their food, since each servant would also be required to carry enough food for himself.¹⁰

Rebolledo (1657a) argued that this was not the first time that such a request had been made. At least twice before, he noted, during the Governorships of Don Luis de Rojas y Borja (1624-1630) and Damian de Vega, Castro, y Pardo (1638-1645), similar orders had been dispatched to the mission provinces, and Rebolledo used this fact in making his decision (see Chapter Five). In reality, however, these earlier instances were distinct from Rebolledo's plan, for the first simply involved the drafting of the informal militia (with rations presumably provided by the Spanish in St. Augustine), and the second involved the transport of corn to St. Augustine (presumably by common burden-bearers only). Governor Rebolledo effectively combined the two orders he cited as precedent, commanding that not only should the militia be drafted, but that its members should carry corn. Such a combined order had no precedent among
the caciques of Timucua, and Rebolledo's failure to consider this resulted in disaster.

Following the meeting at Tolomato, Rebolledo's party returned to St. Augustine. Soon thereafter, the Governor set his plan in motion, drafting appropriate orders on the 19th and 20th of April. The first order was directed to the western mission provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, and the second went to the northern province of Guale. It is important to note that these orders are slightly different, as will be seen below:

[Order to Timucua and Apalachee]
Don Diego de Rebolledo, knight of the order of Santiago, Governor and Captain-General of this city of St. Augustine, Florida and its provinces for His Majesty. Inasmuch as I have had news by Cédula from His Majesty, whom God protects, how the English enemy is endeavoring to come upon this post with design of setting foot in [these provinces] in order to be owner of the mouth of the Bahama Channel and impede the passage of the fleets and galleons which sail out through it, this news and others that I have had from the Field Master Don Juan Montano, Governor and Captain-General of the city of Havana, obligate me to be with the caution and (?) which are required, and to make the preparations necessary for its defense, one of the most important being to send a person of all satisfaction to the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, jointly on the part of His Majesty and mine [to give] this news to all their caciques so that they should be prepared with all their vassals for when the occasion happens, and that for the present they should help me with five hundred men with bow and arrows, or those that they can of those that would not be missed in their fields, so that they might be in garrison in this presidio for what might happen, as they have done on other occasions which have occurred for its defense, and because for the good fulfillment of the above, it seems to me to be very suitable [to send] Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real, with whom I have entire satisfaction, I order that
as soon as he receives this my order he should leave from this presidio with the infantry which I have indicated and go to the said provinces, and in them assemble all the caciques, and on the part of His Majesty and mine ask them to help me with the people that they can, of the most valorous and principal that they have, since these are not those who occupy themselves digging. These [people] should have supplies on their backs for their journey, by not having them in this city, and they are to come as quickly as they are able for its great importance to the defense of this post, and I order the said caciques of the said provinces to give to the said Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real all the favor and aid which is needed, and I order and charge the same to the Lieutenant who serves for me in the provinces of Apalachee, because it is suitable to the service of His Majesty. The copy of this order will be taken by Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and government notary. In the city of St. Augustine, Florida of April nineteenth, sixteen hundred and fifty-six (Rebolledo 1656a).

[Order to Guale]

Don Diego de Rebolledo, knight of the order of Santiago, Governor and Captain-General of this city of St. Augustine, Florida and its provinces for His Majesty. Inasmuch as I have had news from the Field Master Don Juan Montano, Governor and Captain-General of the city of Havana, in which he relates that the Dutch [sic] enemy is making some preparations in their armada in order to come to besiege this post and set foot in it, with which news, and the little preparation of the people, supplies, and munitions which are to be found in this post, I am obligated to remain with the caution which is just, and to make the preparations which are required, dispatching [a messenger] to the province of Guale to advise all of its micos, caciques, and principals, that they should help me with some warriors so that when the occasion arrives, this post will find itself with some defense, for which effect it is adviseable to send a person of all satisfaction [?] and experience, and because I have very entire [satisfaction] of the [experience] of Captain Nicolás Fernández de Goyas, reformado of this presidio, whom I am certain has served His Majesty in it with much satisfaction, giving a very good account of his person, and because I hope that he will continue [this service] in this instance
through being very much in Royal service, I order that as soon as he receives this order he should leave from this presidio with the infantry that I have named and go to the said province of Guale, and in it assemble all the micos, caciques, and principals, and on the part of His Majesty and mine tell and represent to them the necessity with which this post finds itself, and the great importance that they help me with all brevity with some Indian warriors, of the most principal and valerous who would not be missed in their fields, and likewise that they help me with all the Indians that know how to manage firearms, assuring them many honors and mercies on the part of His Majesty and mine, that for all that and the rest which might happen I give to the said Captain Nicolás de Goyas authority so that he may arrange everything as he sees suitable. And likewise he will arrange with the religious, caciques, and micos the purchase by account of His Majesty of all the corn that they have, assuring them that it will be paid on the first occasion. And this task being done, and having recovered all the warriors and firearms that he could gather, with all brevity he should come to this presidio, since in this consists its remedy and defense, from his valor, punctuality, and care, he will attend to all with the finesse which is customary, and I order all the micos, caciques, and principals of all the villages through which the said captain will pass to give him all the favor and aid that is needed so that this service to His Majesty is done that much better. In completion of this order, the copy will be taken by Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and government notary. Given in St. Augustine, Florida on April twentieth, sixteen hundred and fifty-six (Rebolledo 1656b).

These orders reveal different expectations from the coastal Guale province than from the two interior provinces of Timucua and Apalachee. The fact that the emphasis for the latter two provinces was the sending of a specified (and large) number of warriors carrying their own food contrasts with the request from Guale for an unspecified number of
warriors, especially those with firearms, and the purchase of corn.

Whether or not this distinction reflects the accessibility of Guale to ships (and perhaps a larger store of corn there), or simply an arbitrary difference in wording and emphasis, is unknown, but the wording of the order to Timucua and Apalachee seems potentially more inflammatory, especially considering the explicit mention of each Indian carrying his own food. The order to Guale did ultimately provoke a degree of resentment among the caciques of Guale, however this was not cause for rebellion, unlike the order to Timucua and Apalachee (see below). Among the leaders of Timucua, however, the reaction was nearly immediate.

Buildup to Rebellion

On August 19, Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real left St. Augustine in the company of Estaban Solana, a soldier who was to serve as atiquí, or interpreter.11 Pérez was a 45-50 year-old soldier with considerable experience, including several years managing the hacienda of Asile, and probably also serving simultaneously as the provincial Lieutenant of Apalachee (see Chapter Five). The two departed on journey which would ultimately take them through most of the missions in the Timucua province, and while the duration of this expedition is not known, they may have spent several weeks in transit, including travel time and
meetings with local caciques. The day following their departure from St. Augustine, however, another letter was dispatched by Governor Rebolledo, apparently directed to his current Lieutenant in the Apalachee province, Captain Antonio de Sartucha. The charred original dispatch, written and signed in Rebolledo's hand, survived to be entered as evidence in Rebolledo's residencia, and reads as follows.

It seems to me that with the news that [came?] with the ship from Havana, and what [-] has done, he will have arranged what [-] has to help, in which conformity [-] the case suffers delay through the distance [-] provinces, I remit to Captain Agustin Pérez [-] immediately and without one delay send five hundred men, caciques, norocos, and principals who would not be missed in the diggings, with all the firearms, many bows and arrows, food for the road and sustenance of one month in this presidio, and that he place himself immediately on the road with them. This is suitable to the service of God and the king and the conservation of these provinces, with which there is no more to stress than that Your Grace make all the effort that you can so that this is achieved and we all remain well. These Indians should not bring me one hen\(^{12}\), nor any other thing than the corn that I refer to for their sustenance, which / [-----] Captain García\(^{13}\) arrived very well [-] that they remain owing us for another occasion. Of the rest that Your Grace wishes to know send me a courier. I say nothing more than may Our Lord guard you as I desire. St. Augustine, April 20, 1656.

Servants of His Majesty,
Don Diego de Rebolledo

At the hour of this [dispatch], Manuel Gómez has not arrived with the horses, nor do I know what he has done. I desire that he arrive in order to return to Your Grace there. In the interim, Your Grace should remain with one of the two that you have there, that which you think [best], and the other should be sold with Captain Agustín Pérez for what might happen on the road.

(Rebolledo 1656c)
This communication, while fragmentary, reveals Rebolledo's increasing concern for the urgency of his situation. Faced with potentially long delays in receiving additional men and supplies from Havana or other locations, Rebolledo urged the immediate dispatch of 500 Indian warriors, and further specified that they were to bring as many weapons—both firearms and bows and arrows—along with enough food for both the journey to St. Augustine and for a stay of one month. This command augmented the earlier written order, underlining the immediacy of the need. The letter may have arrived in Sartucha's post at Ivitachuco prior to Captain Pérez, since it presumably went on a more direct route.

The expedition of Pérez and Solana is known only from the later testimony of Pérez (1660). This testimony begins upon their arrival at the mission of San Martín, whose cacique, Lúcas Menéndez, was absent at that time. Based on later events, however, it seems likely that he had somehow received news of Rebolledo's order prior to the arrival of Pérez and Solana, suggesting one of two possibilities. Pérez and Solana may have stopped in the mission of Santa Fé, and perhaps San Francisco de Potano as well, on their way to San Martín. During one of these earlier stops, a messenger may have been sent to advise the cacique of San Martín, who then departed to consult with Diego, cacique of San Pedro (principal leader of the Yustaga region, and
apparently second in power only to Lúcas of San Martín). It is additionally possible that Lúcas intercepted a letter from the Governor, perhaps even the one above to Sartucha, or one like it, in which he learned of Rebolledo’s order prior to the arrival of Pérez (Bernal 1660). This latter possibility will be explored below.

Passing through San Martín, Pérez and Solana next traveled to Santa Cruz de Tarihica, relating Rebolledo’s order to its cacique Benito Ruíz. The cacique responded that he would comply with the order, and would send the warriors that were asked of him (although later this same cacique would be revealed as one of the ringleaders of the rebellion). The next stop was Niayca, where the female cacica responded similarly that she would prepare the people that she could in order to comply with the order (once again, this cacica later found herself involved in the rebellion).

From Niayca, Pérez dispatched Solana to go to the mission of San Pedro de Potohiriba, where he had been informed he could find the caciques of San Martín and San Pedro. Solana was to present Rebolledo’s order to both these caciques, and then proceed to Santa Elena de Machava and await the arrival of Pérez. In the meantime, Pérez traveled north to Arapaha, where he relayed Rebolledo’s order to its cacique Pastrana, who responded that he and his vassals would comply and come to St. Augustine immediately.
As Pastrana was very old (and indeed died within four years), Pérez convinced him to name a subordinate to lead the warriors from Arapaha, and this done, the entire group proceeded to Machava.

At Machava, Pérez rejoined Solana, the latter apparently having succeeded in sending word to the caciques of San Martín and San Pedro. In response, Lúcas and Diego sent word that they would meet Pérez and Solana in the town of Ivitachuco (principal in the Apalachee province, although at its eastern edge), where all the warriors and supplies would have to be gathered before the journey to St. Augustine. This request is interesting, considering in hindsight that the rebels of Timucua ultimately endeavored to draw Apalachee into the uprising. There is reason to suspect that even at this point, caciques Lúcas and Diego were at least considering rebellion, if they had not already begun actively plotting it. Whether the meeting at Ivitachuco was simply an attempt to draw the Pérez and Solana away from the heart of the Timucua province (at San Pedro and Santa Elena, where most of the action ultimately took place), or whether Lúcas and Diego were already discussing their options with the caciques of Apalachee, the effective result of this move was to isolate the two Spaniards (along with Lieutenant Sartucha and his two-man garrison already stationed in Ivitachuco) from the happenings in Timucua.
While details of this period are sketchy, a reconstruction of the events which led up to the rebellion is possible. Many things were going on simultaneously, and it is evident that the Spaniards were at first only vaguely aware of the trouble to come. What seems clear, however, is that by the time Pérez and Solana actually met the two caciques in Ivitachuco, the uprising was already a foregone conclusion.

Soon after learning of Rebolledo's order (perhaps even before Pérez and Solana had reached San Martín), the principal cacique of the Timucua province, Lúcas Menéndez, apparently began to garner support for a stand against the Governor. While the cacique of Santa Cruz de Tarihica, Benito Ruíz, was one of the first mentioned by Pérez to have verbally agreed to comply with the order (Pérez de Villa Real 1660), Fray Juan Gómez de Engraba asserted that he was also among the first to call it into question (Engraba 1657b), suggesting that his initial acquiescence to Pérez may have been a stalling measure. In any case, when Estéban Solana passed through San Pedro, he apparently left word for the two absent caciques regarding Rebolledo's order before moving on to Santa Elena to await the arrival of Captain Pérez. This may have been in the form of a letter from Pérez to the cacique of San Pedro, in which he requested that he go to Apalachee with his people in order to get the
corn which they would need to bring to St. Augustine (Alejo 1660).

However the order was formally delivered, the two caciques of San Martín and San Pedro soon dispatched a letter from the mission of San Pedro to Governor Rebolledo. At the same time, the friar at San Pedro, Fray Alonso Escudero, sent a second letter to Rebolledo. While the specific contents of these letters is unknown, later testimony suggests that each attempted to persuade the Governor to drop his request that the caciques be required to carry their own corn. Probably having already spoken with the caciques Lúcas and Diego, Fray Escudero's letter evidently represented an attempt to forestall what Escudero probably suspected could happen (and which eventually did happen), requesting that Rebolledo suspend the order (San Antonio et al. 1657). Escudero apparently dispatched a similar warning to the Franciscan Provincial (probably Fray Pedro Chacon), but this letter was not sent with the first.

The contents of the letter from the caciques of San Martín and San Pedro are more difficult to judge, although the message probably ranged between a polite request to suspend the order and outright refusal on the part of the caciques to comply with the letter of the order (Prado; Menéndez Márquez 1660). In light of the fact that the two apparently did not wait for a response, the latter is more likely. The letter from Fray Escudero apparently stated
flatly that although the caciques had agreed to come to St. Augustine, they would not bring corn on their backs (San Antonio et al. 1657; Argüelles; Menéndez Márquez 1660).

The two letters to Rebolledo, one from the friar and the other from the two caciques, were sent on foot to St. Augustine, and were carried by two Indians - Juan Alejo, a native of mission Santa Lucia in the province of Diminiyuti, and Antonio, son of the cacique Lazaro of San Ildefonso de Chamile (Argüelles; Alejo 1660). Having left from San Pedro, the two traveled to St. Augustine and delivered the letters to Rebolledo. The Governor's perspective remained unchanged, and he immediately wrote in response that the caciques should come loaded despite their objections, for "in the Spanish militia, not one [person] is exempt in an occasion to come to the aid of the [presidio] and to carry that which is necessary" (Prado 1660), and that "on a similar occasion, the Sergeant Majors and Captains also carried burdens" (Menéndez Márquez 1660).

Rebolledo evidently considered the members of the Indian militia in the mission provinces to be military officers and soldiers under his direct command. As a result, his original order, and his subsequent refusal to grant an exception, must be viewed within the context of a military officer under Royal command to prepare for an enemy assault. Nevertheless, this command reflected his ignorance of the state of Indian affairs in Florida, for as the friars
later argued that "it is a very different matter to give orders to a Spaniard, who knows what it is to obey, than [to give them] to one who does not know how to accept such orders" (San Antonio et al. 1657). A native of Cartagena appointed to the Royal Governorship of Florida, and later argued to be a "man of little experience" (Gómez de Engraba 1657b), Don Diego de Rebolledo committed the final act which pushed the Timucua province into open hostility. As noted above, however, the Governor's order was only the last in a long series of offenses against the Indians of Timucua, and entered a province already ripe for rebellion.

The Governor dispatched two letters to return with the two Indian couriers. The first was for Captain Pérez, and the second for the cacique of San Pedro (Alejo 1660). The Franciscan officials later concluded that these two Indians had been instructed by the Timucuan caciques prior to their initial departure to kill any Spaniard they encountered upon their return if the Governor's response was negative (San Antonio et al. 1657). However, based on the testimony of Juan Alejo (still imprisoned in the castillo in St. Augustine four years later), a different sequence of events seems likely.

Alejo (1660) testified that the two letters from Rebolledo were sealed, and that he and Antonio were unaware of their contents when they departed from St. Augustine. On their return journey, however, they encountered five Indians
on the road just past the mission of San Martín. From this group they learned of the first murder of the rebellion, and were informed of the command by Lúcas Menéndez to kill all Spaniards. Consequently, it seems probable that the decision to rebel was made sometime during the journey of these couriers, and that the two letters which they carried from Rebolledo ultimately played no role in the actual initiation of violence.\textsuperscript{15}

It is intriguing to note that the friar Alonso Escudero was later implicated as having supported, if not encouraged, the rebellion. Rumor among the soldiers held that a friar had told the cacique Lúcas Menéndez that Rebolledo wished to make slaves of the Indians, and that he should rise up against the Spaniards (Monzón; Sotomayor 1660), and even a fellow friar named José de Urrutia, later criticized by the Franciscans, asserted later that the rebellion had been caused by the friar who wrote Rebolledo a letter of warning (San Antonio et al. 1657).\textsuperscript{16} While it seems unlikely that a Franciscan friar would incite the murders which began the rebellion, there is reason to suspect that Escudero did ally himself with Lúcas Menéndez against Rebolledo's order, perhaps encouraging disobedience. Escudero was, after all, the resident friar at San Pedro, where the rebellion took shape, and his letter to the Governor accompanied that of the caciques of San Martín and San Pedro (Alejo 1660). In retrospect, fray Alonso Escudero may indeed have played some
role in the refusal of the caciques of Timucua to comply
with Rebolledo's order, but the events set in motion by this
stand soon spun out of control.

Some time after the letters were dispatched (and
perhaps before Captain Pérez and Solana had rejoined in
Santa Elena), the cacique of San Martín called a meeting of
all the caciques of the Timucua province in the council
house of San Pedro (Cruz; Bernal 1660). Here Lúcas Menéndez
made his case against Governor Rebolledo, and in favor of
rebellion. The details of this historic meeting of the
leaders of Timucua may never be fully known, but based on
the scattered evidence from second and third-hand testimony,
it is possible to go beyond the more simplistic explanations
for the rebellion, and to reconstruct the factors which
entered into the consideration of the cacique of San Martín.

As discussed above, Lúcas Menéndez took particular
offense to Governor Rebolledo's persistent refusal to accord
him the customary respect he felt he was due. Rebolledo
failed to grant the appropriate gifts and food for the
caciques of Timucua during their stays in St. Augustine, and
furthermore seemed determined to extract more yearly
laborers, despite raging epidemics. Nevertheless, although
the decision to rebel was specifically directed against the
authority of the hated Governor Rebolledo, Lúcas Menéndez
seems to have been acting within the context of a major
jurisdictional struggle which had been building for years.
Specifically, the abuses of Rebolledo, including his order to draft the Indian militia, were only symptoms of a broader phenomenon relating to the structural integration of Timucua into the Spanish colonial system.

One statement made by a Timucuan Indian mirrors what is argued here to have been a fundamental reason behind the decision to rebel. Captain Alonso de Argüelles (1660) reported that a principal Indian\textsuperscript{17}, also the sacristan of his town in Timucua, had told him one day in his house in St. Augustine that the instigator of the Timucuan Rebellion had been "the said cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas Menéndez, who was principal cacique and did not have vassals, and through that course [the rebellion] would have them." This statement, along with Lúcas' earlier assertion that he was no longer cacique of Timucua, reveals a decline in chiefly authority, at least as perceived by Lúcas Menéndez, and suggests that the rebellion was an attempt to regain political power. An examination of this possibility demonstrates that in many ways, Rebolledo's 1656 order was simply the last blow to chiefly authority which Lúcas would tolerate.

The assertion that Lúcas Menéndez did not have vassals is an intriguing one, considering the fact that he seems to have been universally recognized as the paramount cacique of the entire Timucua province. Two possibilities seem likely. First, the apparent demographic imbalance in the Timucua
province (see Chapter Six) may have left San Martín as the principal town in a heavily depopulated region within the broader province of Timucua. Specifically, while the traditional political center of Timucua province remained in the east, within the Timucua region proper, the demographic center of Timucua had clearly shifted to the west, in the Yustaga region. Beyond this imbalance, the impact of severe epidemics between 1649 and 1651, coupled with the loss of nearly half of the population of Timucua due to a plague in the winter of 1654-5, almost certainly diminished the number of vassals under the cacique of San Martín. Furthermore, as in Guale, abuses of the repartimiento labor system may have left Timucua a largely disfunctional society consisting largely of caciques, women, and children, with very few males typically living under the direct authority of the aboriginal leaders.

It is of course possible such demographic transformations in Timucua had left Lúcas Menéndez a cacique with very little real power within the aboriginal heirarchy. The weight of other evidence, however, suggests a second explanation for the statement that the cacique had no vassals. The fact that Lúcas and the other Timucua caciques felt that they had not been accorded the proper respect by Governor Rebolledo, combined with the increasingly oppressive demands of the yearly labor draft, must have given the aboriginal leaders of Timucua province the
impression that they were being circumvented in the aboriginal political structure, and that the Governor considered them his own vassals. The sense of gradual enslavement to the Spanish military seems to have been growing during the years prior to 1656, but when Governor Rebolledo issued his order of April 19, the resentment ignited into open rebellion.

The only direct reference to the arguments Lúcas Menéndez used to convince the remaining caciques of Timucua to rebel comes from the testimony of two interpreters during the later trial of the rebels. Both indicated that the cacique of San Martín had argued that Rebolledo's order had not been issued because there was a threat of enemies, but rather because the Spaniards "wished to embark to sell them, so that they should be slaves, and to present most of them to the King so that they might be his slaves" (Cruz; Bernal 1660). One soldier later reported having heard it said among the soldiers that "a religious had said / to [--] of the said province [--] that they were going to look for slaves, and that they should rise up" (Monzón 1660), implying that a friar (probably Alonso Escudero) had given this idea to Lúcas Menéndez. While this assertion seems unlikely, it is possible that Escudero had reinforced Lúcas' own resentment to Rebolledo's order, encouraging him at least to write to the Governor in opposition.
The argument that Rebolledo intended to enslave the Indians seems to have been somewhat of a rallying cry for the rebels, for not only was this ultimately given as a reason by the murderers at the La Chua ranch, but the Timucuan rebels also used this rumor in their efforts to draw the Apalachee province into the rebellion (see below). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Timucuan Rebellion only began after the caciques and leaders of the province were ordered to carry burdens personally; decades of participation in the repartimiento labor system had not pushed the Indians of Timucua to rebel. The only reason universally given for the rebellion was Rebolledo's order that the caciques and principal Indians carry corn on their own backs. The activation of the militia was not disputed, nor was the yearly draft of digging Indians for St. Augustine. Even the contribution of corn was never contested.

The crucial point was that after so many assaults to their authority, the aboriginal leaders were finally ordered to subject themselves to manual labor at the bidding of the Spanish Governor of St. Augustine. Had Lúcas Menéndez and the caciques of Timucua submitted to this command, they would have been effectively relinquishing their position as independent leaders of their own society. What the Timucuan Rebellion ultimately boiled down to was a jurisdictional struggle, in which the caciques of Timucua resisted the
final integration of their society into the colonial system of Spanish Florida. This battle would decide the position of Timucua within the political structure of that colonial system, as will be discussed at length in Chapter Ten.

The decision to rebel was agreed upon by the caciques of Timucua soon after news of Rebolledo's order had been received. While it is unclear whether the cacique of San Martín issued this command at that time, or following the first murder of the rebellion (see below), Lúcas Menéndez ultimately put out the standing order that all secular Spaniards in the Timucua province were to be killed on sight. Franciscan friars were specifically exempted from this order, and at the same time, Lúcas personally took steps to insure that the eldest son of his godfather Francisco, Don Juan Menéndez Márquez, would not be killed in the violence about to be unleashed. The rebellion had been set in motion.

The Rebellion: Murders in Timucua

The decision to stand up to Rebolledo's order had almost certainly been made before the caciques of San Martín and San Pedro dispatched a response to Agustín Pérez's request for a meeting, which had been delivered by Estéban Solana while in San Pedro. Lúcas Menéndez and Diego, as the two most important caciques in the Timucua province, sent word to Pérez in Santa Elena de Machava that they would meet
them in the principal Apalachee town of Yvitachuco, on the western frontier of the Timucua province (Pérez 1660). After marching on to Yvitachuco, where the provincial Lieutenant Antonio de Sartucha was stationed with a two-man garrison\textsuperscript{18}, the two soldiers finally met the two caciques face to face, and through the interpreter Solana, the order was formally delivered.

According to Pérez, the caciques immediately agreed to comply with the order, and after the supplies were arranged, all the Indians to be sent from Timucua were dispatched ahead with Estéban Solana, who was to accompany the group to St. Augustine. Pérez remained behind with the Apalachee contingent at the urging of Capitan Sartucha, who argued that the two nations should be kept separate in order to avoid trouble.\textsuperscript{19} Readying his group for departure, Pérez sent one of Sartucha's garrison, Bartolome Pérez, ahead to the town of Asile in order to gather some corn for the journey.\textsuperscript{20} All seemed calm, but later that afternoon the storm would break.

At about two o'clock in the afternoon of the same day that Solana had departed with the Indians from Timucua, Fray Joseph Bamba galloped on a horse into Yvitachuco at high speed, bringing news of two murders. Upon his arrival in the town of San Pedro de Potohiriba, Estéban Solana had been murdered by the Timucuan Indians whom he led, and soon thereafter, when Bartolome Pérez arrived in Asile, where
Figure 3: The Timucuan Rebellion
Fray Bamba resided, an Indian from San Pedro had entered the council house where the soldier was and killed him with a hatchet-blow to the back of the head. The province of Timucua had risen up, refusing to comply with Rebolledo's order and killing the soldiers sent for its execution.

With this news, Captains Pérez and Sartucha immediately sent all the Apalachee Indians already gathered in Yvitachuco back to their homes. The two were left in an unenviable position, having been stranded on the western edge of the rebellious Timucua province, guarding the gateway into Apalachee\textsuperscript{21}. Deciding to remain in Yvitachuco, they posted guards (probably Apalachee Indians) and dispatched the one remaining Spanish soldier, Bartolome Francisco, to go to St. Augustine and bring word to Governor Rebolledo. Francisco was cautioned to travel off the main road, skirting Timucua, in order to protect his life and ensure the safe passage of the letters (Pérez de Villa Real; Rocha 1660).\textsuperscript{22}

In the meantime, however, violence was rapidly spreading to the eastern reaches of the Timucua province. A group of five Indians, two men named Lorenzo and a woman, all natives of Santa Fé, and two men native to San Martín, departed the town of San Pedro as soon as Estéban Solana had been killed (prior to learning of the subsequent murder of Bartolome Pérez). On their journey to San Martín, the group met the two Indian messengers, Juan Alejo and Antonio,
themselves returning from St. Augustine with Rebolledo's responses. They told them of having killed Solana in San Pedro, and reported that "the cacique of San Martín said that upon meeting Spaniards, they should kill them" (Alejo 1660). Each group proceeding on its way, Juan Alejo and Antonio soon arrived after nightfall at a place called Calacala (probably on the banks of the modern Suwannee River at or near Royal Springs). Here they encountered a pair of servants from the hacienda of La Chua: Francisco Vásquez, a Spaniard, and Geronimo, an Indian from the province of Tabasco in New Spain. Carrying corn back from Apalachee for the hacienda (López de Gabira; Argüelles 1660), the two had already gone to bed, and were talking about how the night was, when Juan Alejo and Antonio approached the two and struck them in the head with a stick or club which they carried, following this with a second blow, which killed the two servants (Alejo 1660). According to Alejo, his companion Antonio then took out a knife and scalped the Mexican Indian Geronimo, placing the scalp in a cloth.

Continuing on their journey back to San Pedro, the pair met another group of Indians after having crossed the river of San Juan de Guacara. This group of five included the principal cacique Lúcas Menéndez, his mandador named Lorenzo, another principal Indian who was also sacristan, and another two Indians. Lúcas asked them for news from St. Augustine, and more specifically inquired what the Governor
had said. In response, the two Indian messengers then turned over both letters, and after reading one, Lúcas placed them both in his pocket. While one of these was addressed to the cacique of San Pedro, presumably in response to the letter he and Lúcas had jointly authored, the second was intended for Capitan Pérez, and thus Lúcas Menéndez did intercept at least one of Rebolledo's personal communications to Pérez.

The two Indian messengers told the cacique of the murders of the two Spanish servants, and Antonio showed him the scalp. Interestingly, while Lúcas praised the two for a job well-done, he added that "although he had commanded that they should kill all the Spaniards, he had not commanded that they should scalp them, and he commanded him to bury it, and thus he did at one side of the road" (Alejo 1660). This event seems to underline a basic feature of the Timucuan Rebellion, at least as envisioned by its leader. The uprising does not seem to have reflected an attempt to return to pre-contact cultural norms, with a subsequent rejection of everything Spanish, but instead seems to have centered on a political power-struggle between the Indian provinces of Florida and the Spanish military government in St. Augustine (see Chapter Ten). Indeed, Lúcas Menéndez later explained to a friar that the rebellion did not signify that the Timucuans were "abandoning the law of God, nor refusing to be obedient to [his] majesty"; their actions
were instead designed to "liberate themselves from the offenses and continuous injuries" (San Antonio et al. 1657).

Following the burial of the scalp, the cacique Lúcas wrote a letter to the cacique of San Pedro, Diego, and sent it with the two messengers to San Pedro. They were to tell the cacique what they had done, and inform him that Lúcas was headed for the hacienda of La Chua to find out if there were any Spaniards he could kill, and to send more of his vassals to assist. Juan Alejo and Antonio carried out their instructions, and the cacique of San Pedro sent several more Indians in search of Lúcas Menéndez.

One important question lies in the degree to which the murders were in the original plan for the rebellion. There is some reason to suspect that the first two murders, in San Pedro and Asile, may have been the impetuous acts of individuals acting alone. Juan Alejo testified that he had heard it said that Estéban Solana made disparaging remarks during his journey from Yvitachuco back to San Pedro, stating that "there did not have to be any more caciques than him" (Alejo 1660), suggesting that Solana may have brought on his own murder. Furthermore, the later confession of the Indian who murdered Bartolome Pérez revealed that this was partly a crime of personal revenge, for Pérez had once offended the Indian, entering the buhio (probably the council house) in which the Indian was beside
the fire and kicking him, saying "Go away, dog! Get up from there!" (Sotomayor; Calderón; Cruz 1660).

This Indian, upon learning of the command to kill all Spaniards from several caciques together in San Pedro, left immediately and traveled as far as Asile, where he met Bartolome Pérez and killed him with a hatchet. Dragging the corpse outside, he, too, scalped the soldier. Later, after his capture, he confessed all to the Spaniards, saying that "he knew well that he had to pay later, but that up to then, he had not been a man, and with that action he was a noroco of God and of the King, and that he was very content" (Sotomayor 1660). This statement is important in several ways, for it demonstrates an intriguing blend of cultural norms. By killing and scalping his enemy, the Indian fulfilled (indeed exceeded) his aboriginal right for revenge, and advanced to the warrior rank of noroco, and yet he claimed further that he was a noroco for the Spanish God and King. The murder of Bartolome Pérez seems to have been motivated by personal goals, with the standing order to kill all Spaniards serving more as an excuse than a direct reason.

The first murder of the rebellion might be seen as an unanticipated response to the unfortunate remarks of Estéban Solana during a time of social tension, and it seems certain that the general order for the murder of all Spaniards was issued publicly immediately following this murder. Clearly,
however, the fact that all the caciques of Timucua professed compliance to the order openly to Agustín Pérez, while dispatching a letter of apparent refusal to Rebolledo, suggests that some degree of planning was involved, and it is possible that the murders were a calculated part of the uprising. Indeed, Captain Pérez (1660) later asserted that he was completely unaware of any resistance to the order; otherwise, he would not have proceeded with its execution without consulting the Governor.

Furthermore, later testimony revealed that Lúcas Menéndez had dispatched a letter to Don Juan Menéndez Márquez in St. Augustine, evidently warning him not to come to his hacienda (López de Gabira 1660). Receiving the letter at the point of his departure, Don Juan was unable to read it (since the letter had been written in the Timucuan language\textsuperscript{27}), and he proceeded with his twenty-four league journey to La Chua, unaware of the danger which awaited (Puerta; Monzón 1660). Nevertheless, the fact that the cacique Lúcas was able to send a letter of warning prior to the later murders at La Chua further reinforces the conclusion that bloodshed had been plotted from the very beginning.

The story of the rebellion resumes after the chance meeting of Lúcas Menéndez and his two couriers returning from St. Augustine. The cacique of San Martín there expressed his intention to proceed to the hacienda of La
Chua and kill the Spaniards there, and it seems likely that this was intention was carried out soon thereafter. Don Juan Menéndez, senior owner of the cattle ranch, arrived at La Chua in the company of the soldier Juan de Osuna, and evidently had the letter from the cacique Lúcas read to him by an Indian working at the hacienda (Puerta 1660). As later testified, this Indian lied regarding the contents of the letter, and Don Juan remained at La Chua in ignorance of the rebellion.

The testimony regarding the subsequent murders at the La Chua ranch represents a moving and tragic tale. Early one night, Don Juan was visited at his house on the hacienda by the cacique Lúcas Menéndez, along with the caciques of San Francisco (Juan Baúptista) and Santa Fé, and some fourteen to twenty Indians (Ponce de León; Puerta; Monzón; Calderón 1660). Assuming that they had come on their way to St. Augustine in compliance to Pérez' order, Don Juan asked "So quickly have you attended to going to the presidio?" (Rocha 1660). Surprised at Don Juan's presence despite his warning, Lúcas Menéndez quickly seized the Spaniard by the arm and pulled him outside the house, saying "Don Juan, come here!" (López de Gabira; Puerta; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez 1660). The Spaniard watched helplessly as the rest of the Indians entered the house, and he heard the screams of his companions as they were murdered within; one or two were killed outside as they fled. Ultimately, the soldier Juan
de Osuna and the two black slaves at the hacienda were murdered, while two Indians in Don Juan's employ successfully fled the carnage (Argüelles 1660). Testimony from Juan Pasqua, later imprisoned in the fort at St. Augustine for one of the murders, detailed that while in San Francisco Potano, he had been commanded by the cacique Lúcas Menéndez, under penalty of punishment, to accompany him to La Chua, and there had ordered him to go to a hut outside the main house of the hacienda, to which one of the slaves had fled, and kill him (Pasqua 1660). After the raid, not a single person was left alive in the hacienda beyond Don Juan; even the cattle had been killed by the Indians (Argüelles 1660).

Don Juan had been taken completely by surprise, and initially presumed that would be killed with the rest (Puerta; Rocha 1660). Asking the Indians "What is this?", they told him it was in response to the Spaniards' wish to make slaves of them, and said "Now the Spaniards die!". Telling the cacique "If you have to kill me, let me go to a village, if you have left a religious alive, in order to confess" (Rocha 1660), Don Juan was assured by Lúcas that he should have no fear, saying that he alone would be spared "because of the benefits that they had received from him and his father" (Menéndez Márquez 1660). Don Juan inquired about the safety of the friars, asking "if they had killed the fathers, and they had responded no, that [they had
killed] the Spaniards who were in Apalachee and Timucua and no more29" (Menéndez Márquez 1660). Given a horse and some of his clothes, Don Juan was instructed by Lúcas to return to St. Augustine, and to go away to Spain, but that "he might return within six years, for then they would have a good heart", but "until then they had to be with a bad heart for the evil which had been done with them" (Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Romo 1660). The Spaniard was accompanied as far as the village of San Francisco, three leagues away, by two Indians instructed by the cacique to protect him from harm, and he returned from there alone (Puerta; Menéndez 1660).

The murders at La Chua were the last of the Timucuan Rebellion. In all, seven individuals had been killed over the course of just a few days: three Spanish soldiers, a Spanish servant, two African slaves, and a Mexican Indian. In retrospect, this seems a remarkably limited loss of life, considering the importance that this uprising would ultimately assume. Nevertheless, with these deaths, the only Spanish military presence in the whole of interior Florida was reduced to the two soldiers stranded in Ybitachuco (having dispatched the only remaining member of Sartucha's garrison to St. Augustine).

Of considerable importance is the fact that not a single Franciscan friar was killed, either during this initial wave of violence or during the weeks and months that
followed. This is where the Timucuan Rebellion departs from the other major revolts in the mission provinces of Florida. The 1597 Guale Revolt left five friars dead (half of all the Franciscans in Florida at that time), and three more lost their lives in the Apalachee Revolt of 1647. In each of these cases, the friars seem to have been singled out as targets of aggression, whereas during the Timucuan Rebellion, not only were the friars spared, but one (Escudero) was even implicated as a conspirator in the uprising. Another unnamed friar even managed to arrange a meeting under cover of night with Lúcas Menéndez in Machava, endeavoring to convince the rebels of the rashness of their actions (San Antonio et al. 1657).

The Timucuan Rebellion possessed a number of qualities which set it apart from superficially similar events. As discussed in detail in Chapter Ten, the key lies in the fact that the rebellion seems to have been an outgrowth of a complex set of relationships which developed as an inherent part of the colonial system of Spanish Florida. What makes this event so difficult to disentangle is the presence of several factions, and factions within factions, in both the Spanish and Indian societies. The rebellion cannot simply be boiled down to the standard Spanish/Indian or Religious/Military dichotomies. Nor can the often repeated explanation involving Rebolledo's order that the leaders carry corn be taken only at face value. All of these
explanations form a part of the picture, but to gloss over the intricate complexities of the Timucuan Rebellion is to ignore a golden opportunity to examine in detail the specific consequences of European contact and colonization in one particular situation.

The Initial Response

If the story of the beginning of the Timucuan Rebellion during the spring of 1656 reveals a myriad of complexities, the details of events during the subsequent months of 1656 complicates the picture considerably. News of the uprising in Timucua province arrived in St. Augustine within a few days after the initial wave of murders, probably in May. Governor Rebolledo, at that time unaware of any trouble in the frontier, was busy attending to repairs to the fort, having gone about a league from St. Augustine with a group of soldiers\(^{30}\) to investigate the condition of some wood for use in the fort (Puerta; Calderón 1660). On the return journey, they were overtaken by Don Juan Menéndez Márquez on his horse, where he related the news about the murders at his hacienda of La Chua (Puerta, Monzón 1660). Returning to St. Augustine, Rebolledo ordered a cannon to be fired, calling all the soldiers in the fort to hear the report (Hernández 1660). This news was soon followed by further developments, for within a few days Bartolome Francisco and a pair of Indians arrived with the letter from Captain Pérez
and Lieutenant Sartucha, detailing the murders of the two soldiers Solana and Pérez (Ponce de León; Rocha; Calderón 1660). There is no clear indication that Rebolledo was aware of the murders of the two servants from La Chua (Vásquez and Tabasco) at this stage, unless the cacique of San Martín had informed Don Juan of their murders.

The details of the summer of 1656 are sketchy and vague, but based on the timing of the well-documented retaliatory expedition in September, it seems evident that some three months passed before Rebolledo was able to organize an effective response to the rebellion. Although this might appear illogical, Rebolledo was under direct orders from the King to be prepared for an English land-assault during this period, and thus his actions must be viewed within a broader context. With the news of the uprising in Timucua, Rebolledo instantly knew that he could expect no reinforcements of Indian militia from Timucua and Apalachee without dispatching a force of Spanish infantry from St. Augustine, where they were thought to be needed for the very preservation of the city. In an effort to cut his losses, Rebolledo apparently decided that to quell the rebellion immediately would leave St. Augustine open to imminent attack, and thus his measures reflect the cautious and calculated attempt to contain the uprising until soldiers could be spared after the danger of the English fleet had lessened in the fall. Indeed, during this time,
one of the officers working on the trenches remarked to another that "they did not have to have fear of the enemy which was to come by sea, but rather those on land, because the Indians of Timucua, according to what he understood, had not been sure for many days" (Argüelles 1660).

During this period, the actions of both the rebel Timucua caciques and Governor Rebolledo revolved around the all-important province of Apalachee. Once news of the rebellion had reached St. Augustine, Rebolledo dispatched instructions to Pérez and Sartucha, commanding them to remain in Ivitachuco until assistance could be sent (Pérez 1660). This order was evidently carried by several soldiers, including Bartolome Francisco, who had brought the initial news of the rebellion. Rebolledo dispatched these four soldiers off-road, hoping to avoid their capture (and the interception of the orders) in Timucua (Calderón; Texeda 1660). The soldiers were also sent to reinforce Pérez and Sartucha, at that time alone in Ivitachuco. Letters were additionally carried for several friars (Texeda 1660).

Testimony from the later service record of one of this group, Ensign Juan Bauptista Terraza, described the journey:

...the province of Timucua (the passage for the [province] of Apalachee) finding itself risen up and in arms, it was necessary for the said governor [Rebolledo] to give news to the said Apalachee, for the garrison which there was there as well as for the religious, of this uprising and
how it was against them [the Apalachee] as well, and he sent the said Ensign [Terraza], who was experienced in these provinces, as a spy with four soldiers, off the road without passing through Timucua to give the said news to Apalache, and he went across uninhabited land and woods until arriving and fulfilling with many hardships the order and [delivering the] news which he was given...(Argüelles et al. 1678).

Given the overall distribution of the Timucuan missions in the Yustaga region, this party probably followed the southern border of Timucua, traversing modern San Pedro Bay before arriving at Ivitachuco.

About this same time, several Indians arrived from Apalachee, bringing notice that it was rumored in Apalachee that the principal cacique of Ivitachuco, Don Luis, and the repartimiento laborers from Apalachee, all of whom were at that time in St. Augustine, had been imprisoned by Rebolledo in the city, and that he intended to enslave them\(^34\). Rebolledo acted quickly to counter this rumor, writing to Lieutenant Sartucha and informing Don Luis. The cacique also immediately dispatched his heir and several principal leaders, among whom was his ynixa, or second-in-command, giving them instructions to reveal the rumor as a lie fabricated by the Timucuans, and commanding that the province should remain quiet (Argüelles; Texeda 1660). This group of Apalachee Indians accompanied the four soldiers noted above to Ivitachuco (Texeda 1660), and some time later another Indian messenger returned to St. Augustine, reporting that all the soldiers had arrived safely in
Apalachee, and that their orders had been delivered (Calderón 1660).

As Governor Rebolledo endeavored to formulate a response to the uprising, the Indians of Timucua were busily working to reinforce their position. During the weeks and months following the murders which plunged the province into revolt, the leaders of the Timucua province made rapid preparations for the Spanish military response which they knew would eventually come. While the details of these activities are poorly documented, it is possible to assemble a picture of the overall strategy put into effect during the summer of 1656. What becomes evident is that the Timucuans intended to make a stand in their own territory, and that a major component of their plan was the anticipated support of the Apalachee province.

What had become the normal routine of daily life after nearly half a century of missionization came to an abrupt end in Timucua during the rebellion. As related by the Franciscans the following year, the resident friars in Timucua:

...found themselves reviled by the majority of the Indians, deprived of the necessary provisions, and many times forsaken and alone in their convents, because the Indians gave their attention solely to their dances and preparations for war to which they devoted their time, living like pagans during that period (San Antonio et al. 1657).

These preparations resulted in a substantial disturbance to the yearly crop in Timucua, for there were "many fewer
plantings as a result of the forays that the unruly mob made", and most of the Indians at that time were "roaming through the woods with their wives" (San Antonio et al. 1657). The rebels seem to have largely abandoned their normal residences in the mission villages, looting the stores of food for immediate use.

As noted above, the meeting at which the decision to rebel was formally made was held in San Pedro de Potohiriba, the political center for the Yustaga region within the Timucua province. This fact alone is somewhat surprising, considering that the paramount cacique of the entire province resided at San Martín, far to the east of San Pedro. The murders which started the uprising occurred in four separate locations across the Timucua province, essentially governed by where the Spaniards happened to be at the time. Interestingly, however, immediately following the murders at La Chua, the rebels went to the town of Santa Elena de Machava (Pasqua 1660), just west of San Pedro, and the rebellion soon became centered in this vicinity. Virtually all of the events which followed took place at or near this mission, and a closer examination of this fact reveals a great deal about the strategic planning of the rebel leaders of Timucua.

Santa Elena de Machava was apparently located on the Camino Real leading toward Apalachee from the Timucua province, and was situated between the Timucua towns of San
Pedro and Asile. The friar in Santa Elena, Joseph Bamba, evidently also ministered to the neighboring town of Asile, and the two towns together formed the frontier with Apalachee province to the west. The fact that the cacique of Asile was not mentioned even a single time in all the residencia testimony about the rebellion suggests that Asile may have had little regional political importance in 1656, making Santa Elena the westernmost major town in Timucua province.

This fact is significant, for it was at Santa Elena that the rebel caciques decided to make a stand, and not at another, more centrally located town. In a forest next to the town, just half a league away, the rebels constructed a palisade using thick poles, and fortified themselves within this structure. While the palisade was located within the jurisdiction of the the village of San Juan Ebangelista, a satellite of Santa Elena de Machava (Calderón 1660), it was evidently a new construction, hastily built in a defensible position away from the villages. Here the rebels gathered during the summer and fall of 1656.

Why did the rebels of Timucua choose to construct a fort so close to Apalachee, and so far from the political center of the province at San Martín? The reasons for this decision may never be known with certainty, but based on the actions of these rebels that summer, it is probable that the Timucuan caciques had high hopes that they would be joined
in their stand by the Apalachee province. Apart from the probability that the Yustaga region was in 1656 the demographic center of the Timucua province (see Chapter Six), the location of the Timucua palisade so near to Apalachee, and on the Camino Real, presumably facilitated communication and negotiation with the caciques of Apalachee during the weeks and months following the initial murders of the rebellion. Indeed, this is precisely what occurred during this period, for, as noted above, very early in the rebellion Governor Rebolledo received reports that the Timucuans were endeavoring to draw the Apalachee into the uprising, sending letters to argue their case (Rocha 1660).

The rumors regarding the enslavement of Don Luis and the Apalachee laborers in St. Augustine only serves as an example of the attempts by the rebels of the Timucua province to turn the Apalachee Indians against the Spaniards. It seems evident that a primary goal of the Timucuans was not only to consolidate their own internal support for the rebellion, but also to garner support from Apalachee, which they realized was the key to its success. The Franciscans later concluded that had it not been for the prudence of one Apalachee cacique (presumably Don Luis, or the cacique who decided to verify the Timucuan rumor before acting), the Apalachee province would also have rebelled (San Antonio et al. 1657). This would appear to be the reason behind the strategy adopted by the rebels, for there
seems no other logical explanation for the actions taken that summer.

First, and perhaps most significantly, the very decision to make a stand within a fortified palisade constructed specifically for this purpose appears flawed, unless one considers the importance of Apalachee. The Timucua caciques must have known that the construction of a fort would not fend off the Spanish infantry forever; sooner or later, the palisade would be breached under assault, and with all the rebel leaders within, this would signal the end of the rebellion. The palisade would thus seem to have been constructed not for the permanent defense of the rebel forces, but rather in an effort to buy time for the consolidation of support noted above. The caciques must have hoped that with the construction of a fortified stockade, they could defend against a small Spanish force (such as the handful of soldiers in Ivitachuco), and thus could delay the success of any Spanish response.

The very location of the Timucua palisade reveals much regarding its purpose. Had the purpose of such a fortification been to somehow keep the Spanish infantry in St. Augustine from entering the Timucua province, it would have been far more effectively located in the easternmost reaches of the province, along the Camino Real as it entered the interior (perhaps in the Potano region). The fort's location on the western edge of the Timucua province gave
the Spaniards free access to virtually the entire province, essentially sandwiching the bulk of the rebel force between the Spaniards, who would eventually come from the east, and the Apalachee on the west.

The Timucua palisade was situated in an ideal location to potentially monitor (and perhaps hinder) the entrance of Spanish infantry into the Apalachee province, and thus one possible goal might have been to isolate Apalachee from St. Augustine. The fort could thus have theoretically served to slow communications between Apalachee and the Spaniards, permitting the Timucua caciques time to win the support of this western province. Furthermore, in the eventuality that Apalachee should fail to stand with Timucua, the fort was well-placed to repel a joint Apalachee/Spanish military raid along the Camino Real from the west.

One significant factor in the planning of the Timucua caciques was almost certainly the failed Apalachee revolt of 1647, only nine years earlier. Following the murders which initiated that uprising, the Spanish infantry was augmented by a significant force of Indian warriors from the Timucua province, which may well have made the difference in the infamous battle fought against the rebels on the eastern frontier of the Apalachee province (see Chapter Five). The Timucua leaders must have known that if they could not count on the support of the Apalachee, the Spaniards would certainly use the Apalachee against them.
Intriguingly, the very idea of a fort may have been inspired by the Spanish themselves, for the Timucua caciques and principal leaders had been schooled in Spanish tactics as a part of the developing Indian militia, beginning at least as early as 1649 (see Chapter Five). The construction of a palisade away from occupied villages appears atypical of aboriginal strategy, which generally focused on the fortification of the villages themselves. The Timucua fort's location half a league away from Santa Elena de Machava forms an interesting parallel with St. Augustine and its fort, particularly since one function of aboriginal labor in the repartimiento system of colonial Florida involved the construction and maintenance of the Spanish fort. The statement of one eyewitness, describing the stronghold as a "palisade in the form of a fort" (Pedrosa 1660), might even imply that the Timucua palisade was itself modeled after the Spanish fort.

It should be noted that, in retrospect, the fort was indeed a flawed tactic. The Timucuans seem to have made the same mistake as the Indians of the fortified town of Mabila during their surprise-attack on Hernando de Soto's army in 1540. By barricading themselves within a stockade, the Indians abandoned a major advantage over the Spaniards: mobility. In the case of the Timucua palisade, however, the Timucuans almost certainly possessed at least a small number of firearms (since Rebolledo had earlier ordered them
brought with the 500 warriors), perhaps changing the equation in favor of such a tactic. Nevertheless, although the palisade would ultimately never be tested in battle, there seems little doubt as to the outcome of a Spanish siege against the fort.

While the Timucua rebels prepared their fortification and attempted to win the Apalachee over to their cause, Governor Rebolledo pursued his own plan of action in response to the rebellion. Having sent the four soldiers noted above to Ivitachuco with orders to prevent the Timucuans from making inroads into Apalachee, Rebolledo made preparations for a major military expedition into the interior. Apart from assembling a body of Spanish reformados and soldiers for this force, Rebolledo commanded the arriving leaders of the Guale province (presumably responding to Rebolledo's order of April 20th) to hand over their firearms and return to Guale, saying that he had need of the weapons due to the rebellion in Timucua, and that he intended to pay for them when Royal funds arrived (Sánchez de Urisa; Santiago; Argüelles 1660). Later testimony indicated that there was a lack of arquebuses in St. Augustine at that time, and Rebolledo intended to arm the Apalachee Indians in St. Augustine using the firearms from Guale (Argüelles 1660).36

The caciques of Guale later recounted their stay in St. Augustine that summer in a letter to the King:
...the Governor advising us of the uprising and how, determining to dispatch infantry, we should help him as loyal vassals of Your Majesty with some arquebuses, quivers of arrows, and bows, in order to arm the Indians of St. Augustine, all of our towns helped with all the quivers full of arrows that we could, and beyond this, as true vassals of Your Majesty, we offered to leave our towns, wives, children, and fields, and die with all our vassals at the side of the Spaniards. All of us micos and caciques left our houses from this province of Guale with all the best of our vassals, and presenting ourselves to the Governor, we offered to die in his defense, and telling us to wait eight or ten days, while the infantry was prepared, giving us only a little rotted hardtack to eat. Notwithstanding, we were waiting more than thirty days, and having seen that there was no order, nor were the people being dispatched, as they were not dispatched until three months from then, many of our vassals and some of us fell ill because of the poor treatment and rigor which was had with us...(Menéndez et al. 1657).

The caciques further indicated that during their stay in St. Augustine, news arrived "that the Timucuan enemy was trying to enter our villages and burn them, because of knowing that we, their people, were in St. Augustine", for which the leaders requested permission to return and "help and fortify" their villages.

Treating them poorly, Governor Rebolledo ordered all the weapons which the Guale warriors had brought to be confiscated, saying that "in all his time he did not have to give us one thread of clothing of that which Your Majesty commands given to us as alms" (Menéndez et al. 1657). While Rebolledo's stated excuse (that the weapons were badly needed) may have been true, it seems likely that the Governor hoped to avoid similar trouble in Guale by
disarming the Indians\textsuperscript{37}. The Guale caciques were evidently offended by this command, perhaps guessing Rebolledo's reasons, and although they complied, they returned in disgust with the Governor (Sánchez; Santiago 1660). Later, it was rumored in St. Augustine that the Indians of the Guale province were watching the events in Timucua very carefully, and had the Timucuan Rebellion succeeded, Guale would almost certainly have risen up as well (Santiago 1660).\textsuperscript{38}

Governor Rebolledo was thus not only faced with an existing rebellion in Timucua, but he also had good reason to fear that the uprising might spread to the remaining provinces of Apalachee and Guale. For whatever reason, Rebolledo did not employ Guale Indians in quelling the Timucuan Rebellion, perhaps judging it best to isolate those Indians not already affected by the uprising. The Apalachee, on the other hand, had already been enticed to join the Timucua, and beyond this, their support and assistance in putting down the rebellion was crucial. As a consequence, Rebolledo made arrangements for all the Apalachee laborers in St. Augustine to accompany the planned military expedition into the interior, along with the principal cacique of the Apalachee province, Don Luis. As noted above, he further supplied at least some of these warriors with firearms.
By the end of August, Governor Rebolledo was evidently sure enough of the safety of St. Augustine from the English threat that he could proceed with his planned military expedition into the interior. The rebel leaders of Timucua had finished their palisade by this time, and were still actively involved in consolidating their support. The anticipated confrontation with the Spanish infantry was about to become a reality, and in early September of 1656, Rebolledo signed an order which could potentially decide the fate of all of Spanish Florida, dispatching troops for the pacification of the Timucuan Rebellion.

Notes

1. Ironically, Solana would eventually become the first victim of the Timucuan Rebellion, possibly murdered in the presence of Lúcas Menéndez.

2. The year was written near the top of a page, and thus was burned off. Based on the fact that an epidemic is known to have swept Timucua and Apalachee during the winter of 1654-5, forcing Governor Rebolledo to draft Indian laborers from other areas (Rebolledo 1655), it is possible that the year stated here was 1654 (prior to Rebolledo's arrival that summer). The only other possibility is 1655, in which case the larger demand for Indians dated to 1656, immediately prior to the rebellion.

3. These officers included Captains Antonio and Alonso de Argüelles, Ayudante Don Antonio Menéndez Márquez, Adjutant Francisco Sánchez, and others, several of whom would later figure prominently in the pacification of the Timucuan Rebellion (Argüelles 1660).

4. Puerta (1660) noted the presence of Royal Treasurer Don Joseph de Prado and Sergeant Major Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner.
5. Those known to have accompanied Rebolledo to the meeting at Tolomato were the following: Don Joseph de Prado, the Royal Treasurer, Sergeant Major Salvador de Cigarroa, Captain Lorenzo Joseph de León, and Diego de los Ríos Enriquez, a soldier. These names are confirmed by testimony from the Rebolledo auto of April, 1657 and by several witnesses in the Rebolledo residencia of 1660 (Rebolledo 1657a; Ranjel 1660a).

6. The friars present at Tolomato were, in addition to Chacon and Medina, Fray Alonso del Moral, Fray Gregorio de Savala, and Fray Jacinto Domínguez (in whose company had arrived Sergeant Major Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner earlier that morning).

7. The amount of corn required by Rebolledo has previously been reported to be three arrobas (about 75 pounds), but this seems to be based on the subsequent reports of the friars (Gómez de Engraba 1657b; San Antonio et al. 1657). None of the witnesses who testified for Rebolledo's auto of April, 1657 or the Rebolledo residencia of 1660 indicated more than two or two and a half arrobas, and neither Rebolledo's actual order nor an original letter sent to Apalachee (see below) state specific amounts. Since the friars' reports were intended to indict Rebolledo, and since the soldiers' testimony may have been slanted to acquit the Governor, the amount of corn is assumed to have fallen between two and three arrobas. As noted by Hann (1988:128), even the upper figure (producing a daily portion of just over two pounds) would probably have been considered very short rations.

8. One of the friars present at the meeting (Fray Jacinto Domínguez) was said to have proposed that two and a half arrobas would be more suitable, reasoning that "with the half [arroba] they would be able to sustain themselves on the road, and the rest should be placed in this presidio so that the said Indians should have sustenance during the time that they might be in garrison" (Cigarroa 1657).

9. In the testimony gathered at Rebolledo's request in April of 1657, even Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, a particular enemy of Rebolledo, and with close ties to the Franciscans, was unable to deny that the friars "gave no difference nor contradiction in the proposition which the said señor Governor made" (Horruytiner 1657). Horruytiner was almost certainly the witness who revealed information regarding Rebolledo's April investigation to the friars (San Antonio et al. 1657).
10. While burden-bearers might have simply returned to the interior after having delivered the corn, it seems questionable that they could have carried not only enough food for the cacigues during their journey to and stay in St. Augustine, but also enough food for their own round trip sustenance.

11. Santiago (1660) stated that Solana understood all three of the major Indian languages in Florida, including that of Timucua, Apalachee, and Guale.

12. The term gallina, or hen, may refer to the wild turkey, which this passage implies was sometimes brought as a gift for the Governor from the cacigues. The fact that Rebolledo waived this custom reflects his cognizance of the need for each warrior to carry sufficient corn.

13. This passage undoubtedly refers to the arrival of Captain Francisco García de la Vera from Havana, apparently having been denied the assistance which Governor Rebolledo wished.

14. Captain Francisco de la Rocha (1660) confirmed that although Rebolledo had sent away for provisions, none had arrived by the time of Pérez' journey.

15. While it is of course possible that Juan Alejo lied in his testimony, there seems to have been no reason for him to do so, for in either case he admitted having committed the murders based on the order of Lucas Menéndez.

16. This was told to the soldier leading the military expedition sent to pacify Timucua after the rebellion, but Governor Rebolledo was unable to prove this in the subsequent trial of the rebels (San Antonio et al. 1657).

17. This is one example of information lost during the fire which charred the Rebolledo residencia, for both the name of the Indian, and the name of the town he was from (other than "San [--] of the said province of Timucua"), were burned off the edges of the pages of the original manuscript.

18. At the time of the rebellion, the garrison consisted of soldiers Bartolome Francisco and Bartolome Pérez.

19. Sartucha advised Pérez that the Indians would steal from one another, causing strife, and that the smaller sized groups would be more reasonable for the river-crossings (Pérez de Villa Real 1660).
20. The Indian who murdered Pérez later noted that one reason for having done so was the departure of the soldier with chichubites, defined as "the boxes that the friars and other persons who travel in these provinces carry" (Pedrosa 1660). This was presumably the manner in which corn was transported.

21. The friars later asserted that the rebel caciques would have killed Pérez had he returned from Apalachee (San Antonio et al. 1657).

22. The route of Francisco is not detailed, but it may have been similar to that of the small group of soldiers sent back soon after Francisco's arrival in St. Augustine (see below).

23. This location is known with some degree of certainty, for while the testimony of Juan Alejo places it vaguely on the main road between mission San Martín and the river of San Juan de Guacara, the 1716 relation of Diego Peña fixes the location of Calacala at the point where the Camino Real (heading in the direction of the pre-rebellion site of San Juan de Guacara at Baptising Spring) struck the bank of the modern Suwannee River from the then-abandoned site of San Martín. His description of the route corresponds well to the later Bellamy road, which joined the Suwannee in this vicinity (near modern-day Royal Springs). Captain Alonso de Argüelles (1660) described this encounter as having taken place in the "forest of Ayaxeriva between the river of San Juan de Guacara and the village of San Martín", probably referring to the lowland pine barrens immediately west of the highland hammock belt (see Milanich et al. 1984, for a discussion of the physiography of this region).

24. Based on this testimony, Lúcas Menéndez could read Spanish, although he had employed Timucuan in his letter to Don Juan Menéndez Márquez in St. Augustine (see below).

25. Juan Alejo (1660) remembered that this group included at least three Indians, named Lorenzo, Thomas, and Matheo.

26. In the province of Apalachee, the rank of noroco was achieved only after killing three enemies (Hann 1988), suggesting that if the practice was similar in Timucua, this Indian had already killed two enemies prior to the rebellion. One might wonder where such an opportunity would have arisen in the context of the mission system (although a number of Timucua warriors were recruited in 1647 to fight during the Apalachee revolt).
27. The fact that Lúcas knew how to read Spanish, but chose to write his letter to Don Juan in Timucuan, may relate to his desire that the contents of the letter remain secret to most Spaniards along the way, presuming that Don Juan could have it translated.

28. Rocha (1660) quoted the cacique Lúcas as having earlier said "I guess we have to kill you", and only changed his mind after Don Juan's request, but all other evidence suggests that Lúcas never intended to kill Don Juan.

29. This statement clearly refers to the secular Spaniards, such as soldiers and their servants and slaves, and not to the Spanish friars residing in the mission provinces.

30. These soldiers included Sargento Mayor Salvador de Cigarroa, Ayudante Pedro de la Puerta, the carpinter Martín de Gurriaga, and several servants (Puerta 1660).

31. Monzón (1660) recalled that only thirty days passed between Don Juan's arrival and the Cañizares expedition, but this does not agree with the September 4 date of his departure (see Chapter Eight). In a subsequent letter, the caciques of the Guale province indicated that they were detained three months waiting for Rebolledo to dispatch soldiers to quell the rebellion in Timucua (Menéndez et al. 1657).

32. Captain Alonso de Argüelles (1660) heard this from Adjutant Francisco Sánchez. Both of these officers were later sent on the Cañizares expedition.

33. Ensign Manuel Calderón (1660) later recalled that these soldiers were Adjutant Francisco Sánchez, Ensign Juan Bapustina Terraza, Sergeant Pedro Texeda, and Bartolome Francisco, and this list was confirmed by Texeda (1660).

34. The rumor that Rebolledo intended to enslave the Indians who came to St. Augustine was a major argument used earlier by Lúcas Menéndez to convince the other caciques of Timucua to rebel, and thus it seems logical that this would be a primary tool used by the Timucua rebels to incite Apalachee to rise up.

35. The identifications of the political affiliations of the town of Asile are somewhat problematic during and immediately following the Timucuan Rebellion. Although Agustín Pérez de Villa Real (1660), twice Lieutenant in these western mission provinces, described Asile as being "of the Timucua language", Asile was apparently a true border-town, for its two neighbors to the east and west -- Machava in Timucua, and Ivitachuco in Apalachee -- were
typically described as the last towns in each respective province, with Asile falling in the middle. Indeed, Pérez (1660) located Asile "on the border [en la raya] of both provinces." Much of this confusion stems from the political reorganization sponsored by Governor Rebolledo following the rebellion of 1656 (see below). For a brief time in the late 1650's, Asile seems to have been incorporated into the province of Apalachee, and thus the substantial residencia testimony relative to the 1656 period, but dating to 1660, occasionally mixes references to pre- and post-Rebellion conditions.

36. Captain Alonso de Argüelles (1660) justified Rebolledo's commandeering of the Guale firearms by saying that there was need of them in order to arm the Apalachee Indians following the Timucuan Rebellion, and yet went on to argue that "it was not just that the said Indians [of Guale] should have firearms", probably referring to the standard Spanish policy not to arm Indians. This policy does not seem to have been followed closely in Florida during this period.

37. These weapons had not been returned or paid for by the time of the 1657 complaint by the caciques of Guale, and Rebolledo was said to have argued that the weapons were commandeered for Royal service (Menéndez et al. 1657).

38. Santiago (1660) further testified that the Franciscan Provincial had gone to Guale in order to calm the Indians, but had returned "very disconsolate".
CHAPTER EIGHT

PACIFICATION OF THE TIMUCUA PROVINCE

The Cañizares Expedition: The March to Ivitachuco

On September 4, 1656, Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo issued orders to the Sergeant Major of the two companies of infantry in St. Augustine, Adrián de Cañizares y Osorio. These orders constituted the written instructions to be carried by Cañizares as leader of a force of sixty Spanish soldiers charged with the task of pacifying the rebellious Timucua province. While the original orders evidently did not survive, copies in the office of government in St. Augustine were transcribed during the Rebolledo residencia, and this charred manuscript contains the only extant version of these important orders. The orders read as follows:

[First Order]
Don Diego de Rebolledo, knight of the order of Santiago, Governor and Captain General of this city and presidio of St. Augustine, Florida, and its provinces for His Majesty. Inasmuch as the cacique of San Martín and others of the province of Timucua have rebelled, negating obedience to His Majesty and slaughtering [degollando] the infantry who found themselves in the said province in the execution of my orders, withdrawing to the forests, exhorting and persuading the caciques of the province of Apalachee to the said rebellion, and making impossible the conversion which is made in [the province], for the remedy of which, and in order to punish the aggressors of such a grave crime, I have ordered named a / [----] which
effect, being necessary to name a person of all satisfaction, skill, and experience to go as its leader, and for the [satisfaction] which I have with Captain Adrián de Cañizares y Osorio, Sergeant Major of the companies of this presidio, I have held for good [effect] to name him, as for the present I elect and name him as leader of the infantry so that he rules and governs it, commanding him to execute the said orders which are suitable, understanding an instruction which has been fashioned by my hand, observing it according to [what] is contained in it, and in particular the chapter which pertains to offering peace and concord to the said caciques before arriving at any breakage, unless in an unavoidable case. For all this and the rest which might happen, I give all the power which is required by law and necessary, according to how I hold it, and have from His Majesty, so that in all which might happen, according to the accidents of what happens, he will work briefly and summarily so that what is most suitable to the service of His Majesty—the peace and conservation of these said provinces—is achieved, not omitting whichever method or means besides being pacified according to prudence, and which is recognized to be suitable / [---] asked [---] for all [---] as stated is power and faculty, and I order and command to the Sergeant Majors, Captains, and remaining officers and soldiers who are named that they guard, fulfill, and execute the orders that the said Adrián de Cañizares gives, for what is thus suitable to the service of His Majesty and to the better execution of the affairs at his charge. In case the said [Cañizares] dies by some situation of arms, or from whichever other illness, it is my will that Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who is a reformado of this presidio, be leader of the said infantry, and that in the said occasion he will use this title and instruction in the form which is contained and ordered to the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, which I commanded to be dispatched, sealed with the seal of my arms, and signed by my hand, and endorsed by the undersigned secretary of government, who will take the copy of this commission, which is dated in the city of St. Augustine, Florida, on the fourth of September, sixteen fifty-six. Don Diego de Rebolledo. By his command, Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and governmental notary, the copy taken in the
secretary of government's office. Before me, Juan Moreno / [---]

[Second Order]
[---] Adrián de Cañizares y Osorio, who is of the companies of this presidio, leader of the infantry which is named for the province of Timucua. First, having taken lodging in the place where it seems most easy to communicate with the rebel caciques, he will endeavor to give them to understand that he is not going with intention to make any punishment, and that his intention is only that they retire to their towns, serving and living in them, according to and in the form that they have done up to now, preparing them and giving them notice of the contrary, [which is] war, in which he will proceed with all rigor, not sparing the women or the children, and likewise he will burn the towns, which only will serve to menace them and advertise to them the evil which could be, and not because it has to be executed or is executed. Having used all the means possible, if they still persist in not wishing to reduce themselves to peace, he will proceed by all the paths that there might be which are suitable, before arriving at arms, in order to see if he can thus collect the people who accompany the caciques, so that in this manner they find themselves forsaken of luck [---] / [-----] to be near them, so that with security and brevity, they can be united and protected among the infantry. After having done these tasks and the rest which remains at his disposition, with regard to the desireability of the peace, without which in order to achieve it he should assure them of the pardon of the guilty, and without threatening them that one punishment will proceed against them, conforming to the occasions which happen. If he should have in his hands the said caciques and aggressors of the uprising and of the deaths of the soldiers, he will imprison them and hold them well-guarded in the province of Apalachee, in the part that seems to him most suitable for their security, advising me immediately of everything, so that I may resolve what is most suitable. The rest of the Indians will be aggregated at their towns, as they were before. Likewise, as soon as the referred has been arranged, and [if] the religious of the señor San Francisco would like to come to the chapter, he will give them the infantry necessary so that they might come to this presidio with the security which is suitable,
arranging the rest of the matters which he carries at his charge with the prudence, valor, and interest which a matter so grave and necessitous asks for. / [----] he will do it in a case which is of such importance to the service of His Majesty. Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and governmental notary, will take the copy of this instruction, which is dated in St. Augustine, Florida, on the fourth of September, sixteen fifty-six. Don Diego de Rebolledo. Before me, Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and governmental notary who gives testimony in the office of government, of which I swear. Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and governmental notary (Rebolledo 1656d).

These instructions to Sergeant Major Cañizares were quite explicit, and this copy conforms with the later recollections of this same order by a number of soldiers who participated in the expedition. What seems clear is that Governor Rebolledo's stated intention in dispatching the military force under Cañizares' command was not to crush the rebellion by force of arms, but rather to endeavor to convince the rebels to return to their villages peacefully. Failing this, Cañizares was instructed to round up the rebel Indians under command of the caciques without resorting to force, and thus leave the leaders of the Timucuan Rebellion alone and helpless. Finally, the rebel caciques and the individual murderers were to be apprehended and imprisoned in Apalachee, pending a decision on their fate by Rebolledo himself.

Throughout these orders are statements that force was to be employed only as a last resort. This was indeed the perception of the soldiers after they learned of the order
(Pedrosa; Monzón; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez 1660), and Cañizares followed both the letter and spirit of these instructions in all of his subsequent actions, successfully achieving the stated goals of the order without spilling a single drop of blood. It must be concluded, therefore, that these orders were not merely a written facade designed to conceal more insidious intentions on the part of Rebolledo and the military, but instead reflect the actual intent of the Cañizares expedition.

The troops under Cañizares' command must have departed the city of St. Augustine soon after the issuance of Rebolledo's order. The Sergeant Major led a force of sixty Spanish soldiers, including a wide range of reformados and soldiers³. Many of these officers possessed long experience in the frontier of Florida. Cañizares himself, later described as "a wise person of more than sixty years of age" (Rebolledo 1657b), was a veteran of numerous expeditions into the interior, and had been sent into the Timucua province as early as 1618-1624 on a military expedition to punish the raiding Chisca Indians (see Chapter Six). Based on later testimony, he seems to have known many of the Timucua caciques personally⁴. Don Juan Menéndez Marquez, the second-in-command, along with his younger brother Don Antonio, were co-owners of the ranch of La Chua within the Timucua province along with their younger brother Don Thomás, and were personal acquaintances, if not friends,
of Lúcas Menéndez and other Timucua caciques (see Chapter Four). Many of the other officers and soldiers likewise had experience in Indian affairs, and at least one, Juan Baupista de la Cruz, who served as interpreter, may have been an Indian, judging by his alternate name Nayo.

These infantrymen, constituting one of the largest mobilizations of Spanish troops ever sent from St. Augustine into the interior of Florida, were accompanied by the principal cacique of the Apalachee province, Don Luis of Ivitachuco, and all the Apalachee Indians who had been in St. Augustine during the summer as a part of the yearly labor draft (Argüelles; Entonado 1660). As noted in Chapter Five, at least some of these Indians were given firearms commandeered from the Guale Indians, and thus the Apalachee Indians at least partially augmented Cañizares' military force. Consequently, the Cañizares expedition embodied 60 Spanish infantrymen with a substantial number of Apalachee Indians, perhaps as many as 200 (see Chapter Five), some armed with arquebuses.

The force marched into the interior, probably along the Camino Real, as far as the mission of San Martín. Having passed this town, the group arrived at a lake, where Cañizares assembled the troops and had the appointed notary, Ensign Don Juan Joseph de Sotomayor, read Rebolledo's order to all the men (Sotomayor; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado 1660). Continuing their journey to the west, the
army seems to have stayed off the main route, marching across an uninhabited region (probably south of the Yustaga region) to arrive at the town of Ivitachuco on the eastern boundary of Apalachee province (Pedrosa; Calderón 1660). In this manner, Cañizares circumvented the Timucua rebels (probably known to be largely in Yustaga by that time) and join the six Spanish soldiers already in Ivitachuco⁷, additionally bringing the Apalachee Indians under the cacique Don Luis to their home territory.

At Ivitachuco, the expedition found a considerable force of Indians assembled, including between five hundred (Monzón; Sotomayor 1660) and two thousand (Calderón 1660) Apalachee Indians. Additionally, beyond the soldiers sent from St. Augustine to Ivitachuco, one witness reported the presence of Spaniards from a ship from Havana, presumably having been recruited by Lieutenant Sartucha from a trading expedition to the Apalachee port (Calderón 1660).⁸ During several days in which the army rested and made preparations, Cañizares held a meeting with those caciques of Apalachee who had assembled in Ivitachuco, along with several leaders from the Timucua province who were not among the rebels, including Diego Heva, the cacique of Santa Catalina de Ayepacano, a satellite village of San Pedro de Potohiriba (Sotomayor 1660). While there, a Timucuan Indian named Francisco Hiriba, mandador of the town of Chamile⁹, arrived
in Ivitachuco with a pledge of assistance from Lazaro, the cacique of that town (Cruz 1660).

The fact that not all of the caciques of Timucua chose to follow the rebels is an intriguing facet of the rebellion. While it is clear that the majority of the caciques rebelled, including all of the most powerful leaders (Levels IV and III), a number of subordinate caciques (Levels II and I) chose to side with the Spanish. Their allegiance played an important, if not essential, role in the pacification of the province, and all would ultimately be rewarded by the Spanish for their stand. Significantly, the majority of the Spanish-allied caciques were from towns not situated along the Camino Real, including Chamile, Cachipile, and Arapaha, all of which seem to have been located in the northern reaches of the Yustaga region (although Chamile was only four leagues from the rebel stronghold at Machava). The non-Christian town of Pachala, also near Machava, remained loyal to the Spaniards, as did Santa Catalina de Ayepacano, a Level I satellite and near neighbor of the Level III regional center of Yustaga at San Pedro.

The decision of the caciques of these towns to betray their own aboriginal leaders in favor of the Spaniards may well represent a political power-play, for in failing to support the rebellion, their own personal standing with Spanish authorities was increased considerably. This
ultimately permitted these once subordinate caciques to advance to more central positions within the aboriginal political heirarchy of the Timucua province (see Chapter Nine), and it is not unlikely that this was a factor in their decision to ally themselves with the Spaniards. Another possible factor may have been the fact that most of these towns were not situated along the primary Spanish conduit through Timucua province, and thus they may not have been exposed to the worst of the abuses by passing soldiers before 1656. In this regard, it is notable that every known Level II town along the Camino Real took part in the rebellion.

It was only in Ivitachuco that Cañizares became aware of the rebel stronghold near Machava (Argüelles; Sotomayor; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado 1660), having been informed by the cacique Lazaro (through Francisco Hiriba) and several friars who had taken refuge in his town and others which were not involved in the rebellion (Monzón; Calderón 1660). Using his two interpreters Diego Salvador and Juan Baupista de la Cruz, Cañizares learned from the mandador Francisco Hiriba that Lazaro had remained in his town of Chamile awaiting the arrival of the Spanish infantry, fearing reprisals from the rebel caciques. Now that Cañizares had arrived, Lazaro pledged his support and asked what he should do to assist him (Cruz 1660).
Cañizares sent Hiriba back to Chamile with the reply that Lazaro should dispatch word to the rebel caciques in the palisade near Machava and inform them that the Spanish soldiers did not intend to make war on them, but rather to return the province to peace, and to investigate the causes of the uprising. Francisco Hiriba did not return for several days to Ivitachuco, but when he finally arrived, he carried word from the cacique of Lazaro, who said that he had done as much as he could, which was to send the requested message, but that he had not yet received a reply from the rebels (Cruz 1660). Cañizares once again sent Hiriba back to Chamile to indicate that he had not received any reply either, and that brevity was important, for he needed to inform Governor Rebolledo of his progress.

In the meantime, Cañizares seems to have sent two or three messages from Ivitachuco directly to the rebel caciques in the palisade, probably hoping to establish some sort of direct communication with them (Pérez de Villa Real; Argüelles; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado 1660). All witnesses later stated that replies were received from the rebels, but there is some confusion in this testimony as to who wrote and sent the messages, and what the reply was. One testified that the messages were written by Fray Manuel Umanes, who had been the friar at San Martín before the rebellion, but who had fled to Apalachee after the violence (Sotomayor 1660). This seems likely,
based on the fact that one of Cañizares' regular interpreters, Juan Baupista de la Cruz, made no mention of direct contact with the rebels from Ivitachuco (Cruz 1660). All witnesses indicated that the messages were dispatched with Indians\textsuperscript{11}, but it is evident that the response which Cañizares received was either negative or equivocal. The rebels refused to come to meet the Spaniards in Ivitachuco, and thus Cañizares was forced to come to the palisade in person.

At least some of the replies indicated that the rebels were willing to leave the palisade and return to their villages in peace (Entonado 1660), but this was later concluded to have been a ploy designed to permit the rebels to summon further assistance for their cause (Argüelles 1660). Indeed, as will be seen below, the rebels apparently used this time to spread rumors among the Spanish-allied Indians of Timucua, much in the same manner as had been done earlier in the summer with the Indians of Apalachee.

**Negotiations at Machava**

Seeing that he could accomplish no more from Ivitachuco, Cañizares ordered the army to prepare to march for the Timucua palisade. Before leaving Ivitachuco, the mandador Francisco Hiriba arrived, saying that he carried no message from his cacique Lazaro, but had returned of his own volition in order to be with the Spaniards (Cruz 1660). The
army departed Ivitachuco and marched eastward along the Camino Real, ultimately arriving in the vicinity of the town of Santa Elena de Machava. Along with Cañizares' original force of 60 Spanish infantry came the rest of the soldiers at Ivitachuco, and as many as 500 Apalachee Indian warriors (Sotomayor; Entonado 1660). The long-anticipated confrontation had arrived.

Only half a league from Machava, the army came upon the Timucua stronghold in a forest within the jurisdiction of the Level I satellite village of San Juan Evangelista. The rebels had constructed a palisade, or stockade, using thick, stout poles, and had heavily fortified the interior. Within were assembled a large number of Indians, including most of the rebel Timucua caciques, and upon seeing the Spanish army, the call to arms was sounded (Calderón 1660). Cañizares divided his army in two, sending one group ahead under the command of Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez Márquez, his second-in-command, while the other group remained under his own leadership (Pedrosa; Sotomayor; Calderón; Cruz 1660). This action was evidently taken in order to surround the palisade and seal off the entrances (Sotomayor; Rocha 1660).

Remaining at the distance of an arquebus-shot in front of the wall, Cañizares dispatched Francisco Hiriba to the palisade with the same message as before, requesting that they come out to speak with him (Monzón; Sotomayor;
Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Cruz 1660), and further threatening to assault the palisade if they refused (Entonado 1660). At this, two caciques emerged from the palisade. In the lead was María, the cacica of San Juan Evangelista, on whose territory the palisade had been built, and following her was Deonizio, the cacique of Santa Elena de Machava. The pair came to Cañizares and told him that the rebel caciques were prepared to comply with his requests, but that they could not leave that day, but would meet him the following day in the council house [buxio principal] of the town of Machava (Pedrosa; Monzón; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660), promising to send Indians who would bring them firewood there (Cruz 1660). Cañizares agreed, and the caciques returned to the palisade.

Pleased with this news, Cañizares ordered his army to withdraw from the forest, marching for Machava. Having arrived at the town, the soldiers quartered themselves in expectation of the arrival of the rebel caciques the next day. Late that same night, a group of Indians from the nearby town of Pachala, unconverted but nonetheless loyal to the Spaniards, brought firewood and water for the soldiers, the rebel caciques having failed to fulfill their earlier promise (Cruz 1660). During this same visit, these Indians from Pachala evidently turned over two Indians whom they
said were among the murderers (Calderón 1660), probably wishing to cement their loyalty to the soldiers.

The rebel caciques had not remained idle during the withdrawal of Cañizares' forces from the palisade, for very late that same night Indian messengers arrived from Chamile, having been dispatched by the cacique Lazaro to investigate the rumors he had been told by the rebels. The rebel caciques had sent word to Lazaro that "they should not trust the Spaniards, and that they were deceiving them, and in order to verify what they said, they advised them that [the Spaniards] had imprisoned the said Indians of Pachala" (Argüelles 1660). Furthermore, the rebels within the palisade had reported that "the Spaniards had made war on them and had killed many people", and requested immediate aid from Lazaro and other caciques (Cruz 1660). The messenger from Chamile reported that many of the Indians in the towns of Chamile and Arapaja wished to answer this call and rush to the aid of the rebels, since they had many relatives within the palisade, but that those of Chamile wished to confirm this news before acting (Cruz 1660).

In fact, neither of the rumors was accurate, but the rebels clearly wished to shatter the alliance between the soldiers and the Indians of these northern towns, drawing the rest of the Timucua province into the uprising and augmenting their own forces. As in the case of their overtures to the Apalachee province (see Chapter Five),
however, the rebel strategy backfired, for the exposure of these rumors as lies only served to cement the Spanish/Indian alliance. Indeed, the more the rebel Timucuans attempted to convert others to their cause, the more well-defined became their opposition.

Cañizares openly invited the messenger from Chamile to personally confirm that neither of the rumors was true, and sent him back to his cacique to report his findings and invite Lazaro to come to Machava himself (Argüelles; Cruz; Calderón 1660). The following day, Lazaro arrived in Machava, bringing with him Francisco, the cacique of Cachipile, and Pastrana, the cacique of Arapaja (Argüelles 1660). Having verified that the rumors were false, Lazaro agreed to take a message personally from Cañizares to the rebel Timucua caciques in the palisade, stating that Cañizares still awaited them, and that unless they left as they agreed, the consequences would be unfortunate (Argüelles; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660). After delivering the message, Lazaro returned that day with the reply that the rebels had agreed to leave the palisade and come to Machava (Cruz 1660).

Among the soldiers and Spanish-allied Indians at Machava, however, it was suspected that this was yet another trick designed to delude the Spaniards into permitting their Indian allies to return home, leaving the soldiers open to assault by the rebel forces in the palisade (Pedrosa
Taking no chances, Cañizares advised caution on the part of the soldiers (Monzón; Sotomayor; Cruz 1660), and instructed each of the Apalachee caciques present in Machava to greet one of the arriving Timucua caciques with an embrace, and then sit next to him or her in order to be ready to apprehend them (Pedrosa 1660). A sign was decided upon which, when given by Cañizares, would signal the Apalachee norocos to capture the rebels (Sotomayor; Cruz 1660).

The next day, Lazaro went to the Timucua palisade a second time, and finally returned, leading the long-awaited rebel caciques (Argüelles; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado 1660). Among their number were Diego, cacique of San Pedro de Potohiriba; Deonizio, cacique of Santa Elena de Machava; Benito Ruíz, cacique of Santa Cruz de Tarihica; Molina, cacica of San Juan de Guacara; Pedro, cacique of San Pablo; Juan Ebangelista, cacique of San Lúcas; María, cacica of San Juan Ebangelista; along with the caciques of San Francisco de Choquine, San Lorenzo, Santa Ana, Namo, and the cacica of Niayca (Pedrosa; Argüelles; Monzón; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660). Other principal Indians may also have come, along with at least two Indians who served the caciques (Cruz 1660).

The rebel leaders entered the council house with Lazaro, and were greeted and embraced by Cañizares, who instructed them to sit on the barbacoas beside him.
Employing his two interpreters, Diego Salvador and Juan Baughtista de la Cruz, Cañizares addressed the caciques, saying "Come here, my sons. What has this uprising been about?", and made them a speech, asking them why they had risen up and killed the Spaniards, considering the fact that they had been Christians and such loyal vassals to the Spanish crown for so many years (Argüelles; Monzón; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660). According to all but one of the witnesses present, the caciques only spoke among themselves, failing to respond to the question, although Cañizares asked them a second and third time.18

After admonishing the caciques that if they did not respond, he would have to imprison them in order to investigate the matter, Cañizares gave the pre-arranged sign to the Apalachee Indians in the council house, and the rebels were captured and thrown in chains (Pedrosa; Argüelles; Monzón; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660).19 The Sergeant Major then dispatched the loyal cacique Diego Heva to go to the palisade and bring the murderers, and sent the message that the rebels in the palisade should return to their homes, for the Spaniards intended no reprisals against them (Pérez; Argüelles 1660). The cacique soon returned, bringing two Indians who had been handed over by those in the palisade, whom they said were responsible for the murders of Bartolomé
Pérez and an African slave in La Chua (Argüelles; Rocha; Calderón; Cruz 1660).

Sergeant Major Cañizares had essentially achieved his goal: the apprehension of the rebel leaders and murderers. Only the principal cacique Lúcas Menéndez and the caciques of San Francisco and Santa Fé remained at large, and the rebel forces had retreated from their stronghold. A later reconnaissance of the palisade by Captain Argüelles confirmed that the Timucua palisade had indeed been abandoned (Argüelles 1660). Whether or not the rebels had returned to their towns and villages, or had fled for the woods, is unknown. Nonetheless, Cañizares had succeeded in defusing the Timucuan rebellion, and without resorting to force of arms. What could have turned into a bloody slaughter at the palisade was instead solved using skillful negotiation. The immediate threat posed by the uprising was over, leaving the Timucua province effectively pacified for the time being. The only remaining question was the disposition of the prisoners, and the location of Lúcas Menéndez and the other two rebel caciques.

The success of Cañizares' expedition was due in large part to Indians loyal to the Spanish. Beyond the fact that the bulk of his military force seems to have been composed of Apalachee warriors, the allegiance and assistance of the Spanish-allied Timucuan caciques was of critical importance. Not only did these caciques exercise considerable prudence
in attempting to independently verify the rumors spread by
the rebels, they became directly involved in the
negotiations between Cañizares and the rebel caciques.
Indeed, it seems unlikely that the Sergeant Major would have
been able to arrange a face to face meeting with the rebel
leaders without the earlier entreaties of the cacique Lazaro
and the mandador Francisco Hiriba.

A large portion of the credit must be given to
Cañizares himself, for his restraint and moderation in the
command of his military force, and for the wise decision to
use all the resources at hand, namely the Spanish-allied
Timucuans. The old soldier lived up to his recommendation
as "a person of all satisfaction, skill, and experience"
(Rebolledo 1656), and proved a wise choice to lead the
expedition to pacify Timucua. In many ways, Cañizares has
been given an unjustified reputation in previous historical
literature (based on sources other than the Rebolledo
residencia), accused of having "quelled the rebellion with
undue severity" (Pearson 1983:261) and having "put down the
revolt...with such extreme cruelty" (Gannon 1965). This
portrait largely resulted from the statements of Franciscan
friars, whose letters have long dominated the documentary
record of the Timucuan Rebellion.20 Indeed, as will be
seen below, the cruelties which were yet to come were
actually the product of Rebolledo's hand, and not that of
his Sergeant Major.
Punishment of the Timucua Rebels

Having imprisoned the caciques of the Timucua palisade, Cañizares made preparations for the army to march to Ivitachuco with their prisoners. In the meantime, one of the two Indian prisoners brought by Diego Heva was put on trial in the council house at Machava, having openly confessed to the murder of Bartolomé Pérez (Argüelles; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660). Cañizares took his confession using the two interpreters (Salvador and Cruz) and the appointed notary Don Juan Antonio de Sotomayor. The Indian stated that he had indeed killed Pérez, having left the rebel meeting at San Pedro and traveled to Asile, where he met the soldier in the council house and struck him with a hatchet in the back of the head and scalped him outside (Sotomayor 1660). Citing the earlier incident in Apalachee (see Chapter Seven), in which Pérez had kicked and insulted him, as one reason for the murder, the Indian stated furthermore that he had killed the soldier in order to become a noroco of God and the King, and that he was content with his actions.

Faced with the public confession of one of the murderers, and the fact that the Indian did not regret his actions, Cañizares had him garrotted in public (Argüelles; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660). While this action might seem brutal on the surface, the execution of a confessed criminal for
murder must be viewed as the only legal recourse available to the Sergeant Major, and one which he carried out in accordance with the law, taking the confession in writing before the execution (although these papers were never found during the Rebolledo residencia\textsuperscript{22}). Cañizares took no action against the rebel caciques, nor against the other murderers, deciding instead to transport them to the relative security of the Apalachee province and await further instructions from the Governor.

The day following the imprisonment of the caciques and the subsequent execution, Cañizares set out for Ivitachuco with his forces, leading the imprisoned Timucuans in chains. After their arrival, the rebels were placed in the council house at Ivitachuco, and guards were posted (Pedrosa; Argüelles; Monzón; Sotomayor; Rocha; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado; Cruz 1660). A message was dispatched by Cañizares, in which Governor Rebolledo was informed of the progress of the expedition. Beyond the fact that most of the rebel had been imprisoned, perhaps the most significant (and troublesome) news was that Lúcas Menéndez, the principal leader of the rebellion, remained at large. Ultimately, this would spur the Governor to personal action, but in the meantime, Cañizares took steps to capture the cacique of San Martín.

Leaving the rebels under guard, Cañizares departed Ivitachuco in search of Lúcas Menéndez, bringing with him a
contingent of soldiers and some Indians from Apalachee (Pérez; Monzón; Sotomayor; Calderón; Menéndez Márquez; Entonado 1660). In their company came several friars on their way to St. Augustine, who had not dared to make the journey without an escort of soldiers following the rebellion (Pedrosa 1660). During this journey, Cañizares additionally saw to the peaceful status of the remaining Indians across the province (Argüelles 1660). The party failed to come across the missing cacique in the town of San Pedro (Monzón 1660), and thus continued eastward, arriving at a settlement next to the river of San Juan de Guacara, evidently in a place called Aramuqua, in a forest, where he was rumored to be with a number of Indians (Pedrosa; Entonado; Cruz 1660). Once again, Lúcas was not found, and thus Cañizares dispatched a party of seven soldiers under his second-in-command Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez Márquez to return to St. Augustine with the friars, bringing news to the Governor (Sánchez de Urisa; Pedrosa 1660).24

Proceeding onward to the town of San Martín, Cañizares' yet again failed to apprehend its cacique (Monzón; Entonado; Cruz 1660). Despairing of finding Lúcas Menéndez, and running out of provisions (Calderón 1660), Cañizares decided to give up the search and return to Ivitachuco. After sending Captain Agustín Pérez to St. Augustine with several more soldiers (Pérez de Villa Real 1660), Cañizares returned the eighteen leagues to San Pedro, where he seems to have
dispatched yet another party of eleven soldiers with Adjutant Francisco de Monzón, carrying a letter for the Governor (Monzón 1660). Returning finally to Ivitachuco, Cañizares sent Adjutant Don Antonio Menéndez Márquez with other soldiers to accompany more friars going to an upcoming Franciscan chapter in St. Augustine (Menéndez Márquez 1660).

Awaiting word from Rebolledo in St. Augustine, Cañizares soon received good news from Francisco Hiriba. The Indian had been sent by the cacique of Santa Catalina, Diego Heva, who reported that he had captured Lúcas Menéndez, and was sending him to the soldiers in Ivitachuco. The cacique requested a dozen soldiers to meet the party and escort him the rest of the way to Ivitachuco (Calderón; Cruz 1660). The Sergeant Major quickly dispatched Captain Argüelles with six soldiers, who met the imprisoned cacique of San Martín on the road between Asile and Ivitachuco, bringing him to Ivitachuco and placing him in the council house with the rest of the rebels (Argüelles; Calderón 1660).

By this time the date was late November of 1656. Governor Rebolledo had received several messages from Cañizares (Ponce de León 1660), and while the news of the apprehension of the rebel caciques was encouraging, the fact that the instigator of the uprising, and the principal cacique of the entire province, had yet to be captured was
undoubtedly disturbing to the Governor. Soon after being informed of this situation, Rebolledo decided to go personally to Ivitachuco in order to wrap up loose ends. He sent word to Cañizares of his plans, and immediately began preparing for his journey. The Governor sent a letter to Clemente Bernal, the cacique of San Juan del Puerto, in the province of Mocama on modern Fort George Island at the mouth of the St. Johns river, informing him of the rebellion and summoning him to serve as an interpreter for the expedition (Bernal 1660). Accompanying Rebolledo, in addition to Clemente Bernal, were several officials from St. Augustine, including the Royal Treasurer, two notaries, several military officers, and a friar (Rebolledo 1657c). 

Several other soldiers were also brought, including some who had recently returned from the interior with reports from Cañizares, such as Captain Agustín Pérez (1660).

Governor Rebolledo left St. Augustine on November 27, 1656, leaving behind Captain Juan Ruíz Maroto as the interim Lieutenant Governor during Rebolledo's absence (Moreno 1657; Ponce de León 1660). Ultimately, he would spend well over two months in the interior, during which time he evidently supported all the members of his expedition at his own expense (Heras 1657). The group marched west along the Camino Real, and Rebolledo was fortunate enough to capture the cacique Juan Bautista in his own town of San Francisco de Potano, and followed this success with the apprehension
of the cacique of Santa Fé in his town (Puerta; Argüelles; Entonado 1660).

Meanwhile, Cañizares had earlier received word of Rebolledo's departure, and was marching east from Ivitachuco to meet his party with a group of soldiers. The Sergeant Major came upon the Governor in Santa Fé, and while there, Rebolledo ordered a group of soldiers under the command of Captain Argüelles to descend to the villages of San Francisco and Santa Ana in order to capture some of the Indians who were involved with the murders at La Chua (Argüelles; Sotomayor; Calderón 1660). The party departed, only to meet with failure and return to St. Augustine, but Cañizares joined Rebolledo and accompanied him on his march to Apalachee.

Having arrived in Ivitachuco, Rebolledo found the cacique of San Martín imprisoned with all the rest, and added the caciques of San Francisco and Santa Fé to their number. During the month of December, Governor Rebolledo put the rebel caciques of Timucua on trial in the council house at Ivitachuco. Although the details are scarce, since the original records of the proceedings have not been located, there is good evidence to believe that Rebolledo held a formal trial, employing Clemente Bernal, Diego Salvador, and Juan Baaptista de la Cruz as interpreters to take the confessions of the caciques and murderers, with Juan Moreno y Segovia as the notary.
The only direct testimony relative to the course of this trial was provided by the cacique Clemente Bernal (1660), who summarized the confession of the rebels. They said that Lúcas Menéndez, the cacique of San Martín, had intercepted a letter from Governor Rebolledo, and based on its contents had convened a meeting of the caciques of Timucua in San Pedro de Potohiriba. In this meeting, Lúcas argued that Rebolledo was summoning them not because there was news of enemies, but rather in order to make them slaves. The text of these confessions were recorded by the notary Moreno, and Rebolledo, as judge, subsequently pronounced sentence.

In all, at least fifteen rebel caciques were on trial, and perhaps six of the murderers. After considering all the testimony, Governor Rebolledo sentenced six caciques to death, along with four of the murderers. In a later letter to the King, Rebolledo (1657e) reported that the caciques had been condemned as a result of "being the principal [Indians] who occasioned the rebellion, and for the forceful endeavors which they made so that the remaining provinces would follow their uprising." These individuals were not only hanged, but were strung up at strategic points across the Timucua province, presumably as an example to the rest of the Indians (Calderón 1660). Lúcas Menéndez, cacique of San Martín, Diego, cacique of San Pedro, and Benito Ruíz, cacique of Santa Cruz de Tarihica, were all
hanged in the town of San Pedro de Potohiriba, where the rebellion began. Deonizio, cacique of Santa Elena, was hanged on the road leading to his town of Machava. Juan Ebanjelista, cacique of San Lúcas, was hanged in the town of Asile, along with two of the murderers. Finally, Juan Bauptista, cacique of San Francisco, was hanged on the road to his town of San Francisco, along with the remaining two murderers.

Those executed were displayed at all the major locations where some action occurred during the Timucuan Rebellion, including the original meeting at San Pedro, the murders at San Pedro, Asile, and La Chua, and the palisade at Machava. The execution of the caciques of San Martín, San Pedro, and Santa Cruz in San Pedro confirms the central role of these three caciques in both the rebellion and the overall political structure of the Timucua province. The manner of these executions represented an attempt by Governor Rebolledo to discourage further uprisings, and presumably constitutes part of what he meant by the "pacification" of the province. Although these sentences might be considered light in comparison with those imposed after other rebellions in the Spanish colonies, and it seems to have been this action more than any other which finally led to Rebolledo's eventual deposition and arrest (see Chapter Nine).
The specific fate of the remaining caciques and murderers is unspecified, but it seems likely that all were among those sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment at forced labor in St. Augustine (Ponce de León 1660). This supposition is supported by the fact that none of the named rebel caciques were in power the following February during Rebolledo's visitation (Rebolledo 1657c). Two of the murderers, Juan Alejo and Francisco Pasqua, were still serving in the Castillo at St. Augustine in 1660 during the Rebolledo residencia, and it seems likely that the remaining nine rebel caciques suffered similar fates. A later recounting of the forced labor pool in St. Augustine during the 1650's revealed that between the years 1655 and 1657, the number of Indians at forced labor jumped from only three to eighteen. Ten alone were added in 1657, described as "the year of the punishment of the Timucuan Indians" (Herrera 1660). 33

With the execution or imprisonment of all the most important caciques in the Timucua province, the Timucuan Rebellion was finished. As an aboriginal society, Timucua was politically decapitated, leaving in power only those caciques who had seen fit to ally themselves with the Spaniards. In many ways, however, this event marked essentially the final step in the integration of Timucua into the developing colonial system of Spanish Florida, for Rebolledo did not leave the province in a state of disarray.
As will be seen in Chapter Seven, the subsequent political and geographical restructuring of the Timucua province swept away many of the last vestiges of its aboriginal character, and created a more or less fully integrated and functional component of the Spanish colonial society in Florida.

Notes

1. This term literally translates as "beheading" or "cutting the throat", but this was clearly not the case with the soldier Bartolomé Pérez, nor with the two servants Francisco Vásquez and Gerónimo Tabasco. No details are available regarding the manner of death experienced by soldiers Estéban Solana and Juan de Osuna, or the two African slaves killed in La Chua.

2. The following passage is only partially preserved, and thus its meaning is unclear.

3. The roster of soldiers who participated in the Cañizares expedition included the following individuals:
   Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, commander of expedition
   Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez Marquez, second-in-command
   Sergeant Major Juan Sánchez de Uriza
   Captain Alonso de Argüelles
   Captain Matheo Cu___ [?]
   Captain Francisco de la Rocha
   Adjutant Don Antonio Menéndez Marquez
   Adjutant Francisco de Monzón
   Adjutant Salvador de Pedrosa
   Adjutant Francisco Romo de Uriza
   Ensign Manuel Calderón
   Ensign Diego de Florencia
   Ensign Don Antonio de Sotomayor
   Ensign Don Juan Joseph de Sotomayor
   Juan Bautista de la Cruz / Mayo, interpreter
   Juan de los Reyes, soldier

These soldiers, along with some 45 others, ultimately joined the following soldiers, already in Ivitachuco:
   Captain Antonio de Sartucha,
   Lieutenant of Apalachee province
   Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real
   Adjutant Francisco Sánchez
Ensign Juan Bautista Terrasa  
Sergeant Pedro Texeda  
Bartolomé Francisco

The events of the Cañizares expedition are primarily known from the detailed testimony of eleven participants. See the testimony of Sánchez de Urisa, Pedrosa, Pérez de Villa Real, Argüelles, Monzón, Sotomayor, Rocha, Calderón, Menéndez Márquez, Entonado, and Cruz in Appendix C.

4. The cacique of Santa Cruz de Tarihica, Benito Ruiz, was said to have discussed his displeasure with Rebolledo's failure to provide provisions for the road with Cañizares in the Sergeant Major's house in St. Augustine (Menéndez Márquez 1660), and Cañizares was one of the soldiers cited as having mentioned Rebolledo's policy of distributing gifts only to the non-Christian Indians, suggesting that he enjoyed the confidence of the offended caciques (Horruytiner 1660).

5. The presence of Apalachee Indians in St. Augustine during the Timucuan Rebellion suggests that the yearly labor draft for 1656 had been fulfilled earlier in the year, and that Rebolledo's order for 500 warriors from Timucua and Apalachee was in fact an augmentation of the standard repartimiento labor draft. One might wonder how many male Indians would have been left in Apalachee after not only the common laborers, but also the caciques and other warriors were drafted for service in the city.

Presuming the yearly labor draft from the Timucua province had been fulfilled earlier that year, it is intriguing to wonder what became of these laborers during the rebellion. The only hint of an answer comes from the testimony of Juan Pascua, who was on his way back from the fields in St. Augustine when he met cacique Lúcas Menéndez in mission San Francisco de Potano, and was ordered to assist in the murders at La Chua (Pascua 1660).

The presence of Don Luis, cacique of Ivitachuco and principal cacique of Apalachee, with the laborers in St. Augustine raises additional questions regarding the absence of his counterpart in Timucua, Lúcas Menéndez, along with the other Timucua caciques. The fact that the 1655 labor draft from Timucua and Apalachee was heavily impacted by epidemics the previous winter, resulting in the drafting of Indians from the Diminiyuti province (Rebolledo 1655) might explain the absence of Timucuan leaders in St. Augustine for the 1656 labor draft.

6. The location of this lake [laguna] is unclear, but it may have been one of the sinkhole springs mentioned along the Camino Real just past San Martín by Diego Peña in the early eighteenth century (Peña 1717). Contrarily, Sotomayor may have been referring to the deep spring-fed lake just a few
hundred yards north of the site of San Martín (Fig Springs),
now named Blue Hole. The probability that the army marched
along the less-populus southern border of Timucua implies
that this lake was not one of those in the vicinity of
modern Lake City.

7. One soldier on the expedition later recalled that
Cañizares led only forty soldiers who joined twenty already
in Apalachee (Sánchez de Urisa 1660), but the weight of
other testimony suggests this to be incorrect. This may
have been confused by the presence of other Spaniards from a
Cuban ship in Ivitachuco (see below).

8. While Governor Rebolledo would have had time to request
direct assistance from Havana during the interval between
the beginning of the rebellion and the dispatch of the
Cañizares expedition, the fact that only one document even
mentions the presence of the people from this ship suggests
that their presence was the result of an impromptu request
by Sartucha to one of the many vessels from Havana which
participated in a lively trade with Apalachee.

9. While Francisco Hiriba is known from several witnesses to
have served in San Pedro following the rebellion, the
detailed testimony of the interpreter Juan Bautista de la
Cruz (1660) indicates that during the rebellion, he served
Lazaro, "his" cacique. It is of course possible that he had
been among those at San Pedro who refused to rebel, and
subsequently allied himself with Lazaro on a temporary
basis.

10. Little is known about this village, apart from the fact
that it was "very near [cerquita]" to Machava, and was
described as a non-Christian village. The fact that the
Timucua rebels later spread the rumor that several Indians
from Pachala had been imprisoned by the Spaniards, intending
to draw the cacique Lazaro into the uprising, suggests that
these Indians were probably culturally and linguistically
related to the rest of towns in the Yustaga region.

11. Two witness stated that Francisco Hiriba was among those
sent with messages to the palisade (Argüelles; Calderón
1660), but these individuals seem to have confused this
incident with Hiriba's trips back and forth from Chamile, or
perhaps with the use of Hiriba as a messenger later in front
of the stronghold.

12. This stronghold was consistently described by witnesses
as forts, or fortifications [fuertes] within a palisade
[palenque] made of strong poles. There is no evidence as to
the shape or configuration of this structure, but the fact
that all witnesses stated that it contained a large number
of Indians suggests that it was fairly substantial in size. Since this was a fortification built outside the inhabited villages, it may have been completely distinct from the typically illustrated "palisaded towns" of the Southeastern Indians. As noted in Chapter Seven, the rebel palisade may have been constructed along Spanish military guidelines, perhaps even imitating the Castillo in St. Augustine, which the Indians had helped build and maintain.

13. Sotomayor (1660) says this message was sent with the cacique Diego Heva, but this seems to be in error based on the weight of other evidence.

14. Cruz (1660) testified that after Hiriba was dispatched, the army divided and began to enter the forest, but that Cañizares ordered them to retreat outside the forest following an unspecified rumor among the soldiers, and that following this the two caciques came forth to meet with him (see below).

15. Cruz (1660) does not mention this, but Calderón's (1660) recollection that four murderers were later executed backs up his assertion that two were handed over at this time by the Indians of Pachala.

16. Pérez (1660) states that Hiriba was also sent to the palisade from Machava.

17. Pedrosa's statement that the departure of their Indian allies from Apalachee and Timucua would leave the Spaniards with "little infantry" suggests that, at least in the perception of the Spaniards, the rebel Timucua forces were potentially strong enough to best their force of sixty soldiers. Presuming this was the case, it further reinforces the importance of Indian allies (both Apalachee and Timucua) in the successful pacification of the Timucua province.

18. The interpreter Cruz testified (1660), however, that one of the caciques did respond, revealing Lúcas Menéndez as the instigator of the rebellion, and telling Cañizares the name of the killer of Bartolomé Pérez. The weight of other evidence suggests that this statement was made after the imprisonment of the caciques, perhaps during their trial (see the similarity of Cruz' testimony to that of Clemente Bernal (1660) relative to the trial), and that Cruz remembered the timing of the confession incorrectly.

19. While the capture of the rebel caciques under what was probably presumed to be a guarantee of safe-conduct was not an honorable action on the part of Cañizares, he was following the letter of Rebolledo's order, and probably
judged that a bloody battle could be averted by imprisoning the Timucua rebels. Given the military posture of the rebels within the palisade, Cañizares most likely judged his choices to be between capturing the caciques under a flag of truce, resulting in their legal trial, or taking the palisade by siege, resulting in numerous casualties.

20. An example of this may be seen in Fray Juan Gómez de Engraba's (1657a) description of Cañizares' negotiations as having "managed to learn who were the guilty ones, at times by the use of spies, and at times from prisoners, from whence he proceeded to capture them."

21. Two witnesses (Pedrosa; Menéndez Márquez 1660) use the term ahorcar, which literally means "to hang", but the bulk of other testimony indicates that the Indian was garrotted, or strangled with a rope.

22. Although many witnesses referred to this written case, research by the notary Juan Moreno y Segovia (1660) failed to turn up the elusive case among Cañizares' papers, said by Sotomayor (1660) to be in the house of Cañizares' wife Juana de Mendoza. Only half a month later, the executor of Cañizares' estate, Sergeant Manuel Gómez, testified that the original case remained in the possession of Squad Leader Andres Pérez (Gómez 1660), in the Apalachee garrison at the time.

23. Each witness describes this site using different terms (a settlement next to the river, a forest, a place called Aramuqua), but based on the order of events in each testimony, they seem to have been referring to the same location.

24. This party included Sergeant Major Juan Sánchez de Urisa, Adjutant Salvador de Pedrosa, and five other soldiers (Sánchez de Urisa; Pedrosa 1660). As will be seen below, this was only one of four separate groups of soldiers reported to have been sent to St. Augustine at different times during and after the search for Lúcas Menéndez. It is possible that this is accurate, but since each party was cited by a separate witness, it is possible that one or more of the witnesses may have recalled incorrectly the location from which the soldiers were sent from, perhaps reducing the number of expeditions to a smaller number.

25. This party may be identical with one or more of the other four groups sent to St. Augustine (see previous note).

26. The members of Rebolledo's party included Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and governmental notary in St. Augustine, and Francisco de Rueda, the Royal Notary, along with the
Royal Treasurer Don Joseph de Prado, Sergeant Major Salvador de Cigarroa, Captain Matheo Luis de Florencia, and Fray Antonio Estéban (Rebolledo 1657c).

27. Royal Accountant Sanctos de las Heras officially certified that Rebolledo received no ayuda de costa using Royal funds for this expedition, verifying the testimony of all the witnesses Rebolledo called for his auto of October, 1657 (Heras 1657). It must be remembered, however, that Rebolledo was engaged in many illegal activities during his Governorship, and thus his "personal" funds were presumably at least partially derived from his own corruption.

28. The trial records were not included or copied in the Rebolledo residencia, but there is reason to suspect that they may have been consulted, for the charges against Rebolledo include the complete names of all the caciques and murderers hung by Rebolledo, information not contained in any other document of the residencia. Nevertheless, it is possible that Rebolledo's case "disappeared" between 1656 and 1660, perhaps having been lost or even destroyed as a coverup.

29. Cruz (1660) related a similar cause, although he placed this confession in the council house at Machava (see above).

30. The vast majority of the testimony from the Rebolledo residencia, including that which actually specifies and names the individuals, indicates that only six caciques were hanged, and not eleven as generally reported in the secondary literature (see, for example, Pearson (1983:261) and Bushnell (1989:141)). This last figure seems to stem from a frequently cited letter by Fray Juan Gómez de Engraba (1657b). While in this letter of April 4, 1657, the friar reports eleven caciques hanged, his earlier letter of March 13 reports only six or seven caciques (Gómez 1657a). A letter by Governor Rebolledo himself dated September 18 of the same year stated that he had hanged eleven, not specifically stating whether all were caciques (Rebolledo 1657e). Similarly, Sergeant Major Nicolás Ponce de León (1660) reported that Rebolledo had hanged "ten or twelve Indians, all the most [important] caciques, as heads of the said uprising", suggesting that the caciques were only among those hanged. In sum, the weight of evidence indicates that the total number of Indians hanged was eleven, with only six of these being caciques. Of the remaining five murderers, one had been executed by Cañizares earlier, and the other four were hanged along with the rebel caciques (see below for locations).
31. It is not clear whether these Indians were executed in Ivitachuco and then hung in the various described locations, or were carried alive to these locations and then hung. The latter seems more likely, if only for ease in transport.

32. The charges against Rebolledo in his residencia reveal the names of only two of the murderers hung, although Calderón (1660) enumerates a total of four. The two Indians named were Antonio García Martín Xinija, and Juan Baupista Xiriva. The first may have been the "Antonio" referred to by Juan Alejo (1660) as the son of Lazaro, cacique of Chamile, who assisted in the murders of Francisco Vásquez and Gerónimo Tabasco at Calacala. If this is the case, the fact that he was hung and his partner was not probably relates to the fact that Antonio scalped his victim. Rebolledo's later statement that eleven Indians were hung (including only six caciques) probably includes the murderer of Bartolomé Pérez, garrotted earlier by order of Sergeant Major Cañizares.

33. The data from this list include the following numbers of Indians at forced labor: ten in 1651, five in 1652, four in 1653, five in 1654, three in 1655, eight in 1656, eighteen in 1657 ("the year of the punishment of the Timucua Indians"), and seventeen in 1658. By way of comparison, the number of Royal slaves (presumably African) during these years remained nearly constant: five in 1651, seven in 1652 (following the purchase of two slaves from the hacienda of Asile), and six in 1653 (the "broken and sick" mulatto slave Francisco Galindo was given his liberty October 21, 1652), a number which remained constant through 1658 (Herrera, López, y Mesa 1660). During these years, then, more Indian prisoners provided Royal labor than did African slaves.
CHAPTER NINE
AFTERMATH OF THE TIMUCUAN REBELLION

The Restructuring of Timucua Province

With the execution and imprisonment of the rebel caciques, the Timucua mission province was politically decapitated. All major leaders, including the principal caciques of each Level III region within the province and virtually every other Level II local cacique, had been removed from power, leaving the province in a state of anarchy. Presumably for this very reason, Governor Rebolledo could not leave the interior without attempting to repair what he had undone. Interestingly, Rebolledo's first action was to conduct a systematic visitation of the Apalachee province (see Hann 1986b). During this visitation, Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares y Osorio was named the new provincial Lieutenant in Apalachee, and was given charge of an expanded garrison of twelve soldiers to be stationed in the Apalachee town of San Luis.

Furthermore, Rebolledo issued a code of regulations to be posted in the council house of each Indian town throughout Apalachee (and subsequently in Timucua as well). This code addressed a variety of issues such as burden-
bearing, provisions for passing soldiers, trade and price controls, native dances and games, and punishment of native leaders (Rebolledo 1657c). The regulations seem to have been designed with the particular grievances of the Apalachee leaders in mind, for the subsequent visitation record closely mirrors the previously issued regulatory code (Hann 1986:84). Indeed, none of its seven points addressed the roots of the Timucuan Rebellion, such as the treatment of native leaders in the Indian militia, or the yearly repartimiento labor draft. The regulations seem to have been more of a reward to the Apalachee leaders for their support during the Timucuan Rebellion than an attempt to correct the grievances which sparked it.

Following his visitation of the Apalachee province in late January and early February of 1657, Rebolledo gathered the remaining leaders of the Timucua for a meeting which would provide for the political restructuring of the province. This meeting was held under the banner of a visitation of the Timucua province, but the fact that only a single town was "visited", and that the only items briefly covered in the visitation record related to chiefly succession and the maintenance of the Camino Real, indicates that the meeting was called largely to settle the question of future leadership for the province.

While in Apalachee, Rebolledo dispatched Captain Matheo Luis de Florencia to summon the caciques of Timucua to the
town of San Pedro de Potohiriba for the provincial visitation. On February 13, 1657, having completed his visitation of Apalachee, Rebolledo met in the council house of San Pedro with twenty-five caciques from throughout Timucua province. Based on the text of this visitation, a portrait of the political structure of the Timucua province emerges (Table 3). A comparison of this list with that constructed for the pre-Rebellion period (see Chapter Four, and Table 2 in particular) reveals much regarding the political restructuring of Timucua following the Rebellion. While the 1657 information differs from that of the 1656 list in several important ways, a number of significant contrasts are evident. ³

The most obvious difference is the replacement of executed or imprisoned caciques with new leaders. All of the rebel caciques for whom names are known were replaced by different caciques following the rebellion, and it is highly probable that this was the case for each town involved in the uprising. Many of the names of these new caciques, such as those of Niayca, San Lorenzo, San Lucas, Santa Elena de Machava, San Francisco Potano, and probably Santa Cruz de Tarihica, do not appear in the records of the rebellion, but it seems likely that most or all were secondary leaders who remained loyal during the rebellion. This supposition is strengthened by the appearance in new positions of several
Table 3: 1657 Political Structure of Timucua Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town Name</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Pedro de Potohiriba</td>
<td>Diego Heva</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Santa Ana</td>
<td>María Menéndez</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamile/San Martín</td>
<td>Lazaro</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cachipile</td>
<td>Francisco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chuaquine</td>
<td>Lorenzo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arapaja/Santa Fé</td>
<td>Alonso Pastrana</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Francisco Potano</td>
<td>Domingo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Pablo</td>
<td>Francisco Alonso</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Juan</td>
<td>Juan Bautista</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Elena de Machava</td>
<td>Pedro Menéndez</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Joseph</td>
<td>Sebastián</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Lorenzo</td>
<td>Dionicio</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Matheo</td>
<td>Sebastián</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Francisco</td>
<td>Francisco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Miguel</td>
<td>Francisco Alonso</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Santa Lucía</td>
<td>Francisco</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Diego</td>
<td>Francisco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Santa Fé</td>
<td>Antonio</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Pablo</td>
<td>Bernabé</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Lúcas</td>
<td>Lúcas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- San Matheo</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
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<td>San Agustín</td>
<td>Domingo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihayca</td>
<td>Lucía</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Tari [?] b</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>- San Pedro de Aqualiro</td>
<td>Martín</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Santa María</td>
<td>Alexo</td>
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a Table constructed using the text of the Rebolledo visitation of Timucua (Rebolledo 1657c). Information on level of sociopolitical integration derived from descriptions of principal caciques (Level 2) and caciques within their jurisdiction (Level 1), where indicated.

b No leader from Tari was present at the visitation, but the fact that San Pedro de Aqualiro was described as a part of the "jurisdiction of Tari" suggests that the position of a Level 2 principal cacique did exist for Tari. It is possible that the cacique Martín was the heir-apparent of Benito Ruiz, the former cacique of Santa Cruz de Tarihica, executed during the rebellion.
of the more prominent players in the final negotiations which ended the rebellion.

The cacique Diego Heva, formerly cacique of the satellite village of Santa Catalina de Ayepacano, rose to fill the position vacated by his former superior Diego, hanged for his principal role in the uprising. Diego Heva was one of the first Timucua caciques to stand on the side of the Spaniards, and provided considerable assistance during the Cañizares expedition, personally turning over not only two of the murderers from the palisade, but also apprehending the paramount cacique of the entire Timucua province, Lúcas Menéndez, who was the last to evade Spanish capture. The fact that Diego Heva committed this final act of betrayal against his superior in the aboriginal heirarchy seems ultimately to have served him well, for by the time of the Rebolledo visitation, he had advanced to the central position at San Pedro. Whether or not such an increase in political status and power was originally intended, Diego Heva was rewarded for his allegiance.

The other principal Spanish ally during the Cañizares expedition, Lazaro, cacique of Chamile, seems to have experienced a similar rise in political status. Lazaro replaced the executed Lúcas Menéndez, consenting to move his entire village to the site of San Martín. It is unclear whether in so doing he acquired the Level IV paramount status of the former cacique of San Martín, but his
relative position was almost certainly augmented, for both Cachipile and Chuaquin appear as satellite villages of Chamile/San Martín in the 1657 visitation, apparently having also been relocated to the vicinity of San Martín. Both Cachipile and Chuaquin seem to have been independent Level II localities within the Yustaga region during the pre-rebellion period, but were apparently subordinated after the uprising.

Another ally of the Spanish, the town of Arapaja, was also rewarded for its loyalty; in the 1657 visitation, Alonso Pastrana⁵ was listed as the cacique of both Arapaja and Santa Fé, and was furthermore given preeminence over the previously independent Level II town of San Francisco Potano, as well as at least two other satellites (possibly from the 3-4 villages noted to be subject to Arapaja before the rebellion). This was almost certainly an increase in political status, and indeed Santa Fé was ultimately destined to rise to the position of principal town of the entire Timucua province during the 1670's (see below).

Beyond these caciques whose names figured prominently in the pacification of the rebellion, other individuals rose to power in the stead of their executed predecessors. The new caciques of San Francisco (Domingo), Santa Elena (Pedro Menéndez), San Lúcas (Lúcas), and presumably San Lorenzo (Dionisio) and Niayca (Lucía), replaced the dead and imprisoned rebel caciques of Timucua. Whether or not these
replacements were the legitimate aboriginal heirs of the rebel leaders is not clear, but the fact that during the Rebolledo visitation Pedro Menéndez, the new cacique of Machava, reported a challenge to his chiefly authority by Dionisio, the new cacique of Machava's satellite village of San Lorenzo (Rebolledo 1657c), suggests that the new leaders may have been more a product of Governor Rebolledo's hand than pre-existing aboriginal rules of chiefly succession.

The 1657 visitation reveals additionally that Lúcas, the cacique of the town of Asile, was the uncle of Don Luis, the cacique of Ivitachuco and paramount leader of Apalachee, and furthermore that Asile was included within the jurisdiction of Apalachee (Rebolledo 1657c). This is an intriguing development, since Asile seems to have been considered a Timucua town prior to this period, and was included in the Timucua province during the later decades of the seventeenth century (see Chapter Three, and below). The fact that the cacique of Asile in 1651 was named Manuel indicates that Lúcas had not been cacique prior to that date, but since the cacique of Asile was not mentioned even once in the documentation regarding the Timucuan Rebellion, there is no way to tell who was cacique in 1656. It seems likely, however, based on the massive political changes initiated by Governor Rebolledo following the execution and imprisonment of the rebels of Timucua, that Lúcas had been installed as cacique of Asile by Rebolledo, perhaps in an
effort to expand the domain of the loyal Apalachee province to include the border town of Asile. 

Indeed, Rebolledo seems to have been intent on a complete overhaul of the political structure of the Timucua province. While this is clearly evidenced by the replacement of a number of aboriginal leaders with new caciques from towns in distant locales, Rebolledo's concurrent policy of relocation provides ample demonstration of his intent to restructure Timucua. On a broad scale, Rebolledo's resettlement policy may be summed up by a single phrase: the reorganization of a geographically dispersed and demographically imbalanced aboriginal society into a more or less linear series of populated way-stations along the Camino Real between St. Augustine and Apalachee. This policy was initiated as a direct result of the Timucuan Rebellion, and seems to have largely persisted throughout the final decades of the seventeenth century. A detailed examination of the first years following the rebellion reveals the scope of this program.

The most obvious example of Rebolledo's policy is the relocation of all the most distant mission towns in Timucua to sites along the Camino Real. The governor's comment that "the places of this said province of Timucua are far apart from one another along crosswise paths and not along the royal road" was presented as one reason for holding the February visitation in San Pedro (Rebolledo 1657c), and
Rebolledo's subsequent actions reveal his plan to remedy the situation. This decision was made immediately after the pacification of the province, perhaps following the trial and execution of the rebel leaders, for by the time of the visitation of Timucua on February 13, the cacique Lazaro indicated that he was "leaving his lands to go settle those of San Martín on the royal road to the presidio of St. Augustine", requesting that no other cacique be permitted to exploit the lands he was vacating; Alonso Pastrana made a similar request at the meeting (Rebolledo 1657c). Each was listed as cacique of both his original town and that which he was relocating to (see Table 3). Based on the 1657 visitation record, all the northernmost towns, including Chamile, Cachipile, Chuaquine, and Arapaja, had apparently been induced to relocate to the Camino Real.

In October of that same year, a number of witnesses presented testimony regarding these resettlements. These statements reveal that the primary intent of the relocation policy was to repopulate the Camino Real. Rebolledo's notary, Juan Moreno y Segovia, stated that the governor:

...commanded [the Indians] to repopulate [reparar de gente] some villages which were dismantled, settling them on the Camino Real which goes to the said provinces, for the good government of this said city and of its natives, all with the willingness and liking of the caciques." (Moreno y Segovia 1657)

Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real further testified that Rebolledo:
placed [the Timucua province] in good form and government, populating, with the agreement and consent of the caciques, some villages on the Camino Real, for what might happen in the service of His Majesty / [----] for the journeys which [--] and so that there is commerce and easy dispatch in this presidio." (Pérez de Villa Real 1657)

Other witnesses reiterated that Governor Rebolledo had "left the Camino Real populated" (Gonzalez; Carmenatis; Florencia 1657). The general agreement among all the witnesses was that the purpose of Rebolledo's policy of resettlement was to insure that the Camino Real was populated with Indians.

During the first year following the Timucuan Rebellion, this program of relocation seems to have been carried out without any resident military presence within the Timucua province; the only garrison in the western interior was still located within the Apalachee province, and indeed even farther from Timucua than before the rebellion. Although Cañizares was left with a permanent garrison of twelve soldiers, no Lieutenant was specifically named for the Timucua province until the next year. Although Cañizares was left with a permanent garrison of twelve soldiers, no Lieutenant was specifically named for the Timucua province until the next year. It is of course possible that some of these soldiers routinely assisted in the resettlement of Timucua during 1657, but this was evidently not sufficient, and Rebolledo was forced to take further action in 1658.

Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares y Osorio died from illness in the Apalachee town of San Luis de Niayca on December 23, 1657 (Gómez 1660; Cañizares y Osorio 1669). Only a month later, Governor Rebolledo issued a new order
for the western provinces, re-affirming certain elements of the regulatory code left after the visitation of 1657 and naming a new Lieutenant for the Apalachee province, Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real. The wording of this order is interesting, inasmuch as it reveals the relative status of the Timucua province following the rebellion.

Don Diego de Rebolledo, knight of the order of Santiago, Governor and Captain General of these provinces of Florida for the King Our Lord. Inasmuch as I have understood that, without regard to the repeated orders that I have given to the soldiers who go and come from the province of Apalachee on business which occurs in the service of His Majesty, that in no case should they bring Indians burdened, except only one, who from clear necessity has to bring their bedroll and food, not having a horse on which to bring it, and that he who does the contrary would be punished, as I have left at their disposal in public regulations which I had fixed in the council houses [bujios] of the province of Apalachee, regardless of all this, without knowing the soldier who has done so, the Indians complain to me that this has not stopped some excesses in this regard, with /[----] I order and command to all the caciques of the towns of the Camino Real, which are those of Salamototo, San Francisco, Santa Fé, San Martín, San Juan de Guacara, and San Pedro, that in no case nor [--] nor any other threat that the soldiers who pass might make to the said caciques in order that they should give them Indians for their burdens, that they not permit nor consent to it, nor give them more than barely that which is necessary for their bedroll and sustenance, as I have referred to, on penalty that the cacique who should give it to them will be punished, except in case that, for the service of His Majesty, he shows an order signed by my own hand, recognized by the minister which he has in the doctrina, or the one nearest to it. In the event that [the soldiers] take the Indians by force or violence, the cacique has the obligation to give me an account of it so that I punish and provide the remedy which is suitable. For this, and for its fulfillment and proper execution, Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real, who is going as Lieutenant and Justicia Mayor of
the said provinces, is ordered to make public that he is leaving a copy of this my order fixed in each council house of the above [towns] through which he is to pass, so that it comes to the notice of all. Juan Moreno y Segovia, public and governmental notary, will take the copy in St. Augustine, Florida, on the twenty-third of January, sixteen fifty-eight. Don Diego de Rebolledo (Rebolledo 1658a).

What is striking about this order is not so much its revelation that violations of Rebolledo's standing order against forced burden-bearing were going on, but rather the fact that the Timucua province is not mentioned even once, and its constituent towns are referred to only as "the towns of the Camino Real." Although this nomenclature did not persist, it reveals the intent of Governor Rebolledo's resettlement program as the transformation of the Timucua mission province into a populated corridor linking St. Augustine to Apalachee. In this sense, Rebolledo seems to have intended to destroy Timucua's status as a distinct aboriginal society, reducing it to form a functional component of the colonial system of Spanish Florida.

Probably at this same time, Rebolledo named Captain Martín Alcayde de Cordoba as his provincial Lieutenant in the Timucua province (including both the Timucua and Yustaga regions (Herrera, Lopez, y Mesa 1660)), giving him specific orders regarding the resettlement of the province:

With order of the said Diego Rebolledo, this witness [Alcayde] / [----] and dismantle [--] Indians of the villages of Arapaja and its jurisdiction, which are three or four little villages of few people, and the village of San Yldefonso de Chamile, and the village of
Cachipile, and [the village] of Choquine, all of the said province of Timucua, in order that they should settle in the villages of San Francisco, Santa Fé, San Martín, San Juan de Guacara, and San Agustín de Axyoca, all of the said province of Timucua, which were depopulated, through some having died, and others having absented themselves, from which the said Indians formed a great complaint if it were suitable that these villages of San Francisco and the rest that they were ordered to settle should be populated, and in the service of His Majesty, through being in the commerce and passage from Apalachee, and those that they were commanded to depopulate very astray [muy extraviados] (Alcayde de Cordoba 1660).

This testimony confirms Rebolledo's resettlement policy, and provides some additional details. It is important to note that although Rebolledo's 1657 visitation record and his auto of April, 1657 indicate that the northern towns willingly agreed to populate the Camino Real, the soldier in charge of executing this order later testified that these Indians resisted the idea, but were forced to comply.

An important part of Governor Rebolledo's program for Timucua involved improvements to the Camino Real itself. As attested to by a number of witnesses during his residencia, Rebolledo "commanded that the roads which go to Timucua and Apalachee be cleaned, and that the bad crossings should be repaired and arranged [aliñasen]" (Arguelles 1660). Yet another witness specified further that the governor:

...commanded to open the new road that was made in order to go to the village of Salamototo, which is the village through which one passes in order to go to the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, and in these roads he commanded to repair [aderazar] the bad crossings, and that in the rivers there should be canoes for the passage (Pacheco 1660).
This statement suggests that Governor Rebolledo not only made improvements to the existing road, but also opened new roads to replace earlier sections of the route. The village of Salamototo, mentioned for the first time in Rebolledo's 1658 order above, seems to have replaced the earlier San Diego de Elaca as the primary crossing point of the St. Johns River west of St. Augustine (see Chapter Four). This move was probably intended to facilitate travel and communication along the western mission chain. Less than a decade later, a small garrison of soldiers would be placed at Salamototo, as "the principal passage of all the land, that of Timucua as well as that of Apalachee" (Guerra y Vega 1665f).

It seems likely, in fact, based on the relocation of several existing missions (discussed below), that portions of the original route of the Camino Real may have shifted, probably to the south, but the most significant component of the governor's program seems to have been the redistribution of aboriginal populations in order to populate the existing corridor of travel through Timucua. Nevertheless, Rebolledo's actions reflect a broadly conceived plan. In an effort to maintain and improve this important link across the peninsula of Florida, the road was cleaned and repaired, river-crossings were supplied with both canoes and Indians to man them, and depopulated stretches were revived with an
influx of Indians from other areas within the Timucua province.

Despite a brief controversy in the fall of 1658, during which time both provincial Lieutenants (Pérez and Alcayde) were withdrawn and imprisoned in St. Augustine before being cleared of charges made by a Franciscan friar (Rebolledo 1658b),12 the restructuring of Timucua evidently continued throughout the rest of Governor Rebolledo's term, which ended on February 20, 1659 with the installment of the new Royal Governor Alonso de Aranguiz y Côtés. On November 19, 1659, nearly three weeks after Rebolledo's death due to illness, a new provincial Lieutenant was named for Timucua and Yustaga. Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia, who had been the first Lieutenant of the Timucua province a decade earlier (1649-1651), was again dispatched in 1659 with orders:

...to go to the provinces of Ustaqua and Timuqua to populate and rebuild the villages of San Francisco, Santa Fé, San Martín, and San Juan de Guacara, which had been depopulated by having died in the plagues which some natives have had, and others having fled to the woods, by these villages being the passage and communication to the said provinces from the presidio of St. Augustine, and it being adviseable to the service of His Majesty to deal with its remedy immediately (Fernandez de Florencia 1670).

Evidently, Rebolledo's policy of resettlement did not end with his death, for the effort to repopulate the Camino Real continued under the subsequent governor. This order bears
substantial similarity to the testimony of the previous Timucua Lieutenant, cited above (Alcayde de Cordoba 1660).

There is little information regarding the structure of Timucua province during the Rebolledo residencia of 1660, but what evidence there is suggests that the sociopolitical portrait presented during the 1657 visitation of Timucua persisted at least until 1660. As in 1657 and 1658 (Rebolledo 1658b), Diego Heva was noted by several witnesses to be the current cacique of San Pedro in 1660 (Ranjel 1660), and Lazaro was specifically described as the former cacique of Chamile during the rebellion, who "today is [cacique] of [the village] of San Martín" (Monzon 1660). That the village of San Martín survived at least a few years following the rebellion is further demonstrated by the 1658 description of San Martín with both a council house (buxio principal) and a convent (Salvador 1658).

Based on the evidence presented above, dating to each of the four years following the Timucuan Rebellion, the extent of the resettlement policy initiated by Governor Rebolledo becomes clear. Not only were all Timucua missions originally located off the main corridor of travel forcibly resettled to the Camino Real, essentially a north-south relocation, but most were additionally moved out of their original sub-region within the Timucua province and into another. This movement from the Yustaga region to the Timucua region constituted a major west-east relocation,
particularly for the towns of Chamile, Cachipile, Chuaquine, and Arapaha.

The reason for this resettlement becomes clear when one considers the demographic imbalance discussed in Chapter Six. Perhaps largely due to the "shock wave" effect of demographic decline, the Yustaga region seems to have contained a large portion of the Indian population within the Timucua mission province in 1656, leaving both the Timucua and Potano regions heavily depopulated. These conditions doubtless worsened with the epidemics of the late-1650s (e.g. Rebolledo 1657g; Menéndez et al. 1657). The widespread mortality throughout the mission provinces of Florida during this period almost certainly exacerbated the problems resulting from the demographic imbalance noted above. As a consequence, both the well-populated province of Apalachee and the region of Yustaga were becoming isolated by an increasingly depopulated zone between them and St. Augustine: namely, the regions of Timucua and Potano.

Such an imbalance created immense problems for the developing colonial system of Florida, for the east-west corridor linking all the western mission provinces was of crucial importance for communication and transportation. Although, as was argued in Chapter Six, the process of repopulation from west to east was by no means a novel concept, the Timucuan Rebellion provided Governor Rebolledo
with a unique opportunity to solve the problem in a more comprehensive and permanent fashion. Following the execution or imprisonment of virtually the entire aboriginal leadership of Timucua, Rebolledo was in a position to restructure the province along lines more suitable for the Spanish colonial system. By replacing ousted leaders with others loyal to the Spanish, and by repopulating the eastern portion of the Timucua province using the more isolated towns of western Timucua, Rebolledo not only crushed aboriginal power by dividing and restructuring (both politically and geographically) the old sociopolitical order, but he also achieved a more comprehensive integration of Timucua into the colonial system of Spanish Florida. Timucua was no longer a truly aboriginal society, but was transformed into a functional component of the colonial system: a series of populated way-stations along the Camino Real, inhabited by Indians of the original Timucua province.

A Transformed Province

The years between 1660 and 1675 form a major gap in the documentary record of the Timucua mission province. Following the detailed testimony of the Rebolledo residencia, the next overview of the province appears fifteen years later, and this portrait presents a particularly marked contrast to the Timucua province prior to the rebellion of 1656. What seems clear is that Timucua
had once again settled into a more or less stable routine, once again forming a functioning part of the colonial system of Spanish Florida. The key difference lies in the altered character of Timucua's role in that system, particularly as regards the geographical distribution of Indian populations. A brief examination of the Timucua province during the last decades of the seventeenth-century reveals the extent to which this aboriginal society had been integrated into the colonial system.

The preservation of several orders by Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega during the late 1660's indicates that Timucua evidently remained a consistent contributor to the repartimiento labor draft during this period, along with Apalachee, Guale, and the province of Diminiyuti (formerly called Acuera), which appears for the first time currently known in an official order for digging Indians in January of 1668\(^\text{13}\) (Guerra y Vega 1665a, 1666b, 1668, 1669). Beyond these brief and indirect mentions of Timucua, there is little other documentation relating to the province during this period.

During the first years following the rebellion, the Franciscans of Florida apparently endeavored to resist the geographical restructuring of Timucua initiated by Rebolledo, but there is no evidence that this effort was successful\(^\text{14}\). As part of a letter to the King dated
December 21, 1662, the friars petitioned that Rebolledo's policy be reversed, saying:

Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, when he went to the reduction of the province of Timucua and punishment of the principal heads of the uprising, resolved that some towns of the said province should be dismantled, and their people should aggregate at the [towns] which there are on the Camino Real from this presidio to the province of Apalachee, and although the goal could be good, experience shows that it only serves that almost all of the people, by having drawn them out of their native lands, walk fugitive in the woods, and live among infidels as they do, and die in their apostasy, as in effect happens thus. I find that for reparation of this grave damage, and so that so many souls are not lost, Your Majesty has no other means than to command that with all effect the governor endeavors with the gentleness and good treatment possible to reduce them to the villages of their native lands, so loved by these Indians, since to draw them out of them reduces them to rigorous slavery (Medina et al. 1662).

This request mirrors Captain Alcayde's testimony that the Indians complained about being forced to relocate (Alcayde de Cordoba 1660), and suggests that many fled the missions rather than submit to the policy of resettlement. The mention of slavery suggests that Indians who fled intended to escape the labor draft more than anything else, and further implies that the resettlement of these northern missions on the Camino Real involved an increased participation in the labor system of Spanish Florida.

There is evidence that the eastern reaches of Timucua did become a harbor for cimarrones, or fugitive Indians, in the middle 1660s. In April of 1665, Governor Guerra
dispatched Adjutant Ysidro de Reynoso as leader of a troop of infantry ordered to round up these Indians:

Inasmuch as I have been informed that in some forests which are about three leagues from the villages of San Francisco and Santa Ana there walk a quantity of cimarrones Indians, who, with their depraved intentions, do grave damages in all those environs, and it is hoped that they will increase in number (by not placing the suitable remedy with all brevity) among the dwellers of the said towns, who, as such close [associates], one cannot have entire satisfaction from them, and by whichever resident who happens upon them going away to the said forests and incorporating with the said cimarrones, and increasing the certain number, it will increase the damage (Guerra y Vega 1665d).

The soldiers were ordered to capture any of these fugitives and bring them to St. Augustine, where "he who was guilty" could be punished as an example to the rest of the Indians. There is no evidence of the outcome of this expedition, but the order alone indicates that the Indians from Timucua still occasionally fled to the woods, perhaps escaping from the labor draft. The fact that the eastern region of the Timucua province could provide shelter for these fugitives is also almost certainly a reflection of the continuing demographic imbalance within the province, as reflected in various census figures during the last half of the seventeenth century, noted below.

During the same period, the eastern region of Timucua seems to have also harbored outsiders. In November of that same year, the Governor dispatched Adjutant Francisco Sánchez:
...to go to the province of Timucua to the village of Ajoica to inquire and find out about certain inquietudes which there have been in that province about some pagan Indians called the Chichimecos (Guerra y Vega 1665e).

Sánchez was ordered to investigate the state of the villages in the province of Timucua, and to report to the Governor so that he might "emplace the remedy suitable to the peace and quietude of the natives." This mention of the Chichimecos, soon to appear in Carolina records as the slave-raiding Westo Indians (Swanton 1922:305), suggests further trouble with external raiders in Timucua during this period.15

Despite the friars' 1662 request, the effects of Governor Rebolledo's policy of resettlement in Timucua seem to have persisted in a largely intact form throughout the late seventeenth century. Detailed records from the late 1670's and 1680's reveal a different Timucua than that of the first half of the century. Based on eight comprehensive mission lists and one map between 1675 and 1689, it becomes clear that Timucua province consisted of nine to ten primary missions distributed at intervals along the Camino Real (Díaz Vara Calderón 1675; Fernández de Florencia 1675; Leturiondo 1678; Barreda 1679; Marquéz Cabrera 1680; Cárdenas 1681a, 1681b; Solana ca. 1683; Ebelino de Compostela 1689). As shown in Figure 4, from east to west, these missions were Santa Rosa de Ivitanayo, San Francisco de Potano, Santa Fé de Toloco, Santa Catalina de Ajoica, Santa Cruz de Tarihica, San Juan de Guacara, San Pedro de
Potohiriba, Santa Elena de Machava, San Matheo de Tolapatafi, and San Miguel de Asile.

Although most of the names are identical with those prior to the rebellion, it is important to note that all of the northern missions involved in Rebolledo's program of relocation (Chamile, Cachipile, Chuaquine, and Arapaja) had vanished by the mid-1670's. Whether some or all of the original inhabitants of these relocated towns were incorporated into the old and new towns along the Camino Real is unknown, but the fact that their names disappeared after the well-documented period between 1655 and 1660 suggests that they ceased to exist as aboriginal entities following their move. Many may have indeed fled to the woods, perhaps incorporating with the increasingly common groups of fugitives along the fringes of the Spanish colonial frontier, but those who remained were effectively assimilated into other mission populations.

Based on historical and archaeological evidence, it is possible that most of the late seventeenth-century missions of Timucua province had been relocated following the rebellion. San Pedro and Santa Elena, and probably San Matheo, seem to have been considerably closer to the Apalachee province than before the rebellion, and indeed seem to have been relocated to the west, perhaps in an effort to bridge the previously uninhabited zone between Santa Elena and Asile (see Figure 2). Mission Santa
Cruz had certainly been moved from its original location. As can be seen by comparing Figures 2 and 4, the mission seems to have been pulled down to the mission road, perhaps compensating for the westward relocation of San Juan (see below). Archaeological evidence from the presumed original site of Santa Cruz (the Indian Pond site) confirms the lack of occupation after the middle of the seventeenth century (Johnson 1991), although the post-rebellion location has not yet been identified archaeologically.

The mission of San Juan de Guacara had undoubtedly been relocated before 1675, having been moved from its original location at the Baptizing Spring site (Loucks 1979) to the banks of the modern Suwannee River at Charles Spring. This move was clearly intended to populate the point where the Camino Real crossed the river of San Juan de Guacara, facilitating easy passage. This supposition is supported by statements from the 1670's, in which not only was San Juan described as being situated on the banks of the river at its canoe crossing (Calderón 1675, Fernández 1675), but was also subject to desertions by Indians, due to the "great amount of work they do in carrying the travellers" (Leturiondo 1678).

The only indication that Santa Fé was relocated derives from an examination of the relative distances of missions described in the 1675 lists (Calderón 1675; Fernández 1675), which places Santa Fé farther east than the Shealy site.
(compare Figures 2 and 4), and from archaeological evidence that this original site of Santa Fé dates no later than the mid-seventeenth century (Johnson 1991). The nearby mission of San Francisco seems to have remained in its original location.

Of the two entirely new missions within the Timucua province, Santa Rosa was deliberately created at the midpoint between the St. Johns River crossing at Salamototo and San Francisco de Potano, using Indian families from San Matheo, Santa Elena, and San Pedro (Leturiondo 1768), and Santa Catalina (fused with the neighboring village of Ajoica between 1675 and 1678) seems to have been founded near the old mission of San Martín. The disappearance of San Martín, and the appearance of Santa Catalina in the same vicinity (but not at the same site18), seems to have occurred during the largely undocumented period between 1660 and 1675. The last mention of San Martín as an inhabited mission occurs in 1660, and this corresponds to the archaeological evidence from the Fig Springs site, which was evidently abandoned after this time (Weisman 1992). The fate of the last inhabitants of San Martín is unknown, but it is possible that they simply moved to a new location under the name Santa Catalina. Contrarily, Santa Catalina may have been an entirely new group settled in a new site after the depopulation of San Martín19.
Taken together, the mission relocations which followed the Timucuan Rebellion resulted in the effective abandonment of the northern portion of the pre-rebellion Camino Real (Figure 2), which seems to have passed north from San Martín to Santa Cruz, and then west to San Agustín de Urihica and the rest of the Yustaga missions clustered northwest of the Suwannee River. The Camino Real of late seventeenth-century Timucua passed instead to the south, largely eliminating the northern "bulge" in the earlier corridor of travel.

As can be seen in Figure 4, the Timucua mission province of the post-Rebellion period was characterized by a markedly linear settlement distribution, with all missions situated on or very near the primary Spanish conduit into the interior of northern Florida--the Camino Real. Resulting from the directed program of resettlement during the late 1650's and early 1660's, all northern missions were abandoned, and Indians were aggregated into mission towns on the Camino Real. Timucua became a very real part of what might be termed the western mission chain, with each mission forming a link in the chain of communication, travel, and transport between Apalachee and St. Augustine (see Chapter Five).

Late Seventeenth-Century Timucua

The history of the Timucua province did not end with the political and geographical restructuring following the
Timucuan Rebellion; on the contrary, historical documentation relative to Timucua during the final decades of its existence is, if anything, more substantial than for the pre-Rebellion period. Nevertheless, while Timucua persisted as an aboriginal mission province until the final devastation of the western mission provinces during the early eighteenth century following a series of English-sponsored slave raids, information from this period reveals the comparatively rapid development of a new sociopolitical and economic order within the Timucua mission province. The expanding demographic void created by continuing population decline in Timucua was gradually filled by Spanish soldiers and colonists, who quickly snatched up vacant lands to establish haciendas, or ranches and farms, in the western interior.

In many ways, the Timucua province during this period began to display an increasing resemblance to the more fully-developed colonial societies in the rest of Latin America, with the establishment of relatively extensive Spanish landholdings on formerly Indian lands, and the development of an economic system which actually resulted in the production and export of local products, such as the fruits of cattle ranching, including hides, tallow, and meat (see Bushnell 1978; 1981 for a more complete discussion). During this very same period, however, the expanding frontier of slave-raiding sponsored by the Carolina
colonists to the north placed increasing pressures on the interior mission provinces, ultimately to result in the wholesale destruction of the western mission chain during the first decade of the eighteenth century (e.g. Bolton 1925; Boyd, Smith, and Griffin 1951; Hann 1988).

This story, while integral to the overall history of the Timucua province, is beyond the scope of the present study. The ongoing transformation of Timucua province during the last decades of its existence presents an involved and complicated research project in itself, and much remains to be explored. As an in-depth examination of the Timucuan Rebellion, its origins, and its immediate aftermath, this volume essentially sets the stage for the final transformation and demise of Timucua. As such, the present study forms only one step toward a more comprehensive understanding of the integration of the Timucua province into the colonial system of Spanish Florida.

Notes

1. Beyond Cañizares, the garrison included Adjutant Pedro de la Puerta and Bartolomé Francisco (Rebolledo 1657c).

2. Rebolledo's visitation of Apalachee, and his attempts to address the grievances of its caciques, probably represented an attempt to insure that unrest did not spread to this valued western province.

3. The 1657 list is based on the Rebolledo visitation record alone, and thus includes only those caciques who attended the meeting in San Pedro. It is thus probable that there is
some bias with regard to relative proximity to the visitation site. The 1656 list, in contrast, is derived from the lengthy testimony of numerous soldiers during the Rebolledo residencia, and thus seems somewhat more broad in geographical scope, if less detailed in local heirarchy.

4. The cacique Lazaro was the only one of the leaders present at the visitation to sign at the end of the document, and did so using the name "Lazaro Chamile Holatama", suggesting that he may have appropriated the former paramouncy of Lucas Menéndez.

5. It is unclear whether the cacique Alonso Pastrana who attended the 1657 visitation was identical with the Pastrana mentioned for the pre-Rebellion period. Pérez (1660) described this cacique as extremely old, dying some time prior to 1660, and thus Alonso Pastrana may have been his heir.

6. Based on later developments, it is even possible that Asile had been moved (or would ultimately be moved) closer to Ivitachuco, perhaps across the modern Aucilla River.

7. The location of the Apalachee garrison during the 1647-1652 period seems to have been at the hacienda of Asile, or perhaps in the neighboring town of Ivitachuco. The fact that this was where Lieutenant Sartucha and his two soldiers met Pérez and Solana at the outbreak of the rebellion in 1656 suggests that Ivitachuco, the principal town of the Apalachee province, may have been the site of the garrison during that period as well.

8. In September of 1657, the Franciscans confirmed that no Lieutenant had yet been posted in Timucua (San Antonio et al. 1657:24).

9. In his last known letter to Governor Rebolledo, dated July 18, 1657, Cañizares reported having been virtually incapacitated with illness, and it is possible that he never recovered from this episode (Cañizares y Osorio 1657).

10. While Captain Alcayde is not mentioned specifically in the order of January 23, 1658, he and Captain Pérez were both serving simultaneously as provincial Lieutenants in the fall of 1658 (see below), and there is no indication that there was a Lieutenant in Timucua prior to the death of Sergeant Major Cañizares in December of 1657.

11. Adjutant Francisco Sánchez and soldier Matheo Hernández were ordered by Rebolledo to make two or three canoes for these river crossings (Reyes 1660).
12. This incident involved rumors that the Lieutenants had illicitly attempted to draw information out of several Apalachee Indians regarding what they knew about Governor Rebolledo's activities in St. Augustine.

13. The earliest known reference to the use of Indians from the province of Diminiyuti (Acuera) in the labor draft dates to 1655, but this was an emergency measure following heavy epidemics in Timucua and Apalachee (Rebolledo 1655). While Diminiyuti first appears as a regular contributor to the draft in 1668, it is possible, even likely, that this was the case much earlier, perhaps beginning soon after the Timucuan Rebellion of 1656.

14. This request formed only one paragraph of a much longer letter, and when the contents were summarized for review by the Council of the Indies, this point was left out. As a consequence, the Royal Cédula responding to this letter failed to make any recommendation regarding Rebolledo's resettlement.

15. The mention of the village of Ajoica in this document, later stated to be a neighbor of the new mission of Santa Catalina (and ultimately to be fused with that mission), might provide some hint as to the reasons for the abandonment of the site of San Martín, and the establishment of Santa Catalina prior to 1675 (see below).

16. Asile may also have been moved closer to Apalachee, as noted above.

17. The written account of the early eighteenth-century expedition of Diego Peña (1717) makes specific mention of the first abandoned site (y'capacha) of San Juan de Guacara, implying that the town had been moved at least once. Based on geographical descriptions (and notations of distance), this first site was clearly located in the vicinity of Baptizing Spring (see Chapter Three).

18. A 1690 letter from the Lieutenant of Timucua refers to the sites of both Santa Catalina and San Martín at the same time, indicating that Santa Catalina was not established on the old site of San Martín (Rios 1690).

19. The origins of the town of Ajoica, noted in 1675 to be three leagues west of Santa Catalina (Calderon 1675), and ultimately fused with Santa Catalina less than three years later (Leturiedo 1678), is unknown, but the mention of San Augustín de Axoyca as one of the five Timucua towns to be repopulated by Lieutenant Alcayde (1660) suggests that this name had pre-rebellion roots. The Lieutenant listed San Augustín de Axoyca after San Juan de Guacara, implying that
its original location was to the west of the Suwannee River, but the 1675 location was between Santa Cruz and Santa Catalina, far to the east. As noted above, the presence of Chichimeco Indians at Ajoica in 1665 might relate to the shift from San Martín to Santa Catalina.
The Timucuan Rebellion

The Timucuan Rebellion of 1656 was the culmination of a power-struggle between the Republic of Indians and the Republic of Spaniards in colonial Florida. Specifically, Lúcas Menéndez and other caciques of the Timucua province were resisting the usurpation of their political authority, and the complete integration of their aboriginal society into the colonial system of Spanish Florida. Although the Timucuan Rebellion was an immediate response to one specific action — Governor Rebolledo's activation of the Indian militia, and his accompanying command that the caciques and principal Indians carry their own provisions — the uprising occurred within a climate of increasing resentment toward the erosion of chiefly authority, a process which had begun half a century earlier.

The aboriginal leaders who first rendered obedience to the Spanish crown, and who agreed to convert to Christianity, accepting resident friars within their societies, seem to have done so in an effort to maintain and augment their own internal political power. The Spanish
Governor provided them with external legitimization, and visible symbols of authority in the form of clothing and iron tools. Franciscan friars served as internal intermediaries between the Republic of Spaniards and the Republic of Indians, serving as cultural brokers within aboriginal society. The initiation of the process of missionization therefore represented an attempt by the caciques to control and regulate access to Spanish authority, and in so doing to preserve the privilege of chiefly power.

While these goals may have been largely achieved during the early years of missionization, the ongoing process by which aboriginal societies were integrated into the expanding colonial system resulted in an overall erosion of the political power of the caciques. Although the official structural linkages between the Timucua mission province and St. Augustine were indeed limited, the stresses of the colonial labor system, along with massive demographic transformations, left aboriginal leaders ruling increasingly disfunctional societies. Ultimately, the mission provinces in general, and Timucua in particular, settled into a relatively well-defined role in the colonial system: that of a vast labor reserve for the colonial society centered at St. Augustine.

The erosion of chiefly authority was not limited to Florida; during this same period, there seems to have been
an overall decline in the power of Indian leaders throughout Latin America:

In the seventeenth century, however, several circumstances combined to erode their preeminence. Indian resettlement disturbed the territorial and kinship bases of their power, and, as the royal bureaucracy expanded, the crown became less dependent on their political intermediation. In some instances commoners challenged their domination of indigenous municipal government. The growth of Spanish estates put pressure on their lands, and, as Indian populations declined or villagers migrated to towns and haciendas, nobles sometimes had to make up the tribute demanded by the royal treasury from their own pockets. Their fortunes varied from region to region, but as a class they tended to become proletarianized (McAlister 1984:396).

Aboriginal leadership declined as Indian societies became increasingly integrated into the developing colonial systems, within which Indians generally served as laborers. Florida was no exception, although as will be discussed below, the peculiar character of Spanish Florida placed additional stresses on aboriginal societies.

It was within this context that Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo made the errors in judgement which forced Lúcas Menéndez and the other caciques of Timucua to choose between complete subordination and armed resistance. With his continual disregard for their authority, and the ill-advised 1656 order that the previously privileged caciques should be forced to carry their own food on their backs, Governor Rebolledo swept away any possible reason for the caciques of Timucua to continue tolerating the abuses of the colonial system, effectively negating the original reason for
rendering obedience and accepting missionaries in the first place. Although the goal of the Timucuan Rebellion was to regain political control over their own society, Lúcas Menéndez and the other caciques of Timucua succeeded only in accelerating the integration of Timucua into the colonial system of Spanish Florida.

In the aftermath of the rebellion, Timucua was politically and geographically restructured in an effort to force it to more efficiently fulfill its role within the colonial system. Although Timucua remained a mission province populated by Indians under aboriginal leadership, fundamental questions regarding its degree of political autonomy had been effectively settled. Although the repercussions of this transformation were only subtly perceived, the end result of the Timucuan Rebellion was the more complete incorporation of Timucua into the still-developing colonial society surrounding the garrison town of St. Augustine. The final assimilation of the remnants of Timucua occurred half a century later, as Spanish authorities finally bowed to pressure from English-led slave raids.

The Failure of Spanish Florida

The Timucuan Rebellion reveals several important points regarding the nature of the colonial society of Spanish Florida, and provides some insight into the consequences of
its failure during seventeenth century to become a fully developed Spanish colonial society like others in Latin America. At its root, the Timucuan Rebellion reflected the fundamental instability of the seventeenth-century colonial system in Spanish Florida. In a way, this forms only a part of the essential instability of any colonial system, inasmuch as such a system seems inherently incapable of stasis. Colonial societies were perpetually in a process of development, gradually incorporating more and more aboriginal populations into the expanding Spanish colonial system. The key lies in the fact that missionization formed only one stage in such a developmental sequence, and as such was primarily a catalyst for further developments.

Florida, however, did not effectively develop beyond the mission stage during the years of colonial expansion in the seventeenth century. Almost until the final withdrawal of the interior missions, there was still only one colonial Spanish town in Florida, and this town was still peopled principally by Spanish soldiers and their dependents. Seventeenth-century St. Augustine was essentially a garrison town, and never truly spawned a broader colonial society on the scale of those in much of Central and South America. Two factors seem to have contributed to this status: the poverty of the land of Florida, and its location on the northern frontier of the Spanish colonial empire. The first virtually insured that Florida would never experience the
early economic development of the richer regions of the New World, and the second prompted the development of a comparatively stable mission frontier which resisted change.

Across the Spanish empire, open frontiers were typically characterized by mission provinces, which served as buffers against the depredations of hostile enemies, both Indian and European (McAlister 1984:321,447). Lacking the economic motive to drive further territorial expansion, Florida effectively served as a strategic outpost. As an unproductive seventeenth-century garrison town, St. Augustine was maintained at Royal expense, and was largely incapable of developing beyond the mission stage. While such a condition of relative stasis might have served a useful function in the realm of geopolitics, there is evidence that the tensions created by the failure of the Florida colonial system to develop beyond this stage may have contributed to the Timucuan Rebellion.

Specifically, the political structure of colonial Spanish Florida was inherently unstable. The theoretical foundations for the structural relationship between the Republic of Indians and the Republic of Spaniards seemingly assured the internal political autonomy of the aboriginal societies constituting the mission provinces (see Chapter Four). Nevertheless, as this volume has shown, the very nature of the developing colonial system of Spanish Florida contributed to the gradual erosion of the political power of
Indian caciques, through the increasing stresses of the colonial labor system and concurrent demographic transformations. The very development of this colonial system mandated nearly constant alterations in the status quo.

While the developmental trajectory of colonial society in Spanish Florida encouraged the assimilation of converted and acculturated Indians into an economic system based on aboriginal labor (as occurred in other regions of the colonial empire), the countervailing tendency toward the persistence of the existing sociopolitical structure resulted in severe stresses on aboriginal leaders. Optimally, having passed though the mission stage, Timucua (or more properly its inhabitants) would have become a functioning part of the Spanish colonial society. Nevertheless, Timucua remained a mission province long after it should have been assimilated, leaving its caciques in the unenviable position of ruling an increasingly disfunctional society.

The stresses set up by these contrasting tendencies provided the context within which the Timucuan Rebellion erupted. In many ways, the Timucuan Rebellion might be seen as a good example of the political consequences of missionization in a colonial setting. Viewed as a prelude to the eventual assimilation of indigenous societies into a new colonial society, missionization ultimately served as a
catalyst for their transformation. In the instance of the Timucua mission province, the paradox of attempting to maintain an autonomous Indian society within the conditions of societal transformation and assimilation within a colonial system created conditions ripe for open conflict.

Interestingly, the endeavor to maintain largely independent Indian republics was not a simple Indian vs. Spanish opposition. While the secular/military authorities of St. Augustine (and particularly the Governor) favored the rapid transformation of the mission provinces into the labor reserve for Spanish Florida, the Franciscan friars seem to have regularly sided with the Indian leaders in their efforts to retain internal political control. It is no coincidence that the Timucuan Rebellion has often been linked by modern researchers with the broader theme of "civil-religious" conflict (e.g. Gannon 1965; Pearson 1983; Hann 1986b, Matter 1990). The rebellion of 1656, though unsuccessful on the part of the rebel Timucua caciques, sparked a major controversy in Spanish Florida, leading to the creation of considerable documentation by both the Governor and Franciscans (e.g. Rebolledo 1657; San Antonio et al 1657).

The conflict was not simply a disagreement regarding the presence or absence of soldiers within the mission provinces, or the perpetual abuses of the labor system (although much of the sparring centered on these subjects).
The fundamental question seems to have been one which addressed the essential nature of colonial Spanish Florida: namely, was the Republic of Indians (the mission provinces) to remain a distinct, autonomous power in Florida, or were the Indians eventually to be assimilated into the colonial system, forming a labor reserve beneath the authority of the Republic of Spaniards. The nuances of this point are complex and often confusing, but it might be argued that this very fact may have contributed to much of the conflict.

The factions which developed as a part of this controversy were not strictly secular vs. ecclesiastical, for there were individuals on both sides who favored the position held by the other (Sergeant Major and twice-Governor Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, for example, appears to have consistently sided with the Franciscans). Furthermore, this question ultimately became embedded in a conflict during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century between the authority of the secular clergy of St. Augustine and the Franciscans regarding jurisdiction over the Indians living in St. Augustine (see Kapitzke 1991:105-13). The debate seems to have raged throughout the mission period, although in the end, it would be the Carolinians who settled the question of the mission provinces definitively.

In the final analysis, the Timucuan Rebellion represented a decision by Lúcas Menéndez and his fellow caciques to take up arms against the inevitable assimilation
of their society into the colonial system of Spanish Florida. Although their show of resistance ultimately failed, accelerating the very process which it was designed to halt, the rebellion of 1656 provides a revealing case-study in the complex, and sometimes violent, process by which indigenous societies were integrated into the Spanish colonial empire.
APPENDIX A

MISSION LISTS FOR THE TIMUCUA PROVINCE

1606-9 Prieto Relation (Oré 1936)

San Francisco
Santa Ana
San Miguel
San Buenaventura
San Martín

1616 Oré Visitation (Oré 1936)

Apalo, doctrina
San Francisco de Potano, convento
Santa Fé de Teleco, convento
San Martín de Timucua, convento
Cofa, convento
San Juan de Guacara, convento
Santa Cruz de Tarihica, guardiania
[Taraco]

1628 Franciscan Congregation (Guadalupe 1628)

San Francisco de Potano
San Martín de Ayacutu

330
Santa Cruz de Tarihica
San Pedro de Potohiriva

1630 Alonso de Jesús Petition
Santa Cruz de Tarihica
Urihica
Arapaha
San Pedro de Potohiriba
San Martín de Timucua

1655 Díez de la Calle (1659) List
[northern missions]
Santa Cruz de Tarica (54 leagues from St. Augustine)
San Agustín de Urica (60 leagues)
Santa María de los Angeles de Arapaja (70 leagues)
Santa Cruz de Cachipile (70 leagues)
San Francisco de Chuaquin (60 leagues)
San Ildefonso de Chamini (70 leagues)
San Pedro y San Pablo de Poturiba (60 leagues)
Santa Elena de Machaba (64 leagues)
San Miguel de Asile (75 leagues)
[southern missions]
San Martín de Ayaocuto (34 leagues)
Santa Fé de Toloco (30 leagues)
San Francisco Potano (25 leagues)
1657 Rebolledo Visitation

San Pedro (satellite Santa Ana)
Chamile/San Martín (satellites Cachipile and Chuaquine)
Arapaja/Santa Fé (satellites San Francisco Potano, San Pablo, and San Juan)
Santa Elena de Machava (satellites San Joseph and San Lorenzo)
San Matheo (satellites San Francisco, San Miguel, Santa Lucía, San Diego, Santa Fé, San Pablo, San Lúcas, San Matheo)
San Agustín
Nihayca
San Pedro de Aqualiro (satellite of Tari)
Santa María

1675 Díaz Vara Calderón Visitation

Santa Fé, principal town
San Francisco, depopulated (3 leagues to the south)
Santa Catalina (12 leagues from Santa Fee)
Ajohica (3 leagues from Santa Catalina)
Santa Cruz de Tarihica (2 leagues from Ajohica)
San Juan de Guacara (7 leagues from Santa Cruz, on the river bank)
San Pedro de Potohiriba (10 leagues from San Juan)
Santa Elena de Machaba (2 leagues from San Pedro)
San Matheo (4 leagues from Santa Elena)
San Miguel de Asile (2 leagues from San Matheo)

1675 Fernández de Florencia
San Miguel de Asile, 40 persons (1.5 leagues from Yvitachuco)
San Matheo, 300 persons (2.5 leagues from San Miguel)
Santa Elena de Machava, 300 persons (3.5 leagues from San Matheo)
San Pedro, 300+ persons (1.5 leagues from Santa Elena)
San Juan de Guacara, 80 persons (9 leagues from San Pedro, on river)
Santa Cruz de Tarihica, 80 persons (8 leagues from San Juan)
Santa Catalina, 60 persons (5 leagues from Santa Cruz)
Santa Fé, 110 persons (9 leagues from Santa Catalina)
San Francisco, 60 persons (4 leagues from Santa Fee)

1678 Leturiondo Visitation
San Miguel de Asile
San Matheo
Santa Elena de Machava
San Pedro de Potohiriva
San Juan de Guacara
Santa Cruz de Tarihica
Santa Catalina, aggregated with Ajoica
Santa Fé
San Francisco Potano

1679-80 Barreda Patent

Asile
San Matheo
Machaba/Santa Helena
San Pedro
San Juan de Guacara
Tarijica
Ajuica/Santa Catalina
Santa Fé
San Francisco

1680 Márquez Cabrera List

San Francisco de Potano
Santo Thomas de Santa Fé
Santa Cathalina de Ahoica
Santa Cruz de Tarihica
San Juan de Guacara
San Pedro de Potohiriva
Santa Elena de Machava
San Matheo de Tolapatafi
San Miguel de Asile
1681 Cardenas List (April)
Santa Catalina
Tarigica
San Juan de Guacara
San Pedro
San Mateo
Asile
Machaba
San Francisco
Santa Fé

1681 Cardenas List (December)
San Francisco
Santa Fé
Santa Catalina
Santa Cruz de Tari
San Juan de Guacara
San Pedro
Santa Elena de Machaba
San Mateo
Asile

ca. 1683 Solana Map
Eyvitinayo
Santa Fé
San Francisco
Santa Cathalina
Tarijica
Guacara
San Pedro
Machava
San Matheo
Asile

1689 Ebelino de Compostela Visitation
Santa Rosa de Hivitanayo, 20 families
San Francisco Potano, 25 families
Santo Thomas de Santa Fé, 36 families
San Agustín de Ajoica, 40 families
Santa Cruz de Tarihica, 20 families
San Juan de Guacara, 30 families
San Pedro de Potoiriba, 150 families
Santa Elena de Machaba, 100 families
San Matheo de Tocapatafe, 50 families
San Miguel de Asile, 30 families

1694 Florencia Visitation
San Miguel de Asile
Santa Helena de Machaba
San Matheo
San Pedro Potohiriva
Santa Fé de Timucua
San Francisco Potano
Yvitanaio, abandoned

1697 Menéndez and Florencia List

Asile (2 leagues from Vitachuco)
Machava (1 league from Asile)
San Matheo (<1 league from Machava)
San Pedro (5 leagues from San Matheo)
Santa Fé (22 leagues from San Pedro)
San Francisco (3 leagues from Santa Fee)
APPENDIX B

PRE-REBELLION PLACENAMES IN THE TIMUCUA MISSION PROVINCE

Apalo

Doctrina visited by Fray Luis Gerónimo de Oré in November, 1616. Located two and a half days' walk from San Antonio de Enacape on the River of Tocoy (the St. Johns), on the way to San Francisco de Potano.

Aramugua

Place where the cacique of San Martín was rumored to have withdrawn to during the rebellion. Probably identical with the "settlement which is next to the river or San Juan de Guacara", and also described as "a forest where some Indians said he was with a quantity of Indians." This location was on the route taken by Cañizares between Ivitachuco and San Martín.

Arapaja

See Santa María de los Angeles de Arapaja.

Asile

See San Miguel de Asile.
Axoyca
See San Augustin de Axoyca.

Ayacutu
See San Martin de Ayacutu.

Ayeheriva
Name for the forest "between the river of San Juan de Guacara and the village of San Martín", where Francisco Vásquez and Gerónimo Tabasco were killed. Also see Calacala.

Ayepacano
See Santa Catalina de Ayepacano.

Cachipile
See Santa Cruz de Cachipile.

Calacala
Place described as being past the village of San Martín, but "before arriving at the said river [of San Juan de Guacara]". Calacala described by Diego Peña in 1716 as being located on the bank of the River of Guacara, more than five leagues west of San Martín, and prior to arriving at the first ycapacha of San Juan de Guacara. The trail followed the river beginning at Calacala. This location was
within the forest of Ayeheriva. Possibly located at modern Royal Springs.

Chamile
See San Ildefonso de Chamile.

Chuaquin
See San Francisco de Chuaquin.

Cofa
Aboriginal village, possibly within the Timucua province, missionized prior to 1611. Friar probably present as of the 1611 murders by the Pohoy and Tocopaca. Noted in 1616 by Fray Oré to be a convent with a friar who was among the other friars of Timucua province attending the Franciscan Chapter held at San Martín. The former location of this village described in 1635 by Governor Horruytiner as "through the mouth of the bar through which the river of San Martín flows into the sea, where there used to be a village of Christians which was called Cofa". Political and cultural affiliations unclear, although archaeological collections from this area suggest connections with the interior Timucua region (the Suwannee River basin).
Cotocochuni

Aboriginal village visited by Fray Martín Prieto in 1608 on his journey to Apalache (12 leagues distant from Ivitachuco). Cacique of "the province and nation of Cotacochuno" converted in 1623 by friars Alonso de Pesquera and Gregorio de Mobilla, resulting in the reported conversion of "more than thirteen thousand souls" in twelve years. Province of Cotocochuni probably corresponds to the later Yustaga province. Also see San Pedro de Potohiriba.

Guacara

See San Juan de Guacara.

Namo

Aboriginal village, probably subject to San Francisco de Potano. Caciquillo reported to have returned from St. Augustine to San Francisco in the company of its "principal cacique" in 1654 or 1655. Depopulated by 1660.

Niayca

Aboriginal village, first mentioned as being located between Santa Cruz de Tarihica and Arapaha on the 1656 route of Captain Pérez. Ensign Solana dispatched from Niayca directly to San Pedro. Unnamed cacica involved in the Timucuan Rebellion. Possibly identical with San Agustín de Urica.
Pachala
Aboriginal village, described as being very near (cerquita) to Santa Elena de Machava. Unconverted as of 1656, but allied with the Spanish during the Timucuan Rebellion.

Potano
One of the three regional provinces ultimately to form the Timucua mission province, situated in the lowland lake district of the Alachua archaeological culture. Missionized between 1606 and 1608, primarily by Fray Martín Prieto. Frontier wars of the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth-century epidemics largely devastated Potano, which effectively merged with Timucua within ten years after its missionization. Also see San Francisco, Santa Ana, San Miguel, and San Buenaventura de Potano.

Potohiriba
See San Pedro de Potohiriba.

San Agustín de Axoyca
Aboriginal village, one of five ordered repopulated in 1658 (possibly along the Camino Real). Village of Ajoica later situated west of mission Santa Catalina.
San Agustín de Urihica

Aboriginal village, probably within the Yustaga province, and missionized between 1623 and 1630. Noted to be in need of a horse in 1630. Described as 60 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located 6 leagues from Santa Cruz de Tarihica and 10 from Arapaha. May be identical with Niayca of the rebellion era. Possibly located near the junction of the Alapaha and Suwannee Rivers.

San Buenaventura de Potano

Aboriginal village within the Potano province, missionized ca. 1607 by an unnamed friar at the site of the Potano town destroyed by Miranda in 1584. Last known reference places Fray Martín Prieto at San Buenaventura in 1613. Probably located at the Richardson site.

San Francisco de Chuaquin

Aboriginal village, possibly within the Yustaga province, missionized after 1623. Described as 60 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located 10 leagues from both Santa Cruz de Cachipile and San Ildefonso de Chamile. Cacique probably participated in the Timucuan Rebellion. Possibly located near the junction of the Withlacoochee and Suwannee Rivers.
San Francisco de Potano

Aboriginal village within the Potano province, missionized in 1606 by Fray Martín Prieto. Probable political center for the Potano province after the 1584 Miranda raid. Mission San Francisco survived as the only major mission of the Potano province through the rebellion era. Fray Martín Prieto attended the 1628 Franciscan congregation from San Francisco. One of two missions largely depopulated by flight by 1654. Described as 25 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located five leagues from Santa Fé de Teleco. Cacique Juan Bautopista hanged on the road to San Francisco for his participation in the Timucuan Rebellion. Probably located at the Fox Pond site.

San Ildefonso de Chamile

Aboriginal village within the Yustaga province, missionized after 1623. Described as 70 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located 10 leagues from both San Francisco de Chuaquin and San Pedro de Potohiriba. Noted to be four leagues from Santa Elena de Machava in 1656. Cacique Lazaro allied with Spanish during the Timucuan Rebellion (although son Antonio was a rebel murderer). Possibly located near Madison, Florida.
San Juan de Guacara
Aboriginal village within the Timucua regional province, missionized between 1608 and 1611. Located eight leagues from both San Martín de Timucua and Santa Cruz de Tarihica in 1616. Cacica Molina participated in the Timucuan Rebellion, although San Juan may have been largely depopulated by that date. Probably located at the Baptising Spring site.

San Juan Evangelista
Aboriginal satellite village within the jurisdiction of mission Santa Elena de Machava. Cacica María participated in the Timucuan Rebellion, during which time the rebel palisade was constructed near her village (half a league from Santa Elena).

San Lorenzo
Aboriginal village, probable satellite of Santa Elena de Machava. Cacique participated in the Timucuan Rebellion.

San Lucas
Aboriginal village, possible satellite of San Matheo de Tolapatafi. Cacique Juan Evangelista hanged in Asile for his participation in the Timucuan Rebellion.
San Martín de Timucua/Ayacutu

Aboriginal village, missionized by Fray Martín Prieto in May of 1608 as the principal town of the Timucua province. Location of the 1616 regional Franciscan chapter held by Fray Oré. Fray Juan Gómez de Palma stationed at San Martín in 1613, and Fray Pedro Muñoz attended the 1628 Franciscan congregation from San Martín. Noted to be in need of a horse in 1630. Described as 34 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located four leagues from Santa Fé de Teleco. Fray Manuel Umanes stationed at San Martín in 1656, when its cacique Lúcas Menéndez, principal cacique of the Timucua mission province, started the Timucuan Rebellion. Lucas was hanged in San Pedro for his participation. Probably located at the Fig Springs site.

San Matheo de Tolapatafi

Aboriginal village within the Yustaga province, possibly missionized prior to 1657. Although San Matheo does not appear in any documentary references prior to this date, the satellite village of San Lúcas may have been associated with San Matheo. Possibly located somewhere south of Madison, Florida.

San Miguel de Asile

Aboriginal village, probably associated with the Yustaga province, missionized between 1623 and 1633.
Hacienda of Asile operated one league from the mission (on lands within the jurisdiction of its cacique Manuel) between 1645 and 1652, but was largely dismantled and turned over to the Franciscans in 1652 after Manuel's 1651 petition. Mission of Asile located within two leagues of Ivitachuco in the Apalachee province during this period. Described as 75 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located eleven leagues from Santa Elena de Machava and nearly adjacent to San Lorenzo de Ivitachuco. Noted to be on the border with Apalache during the rebellion-era, but of the Timucuan language. Bartolome Pérez murdered in Asile during the Timucuan Rebellion. Probably located on the eastern side of the Aucilla River.

San Miguel de Potano

Aboriginal village within the Potano province, missionized in 1606 by Fray Martín Prieto. No further references to San Miguel appear, suggesting it was abandoned along with other early Potano missions.

San Pablo

Aboriginal satellite village, possibly associated with San Pedro de Potohiriba. Cacique Pedro participated in the Timucuan Rebellion.
San Pedro de Potohiriba
Aboriginal village within the Yustaga province, probably also known as Cotocochuni, principal town in the province of that name, missionized after 1623. Fray Antonio Era[?] attended 1628 Franciscan congregation from San Pedro. Noted to be in need of a horse in 1630. Described as 60 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located ten leagues from San Ildefonso de Chamile and four leagues from Santa Elena de Machava. Cacique Diego, regional leader of the Yustaga province, hanged in San Pedro for his participation in the Timucuan Rebellion. Original decision to rebel made in the council house at San Pedro, and Esteban Solana, the first victim, was murdered in San Pedro. Fray Alonso Escudero of San Pedro was later accused of conspiracy in the rebellion. Probably located somewhere southeast of Madison, Florida.

Santa Ana de Potano
Aboriginal village in the Potano province, missionized in 1606 by Fray Martín Prieto (400 persons baptized). Located within a day's walk of San Francisco and San Miguel de Potano. Probable satellite to San Francisco in 1656. Cacique participated in the Timucuan Rebellion.
Santa Catalina de Ayepacano

Aboriginal satellite village within the jurisdiction of San Pedro de Potohiriba. Cacique Diego Heva allied with the Spanish during the Timucuan Rebellion.

Santa Cruz de Cachipile

Aboriginal village, possibly within the Yustaga province, missionized after 1623. Described as 70 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located ten leagues from San Francisco de Chuaquin (unknown distance from Arapaha). Cacique Francisco allied with the Spanish during the Timucuan Rebellion. Possibly located along the middle Withlacoochee River near the Georgia state line.

Santa Cruz de Tarihica

Aboriginal village in the Timucua province, missionized in 1611, with 712 Christians noted by Oré in 1616. Fray Francisco Fernández attended 1628 Franciscan congregation from Santa Cruz. Noted to be in need of a horse in 1630. Described as 54 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located 24 leagues from Santiago de Ocone and six leagues from San Agustín de Urihica. Fray Alonso Escudero stationed at Santa Cruz in December of 1651. Cacique Benito Ruiz hanged in San Pedro de Potohiriba for his participation in the Timucuan Rebellion. Probably located at the Indian Pond site.
Santa Elena de Machava

Aboriginal village in the Yustaga province, missionized after 1623. Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia stationed at Machava as the first provincial Lieutenant of Timucua between 1649 and 1651 (training Indian militia). Described as 64 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located four leagues from San Pedro de Potohiriba and eleven from San Miguel de Asile. Noted to be four leagues from Chamile in 1656. Cacique Deonicio hanged on the road to Machava for his participation in the Timucuan Rebellion. Rebel palisade constructed on the territory of Machava's satellite San Juan Evangelista, and the council house of Machava was the site of the final negotiations and capture of the Timucuan rebels. Probably located south of Madison, Florida, perhaps on the edge of San Pedro Bay.

Santa Fé de Teleco/Toloco

Aboriginal village in the Timucua province, missionized between 1608 and 1611. One of two missions largely depopulated due to flight in 1654. Described as 30 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located four leagues from San Martín de Ayaocuto and five from San Francisco de Potano. Cacique participated in the Timucuan Rebellion. Probably located at the Shealy site.
Santa María de los Ángeles de Arapaja

Aboriginal village, possibly in the Yustaga province, missionized between 1623 and 1630. Described in 1630 as a "land of Christians" some 70 leagues northwest of St. Augustine, situated 30 leagues west of Santa Isabel de Utinañica and 15 leagues east of Apalache across "flat land". Noted in 1630 to be in need of a horse. Described as 70 leagues from St. Augustine in 1655, and located ten leagues from San Agustín de Urihica (unknown distance from Santa Cruz de Cachipile). Elderly cacique Pastrana allied with the Spanish during the Timucuan Rebellion. Probably located along the middle Alapaha River in deep southern Georgia.

Tarihica

See Santa Cruz de Tarihica.

Teleco

See Santa Fé de Teleco.

Timucua

One of the three regional provinces to form the Timucua mission province. Visited by Baltasar Lopez in 1597, and missionized between 1608 and 1611. Also see San Martín de Timucua.
Tolapatafi

See San Matheo de Tolapatafi.

Urihica

See San Agustín de Urihica.

Yustaga

One of the three regional provinces to form the Timucua mission province, situated in the northwestern region of the Suwannee River drainage basin, within the distribution of the Suwannee Valley archaeological culture. Identical with the province of Cotocochuni, missionized beginning in 1623 by friars Alonso de Pesquera and Gregorio de Mobilla.
APPENDIX C
SECRET TESTIMONY REGARDING THE TIMUCUAN REBELLION OF 1656

Introduction

The following translations were derived from the second and third notebooks of the residencia of Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, located in the Archivo General de Indias under the heading Contaduría 964. These notebooks comprise the secret testimony taken from witnesses during April and May of 1660 by the judge of the residencia, Royal Inquisitor Don Diego Ranjel\(^1\), with the assistance of the Royal Notary Francisco de Rueda, both of whom traveled together to St. Augustine from Havana in order to conduct the residencia. The second notebook includes 250 folios of testimony from thirty witnesses called before the judge to respond to a set of more than thirty standard questions regarding the term of Governor Rebolledo. The third notebook is composed of 110 folios of testimony from forty-three witnesses (mostly new, but including some recalled from the original list) called to respond to questions regarding specific issues raised in the testimony from the second notebook.

For this volume, only the testimony directly relative to the Timucuan Rebellion, or to Rebolledo's Indian policy
in other provinces, will be presented. The bulk of this testimony appears under the ninth question of the standard secret investigation, which asks the witnesses:

If they know that the said Governor visited the Indian towns at peace or if he has endeavored to know how the native Indians were ministered to, and if the said Governor or his lieutenants have made any bad treatments, and if they have looked after the growth and conversion of the [Indians], or if in this there has been some fault.

Testimony included from the third notebook generally followed up on points raised by the above question, and each specific question is included in the translation below. It should be noted that all this testimony was presented orally and recorded by the notary Rueda in the presence of the witness, who then signed the transcript (if he was literate). No copies of this original manuscript are known to exist, and thus the pages examined for this translation represents the only extant version of this oral testimony.

Unfortunately, the legajo, or bundle of documents, in which this testimony appears was severely burned in the first part of the twentieth century, and as a consequence the margins, and in some cases a portion of the written text, have been charred or completely burned off (in many cases resulting in the irretrievable loss of extremely valuable information). For the following translations, textual gaps are indicated with the following conventions: an entire line missing (typically the uppermost on each page) is designated [---], while gaps of only a few words
at the end of a line (typically on the right margin) are designated [--]. Individual pages are subdivided using the "/" symbol. All testimony below was taken down by a single notary, Francisco de Rueda, and while almost all of his script is readable with some effort, passages where transcription was uncertain (in many cases due to bleed-through of the ink), or where meaning was unclear, are bracketed in the translation. The resultant text is occasionally disjointed, but the reader can generally fill in the blanks using contextual evidence.

It should be noted that the following text is a legal document, and as such is replete with seventeenth century-Spanish legal usages and jargon. Furthermore, there was no punctuation, and little attempt to create distinct sentences, resulting in a loosely-structured text which resembles stream of consciousness more than organized narrative. This testimony was originally intended only to provide confidential information for the judge of the residencia, and was never intended to be published as is. Nevertheless, the depth of information revealed in these witnesses' responses to the ninth question is remarkable, particularly when compared with the lackluster responses to the same question during the residencias of other Florida Governors. The following translated testimony thus constitutes a major documentary source regarding the
Timucuan Rebellion of 1656, and the Indians of Spanish Florida in general.

Second Notebook: Secret Testimony

The following testimony represents direct answers to the ninth question of the secret investigation (see above). Each entry is headed by the full name of the witness (including current military rank or other designation, and age, if present in the manuscript), the date on which the testimony was given, and the original folio designations which denote the location in the second notebook of the complete testimony of that witness.

Sergeant Major Don Nicolás Ponce de León
April 26, 1660 (folios 9-20)
"To the ninth question he said that / [----] referred in the question [-] the said Governor commanded [-] for what could happen [-] trenches in the place called San Antonio [-] in which the sentinel serves, which is where the enemy could do damage to this city if they should situate people on land [-] might take possession of it, and he placed it in execution, commanding that the soldiers from this presidio and the Indians that each one has in his service should go to make the said trenches, and he commanded that Captain Agustín Pérez should go to the province of Timucua and bring five hundred Indians of the principals2, without
touching the laborers, since it was the time of the plantings and they should not be absent from them, and that each one of the said Indians should bring provisions for one month for themselves, and the said Captain Agustín Pérez went to the province of Timucua and related the [order] to the caciques / [----] they came in [---] the said Captain Agustín Pérez [---] the province of Apalachee, which is farther off from that of Timucua going from this [city], and from there he sent a soldier named Estéban Solana to the said province of Timucua so that all should get ready for the next day to march for this city, and so that the said [soldier] would come to the said province in order to come with them, and the said soldier having arrived at the village of San Pedro, which is the second of Timucua coming from Apalachee to this city, after having told them why he was going, the Indians of the said village of San Pedro killed him, and then some Indians left from it and went to the village of Azile of the said province, where there was a soldier of the garrison of Apalachee, who had gone by order of the lieutenant of the said province of Apalachee, and they killed him, and this witness knows this because he saw letters from the captain, / which in the occasion [he wrote from the] province of Apalachee, in which he was, to the said Governor about what was referred to above, and at the present the said captain does not reside in these provinces through being married in the city of Cuba, and the said
Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo having received the said letters, and likewise the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez having come from his haciendas which are in the said province of Timucua in the place called La Chua, he gave account to the said Governor of the uprising of the said province, and that in the haciendas of the said [Menéndez] the said Indians killed three slaves and Juan de Osuna, a soldier of this presidio, in his presence, eighteen or twenty Indians having arrived at the said haciendas in peace, saying that they were coming to this city in virtue of the order that Captain Agustín Pérez had given them in name of the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo / [----] from San Pedro withdrew the said Don Juan Menéndez [--] remaining people, and then the remaining Indians killed the said soldier and slaves, and this witness knows this from having heard it thus from the said Don Juan Menéndez, and that he had told it to the said Don Diego de Rebolledo, he who commanded that the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares should go to the province of Timucua and take sixty soldiers from the presidio with their weapons, and some Indians from the province of Apalachee who were in this city in the diggings, and that he should apprehend the heads of the mutiny and those who had committed the referred killings. The said Don Diego de Rebolledo gave the said order in writing to the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, which will be found in the office of Juan Moreno, who made
the copy of it, or among the papers which remained through the end and death of the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares. In virtue of the said order, he departed from this city with the referred people and having / [----] of Timucua he apprehended [--] of San Martín, San Pedro, and the [cacique] of Santa Fé, and others whose villages he does not remember, and some Indians who were among the killers, and he sent notice to the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, because [this witness] saw some of the soldiers who had gone with the said sergeant major, who said that they had come to give account of what had been done, and then this witness saw that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo departed, saying that he was going to the said province to visit it and find out about the said uprising and causes, and having arrived at the said province of Timucua, it was said that he had made and sentenced the cases against the guilty, and that he had hanged ten or twelve Indians, all the most [important] caciques, as heads of the said uprising, and he brought another ten or twelve condemned to serve in this presidio for a limited time, one for more, another for less. This witness does not know the said cases by the sight of his eyes more than what has been told him by Juan / [----] said Governor for [--] and punishment with which the Indians remain quiet and pacified, and he agreed with them that not one of the principals, of those that are not dead, should carry cargos thus, that they should be paid
for their labor, and that when some soldier should pass through their villages, they should have no obligation to give them food at their cost, and [this witness] knows that [the Governor] made no other visit of the said towns more than that he sent Captain Nicolás de Carmenatiz to the province of Guale to make a visit, and the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, in the occasion referred to above, went to Timucua, and this witness knows that he visited the provinces of Apalachee, and he refers to the papers about it which the said notary Juan Moreno had before him. Regarding the bad treatment of Indians, this witness only knows that the said Governor seated the caciques who came at his table."

Don Joseph de Prado, Royal Treasurer (age 44)
April, 1660 (folios 20-31)
"To the ninth question he said that he knows that the said Governor Diego de Rebolledo went on the visitation of the villages of the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, and this witness went in his company, and he doesn't know if he visited that of Guale, and regarding the treatment of Indians and natives he doesn't know him to have done evil to the said [Indians] in any particular case, more than that he has heard it said that when the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo sent Captain Agustín Pérez to the said provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, the uprising of the Indians of
Timucua resulted, [the case] being thus: before having taken this resolution, the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, having received a Cédula from His Majesty, in which he was informed that the English enemy menaced this post, and that he should remain with caution, the said / [----] Salvador de Cigarroa and other persons went to the doctrina of Tolomato where served father Fray Pedro Chacon, Provincial who has been of these provinces, and having arrived, they found in company of the said Fray Pedro Chacon, to what he remembers, father Fray Juan de Medina, likewise Provincial in the opinion of this witness [?], and father Fray Jacinto Domínguez and Don Pedro Horruytiner, resident of this city, and all being together, the said Don Diego de Rebolledo made a presentation of the Cédula of His Majesty and what it contained, and likewise how, through this presidio being so necessitous of people and supplies through having scarcely that necessary for the sustenance of the infantry which were in the presidio, he found no other recourse to which to appeal than to send to the said provinces of Timucua / [----] the natives for the [--] of the enemy that [--] and that it was necessary that each one bring the sustenance necessary for his person, because on the other hand it was not possible to sustain them, and having seen this proposition, there was not one of all the referred who found themselves present who was of a contrary opinion, but that it was suitable to conduct them [the Indians], without
contradicting the said proposition, only [discussing] about the quantity of corn that each one could carry. He left them in this conformity, and the said Governor, this witness, and the said Salvador de Cigarroa and others who he does not remember returned for this city, and then the said Governor Diego de Rebolledo placed in execution the sending to conduct the said Indians as is referred, and for it he sent the said Captain Agustín Pérez who took in his company Estéban Solana, soldier / [---] to be interpreter of [---] the Indians. This witness does not know if he carried a written order or not, because it was dispatched in the office of government. The said [pair] having arrived at the said provinces, those of Timucua, it was said in this city that its caciques had dispatched a letter to the said Governor, although this witness did not see it nor did he know what it said, it was rejecting [the order] with respect to commanding that the principals should come to this city, that they ought not come loaded, because among them only the ordinary Indians carry burdens, not the principals, and this witness also heard it said that about the said reason wrote father Fray Alonso Escudero, doctrinero of a town of the said province, and that the said Governor having received the referred warnings, this witness heard it said generally, not remembering who in particular, that the said Governor had responded that they should come loaded nevertheless / [---] in the Spanish militia, not one [person] is exempt in
an occasion to come to the aid of [the presidio] and to carry that which is necessary. After the referred, this witness heard it said that the Indians of Timucua had killed the said soldier Estéban Solana, although he does not know the precise cause for which it was, and after some days Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who at present is absent, came to this city [telling] how the Indians of the said province of Timucua had risen up and killed the people of his hacienda which is called La Chua. This witness does not know what was the foundation of the uprising of the said Indians, nor if it were for the referred, and about this this witness has made a statement at the request of the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo before notary Juan Moreno, to which he refers without any contradiction."

Captain Nicolás de Carmenatiz (age 40)
April, 1660 (folios 31-34)
"To the ninth question this witness said that he knows and saw that the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo went personally to visit the villages of the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, and he tried to find out how the native Indians were governed and ministered to, and this witness, on order of the said Governor through being sick, with commission and his title which he has in his power, went to the visit of Guale, which is that which he [the Governor] lacked doing, and this witness saw that the said
Governor made good treatment to the said Indians, and that he made punishment to some of the caciques of the province of Timucua, in which this witness did not find himself present, and refers to the cases which there were about it which passed before Juan Moreno / [----] went to the punishment with the said Governor, and in the occasions that this witness [--] the said Governor endeavored for the [--] and well-being of the said Indians [--] news that in the visit that he made in the said provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, he placed regulations in the villages and the houses where the Indians meet for the good government of those who before were against the Spaniards, to which this witness has heard said commonly, and with regard to the conversion in it [the province], that for many years it has remained without expanding one thing$^3$, and this he responds. He was questioned if in this city there is a protector named for the defense of what relates to the said Indians, and he said that there is not one, and that for fourteen years to this [present year] he has not known of one, and that before he knew of one who the Governor named, and when some business of Indians offers itself, the Governors officially name a person who comes to their defense."

Captain Bartolomé López de Gabira, reformado (age 58)

April, 1660 (folios 40-46)
"To the ninth question he said that ... in the province of Timucua there was a rebellion and uprising among the Indians. This witness does not know from what it proceeded more than that he heard Don Juan Menéndez, who at present is in New Spain, say that having gone to his hacienda called La Chua, which is in the said province of Timucua, the cacique of San Martín had asked him how had he gone there, having written him that he should not go, that he should come immediately because they had [to kill] all his people / [- -] they killed two [--] that he had in the hacienda [--] soldier who was called Osuna, and another Spaniard who was coming with corn from Apalachee for the hacienda in company of an Indian of another province, and that they also killed an Indian who went with him. They also killed two soldiers who were coming from Apalachee to this city, the one called Solana and the other Bartolomé, all of the rest of which, beyond what the said Don Juan Menéndez said, was public in this city with those who the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo then sent with the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares. [This witness] does not remember how many people went. Afterwards he [Cañizares] sent to say that the cacique of San Martín had not appeared, with which news the said Governor left, taking with him more people and the notary Juan Moreno. He found when he arrived that [?] already was / [----] and others that he does not know because he did not find himself present and he had news of
them. This witness does not know the cause for which the said Indians rose up and killed, and this witness does not know if anything was written or not, only that he holds for certain that later justice was done with them, and it was the notary who wrote it."

Sergeant Major Juan Sánchez de Uriza, reformado
April 28, 1660 (folios 46-54)
"To the ninth question this witness said that he saw that the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo went personally to visit the towns of peace of Apalachee and Timucua, and with regard to the treatment of the Indians, what this witness knows is that the caciques and micos, who are caciques of more estimation in the province of Guale, having come at the calling of the said Governor in the occasion of the tumult of the province of Timucua / [----] [Antonio] de Argüelles and Alonso de Argüelles, brothers, that the said caciques had gone disgusted with the Governor for not having [-?] as they wished, for the said Governor having commanded that they gather up the arms that they and their Indians had, as with result they gathered them up and brought them to this city, but from this not one damage nor inconvenience resulted. With regard to the tumult that there was in the province of Timucua [---] in the province of Apalachee, where this witness went in company of the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who went as head of forty men who left from this
city. These were Captain Francisco de la Rocha, the said Captain Alonso de Argüelles, the Adjutant Don Antonio Menéndez, the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who at present is absent, the Adjutant Francisco Monzón, and the Captain Matheo [Cuevas?], which are those who at present he remembers / [----] in writing, which to what he is want to remember passed before the notary Juan Moreno, so that he should go [and] meet with another twenty men who were in the said Apalachee so that they might apprehend the caciques of the said province of Timucua. He does not know if he carried order to punish them, that for this it will be on record that he hanged an ordinary Indian in the place of Machava of the province of Timucua for saying that he had done a killing or killings in the province of Apalachee, and this witness does not know that anything was written about it, more than that there was no notary then, nor did the said Adrián de Cañizares take one. In virtue of the said order they apprehended Dionicio, cacique of the said village of Machava, and Diego, cacique of San Pedro, and another three or four caciques whose names he does not remember, and they carried them as prisoners to the said province of Apalachee / and this [----] he heard to say in particular Bernardo de Santa María, religious of the order of San Francisco, who attended in a doctrina of the said province of Apalachee, that the said province of Timucua had risen up for having obligated the caciques and remaining principals
to carry corn in order to bring it to this presidio because of the news that had come from His Majesty that the English enemy had to come, and that they should be prepared, and he heard the same said by father Fray Pedro Vásquez of the said religion, who then was in the village of Aspalaga, of the said province of Apalachee, and father Fray Joseph Bamba of the said religion, who was doctrinero in the village of Machava, province of Timucua, and Fray Manuel Umanes, who attended in a village of the said province, the name of which he does not remember. He did not hear this from one lay person, neither Spaniard nor Indian. And after he came to this city he heard / Captain [-?-] and Sergeant Major Don Pedro Horruytiner say that the cause for the said Indians having risen up had been the command for the caciques and principals to carry cargos. If the said Captain Agustín Pérez did it with order of the said Governor or not, he refers to the said order. After the referred, this witness came in company of the said Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, and they brought a letter from the said leader for the said Governor in which he advised him of what he had done, and likewise this witness and the rest told him by word of mouth, with which the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo resolved to go in person to the said provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, and it was said in this city that the Governor having arrived, they apprehended Lúcas, cacique of San Martín, and another cacique, of San Francisco, and
others, and that he had commanded that all the imprisoned caciques be hanged / [----] sentence he refers to the [--] which passed before the said Juan Moreno. [This witness] does not know another thing with regard to the treatment of the Indians which had been done poorly, and now he has remembered that the said Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez said to this witness many times that the cause for the said Indians having risen up and killed his people was having commanded the caciques and principals to carry cargos, and he gave other causes which he does not remember."

Adjuntante Pedro de la Puerta, reformado
April, 1660 (folios 54-63)
"To the ninth question this witness said that he knows and saw that the said Governor went personally to the visit of the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua of this jurisdiction, taking with him Juan Moreno, government notary ... and that a Cédula from His Majesty having come, in which he advised the said Governor that the English enemy was trying to come upon this post and that he should be with caution, the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo communicated the said Cédula in this city with the treasurer Don Joseph de Prado and with Don Pedro Horruytiner, as persons / [----] of this province [--] proposed by the said [Prado and Horruytiner] that [--] good to conduct the principal Indians of this province for its defense. It seemed to the said Governor that it was a
business that would hold difficulty, summoning them as well as finding themselves without supplies, and thus they resolved to consult the father fray Pedro Chacon and father fray Juan de Medina, who was Provincial actual of this province, who found themselves in Tolomato, and the said [two] with fray Jacinto Domínguez, who is at present Guardian in Havana through being experienced and knowledgeable, all religious of the order of the señor San Francisco. They embarked in a launch and went to the said village of Tolomato, and likewise the Sergeant Major Salvador de Cigarroa, who had been treasurer in this city, went in his company. Having arrived at the said / [----] the said Governor proposed to the fathers fray Pedro Chacon and Juan de Medina the doubt with which he continued in reason of the Royal Cédula from His Majesty about the defense of this post, and he [proposed?] that the caciques and principal Indians should be summoned and should come to this city for its defense, in case the enemy should come, and that each one should bring one or two arrobas of corn for his sustenance, through this presidio being on that occasion very lacking and necessitous of supplies if they should come. With which the said Governor with the rest of the persons that had gone with him returned to this city, and this witness knows this for having seen them go and return, and for having heard the said Governor and Salvador de Cigarroa say what had happened in the said meeting, and
thus it was said publically in this city. After which the said Governor sent Captain Agustín Pérez / [----] and this witness has [--] because noone leaves for the provinces without it, and [--] copy if he carried it in the office of government [--] to the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee in order to summon the said caciques and principal Indians, and so that they should bring corn for their persons, one or two arrobas according to what is said, for their sustenance in the interim during which it might be brought from other places. The said Agustín Pérez departed from this city, and [this witness] does not know if he took another person with him or not. After which, more than twenty days having passed in the opinion of this witness, the said Don Diego de Rebolledo, carrying in his company the said Sergeant Major Salvador de Cigarroa, this witness, and Martín de Urriaga, a carpinter, and his servants who [this witness] does not remember, went to the [remate del barial..] of San Marcos, behind the hump [corcobada] which [ ? ] / [----] wood which was [--] in order to find out if they were suitable for the fort, and having seen them, and being on the return journey, the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who at present is in New Spain, arrived and said that he came from a hacienda that he had named La Chua in the province of Timucua, and that being with his people one night at nightfall, the cacique of San Martín had arrived with more than twenty Indians at the house which he has in [the hacienda]. The
said cacique had grabbed him by the arm telling him "Don Juan, come here", and withdrawing a little outside of the door of the said house, the rest of the Indians entered within it and killed four or five persons which he had in his service, one of them a soldier who had gone from this city with [Don Juan], and one or two of them, who came out fleeing, they had killed outside. / [----] Menéndez [--] "What is this?", and he had responded that he should not have fear, that he did not have to do him evil, and that he should come to the city, and for this he gave him two Indians who might accompany him so that others should not do him evil up to the village of San Francisco, three leagues from the said hacienda La Chua for this city, and that from there he had come alone. And the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo asked him what motive had the said Indians had for this, and the said Don Juan responded that before, the said cacique of San Martín had written him a letter, being on horseback from this city in order to go to his said hacienda, through [the letter] being in the language of Indians which he did not understand, he had not opened it. He had proceeded with his journey, and having arrived at the said hacienda of La Chua, he gave the letter to an Indian who he had in his service who spoke / Spanish so that [--], this witness does not remember what he said the letter contained, more than that the Indian had deceived him in what he had told him. After which news came to this city
how the Indians of the village of San Pedro had killed a Spaniard and an Indian from Tabasco that the said Don Juan had in his hacienda, [both of] whom he had sent to look for corn, and Estaban Solana, a soldier from this presidio, had died in the village of San Pedro, and in Azile Bartolomé Pérez, a soldier who was in the company of the Lieutenant Sartucha, all of which villages are of the jurisdiction of Timucua. With these news, the said Governor sent the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañisares as head of forty or sixty men, and among them the said Don Juan Menéndez, the Sergeant Major Juan Sánchez de Urisa, Captain Francisco de la Rocha, Ensign Diego de Florencia, who is at present in Havana / [-- --] and other soldiers who [--], and within a little time [this witness] heard it said how an Indian [?] had come [--] how the caciques of Machava and of San Pedro and Tari and others were making forts in a palisade, and that the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañisares had seized them, and that he did not find the cacique of San Martín, nor [the cacique] of San Francisco or Santa Fé. And thus with these news [?] the said Governor resolved to go in person, as he went, taking with him Juan Moreno, notary, the treasurer Don Joseph de Prado, the said Salvador de Cigarroa, and other persons who [this witness] does not remember. And afterwards it was said that the said Governor had seized the said caciques of San Francisco and Santa Fé on the road, and later [the cacique] of San Martín and other Indians,
accomplices in the deaths, and that the said Governor had commanded to hang / [----] who were responsible for the deaths, and that they had [--] case before the said notary, whom [this witness] has heard say that he has [the case] in his power. And this witness does not know the foundation of the said uprising, only that more than six years before, he heard it said publicly, not remembering who, that they wished to rise up, but he does not know the cause."

Adjutant Phelipe de Santiago, reformado (age 46)
April 26, 1660 (folios 63-71)

"To the ninth question, this witness says that he saw the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo go personally to visit the towns at peace of the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, and in this occasion he sent to call upon the caciques and principals of the province of Guale, and having come and brought firearms, the said Governor [?] them, saying that he had need of them for / [----] with him to the said provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, and commanded that the said Indians should return to their land, with which the Indians went away very annoyed and disgusted with the said Governor, which was public in the village [?], and it was rumored in it that the said Indians, for the annoyance with which they had gone, were on the look-out for what happened with the Indians of Timucua and Apalachee, so that they might make another [uprising] thus, if that of Timucua
should succeed [?], and afterwards [this witness] heard it said, he does not remember by whom, that having gone to the said province of Guale in order to quiet the said Indians, the father fray Francisco de San Antonio, who was then Provincial, had come back very disconsolate. And likewise this witness heard that the Indians of Timucua raised a tumult because of the Governor having commanded that the caciques and principals of the said province should come to this city for the defense / [----], and this witness heard it said that [the Governor] had letters from His Majesty, God guard Him, in which he was advised that the English enemy tried to come to take this city, and thus he made many preparations, like repairing the Castillo, the large part of which was collapsed, and all the wood rotted, and he likewise made trenches in the mouth of the bar, and [commanded that] each one of the said Indians should bring one or two arrobas of corn for his sustenance in the time that they had to be in this city, in the interim during which [the Governor] might be aided from other places, because in that occasion there were no supplies, not even for the infantry of the presidio. The cause of the said tumult was having commanded them to bring and carry the said corn, through being caciques and principals who did not have obligation for this. [This witness] does not know / [----] the said Governor ordered a meeting or communicated it [--] some person, more than that the said tumult and uprising had
happened, and the said Indians of Timucua had killed the servants and slaves of the hacienda of cattle, called La Chua, which the said Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez has in the said province of Timucua, and they likewise killed two soldiers of this presidio, one called Bartolomé Pérez, and the other Estéban Solana, a man of much consideration in this province, through being an atigui and interpreter of three languages, the one of Guale, and the other two of Timucua and Apalachee, since in this presidio there are few who understand them. [?] [This witness] knows no more than that the said [Indians] from Timucua did the said killings in the village of San Pedro to Estéban Solana, and in Azile, border of the province of Apalachee, to Bartolomé Pérez, to which the said Governor went / [---] with some soldiers [---] of those from Apalachee, having had news that the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who he had sent first with infantry in order to apprehend the guilty in the said rebellion, had imprisoned some of the caciques of the said province of Timucua, heads of the said rebellion and tumult, and he did justice to them, hanging some caciques, all of which was public and notorious in this city, and [this witness] refers to the case which there was about it."

Adjutant Salvador de Pedrosa, reformado (age 47)

April 1660 (folios 72-9)
"To the ninth question he said that not only did the said Governor not give bad treatment to the Indians, but rather before, this witness saw that he scolded the soldiers, because they made bad treatment to the Indians, and [this witness] saw that the said Governor gave money to the Indians so that they might eat, and that when there was the uprising of the Indians, this witness was not in the city, and when he came, it was at the time that the said Governor named for head Adrián de Cañizares, so that he should go to apprehend the caciques and Indians of the tumult, and this witness knows that the said [Cañizares] carried an order, and read it there to all, which said that the said Adrián de Cañizares, with the people that he took, which would be up to sixty men, and among them the Adjutant Francisco Romo, Sergeant Major Francisco Sánchez [?], Captain Francisco de la Rocha, Adjutant Francisco Sánchez, Ensign Manuel Calderón, and Captain Alonso de Argüelles, who are all that he remembers, should go to the province of Apalachee, without touching upon the province of Timucua so that they might not disturb the Indians, and from there he should endeavor to have communication with the said Indians of Timucua, without offending them, and find out the cause that they had had for having become disturbed, and for having committed the murders that they had done, and that he should apprehend the guilty caciques and killers, and repeat the said order a second time, and that he should endeavor to
quiet them by good [means], and in case he should not be able to draw out people from Apalachee, he should go and apprehend all the guilty, and in case he should apprehend them without having a disturbance, he should take them to the province of Apalachee, and from there send news. In execution of the referred, the said Adrián de Cañizares went / with the said people [--] palisade in the form of a fort, which the said Indians of Timucua had made next to the village of Santa Elena de Machava, which is in that place the most near of that jurisdiction to that of Apalachee. Having arrived at the said palisade, they divided themselves in two squads, by there being a great quantity of Indians gathered in it, the one squad at the charge of the said Adrián de Cañizares, and the other at the charge of the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menenedez, and they held the said palisade in the middle in order to invest [?] some on one side and others on the other. The said Indians having seen that they continued approaching and surrounding the said palisade, a cacica of the village of San Juan and the cacique of Santa Elena, villages of the said province of Timucua, came forth and went out to meet and speak with the said Adrián de Cañizares, saying that they gave their obedience, and that they were friends, and that they [the soldiers] should withdraw / [----] from Santa Elena, that all those there were caciques, with which the said Adrián de Cañizares commanded that they withdraw, and all went to the
said buxio. Being rumored among the Spaniards and the Indians of Apalachee and others of the said province of Timucua, who were not of the accomplices [?] in the tumult and uprising, that the intent of the Indians was to receive them in peace, and after the Indians of Apalachee and the rest who were at peace with the Spaniards had gone, then they would have little infantry, and then they would seize and kill them, regardless of the referred, for then the said Adrián de Cañizares gave no order more than to say that all should be with caution, and that upon the entrance of the caciques of the said palisade, the soldiers should be cautious with the door of the said buxio. To the / caciques [--] Apalachee, who were the one from Yvitachuco [?], who at present [this witness] does not remember his name, and the one from Cupayca, who is called Don Juan, and Benito, who [this witness] does not remember from which village he is, and others who he does not remember, the said Adrián de Cañizares said that when he embraced with one of the said caciques, each one should embrace with his own, and hold him close [?] in order to apprehend them. The following day the said caciques and cacica who were in the said palisade went with some principal Indians to the said buxio. [This witness] does not remember the names of the said caciques more than that one was cacique of San Pedro, another from Santa Elena, the said cacica of San Juan, and another two or three caciques, to what he is want to remember, and they
apprehended all, and two Indians who they said were those who had killed the Spaniards. And after having imprisoned the said caciques, according to what was said, they sent order to / [----] they were and should not move [--] came to defend [---] this witness does not remember who he heard say this. They were in the said buxio that day and night, and the next [day] they left for the village of Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, taking the said prisoners with them. Having arrived, they put the said Indians in prison with guards, and left from the said village for the village of San Martín, province of Timucua, in search of its cacique, taking in their company some religious who were coming to this city, and who did not dare to come because of the uprising of the said Indians. They went to a settlement [rancheria] which is next to the river of San Juan de Guacara, where the said cacique of San Martín was said to be, but they did not find him. From there the said Don Juan Menéndez, this witness, and another six persons came to this city, bringing / [----] religious, to what [this witness] is want to remember, for the said Don Juan Menéndez to give account to the said Governor of what had happened. And being in the said village of Machava, an Indian was apprehended, and [this witness] does not remember who apprehended him more than that they took him there imprisoned by saying that he had killed a Spaniard. The said Adrián de Cañizares finding out about the case, it
seemed that the murder was of Bartolomé Pérez, a soldier of this presidio, and that [the Indian] had killed him in the town of Azile, of the said province of Timucua. He took the confession of the said Indian, and he confessed that it was true that he had killed him, according to what they said, because this witness did not understand the language, and that the cause for having done it was for leaving to carry chicubites, and to be a noroco. Chicubites means the chests that the friars and other persons who travel carry in these provinces, and noroco means knight [caballero] / [----] the said Adrián de Cañizares [commanded] them to hang him, and the people executed him there in the said village. The autos passed before Don Antonio de Sotomayor, because he performed the office of notary, but [this witness] does not know who named him [notary], and at the present the said [notary] is an ensign. And the said Don Juan Menéndez, this witness, and the rest having arrived and given account to the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, he placed himself them on the road and went for the said province of Apalachee, carrying with him some soldiers. This witness remained and does not know what happened there more than that he heard it said that the said Governor did justice to some caciques, which is on record in the autos which are referred to. And on this occasion, he heard it said that the said Governor visited the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, and this is what he knows of the question."
Captain Agustín Pérez de Villa Real, reformado (age 44)
April 30, 1660 (folios 79-91)
"To the ninth question this witness said that he knows that the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo visited personally the villages of the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua / [---] they went as soldiers [---] company, and he heard it said generally, not remembering who in particular more than Captain Francisco de la Rocha, that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo had said some insolent words to a cacique of the province of Guale, which among others one was to tell him to kiss him in the behind, and that the cacique had gone away very upset [?] from it, and the said Francisco de la Rocha will be able to say more in particular what happened. And likewise he heard it said, not remembering by whom, that the cacique of San Martín had given complaints about the said Governor to the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who at present is in New Spain, saying that now he was not cacique of Timucua, nor was attention paid to him, since having come to this city, in order to return [?] he did not have to carry food for the road, nor / [---] the cost being barbarous, he lacked wheat and corn. And the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo having had news from the Governor of Havana, to what this witness understood, that His Majesty advised him that the English enemy tried to come upon this post, since in that time he found himself with the fort poorly finished [?], and that he needed to make trenches in
the mouth of the bar, and that also he said to this witness that he wished to make [trenches] from the fort up to San Francisco, at the shore of the sea, having communicated and dealt with all the most [important] persons of this city about the case, and likewise having gone to Tolomato, where the father fray Pedro Chacon was to be found, a very old religious who has been Provincial of this province, and experienced in things, and [this witness] heard it said that he had also found father fray Juan / de Medina [--] who was then [--] and having discussed it with the [above] and others, and [having discussed] other preparations for the defense if the enemy should come, he resolved to send to call upon the caciques and the rest of the principals of the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, that between them they should gather up to five hundred men, and that each one should bring the sustenance of corn which they had need of for the road and for some days in the interim that supplies were looked for in this city. For this effect, he gave an order in writing to this witness, which he has in his power, and it passed before Juan Moreno, governmental notary, for which effect this witness departed, taking in his company Estéban Solana, soldier of this presidio, and atiqui and practicioner of the language of Timucua. And having arrived at the village of San Martín, / which is [--] in it Lúcas, its cacique, he passed to the village of Santa Cruz de Tari, village likewise principal of the said province, and in it
he found Benito, its cacique, and this witness gave him to understand the order that he carried from the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, and he responded that he would very willingly come to this city with the people that the Governor asked for. Then he passed to the village of Niayca, where he found the cacica, the name of whom he does not remember. Having given her to understand the said order that he carried, she said that she would prepare the people that she could in order to comply with the said order. From there this witness passed to the village of Arapaja, having sent the said Estéban Solana, atiqui, to the village of San Pedro, where he had notice that the said cacique of San Martín was, and likewise Diego, cacique of the said village of San Pedro, so that likewise he should make known the said order / [----] of the said two caciques, he should go to the village of Machava, which is the last which borders with the province of Apalachee, and that he should wait for this witness there. And in the said village of Arapaja, this witness made known the order that he carried to its cacique, called Pastrana, and he responded that he and his vassals would come to serve His Majesty like the rest of the caciques. Seeing that the said Pastrana was an old man, who is now dead, and that it was not suitable to place him on the road, and for the ministry, he said he should name a person in his place who might come with his people, and although at first he refused, he said he would name a
person, as he did, and he named of the principal Indians of his village. With the people who the said cacique named, this witness went from this village to the said village of Machaba, and in it he found the said Estéban/ Solana, and this witness that he had declared the order as stated above. And the said caciques of San Martín and San Pedro sent as reply that they would go to the village of Ybitachuco, principal village of the province of Apalachee, where all had to meet in order to bring the supplies and come to this city, with which this witness and the rest, in company of the said Estéban Solana, departed from the said village of Machava and went to the said village of Ybitachuco. Having arrived at it, they found the said caciques of San Martín and San Pedro, and all being together, along with the Lieutenant Antonio de Sartucha, who in that occasion was [Lieutenant] of the said provinces for the said Governor, this witness made known the said order by means of the said Estéban Solana, interpreter, and by Diego Salvador, atiqui and interpreter of both languages of Apalachee and Timucua, and all responded that they were ready to comply with the said / order [--] by command of the said Lieutenant, the supplies [--] each one had need of for the journey, and they asked for [??]. And having dispatched with them all the people from the said Timucua, in company of the said Estéban Solana, in order that they should march for this city, this witness remaining in order to dispatch
those from Apalachee, who this witness had likewise given to understand the said order, through all the caciques and principals having met in the said village of Ybitachuco of its jurisdiction, which they also obeyed. He dispatched the said Indians from Timucua ahead because the said Lieutenant Antonio de Sartucha told this witness that he should do it thus, because if both nations came together, they would steal what they brought from each other [se hurtaban unos a otros] and cause grief among them, and likewise because in the rivers it would be better / [?] to dispatch, and there would not be [--] in order to cross in canoes, from which [?] this witness remained in order to leave in the afternoon another day in pursuit of them with the said people from Apalachee. And being [ready] to leave from the said village of Ybitachuco, with the people prepared, he sent Bartolomé Pérez, a soldier of this presidio who served in the said province of Apalachee in company of the said Lieutenant, ahead to the village of Azile, of the Timucuan language, in the boundary [raya] of both provinces, so that there he might have a little corn prepared in order to bring. About two in the afternoon, a little more or less, on the same day that the said Indians from Timucua left, the father fray Joseph Bamba, who served in the said village of Azile, arrived at the said village of Ybitachuco on a horse at all speed, where this witness was, and he said that in the said village of San Pedro the Indians had killed the said Estéban
Solana / [----] company as soon as they arrived, without saying in particular who, the said father saying that the province of Timucua was risen in revolt. And [he said] that the said Bartolomé Pérez, as soon as he arrived at the said village of Azile, being in its buxio, an Indian from the village of San Pedro entered and he struck him from behind with a hatchet in the head and killed him. And seeing the referred, this witness and the said Lieutenant Antonio de Sartucha told the people of Apalachee that each one should go to his village, and thus they did, and this witness and the said Lieutenant remained in the said village with some people of garrison, because it was said that the caciques of the said Timucua were confederated against the Spaniards and the people of the said province of Apalachee. And this witness and the said Lieutenant wrote to the said Governor, giving him account of what happened / [----] from the said village of Azile who is called Bartolomé, and [this witness] does not remember [his surname], giving him an order that he should come off the road, so that the Indians of Timucua should not do him evil and steal the letters. And the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo responded that they should stay in the said village of Ybitachuco with all caution until he might go in person or send [someone]. And after days, there arrived at the said province the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares as head of some people, and among them the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez as second in command,
with forty or fifty soldiers from this presidio. And having arrived at the village of Ybitachuco where this witness was, they stayed some days resting, and all together, and the people that they had there, and some from Apalachee, they came to the village of Machaba / [----] Timucua, and a little [--] in a wood were the caciques of the said province with many people gathered, and made into the form of a stockade [estacada] in order to defend themselves. The said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares sent them a messenger, telling them that they should leave in peace, that he did not wish to make war on them, and they should see and speak with him. The said Adrián de Cañizares going with the said people up to the wood and place where the said Indians were, the cacique of Machaba, called Deonizio, and the cacica of San Juan Ebanjelista, whose name [this witness] does not remember, came forth to receive him, and said to the said Adrián de Cañizares that he should go away to the village of Machaba where they were, and the following day all the caciques would go to see him, with which they returned and stayed in [the village]. The following day, the said Adrián de Cañizares sent them another message, not saying / [----] that they should come, and he sent the message with two Indians, the first with Francisco Xiriba, of those from San Pedro of the said province of Timucua, and the second with an Indian whom [this witness] does not remember. And to the said second message, that day or the following, came the
said caciques and cacica came, and having arrived at its buxio, they apprehended the said cacique of Machava, Deonizio, and Diego, cacique of San Pedro, and Benito, cacique of the said village of Santa Cruz de Tari, and the said cacica of San Juan Evangelista, and other caciquillos and cacicas whose names [this witness] does not remember. From there they took them to the said village of Ybitachuco, and the remaining Indians who were in the woods, each one went away to where he wished, without any action being taken against them. Leaving the said caciques imprisoned, and having posted guards, the said Adrián de Cañizares departed in company of some of the infantry / [----] Apalachee for the village of [San Martín ?] in search of the said cacique Lúcas of the said village. Having arrived at it, he did not find the said cacique, and this witness with some soldiers came to this city at the order of the said Adrián de Cañizares. And at all of the referred, there found themselves present Captain Francisco de la Rocha, Captain Alonso de Argüelles, Juan de los Reyes, Adjutant Francisco Monzón, and [this witness] does not remember the names of the rest. And having arrived at this city and stated to the said Governor what happened, after some days he departed from this city, and this witness in his company, and the treasurer Don Joseph de Prado and Juan Moreno and other persons. They arrived at the said village of Ybitachuco and found the said cacique of San Martín imprisoned with the
rest, and the said Governor made the case and sentence, and
condemned to death the caciques Lúcas of San Martín, Diego
of San Pedro, Benito of Tari / [----] does not remember his
name, and the cacique of San Lúcas, and two Indians who had
killed the said Bartolomé Pérez and Estéban Solana, as will
appear from the case which is referred to. And after the
referred, the said Governor visited the said provinces of
Apalachee and Timucua, and left in the principal buxios of
the villages fixed regulations of the mode of conduct [?] of
the Indians and soldiers who passed through, and this
witness did not see that in the said provinces the said Don
Diego de Rebolledo made bad treatments to the Indians. This
witness did not know the cause for which the said caciques
of Timucua killed the said soldiers and rose up in revolt
more than the complaints referred to above that when they
came to this city they did not treat them as they were in
the habit of, although this witness heard it said publicly
in the said village of Ybitachuco, and afterwards in this
city, that to the cacique / [----] in the time that he was
in [--], the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo did him
many good treatments, and seated him at his table. And
after the referred, [this witness] has heard it said across
the village [?], not remembering who, that the protest that
the said caciques of Timucua had taken for the said uprising
was to say that he had commanded the caciques and principals
to carry the food which they had to bring for the war and
news of enemies, but this witness does not know it, because in the time that he was in those provinces to make known the order that he carried, he did not recognize one thing among them, for had he recognized it, he would not have placed the said order in execution, and would have given account to the said Governor of what happened, because all the caciques and principals showed much willingness to come to this city for its defense."

Captain Sebastián Rodríguez, Piloto Mayor (age 58)
April 30, 1660 (folios 92-6)

"[To the ninth question this witness said that] he does not know that the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo made any bad treatments to the Indians, and heard it said by the Ensign Luis de Biana, reformado of this presidio, and other soldiers whose names at present he does not remember, that a soldier, whose name he does not remember, nor who he was, had struck the cacique of San Martín, who is one of those of Timucua, in the face with a piece of meat or a slap, not remembering which one of these two he said. And likewise he heard it said that some religious and soldiers, whose names at present he does not remember, nor who they are, that the uprising of the Indians of Timucua was for having commanded the caciques and principals to come and bring corn for their sustenance during the time that they might be in this city, because of the said Governor having had news from Madrid
that the enemy had to come upon it, which / [----] he came to this city, because when it happened he did not find himself present, and likewise after he came to this city from his journey, he heard it said that the said Governor had visited the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, and had left them regulations for their government, and that it had been against the soldiers and in favor of the Indians, preventing that they should give Indians who would carry the clothes and food for the soldiers when they pass through the said provinces, unless paying for it, and that other times they were in the habit of making payment."

Captain Antonio de Arquelles, reformado (age 40)
May 1, 1660 (folios 96-103)

"To the ninth question this witness said that ... from the said Captain Agustín Pérez came news that the Indians of the said province of Timucua had killed the people of the hacienda of La Chua, which is of the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, in the said province, and Juan de Osuna, a soldier who was of this presidio, and had gone to the said hacienda in company of the said Don Juan Menéndez, who was the only one they left with life, telling him to come to this city, and likewise they had killed Bartolomé Pérez in the village of Azile and Estéban Solana, interpreter of the said language, in the village of San Pedro, [both] soldiers from this presidio, and another two servants of the said Don Juan
Menéndez who were going with supplies for the said haciendas. This witness does not know the cause that they could have had for the referred. [The Governor] sent Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares with infantry for the pacification / of the uprising [--] afterwards the said Governor went and did justice to the conspirators [?], and he refers to the cases that there were about it. As he has said, [this witness] did not know nor does he know now the cause of the said uprising, because each one said what it seemed to him, some because [the Governor] had commanded them to carry burdens, others because of the soldiers, others because they had nothing to eat when they came to give obedience to the said Governor, recently come to the city, but [this witness] cannot state a person in particular from whom he heard this."

Captain Alonso de Argüelles, reformado (age 36)

May 2, 1660 (folios 103-116)

"To the ninth question this witness said that he knows that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo visited personally the towns at peace of the native Indians who are in the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, and he likewise knows that in the time of his government, the said Governor treated the Indians of these provinces with all amiability and treated them well, because he saw on some occasions that [the Governor] had the caciques and principals of [the provinces]
who came to this city in his house, and seated them at his table. One cacique who was from Cupayca, of the province of Apalachee, being in this city, fell ill, and the said Governor placed him in bed in / his house [---] died, they interred him [---] of the señor San Francisco, and [---] to all those of this city so that they should attend to his interment, as they did, from which many other Indians from the province of Apalachee who found themselves in this city were insanely content to see the interment. It had been done with such solemnity that if the frairs had interred him, there was not one other thing to do more than carry him with four Indians and place him in the church, as they are accustomed in their towns. And likewise this witness saw that [the Governor] imprisoned Thome, a soldier of this presidio, and another soldier, the son of Ines Martín, whose name he does not remember, for having had displeasure with some ordinary Indians, the said Indians being worthy of punishment for the said occasion in the opinion of this witness. Likewise he punished many others / [----] who he does not remember because the Indians complained about them. In the opinion of this witness, the uprising and mutiny which the Indians of the province of Timucua made was not for cause or guilt of the said Don Diego de Rebolledo, [?] because in this city it was said that the said Governor had had a Cédula from His Majesty, in which he commanded him to be with all preparation and caution in the defense of this
post, because the English enemy tried to come upon it, and this witness holds for certain and without any kind of doubt that he had the said Cédula, through it being public and [??] in the city, and because its fort was very ruined and collapsed to the ground in many places. And then the said Don Diego de Rebolledo instantly surrounded it all with new wood, as it is at present, and gave order / [----] in the place [---] should make trenches, as they did, going in person to show the arrangement [?] and trenches they had to have, where he left this witness and the Captain Antonio de Argüelles, his brother, and Don Antonio Menéndez and Francisco Sánchez and other residents with the Indians that each one had in his service working in [the trenches], coming to this city to serve in the building of the said fort. And after this witness came from the said trenches to this city, Captain Don Pedro Horruytiner, Adjutant Pedro de la Puerta, Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who is now dead, Salvador de Ciagarroa, absent, and father fray Jacinto Domínguez said to this witness that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo had made a meeting in this city with the heads and principal people of it about if it would be suitable that the caciques and principal Indians / [----] government should be summoned for its defense for if the enemy should come. He likewise went to the village of Tolomato, of the province of Guale, to consult with the father fray Pedro Chacon and the father fray Juan de Medina, very old father
of the province in this land, and who was then Provincial actual, who [both] served in the said village, and it had been resolved that the said caciques and principals should be summoned, leaving the rest of the Indians of service so that they might attend to the fields, because in that occasion this presidio was very lacking in supplies, for having neither wheat or considerable corn, and the little that there was should be reserved for the occasion. It was arranged that each one of the said Indians who had to come for the said defense should bring one or two arrobas of corn for the sustenance of their persons. And the said Governor having returned / from [--] this witness saw, because [--] that he dispatched Captain Agustín Pérez, and that he should carry in his company Estéban Solana, soldier of this presidio and interpreter of the languages of the Indians of the said provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, so that he should go to the said provinces and summon the said Indians. And this witness heard it said that he had given him an order in writing of what he had to perform, which will be on record in the forms to which he refers [?]. The said Agustín Pérez having gone, after a few days an Indian from the village of San Pedro, province of Timucua, came to this city with a letter for the said Don Diego de Rebolledo, which he read to this witness, being in the fort, and although there were other persons working in it, noone more than this witness found themselves present when the letter
was read [?]. The said letter was from father fray Alonso Escudero, who served in the said village of San Pedro, and the said letter told how the said Agustín Pérez had given the order which he said he carried to the caciques of that province, and they said that they did not wish to carry burdens. The Indian who brought the said letter is named Juan Alexo, bringing in his company Juan Pasqua. Both are prisoners in the fort of this city, because when they returned with the reply from the said Governor, they killed Francisco Vásquez and Gerónimo Tabasco, persons who served in the hacienda of La Chua, which is in the said province of Timucua, to which they were coming with corn for sustenance, having encountered them in the forest of Ayaxeriva between the river of San Juan de Guacara and the village of San Martín of the said province of Timucua. Afterwards in his house, where this witness also found himself, the said Don Diego de Rebolledo told the said two Indians, who had brought the letter [with the] message from the cacique, that he told them that they should come, and they should do what they wished, and understanding that the said Governor wrote in reply to the said letter, [this witness] does not know effectively if he did it or not. After the said Indians had gone, Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez came to this city from the said hacienda of La Chua, and said that the cacique of San Martín, who is the principal [cacique] of the province of Timucua, and the [cacique] of San Francisco, and
other principal Indians had gone to his hacienda and had killed the slaves and people of service that he had in it, without leaving a person alive, up to the creatures, which they killed, except there were two Indians who fled, and the said Don Juan Menéndez. They told him that he should come immediately to this city / [---] clothes of his garments what he had there, without letting him bring something of what he had [??]. They had also killed Juan de Osuna, a soldier who he had taken in his company when he went from this city. And likewise, news came from the province of Apalachee that there it was said that the Governor had imprisoned the cacique of Ybitachuco in this city, and all the Indians of the diggings which there were in it, and that he wanted to make them slaves. This news was brought by two Indians who were said to have been dispatched by the soldiers of the said province of Apalachee. This witness did not see the letters which they brought, more than that later what they said was made public, which is referred to above. This witness saw that the said Governor gave the said Indians some iron tools in gratitude for having brought the said news. And the said Governor having seen the above, this witness saw that he wrote to the / Lieutenant [---] Apalachee, and likewise [---] Don Luis de Ybitachuco sent his heir and principals, with an ynixa of the said cacique, which is like a Sergeant Major, commanding that they should be quiet, and that all which those of Timucua had made
public was a lie and false. And after some days, the said Governor sent the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who was alive in this post on that occasion, with sixty soldiers, taking in his company the said cacique of Ybitachuco and all the Indians of his jurisdiction and province who were in this city in its labors, and he carried an order and instruction in writing of what the said Sergeant Major had to perform, to which is referred. And all the referred having departed from this city, and among them this witness as one of the said, and having arrived at the said village of Ybitachuco, the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares having had notice that the caciques and principals and many Indians of the said province of Timucua were in a forest, having made forts next to the village of Machava, of the said province of Timucua, he sent them messages two or three times, and letters written in their language with Francisco Hiriba, principal Indian and mandador of the village of San Pedro of the said province of Timucua, and with another Indian who is now dead, so that they should return to their villages as before, and that he did not intend to make war on them, nor do them any damage. The Indians responded that they would do what he ordered, and they returned to their villages, which according to what they found out was [confizion] and with intent of summoning more caciques and Indians of those who were not risen up / so that [---] more [to?] their party
[---] by the cacique Lazaro, who is [cacique] of the village of Chamile, of the said province of Timucua, four leagues from that of Machava, who went to where the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, this witness, and the rest of the soldiers were, having first sent two messengers to find out if it were true that the Spaniards had imprisoned the Indians of Pachala, who were at peace, and with the replies they took, that it was a lie, the said cacique Lazaro came, and likewise [the cacique] of Cachipile, named Francisco, and [the cacique] of Arapaja, named Pastrana. They said that the caciques who had made forts in the said forest had sent to say that they should not trust the Spaniards, and that they were deceiving them, and in order to verify what they said, that advised them that [the Spaniards] had imprisoned the said Indians of Pachala, with which is known the malice of those who were in the said forest. And having communicated / [-----] companions with the said Sergeant Major about the case, the said cacique Lazaro went to the said forest, and there came out the caciques of San Pedro, named Diego, and [the cacique] of the village of San Pablo, named Pedro, and Molina, cacica of San Juan, and Benito, cacique of Tarixica, and [the cacique] of San Lúcas and [the cacique] of San Lorenzo, whose names [this witness] does not remember, and other principals and caciques with [the cacique] of Machava, Deonizio, and the cacica of San Juan Ebangelista, who according to what [this witness] is want to
remember, is named María. He took them to the village of Machava, where the said Sergeant Major, this witness, and the rest of the soldiers had arrived, and being in the principal buxio of the said village, seated on the barbacoas, the said Sergeant Major admonished them and presented the case, [asking] why they had risen up, giving them to understand by Juan Baughtista de la Cruz, soldier of this presidio, atiqui and interpreter of the language of Timucua / [----] village of Mocoso [--] of Diminiyuti, which is of infidels, and who was raised in the province of Apalachee, and is atiqui and interpreter of the said language and that of Timucua. The said caciques and the rest of the Indians did not respond one thing, with which the said Adrián de Cañizares told them by means of the said interpreters that it was necessary to apprehend them in order to investigate the case, and he apprehended all the referred, and sent an order to the forest where the rest were so that each one should go to his town quiet and secure that they did not have to do them damage nor injury. Then the said Adrián de Cañizares sent this witness to the said forest to see if the said Indians were there, and he did not find them. And having returned to the said village of Machava, this witness saw that two Indians were imprisoned, who they said had been brought imprisoned by the cacique Diego Xeva / [----] for saying that one had killed Bartolomé Pérez treacherously in the village of Azile, and the other
[had killed] a black man in La Chua. In the presence of all, these Indians confessed to having done the said killings, and one of them said that he had killed the said soldier Bartolomé Pérez in order to be a noroco of God and of the King. Noroco means brave man [valiente]. The said Adrián de Cañizares took the confession of this Indian before Don Antonio de Sotomayor, who went named as notary, and having substantiated the case, he commanded him to confess, and garroted him, which was suitable as an example for the rest according to the feeling of this witness. Then he dispatched notice to the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo of what happened, and departed with the people and prisoners to the said village of Ybitachuco. Having left the prisoners in its principal buxio with a garrison, / the said Adrián de Cañizares returned [--] to traverse [the towns?] of the said province of Timucua, and he told them that they should be quiet, and that he was not going to do them one damage, but that they should stay in their villages and houses. After this, this witness apprehended the cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas, between the villages of Azile and Ybitachuco, by order of the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who, having notice that he was there, sent this witness and six soldiers in his company so that they might apprehend him. Having done so, he took him to the said Sergeant Major and placed him in the buxio with the rest of the prisoners. And after some days, the said
Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo went with some people from this city, and this witness met him in the village of Santa Fé, of the said province of Timucua. He was carrying imprisoned the cacique of San Francisco, named / [---] order to this witness so that with [--] soldiers he should descend to the village of San Francisco and Santa Ana and apprehend some Indians who were those who had found themselves in the hacienda of La Chua when they killed some of its people. Having done this task, this witness could not apprehend them, and came to this city. Afterwards, he heard it said that the said Governor had done justice to some caciques, and he refers to the case. This witness does not know the cause which the said Indians of Timucua had to rise up, and only knows that, making the trench at the bar, as he has said above, Francisco Sánchez, a soldier of this presidio, said that they did not have to [reselarse] from the enemy which had to come by sea, but rather those on land, because the Indians of Timucua, according to what he understood, had not been sure for many days, and [it was] also said / to this [witness by ??], principal of the town of San [--] of the said province of Timucua, and its sacristan, after the uprising had passed, being one day in this city in the house of this witness, that [the one] who started the uprising of the Indians of the said province of Timucua had been the said cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas
Menéndez, who was principal cacique and did not have vassals, and through that course could have them."

Captain Martín Alcayde de Cordoba, reformado (age 53)
May 2, 1660 (folios 116-25)

"To the ninth question this witness said that he saw that the said Governor went in person to visit the towns at peace of the provinces of Timucua, Ustaca, and Apalachee, and he sent a person to the province of Guale. This witness heard the cacique of San Martín complain that having come to render obedience at the time that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo came, eating one day in the house of Estéban Solana, atiqui and interpreter of his language, this witness entered in it and asked him why he was eating there, and the said cacique responded that he was hungry, and his comrade did him the mercy of giving him that [food]. This witness returned to ask why the Governor did not give it to him, and he responded that if he were cacique of Ays, or another infidel, that the Governor would give it to him. This witness responded that he should have patience, and the said cacique said yes, because he was a Christian. This witness also says that in the province of Mocama, which is withdrawn from the village of San Pedro, which is the head of the said province, between two lakes / [----] little towns [pueblecillos pequeños] [---] that the largest was Santiago, in which village a religious served. The said villages are
very remote from this city, and likewise withdrawn from the rest of the provinces, and because of the village of Nombre de Dios, which is under the artillery of the fort, having been depopulated, the said Don Diego de Rebolledo tried to reduce the said little towns to this [village] of Nombre de Dios, which would be more among the Catholics, and at hand for the service of the King, for which he called the caciques. The cacique of Santiago de Ocone having come to this city as head of the rest, he said to the Governor that they would come very willingly to settle where he commanded them, and furthermore that he would be served to give them time to gather what they had sown, from which the said Governor became infuriated and commanded him to be taken as a prisoner to the fort, saying that he had to stay until they came / [---] vassals, and of the rest of the caciques. Then he commanded Captain Juan Fernández to make the Indians come, and for this he should burn the houses. This witness found himself present when this happened, and afterwards the said Captain Juan Fernández went with some soldiers, and when he returned, he said to this witness that bringing all the people and having the meeting in the said village of Ocone, as principal, in order to convey it to this city and village of Nombre de Dios [?], the greater part of them fled to the forests, and most of them never again had recourse to the village, except for some who had gone to the village of San Pedro. This witness has done some tasks with those who
are in the forest, and could not reduce them so that they
might come under the bell. This witness has heard it said
by the cacique of Chamile, named Lazaro, and Diego Xeva,
cacique of Santa / Catalina [- - -] San Pedro [by?] the said
Governor [- - -], and the cacique of Cachipile [- - -] Coachine,
all of which are of the province of Timucua, that the
uprising which some of its caciques made was for having
commanded them to carry corn for their sustenance, through
not having it in this city in the occasion when there was
news that the enemy had to come upon this post, and that the
said Don Diego de Rebolledo gave an order to Captain Agustín
Pérez that he should go to summon them for the aid of [the
post]. This witness does not know what more might be the
certain cause, and this witness knows that, having certain
news that the enemy wished to come upon this post, it is
suitable to the service of His Majesty and the conservation
of [the post] to convey and summon the Indians of the said
friendly provinces, having supplies to sustain themselves.
With order of the said Diego Rebolledo, this witness / [- - -]
and dismantle [- - -] Indians of the villages of Arapaja and
its jurisdiction, which are three or four little villages
[lugarzitos] of few people, and the village of San Yldefonso
de Chamile, and the village of Cachipile, and [the village]
of Choaqueine, all of the said province of Timucua, in order
that they should settle in the villages of San Francisco,
Santa Fé, San Martín, San Juan de Guacara, and San Agustín
de Axoyca, all of the said province of Timucua, which were depopulated, through some having died, and others having absented themselves, from which the said Indians formed a great complaint if it were [?] suitable that these villages of San Francisco and the rest that they were ordered to settle should be populated, and in the service of His Majesty, through being in the commerce and passage from Apalachee, and those that they were commanded to depopulate very astray."

Captain Francisco García de la Vera, reformado (age 44)
May 3, 1660 (folios 126-32)

"To the ninth question this witness said that he heard it said that the said Governor visited the villages of the jurisdiction of the provinces of Apalachee and Timucua when he went to the pacification of the Indians of the said Timucua, and this witness heard some soldiers, who he does not remember, that in the town of San Luis, jurisdiction of Apalachee, and in another village which he does not remember, that the said Governor had treated the caciques of principals of the said town poorly by mouth, about his dispatch, and not having brought Indians in order to leave, and that this had happened upon the departure of the said Governor from one village to another when he visited it. And in this city, [this witness] did not see that the said Governor treated badly one Indian nor cacique of those who
came, and in one occasion, this witness being present, asking the cacique of San Luis de Apalachee / [----] forced from this [---] the Governor got angry that he refused to concede it that he should not ask for hens and that he should not understand that he was afraid [??], and the said Governor told him this through an interpreter, and before this [interpreter] said it to the said cacique, he did not understand, because he did not understand the Spanish language [?]. This witness asked the said Governor to share himself [?], and not to give the said reply, and thus it was done, and he said to this witness that he should say to the said cacique that he said that in that occasion he could not release the Indian that he asked for, and that afterwards, on another occasion, he would do it, with which the said cacique was pleased."

Adjutant Francisco de Monzón (age 32)
May 4, 1660 (folios 142-151)
"...and that an order from His Majesty having come to this city, in which he advised that the English enemy was trying to come upon it, the said Don Diego de Rebolledo / [----] with order that he should summon five hundred Indians of the province of Timucua and Apalachee, and that they should bring supplies, according to what was said, since this witness did not see the order, nor did he know of it, for which it will be on record what it contained, if there is
one, to which he refers. And after some days, which would be fourteen or fifteen to what he is want to remember, a little more or less, Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez came to this city, and [this witness] saw him enter it in the company of the said Governor and other persons who were in a savannah outside the city, and it was said that the said Don Juan Menéndez had told the said Governor that being in a hacienda that he has, named La Chua, in the province of Timucua twenty-four leagues from this city, the cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas, had arrived at the house of the said hacienda, and [the cacique] of San Francisco, whose name [this witness] does not remember, with some twenty Indians, and they had killed the slaves and people that he had in the hacienda, and Juan de Osuna, a soldier from this presidio who had gone / in [---] Menéndez. The said cacique of San Martín had [---] from the rest of the people, and the said Don Juan asking if he wished to kill him, he said no, rather he should come to the city. Afterwards, approximately thirty days in the opinion of this witness, Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares and the said Don Juan Menéndez and this witness left from this city with sixty soldiers, and the said Governor gave an order to the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares in writing which was read after leaving from this city in the presence of all. In it, [the Governor] ordered that he should not make war on the said Indians, but rather by all means endeavor to quiet
them, and if they should encounter some Indian, he should not do him any bad treatment, and other things which at present [this witness] does not remember, and he refers to the said order. They went traveling to the village of Ybitachuco, of the province of Apalachee, where convened five hundred / [----] province, and by some letters, some religious who were in the said province of Timucua in villages which were at peace, and by the cacique Lazaro, who was [cacique] of Chamile in that time, province of Timucua, and today is [cacique] of [the village] of San Martín of the said province, the said Adrián de Cañizares had news that the said cacique, who was then [cacique] of San Martín, and others with Indians, were in a forest in a palisade near the village of Machava, of the said province of Timucua, with which the said Sergeant Major Cañizares commanded to march for the said forest. Being in front of the wall, he sent them messengers, and in particular Francisco Xiriba, an Indian from the village of San Pedro of the said Timucua, so that the caciques who were in the said palisade should leave, and that he wanted to speak, giving them to understand that he was not going to war, but rather to pacify them. The said Francisco Xiriba and others having gone, / [----] said message, and the cacique of the village of [--] and a cacica of the village of San Juan Evangelista, whose names [this witness] does not remember, returned and spoke with the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who
received them well, and said that they should tell the rest of the caciques to leave, because he was not going to make war on them, but rather to pacify them. And the said cacique and cacica having returned to the forest, the said Sergeant Major commanded to march to the said village of Machava, which is half a league, a little more or less, from the said forest. Having arrived, they stayed the following day, and on the next, there went to the said village the caciques of San Pedro, named Diego, and the [cacique] of Tari, and the [cacique] of Santa Ana, and another two or three heirs whose names [this witness] does not remember, and the said cacica of San Juan Ebangelista and another two who he does not remember from where they were, and having arrived at the principal buxio of the said village, where / [----] he advised the people that he took that they should be with caution, in case the said Indians should wish to make some treachery. The said Sergeant Major received and embraced them, and ordered them to sit next to him, and by means of Juan Bauptista de la Cruz, called by another name Nayó, atiqui and interpreter of the said language, he asked the said caciques what cause they had had to rise up, since they had been Christians and maintained the faith [?] for so many years, and the said caciques did not respond one thing. He asked them a second and third time, but they did not respond one word, and having seen this, he made a sign which he had given before to some of the said soldiers and Indians
from Apalachee who were present, and having seen it, they apprehended the said caciques, seating them [?] and throwing them in chains. The following day the said Adrián de Cañizares marched with all, and they went / to the [---] province of Apalachee [---] traveling all that day, and the following day they arrived and placed the said caciques as prisoners in the place of the principal buxio, and placed a guard of soldiers and some Indians. Having stayed two or three days preparing supplies, they went in search of the cacique of San Martín, Lúcas, and having arrived at the village of San Pedro, where it was said he was, they did not find him, and they marched for the said village of San Martín. Having arrived, he was not found, nor did they have word of him, with which they returned another time to the said village of San Pedro, which are eighteen leagues from one to the other. The said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares gave order to this witness so that with eleven soldiers he should come to this city to give account to the said Governor of what had happened, bringing a letter, and this witness arrived at this city and gave the letter / [---] the said Governor left within days with some soldiers, and this witness remained. He does not know what happened there more than that they hanged some delinquent caciques, referring to the autos and case which there was about it. This witness does not know the cause that the said Indians of Timucua had for the said uprising, more than having heard
it said, in the time that he was in the said province of Apalachee, by some soldiers of those who in that time served in it, like Bartolomé Francisco, and this witness does not remember well if he also heard it said by Ensign Juan Baupísta Terrasa, that the cause of the said Indians having risen up and mutinied had been that Captain Agustín Pérez, who had gone for the conveyance to this city, wanted the caciques and principals to carry burdens. Others who [this witness] does not remember in particular said that a religious had said / to [---] of the said province [---] that they were going to look for slaves, and that they should rise up. This witness does not know [?] should have the referred, more than that it was said among the soldiers. On this occasion that the said Governor went to the said provinces, he visited them, according to what he heard said."

**Captain Don Matheo Pacheco, reformado (age 40)**

May 5, 1660 (folios 151-7)

"...the said Governor had [the cacique] of Cupayca in his house, where he fell ill, and he ordered him treated. Having died, the said Governor made him a very good interment, inviting those of this presidio for the interment, in which this witness found himself. [This witness] did not hear the said Indians complain, because the
Governor made whichever person pay those of labor what was due."

**Ensign Don Juan Joseph de Sotomayor (age 27)**

May 1660 (folios 157-66)

"To the ninth question this witness said that he saw that in the time that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo governed this city, the said Don Diego received well the caciques and principals who came from the subject provinces, and gave food to all the most [important] in his house, and in particular, the said Don Diego de Rebolledo made many festivals for the cacique of Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, and gave him gifts. This witness having presented to the said Don Diego a sword from Toledo which he esteemed highly, the said Don Diego gave it to the said cacique, and seated him at his table... and having come to this city, [this witness] found out in it for public knowledge that the said province of Timucua had risen up, and they had killed Estéban Solana, atiqui of the language and soldier of this presidio, and Bartolomé Pérez, likewise a soldier, and / [----] from Don Juan Menéndez [--] dead, and he saw that the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares was prepared in order to go as head to the said uprising. This witness was named to go as a soldier with others, which including all were sixty men, and after having left from this past village, the town of San Martín, upon arriving at
a lake that is there, he did an auto with the people, and
gave this witness the order that he carried so that he
should read it to all, and this witness did it with a loud
voice, so that all might be able to understand it, calling
for all the reformados to come close. [The order] comprised
that he should endeavor to quiet the land by the form and
means possible, without resorting to arms, and to what [this
witness] is want to remember, that he should apprehend the
guilty and heads of the uprising, as will be on record at
more length by the said order, which passed before Juan
Moreno, public and governmental notary. He proceeded his
journey until arriving at the village of Ybitachuco,
province / [----] did an auto where [--] many caciques,
principals, and Indians of the said province of Apalachee,
and some from the province of Timucua, and in particular a
cacique of the province of Timucua who, to what [this
witness] is want to remember, they said was the cacique of
San Pedro, who remained very vigilant and loyal. There it
was found out that the Indians of Timucua were in a little
forest [montecillo] next to the village of Machaba, province
of Timucua, and that they had made a palisade for their
defense. The said Adrián de Cañizares wrote them in their
language two or three times with Indians of the said
province of Timucua. [The messages] were written by Father
Umanes, who is now dead, and who was an interpreter of the
said Timucua and doctrinero of the village of San Martín,
and who had passed to the province of Apalachee due to the uprising. According to what was said there, [the letters] contained that the caciques who were in the said forest should go to where the / [----] do them damage, but rather pacify them, and that they should be at peace, endeavoring by the means possible to give them to understand the referred. And having written the said letters, the said Indians did not go at his call, before it was said that the said Sergeant Major should go to where they were, because they were with a good heart. This witness did not know for certain, because they wrote the said letters in their language. And thus the said Adrián de Cañizares came forth with the said infantry and up to five hundred Indians from Apalachee who had joined them there, and having arrived in view of the said forest and palisade, they divided themselves in two parts, the said Adrián de Cañizares going as head of one, and he named Don Juan Menéndez as head of the other, marching a bit ahead, and the other remaining behind, having to hold the entrances. Being at [the distance of] an arquebus shot, the said Adrián de Cañizares again sent a message to the said Indians and caciques with the said cacique of San Pedro / who [--] Diego Xeva, so that [--] palisade where [??] at war, and with the said message, a cacique and the cacica of San Juan Ebangelista left and came to where the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares was, and they spoke with the said Sergeant Major. They
returned, and according to what was said, they said that he should go with his people to the village of Machava, and that they would go there, with which the said Sergeant Major commanded to march for the said village. Having arrived, they entered in its principal buxio, and the said Adrián de Cañizares posted guards (?) and gave order that all should be with caution, and that upon the Indians coming, and making a sign, they should apprehend them. He gave this order to the norocos, who are the principals of the province of Apalachee. The following day, in the afternoon, there went to the said buxio the caciques who were in the said palisade and the said cacica of San Juan / [----] is a signal of peace, and the said Indians seated themselves on a barbacoa, and the said Adrián de Cañizares made them an address by means of an atiquí and interpreter, which this witness did not understand, and after the said reasoning, he made the sign that he had given, with which they apprehended the said caciques and threw them in chains. They also apprehended an Indian who they said had killed the said soldier Bartolomé Pérez in the village of Azile, of the said province of Timucua. He made the case, in which this witness served as notary, and Juan Bauptista de la Cruz, a soldier of this presidio, as interpreter, in order to take the confession, and having taken it, he confessed that it was true that he had done the said killing, and that the cause had been because in times pase, the said Indian being
in a *buxio* of one of the villages of Apalachee, stretched out next to the fire, the said Bartolomé Pérez entered, and striking him with his foot, he said "Go away, dog, get up from there!" / [---] the caciques of the said province of Timucua walked in council [?], and saying that they had to kill all the Spaniards, as he heard in the village of San Pedro, where some caciques and principals were together, without waiting for arms, he left the said village of San Pedro, and going toward Apalachee, he entered in the village of Azile, the last *postren* village of the province of Timucua, he met the said Bartolomé Pérez upon entering its *buxio*, and gave him a hatchet-blow in the head and killed him, and dragging him outside, he scalped him, [?] of heathenism, which is to cut off all the skin with the hair. Well he knew what he had to pay afterwards, but until them, he had not been a man, and with that action he was a *noroco* of God and the King, and he was very content, as will be on record at greater length in the *autos* which they made, which remained / [----] Adrián de Cañizares, who died in the said province of Apalachee, and this witness swears that they remained for his executors Manuel Gómez, Sergeant reformado who is in this presidio, and Andres Pérez, Cavo de Esquadra, who is in the said province, and who will be able to give a copy of the said papers, or which will be found in the house of Juana de Mendoza, his wife. After that, they carried the said caciques imprisoned to the said village of Ybitachuco.
where they placed them in its principal buxio with chains and guards, and sent account to the said Governor of what happened. Afterwards, he left in search of the cacique of San Martín, who did not appear, and did other tasks in which they were occupied much time, and having returned to the said village of Ybitachuco, they had news that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo was going, and they came forth to receive him at the village of Santa Fé, of the province of Timucua, [including] this witness with other soldiers, and from there / [----] where there was news [---] the said Governor did justice to the said imprisoned caciques, and [this witness] refers to the case, where those who they were will be seen. This witness does not know the cause that the said Indians had for the said uprising, because some said that the said Indians, as they found out about knews that the enemy had to come by sea, wished to take pleasure in the occasion and rise up. Others said it was because the caciques had been commanded to carry the sustenance for them while they might be in this presidio, and others said that the friars had the guilt, with which this witness is unable to say anything with foundation... And likewise this witness heard it said that the said Governor, in returning, visited on the way the said provinces of Apalachee, Timucua, and Ustaca."
Captain Francisco de la Rocha, reformado (age 33)
May 6, 1660 (folios 166-175)

"To the ninth question this witness says that he knows that
the said Don Diego de Rebolledo visited the towns of the
provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, because this witness
found himself in the said province of Apalachee at the time,
and when the said Don Diego went to make the said
visitation, [this witness] does not know that he did bad
treatments to the Indians. What he knows is that, the said
Governor having recently come to this city, the micos and
caciques of these provinces came to render obedience to him,
and the cacique of Guale gave some complaints to this
witness that he had not / [----] Governors gave them gifts,
[---] time giving him a suit at the cost of His Majesty.
Likewise, the Adjutant Don Antonio Menéndez said to this
witness that the cacique of San Martín, of the province of
Timucua, who among them was the most principal, had been
complaining one night about what was done with them in this
city. This witness does not remember in particular what
[the complaints] were, but this witness judges that the said
complaints were not of consideration, nor cause that the
said Indians should leave off attending to all that they
were commanded which might be of service to His Majesty,
because if the said [Indians] formed some complaint, others
were very [??], and the said Governor treated them well,
with many demonstrations, and in particular, this witness
remembers that he did so with Don Luis, principal cacique, and the most important of the province of Apalachee, who serves in Ybitachuco. This witness affirms [??] neither knew nor understood that the said Governor treated any [Indian] poorly... and he sent Captain Agustín Pérez to the said provinces of Timucua and Apalachee with an order which this witness saw, which to what it seems said that he should summon the principal Indians and that they should bring two arrobas of corn for their sustenance / [----] will be on record, because on that occasion this presidio was lacking in supplies, and there were not those necessary for its people, because although the said Governor had sent to search for [supplies], they had not come. The said Captain Agustín Pérez having gone to the said provinces, after some days the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who today is absent in the Kingdom of New Spain, came to this city from a hacienda of his named La Chua, which is in the said province of Timucua, and said that the Indians of [the province] had risen up, because the cacique of San Francisco⁴ and other caciques and Indians had gone to his said hacienda and had killed the slaves and all the people that they found there in their sight, the said [Don Juan] having withdrawn a little [?]. And this witness heard the said Don Juan Menéndez say that when he saw the said caciques enter his said hacienda, he had judged / [----] which the said Agustín Pérez had carried, they came for this city, and so he told
them when he saw them, "So quickly you have attended to going for the presidio?\textsuperscript{5}", and at these words, one of the caciques who was there pulled him outside by the arm, and at the instant he heard shouts of the people who were in it, and saying to the said cacique "What is this?", he responded that "[??] I guess we have to kill you", and the said Don Juan responded "Well, if you have to kill me, let me go to a village, if you have left a religious alive, in order to confess", and the cacique returned to say that he should not be afraid, that he did not have to do him wrong, and he had given him a horse, and he came, and this witness did not hear another thing. After many days came news from the said Captain Agustín Pérez, and [the messenger] said that he had come skirting [the province of Timucua] so that the Indians might not seize him, and some Indians from Apalachee brought him [?] / [----] Indians of Timucua were risen up, and that the said Captain Agustín Pérez, with the Indians of the province of Apalachee and the Lieutenant and soldiers, were in the village of Ybitachuco, so that the rebellious Indians might not enter in the said province of Apalachee, because they menaced them greatly, but that they should help them, sending them letters for it\textsuperscript{6}. With this news, the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo resolved to sent people to the said province of Timucua in order to pacify them, and he named as head Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who was [Sergeant Major] in that time, and likewise the said
Sergeant Major Don Juan de Menéndez, and this witness and other soldiers, who with all were sixty, with an order in writing from the said Governor of what he had to do. [The order] was read in the presence of all after / leaving [---] in the said province so that they should be forewarned of what they had to do, and so that they should not go beyond its limits. They marched up to the said village of Ybitachuco, withdrawing from the said province of Timucua, and having arrived at the said village and incorporated themselves with the rest who were there, the said Sergeant Major Cañizares dispatched messengers to the caciques of Timucua, who were in a palisade next to the village of Machava, which is the last of the said province, bordering [convecino a] that of Apalachee, with Indians at peace from the said province of Timucua, sending them to sayg that the intent and order that he carried was not to make war on them, but rather to quiet them, and that if there was some guilty, he should be handed over [?], and they should not take up arms, because if they did so, it was necessary to make war on them. The messengers went and came many times about this, and thus it was necessary to leave from the said / [----] they left, marching toward where the said Indians from Timucua were, who had constructed a very well-made palisade and fortification of stout wood. They arrived near the said palisade, in the manner that it would be possible to speak from one side and from the other, and the said
Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares sent Francisco Xiriba, mandador of the town of San Pedro of the province of Timucua, which was at peace [??], and he went with the people from this presidio in order to tell the said caciques who were in the said palisade should come forth to speak and make their plea, with which the cacique of the said village of Machava, named Deonizio, and the cacica of the village of San Juan Ebanjelista came forth and spoke to the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares. They told him that the caciques would come forth and give their explanation, with which they entered in the said village of Machava, and stayed in the buxio two days awaiting the said caciques. Finally the said caciques went, and the said Sergeant Major received them / [----] made them a speech, while [?] being such good caciques [---] vassals of His Majesty, they had risen up, an action of such bad consequence, which could cause them great damage, and he said this to them by means of interpreters of the said language of Timucua. The said caciques did not respond one thing, and for two or three times he said it to them, and admonished them by the said interpreters that they should respond, and that if not, he had to take them as prisoners to the said province of Apalachee. Nevertheless, the said caciques did not respond, with which the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares ordered them apprehended thrown in chains. Later that night, some of the caciques from the said province of
Timucua who were at peace, one of whom was Diego Xeva, who was [cacique] of Santa Catalina de Ayepacano, but the names and locations of the rest [this witness] does not remember, brought imprisoned / [----] presented to the said Sergeant Major, saying that that Indian had killed Bartolomé Pérez, a soldier of this presidio, in the village of Azile, entering in the principal buxio treacherously. This witness does not know if a case was made in writing or not, more than that he heard the said Indian confess vocally that it was true that he had killed the said Bartolomé Pérez treacherously, only in order to be a noroco, and other things that he said [this witness] does not remember. The following day [Cañizares] ordered him garroted, and he was executed in the presence of all. After this, they went for the said village of Ybitachuco, where they secured the said caciques and gave news of it to the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo, who went from this city to the said village. Having arrived, he made the cases and sentence, and did justice to some of them, as will appear in the case which passed before Juan Moreno, public notary, and this witness came for this city, remaining / [----] said visitation. He did not know nor percieve the cause and motive the said Indians of Timucua might have had for having risen up, and according to the news that he had from [??] persons on another occasion that there was news that the enemy wished to come upon this post,
the said Indians of Timucua were for rising up, and had made watch-towers for firing arrows. 7"

Ensign Manuel Calderón, reformado (age 33)
May 7, 1660 (folios 182-194)
"... after which, after some days, it was said publicly in this city that the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez had come / [----] TImucua of cattle, and had said to the said Governor and other persons who found themselves in his company in a savannah where they were, about one league from this city, that he had gone to it late [?], and how being in his hacienda with his slaves and servants, and Juan de Osuna, a soldier from this presidio whom he had taken in his company when he went from this city, there had arrived at its house the cacique of San Martín, the [cacique] of San Francisco, and the [cacique] of Santa Fé, taking in their company fourteen Indians, and that the cacique of San Martín had seized the said Don Juan Menéndez by the hand, drawing him outside the house, and the rest of the caciques and Indians had rushed at and killed all those who were in it, and [the cacique] told the said Don Juan that he should come to this city, giving him a horse, and that he should go to Spain and give account to His Majesty, and that they might return from there / [----] in the [---] which is a place and bar of this city, and this was said generally, which the said Don Juan had referred to the Governor. After this,
after some days, two Indians came, and this witness being in the guard, he saw them enter in the house of the said Governor, and then this witness, as Sergeant, which he was then, went to the said house of the Governor to see if something was needed, and this witness saw that they had brought more letters, which they said were from Captain Antonio de Sartucha, who was Lieutenant of the said provinces of Apalachee, and later it was said that he advised in them that the province of Timucua had risen up, and that they had killed Estéban Solana, a soldier of this presidio, and atiqui and interpreter of that province, who had gone in company of the said Captain Agustín Pérez, with which the said Governor / [-----] through different parts, because [??] that the Indians should intercept them. This witness does not know the orders that they carried, who were Adjutant Francisco Sánchez, Ensign Juan Bautista Terraza, who at present is in Apalachee, Sergeant Pedro Texeda, and Bartolomé Francisco. After some days, an Indian who this witness saw came and brought letters for the said Governor, and later they were made public, and were of news of how those who had left as messengers had arrived with the letters that they carried. Then the said Governor dispatched Adrián de Cañizares, who was then the acting Sergeant Major of this presidio, and in his company the said Don Juan Menéndez, with sixty soldiers from this presidio, and this witness as their Sergeant, with order and
instruction from the Governor of what they had to do, entrusting much to them, that they should not arrive / [----] but rather that first [--] that in any case they do all possible tasks in order to reduce them by good [means], to what [this witness] is want to remember, as will appear in [the order]. Having left from this city, the said Adrián de Cañizares, being on the road, and in particular being near to the Indians, had [the order] read and made public to all the infantry together, about if they had to charge them or not. And having traveled [??] as far as the village of San Martín, and from there across an unpopulated region [por despoblado] they arrived at the village of Ybitachuco, which is on the frontier of Timucua, and a village of Apalachee, where they found the said Lieutenant Antonio de Sartucha with the people that he had from this presidio, and many Indians from Apalachee, which in the opinion of this witness would be up to nearly two thousand persons, and he also had the people from a ship from the city of Havana. And then / [----] he prepared supplies for [--] and wrote to the cacique of San Martín and to the [cacique] of Machaba, remitting the letters with Francisco Xiriba, an Indian mandador of the said province fo Timucua, so that he should give them to the said caciques who they said had made forts in a forest next to the said village of Machava, in which they had made a palisade of stout poles, and in which a quantity of Indians of the said province of Timucua were
together. The said Francisco Xiriba having returned, it was said that he had brought a reply from the said cacique of Machava, saying that he could not come alone to where the said Sergeant Major was, even less should the said cacique of San Martin come in his company. Then the said Sergeant Major resolved that he should march in search of the said Indians to the place where they were, and arriving near, the Indians sounded the call to arms. Then the said Sergeant Major divided the people that he brought in two parts, one at his charge / [----] Don Juan Menéndez [---] wished to enter in the forest where they had made forts. The said Indiands returned to [??] outside and to come forth from the forest, making high [??], from where the said Adrián de Cañizares sent a message with the said Francisco Xiriba so that he might tell the cacique of Machava and the cacica of San Juan Ebanjelista, who was the superior of that land, that they should come to where the said Sergeant Major was to meet with him. And the said Francisco Xiriba having gone and given the message, according to how it appeared [?], the said cacique and cacica came forth and arrived where the said Sergeant Major was, who in the presence of this witness told them, by means of Diego Salvador, atiqui and interpreter of the said language, native Indian of the province of Mocoso, that he was not going to make war on them, but rather peace and tranquility, and to find out why they had risen up, and that this was what the Governor
endeavored / [----] and the said cacique and cacica said that they would leave and go to the buxio of the said village of Machava, with which they returned to the palisade, and this happened in the presence of this witness. The said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares withdrew to the said village of Machaba and entered in its principal buxio with all the people, expecting that the said Indians should go. And late that night, after having arrived, the Indians of that village of Pachala, which is very near there, who were not of the rebels, carried two Indians to the said village of Machava and turned them over to the said Sergeant Major, saying that they were killers. And the following day, the said Adrián de Cañizares sent to call upon the cacique of Chamile, named Lazaro, who was he who sheltered the religious of that province so that [the rebels] should not do wrong to them, according to what was public there, and having received the message / [----] and in his company [---] man who had retreated to his doctrina from fear of the Indians. Having arrived, the said Sergeant Major told him to go to the palisade where the caciques and Indians were and tell them that they should go to the buxio, because he was not going to do them any wrong, and other reasons, by means of the said atiqui Diego Salvador. The said cacique went and returned, and in his company the caciques of San Pedro, whose name [this witness] does not remember, the [cacique] of Tari, the [cacique] of Machaba, and the said
cacica of San Juan Evangelista, and the cacique of San Francisco. The said Sergeant Major received them and commanded them to sit, and being there, he questioned them by means of the said interpreter, saying "Come here, my sons. About what has been this uprising?" for two or three times in the presence of all the people who were there, and the said caciques spoke to one another about what the said interpreter Diego Salvador said / [----] all, and not one responded to what the said Sergeant Major had said to them, with which he ordered them apprehended. And the Indians of the palisade sent two Indians imprisoned so that they should be turned over to the said Sergeant Major, as they did in the said buxio of Machaba. [This witness] is not certain if it was before apprehending the caciques or after. They said that the said two Indians were killers, and one of them there confessed publicly that he had killed a Spaniard named Bartolomé Pérez, a soldier of this presidio, in the village of Azile. According to what the said interpreter said, the said Indian confessed because one day, being in Apalachee next to the fire, the said Bartolomé Pérez had arrived and struck him with his foot, saying "Get up from there!" Then the said Sergeant Major made a case which Ensign Don Juan Antonio de Sotomayor, who was then a soldier, wrote up. And then the next day they garroted him / [----] in the said village [---] the said Sergeant major ordered to march for the said village of Ybitachuco, carrying the said caciques
imprisoned. They put the said caciques in the buxio, and he sent a messenger to the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo of what he had performed. And afterwards, some soldiers left, with the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares as leader, in search of the cacique of San Martín, whose name [this witness] does not remember, and after many days they returned to the said village without having found him, because he lacked provisions. And some days having passed, the said mandador Francisco Xiriba went to the said village of Ybitachuco and said to the said Adrián de Cañizares that the cacique of San Pedro said that he had the cacique of San Martín imprisoned, and that he should send a dozen men so that they might take him to his presence. [Cañizares] sent them, Captain Alonso de Argüelles going as leader, and he apprehended him and carried him imprisoned to the said / [-- --] of Ybitachuco. And the said Sergeant Major having news that the said Governor was going, he came forth from the said village to receive him, and he met him in the village of Santa Fé, of the said province of Timucua, from where they returned together. He made a case before Juan Moreno, public notary, and did justice to six caciques, who were the [caciques] of San Martín, San Pedro, Machava, Tari, San Francisco, San Lúcas⁹, and four Indians, killers. He hanged the caciques of San Martín, San Pedro, and Tari in the village of San Pedro, and on the road of Machava its cacique, and the [cacique] of San Francisco and two of the
killers on the road which goes to San Francisco, and the
cacique of San Lúcas and the other two killers in the
village of Azile, and the case is referred to. This witness
does not know the cause of the said uprising, because some
said that it had been for having commanded the principals to
carry burdens / [----] fields had [--] and that if they had
to perish, it was better to rise up, and others said that it
was because the cacique of San Martín had been angry with
the Ensign Don Cosme, and this is what this witness heard,
but he does not know from which persons, and has he has said
above, none of the said causes have foundation for the said
uprising in the opinion of this witness, and in reason of
this, he did not hear another thing. And the visitation
that the said Governor made was after the referred, and in
it, according to what this witness heard and saw, it was to
make good treatment to the Indians, for their government,
and they said that the regulatory codes that he left them
were against the soldiers in many things, which had not been
used up to then, such as that the Indians should not give
them anything to eat when they were going as messengers from
one part to others without being paid, and that they should
not carry any more burdens than the bed / [----] and knows
of the question."
Constable Diego Hernández (age 57)

May 8, 1660 (folios 193-200)

"To the ninth question he said that the Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who is at present in the kingdom of New Spain, having come to this city bringing news of how being in his hacienda La Chua / [----] the province of Timucua in the first place going from this city, there had arrived at it some caciques of the jurisdiction of the said Timucua, the names and villages of which [this witness] does not remember, with some Indians, and that before his eyes they had killed his slaves that he had in his house and the people of service, and among them Juan de Osuna, a soldier of this presidio who had gone in his company. [This witness] heard this said by the said Don Juan Menéndez, who had given account of it to the said Governor, who gave an order to this witness to discharge an [artillery?] piece in the fort in order to join the people, which he then did. And afterwards, within a few days, he heard it said that some Indians came and brought news to the said Governor from the Lieutenant Antonio de Sartucha, who was in Apalachee as Lieutenant, / [----] who the said Governor had sent before to the said provinces of Timucua and Apalachee in order to summon a quantity of Indians who should not make fault to their fields, so that they might come to this city because of the said Governor having had news that His Majesty commanded to say that the English enemy had to come upon
this post ... and some days after the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares left, it was said that news had come that he had imprisoned some caciques of the rebels, and that he had them in the village of Ybitachuco. And the said Governor departed from this city / [----] with him some persons, and among them the treasurer Don Joseph de Prado and Juan Moreno, public notary, and some soldiers. After days, news came that the said Governor had done justice to some of the accomplices. This witness does not know the cause that the said Indians had for having mutinied and risen up, because this witness saw that when the caciques and principals of the provinces subject to this city came to it, the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo received them well in his house, giving them food to eat, as he did with the cacique Don Luis, who is from Ybitachuco, of the jurisdiction of Apalachee, and its principal [cacique]. And this witness likewise saw that [the Governor] many times apprehended the soldiers due to complaints which the Indians gave him of how they were treated badly. And although [this witness] heard it said variously [?] / [----] treatment made [---] Captain Agustín Pérez, and he heard [---] the Ensign Don Cosme Catalan, for saying that he had had a difference with an Indian. This witness judges and holds for certain that all that they said was without foundation that should occasion the uprising of the said Indians, nor does he remember a person in particular from whom he heard this.
And what he knows is that the Indians are want to make up yarns, and deceivers, and that on other occasions that they have seen the presidio lacking in provisions, they have given signs and indications of their evil intent and little stability. And in particular, this witness heard it said in the time that Damian de Vega governed this city, while in this time on one occasion there was a great lack of provisions in it, that the said Indians walked restless and tumultuous, from which it was presumed that they wished to make some uprising, and thus for the said reason, like for the news that / [----] [??]. And after the said Governor came to this city, he heard it said that he had visited the said provinces of Apalachee and Timucua."

Domingo González, carpinter (age 70)  
May 8, 1660 (folios 200-206)  
"To the ninth question, this witness said that ... [Don Juan Menéndez] being in his hacienda of cattle, La Chua, with his slaves and people of service, there had arrived some caciques that he mentioned, but whose names [this witness] does not remember, of the jurisdiction of Timucua, with some Indians, and that they had killed his slaves and people of service, leaving with life him alone, with which the said Governor came to this city, and then within a few days dispatched Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who was of this presidio, as leader of the soldiers and reformados who
went ... and he heard it said how he had hanged the cacique of San Martín and others, and that on the road he had visited the towns of the said provinces of Apalachee and Timucua..."

Adjutant Don Antonio Menéndez Márquez, reformado (age 25)
May 9, 1660 (folios 206-16)
"To the ninth question he says that what he knows is that Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, older brother of this witness, on one occasion said in the presence of others that Juan Menéndez, an Indian who was living in Nombre de Dios, and who now is dead, and who was an interpreter of the language of Timucua, the said Don Juan asking him if the cacique of San Martín had gone away content when he came to render obedience to the Governor, he had responded that no, but rather disgusted from the little reception that he had found in the Governor, who was Don Diego de Rebolledo. And Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who is now dead, related to the said / [----] Pedro Horruytiner that the [cacique of] Tarixica, named Benito, in this city had entered in his house, telling him that he was going away, and the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares responded "How are you going, without carrying something for the road?", and he had told him that he had gone three or four times, and that they gave him nothing, and thus he would go running in order to arrive quickly at his land. And this witness and the rest
understood that the complaint was that the Governor did not give food for the road, and both caciques were from the province of Timucua. On another occasion, this witness being in the said village of San Martín, the said cacique, who was named Lúcas Menéndez, gave complaints to this witness, and what he most understood was that he said "After your father died, no attention is paid to us now," and other reasons like that which [this witness] does not remember well, and this witness understood that they were complaints of the Governor from the time that he had been in this city. He also complained that the year / [----] thirty-two digging Indians who should come to this city for the labors, and afterwards there had been a plague [peste] and almost half of the people of the said province of Timucua had died, and that consecutive year he had ordered to pick out fifty or sixty, not remembering well which of these two numbers he said. And the said cacique retorted, to what this witness is want to remember and understood, that the Indians died and the Spaniards will die, and this witness understood, in his opinion, that he said that upon the Indians dying, the Spaniards would die. There had not been another Spaniard present, although there had been many Indians, his vassals. And on another occasion, this witness being in the village of San Francisco Potano, which is of the said province of Timucua, the caciquillo of the village of Namo, a village now depopulated, and the principal cacique of the said
village of San Francisco went from this city, and this witness asked them how they had gone, and what had they given them, and the said caciquillo of Namo responded / that [--] nothing, but rather it was [--], and this witness was alone. And likewise, [this witness] heard it said, not remembering by whom, that [the Governor] had treated some principal Indians from the province of Apalachee poorly over having arrived to ask for an Indian woman from their village who was in this city. And father fray Alonso Escudero, who serves in the village of Azile, and in the time of the tumult and uprising of the said province of Timucua served in its village of San Pedro, said to this witness that the cause for the said Indians of Timucua having risen up had been for the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo having sent an order that five hundred Indians, principals and caciques, should come, and that these should bring provisions for their persons for the road and to stay thirty days in this city, and that the principals and caciques said that they were not accustomed to carry burdens, and thus they had written to the said Governor / [--] Escudero, for having [--] the said caciques and principals, and that they would come, but to command that [they should come] burdened no, because they were not accustomed to it. And the said Don Juan Menéndez told this witness what he has referred that the said Governor said, and he had said that he had received a letter from the said caciques of Timucua, in
which they asked him to command that they should not come burdened, and [Don Juan] had asked what he had responded, and the said Governor said that he responded that on a similar occasion, the Sergeant Major and Captains also carried burdens. And likewise the said [Don Juan] told this witness, his brother, how being in his haciendas called La Chua, in the said province of Timucua, there had arrived its house the said cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas, and the cacique of San Francisco [??] referred to above, with some twenty Indians, and having entered within, the cacique of San Martín grabbed him / by [--] at that instant he heard the [--] and slaves and persons of service, and among these Juan de Osuna, a soldier of this presidio, from which the said Indians killed them, and that they [??] and that the said cacique of San Martín had started to speak with him with interpreters, and further that as he saw what was happening, he judged that they wished to kill him. He did not understand what he said, and he only remembered that they had said that they [the Spaniards] wished to make them slaves, and that likewise they said "Now the Spaniards die!" He had asked if they had killed the fathers, and they had responded no, that [they had killed] the Spaniards who were in Apalachee and Timucua, and no more. Then he had asked that if they had to kill him, they should led him go to confess at a village, and they had responded that for the benefits that they had received from him and his father / [--)
he should come and go away to Spain, and he might return within six [--], that they they would have a good heart, and although they spoke more like the referred, he did not pay attention to it. Then they gave him a horse so that he might come, and they gave him his clothes, and in order not to come embarrassed he left it, and he gave him two Indians so that they should accompany him, and so that he should not encounter Indians who might kill him. And to this witness and his said brother, and the religious who were in the said Timucua, according to what they understood and said, the cause of the said tumult and uprising was having commanded the said caciques and principals to carry the provision for their persons, for the journey and what they might eat here. [This witness] knows that they had been commanded to bring provisions because of the statement of Captain Agustín Pérez, who was the person who the said Governor sent to convey the supplies, and because of Don [--] having shown to this witness / [----] which the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo wrote, in which he said that five hundred men should come, and that each one should bring provision for [--] and so that they might eat for thirty days in this city. This letter was shown to him after His Mercy came to this city. This witness knows that on the occasion that he ordered the said Indians to come for the aid of this city, there were no provisions of consideration in it, and unless the [Indians] brought it, they would not
have been able to sustain themselves in any way. [This witness] has heard it said that on another occasion that corn was necessary for the sustenance of this city, a frigate was sent to a river which enters through Ocone [??] in the province of Mocama, and that the Indians of service had been commanded to descend there with a quantity of corn in order to load the said frigate. And this witness says that there is no doubt that, having news of enemies, it was suitable to summon the said principal Indians for the aid of this post, and this witness has not seen that the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo made any bad treatments to the Indians, and that when he went to the case of the uprising of the said Indians of Timucua, it was said that he had visited the said province, and that of Apalachee, and this he responds. And likewise [this witness] said that he heard it said that he had sent Captain Nicolás de Carmenatis to the visitation of the province of Guale, who are those at peace, and this he responds. This witness was questioned if it is true that he left from this city in company of the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who went as leader of sixty men, reformados and soldiers from this presidio, by order of the said Governor, and with an order in writing of what he had to do, so that he should go to the pacification of the said / Indians [--] had to do [--] what happened in it. He said that the said Governor having had news of the said uprising, he sent the said Sergeant Major with an order
which he commanded read on the road, this witness, who went in his company, being present, in which it was commanded that with all peace, he should endeavor to have them without making war on them, as will appear in [the order], to which he refers. And having arrived at the village of Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, which is on the border [raya] of both provinces, the said Adrián de Cañizares had news that the rebel caciques of the said province of Timucua were in a forest next to the village of Machava, having made forts in a palisade. [Cañizares] sent them messages with Indians in order that they should go from where they were, and seeing that they did not wish to, it was determined to come forth to where the said Indians were, as he came forth with some of / [----] said Sergeant Major [--] arrived in view of the said forest where the said caciques and Indians were, having made forts within a palisade. He sent them messages so that they should leave, and that he was not going to make war on them, but only to find out the cause of having risen up, and no more. And afterwards, the cacique of the said village of Machaba and the cacica of San Juan Ebangelista came forth and told the said Sergeant Major that he should go to the buxio of the said village, with which they withdrew and went to the said buxio. At the end of two or three days, seeing that they were not coming, he sent a message to the said caciques with the cacique Lazaro, who is of Chamile of the said province of Timucua, that as they were not coming, he
was awaiting them. He returned afterwards, coming with him the said caciques who are those of the said village of Machava, the [cacique] of Tarixica, the [cacique] of San Pedro, the [cacique] of San Lúcas, the cacica of Niaxica, and the said cacica / [----] and some [---] in the said palisade, and [---] Adrián de Cañizares commanded them to sit, and made a question by means of Juan Baupista de la Cruz, who today is in this city, and by others. By this witness being on guard in the door, he was not in it, more than that [Cañizares] ordered them to apprehend them and throw them in chains. And then they brought an Indian who they said had killed Bartolomé Pérez, a soldier of this presidio, and the said Indian confessed that it was true that he had killed him, and he made a case and hanged him. And from there they returned to the said village of Ybitachuco, and he went away to look for the cacique of San Martín, but they did not find him, and having returned another time, he commanded this witness and others to come to this city and bring on the road the fathers who had to come to the chapter. Having arrived at this city, an account was given to the said Governor, who immediately departed / [----] in his company with others, and having arrived at the said village of Ybitachuco, the said Governor made the cases and hanged the delinquents, before Juan Moreno, public notary, to whom is referred. Leaving all in
Squad Leader Bartolomé Entonado (age 26)
May 10, 1660 (folios216-24)
"To the ninth question he said that the Governor having news
that the caciques and Indians of / [----] had risen up and
killed the slaves and people of service which Sergeant Major
Don Juan Menéndez had in the hacienda of La Chua, who this
witness heard say it, and that likewise they had killed
Bartolomé Pérez and Estéban Solana, soldiers of this
presidio, the said Governor ordered the Sergeant Major
Adrián de Cañizares, who was of this presidio, as leader of
more than forty soldiers from this presidio, among which
went this witness, and likewise with the Indians from
Apalachee who were in [the city] for the diggings, and
having left from this city, the said Sergeant Major Adrián
de Cañizares ordered read the order which he carried of what
he had to do. This witness does not remember what it
contained, although he heard it read, and he refers to it.
He saw that, all having arrived at the village of
Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, which is on the border
[raya] of Timucua, the said / [----] that the rebel caciques
of the said Timucua, with a quantity of Indians, had made
forts in the jurisdiction of Machava, of the said province,
in a forest, as he had since he left from this presidio.
And the said Adrián de Cañizares, with Indians of the said province who were at peace in company of the infantry, sent messages to the said caciques with letters so that they might leave from where they were and go away to their villages, and that he was not going to do them damage or war, but rather to quiet them and find out the cause of the uprising. And although the said Adrián de Cañizares had a reply from the said caciques with letters which were read, which this witness heard, and which Diego Salvador, interpreter of the Timucuan language who resides in Apalachee, gave them to understand, in some [letters] they said that they would leave, and in others that they did not dare to leave, because [the Spaniards] deceived them. With this, the Sergeant Major resolved / [----] taking the said infantry [--] other persons who were in his company, and Indians from the said province of Apalachee, and having arrived at the forest where the said caciques had made forts in a palisade encircled with poles to the appearance [?], this witness saw that the said Sergeant Major sent the said caciques messages with the said Indians of Timucua who were at peace, whom [this witness] does not remember, so that they should leave, and that they should do this, and that he was not going to do them damage, and that if not, it would be by force of arms to charge against them. With the said messengers, Deonizio, cacique of the said village of Machava, and the cacica of the village of San Juan.
Ebandelista, which is in the said province of Timucua, came forth from the said palisade and arrived where the said Sergeant Major was. By means of the said interpreter Diego, and Juan Bauptista de la Cruz, who is also / [----] he should withdraw [---] principal buxio of the said village of Machaba, and that they would all leave and go there. The said Sergeant Major withdrew to the said village and buxio, and the said Indian cacique and cacica returned to the said palisade. And seeing that the said caciques were not going, and that three days had passed, the said Sergeant Major determined to return another time to where they were. And at this [time] there arrived the cacique of Chamile, named Lazaro, who was of the said province of Timucua, and was a peace, and he told the said Sergeant Major that he would go to call upon them, with which he should give them word of not doing them evil, and the said Sergeant Major said that he should go. And having gone, he returned to the said buxio and brought the cacique of San Pedro, who was named Diego, and the said cacique Deonizio of Machava, and the said cacica, and other caciques who [this witness] does not remember, and arriving where / [-----] to seat themselves [---] of the said interpreters, they were questioned in their language for what cause they had killed the Spaniards and risen up. The caciques did not respond anything about it, although it was said to them for three times, and they only looked at one another, for which cause the said Sergeant
Major ordered them apprehended. With them, he went away another time to the said village of Ybitachuco, having first garroted an Indian who they had brought from the said palisade, for cause that he had killed the said soldier Bartolomé Pérez, which the said Indian confessed by means of the said interpreters and atiquis Diego Salvador and Juan Bauptista de la Cruz. Having arrived at the said village of Ybitachuco, leaving the said caciques imprisoned and with guards, the said Sergeant Major, with some soldiers, and among them this witness, and some Indians from Apalachee, went in search of the cacique / [----] of the accomplices [----] uprising to a forest where some Indians said he was with a quantity of Indians. He did not find him, although he also went to his village, and thus he returned to the said Ybitachuco, where, having news that the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo was going, he came forth to receive him. All having arrived at the said Ybitachuco, the said Governor carrying with him the cacique of San Francisco and the [cacique] of Santa Fé, who were also of the rebels, and who the said Governor had found in their villages, he fulfilled the case before Juan Moreno, government notary who he took in his company, and did justice to the accomplices, hanging them, which will appear in the said case, to which is referred. This witness does not know, nor was able to fathom, the cause of the said uprising, and only heard it said by some in the said province / [----] who [this
witness] does not remember, that the cause of the said uprising would be because the said Governor, having news that the enemy had to come upon this port, had sent Captain Agustín Pérez so that he should bring principal Indians so that they might help to defend this post if the enemy should come, and that they should bring the corn that might be necessary for their sustenance, because in the presidio there was no [corn]. This witness, for the said effect, heard it said in this presidio before the uprising that the said Captain Agustín Pérez had gone for the said principals of the said provinces of Apalachee and Timucua. He did not know the order that he carried, and only knows that on the said occasion, there was neither corn nor sufficient provisions in this presidio, not even for the people who were in it, and that if the said Indians should come, it was necessary that they should bring provisions, because here there was nothing to give them except what they brought, and / [----] all [??] said English, as there was [--]. And after the said Governor made the said punishment, he came visiting the villages of the said provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, and [this witness] did not see in them that the said Governor did any bad treatments to the said caciques or Indians, nor in this city to those who came did he see that he did the said bad treatments. And he only heard the Ensign Luis de Biana and Bernabé López say that the said Governor had treated badly by word some Indians, and [this
witness] does not remember which they said. And this witness saw that to Don Luis, cacique of Ybitachuco, who is the most principal and above the rest of the said province of Apalachee, having come to this city, the said Governor received him well and gave him gifts and food in his house, and likewise to the rest of the principals who had come with him, which this witness saw many times, and this he responds to the question."

Adjutant Jacinto de los Reyes, reformado (age 34)

May 9, 1660 (folios224-31)

"To the ninth question, this witness said that ... being in the presidio in conversation with some Indians from the said province of Timucua, whose names he does not remember, who were working in his field, asking them what cause and motive they had to kill the people of La Chua and the Spaniards, the said Indians responded to this witness that as they had news that the enemy had to come to this post / [----] and killed the Spaniards [--] they had risen up and done the said killings, and this witnesss knows that the said Governor having the said news, ordering the said principal Indians was necessary, in that there should not be doubt for the defense of this post if the English were coming, because the infantry, or at least the greater part of them, had to be in the fort, and there was noone who might make opposition to the enemy, and they could enter through the
bar and other parts and seize the land, and the said Indians would be able to face up to them with some of the soldiers and not let them come off on land, because unless there was someone who could do this, it was unavoidable to conquer the city and then the fort, having it besieged by land and by sea, with which it would be impossible to be able to sustain themselves in it, nor to have aid for it, and this he responds and knows of the question.

**Ensign Alonso Solana (age 40)**

May 12, 1660 (folios 239-50)

"To the ninth question this witness said that ... he likewise heard Captain Francisco García, Ensign Bernabé López, Ensign Luis de Biana, and other soldiers who went and came to [and from] the provinces subject to this government that the said Don Diego de Rebolledo, in order to protect the Indians, was against the soldiers, and had commanded [the Indians] that they should not given them anything to eat unless for their money, as they did before [??]. And likewise he heard the referred say that although the Governor had done away with the caciques giving them food, they said that they had to give it graciously [???]. This witness does not know the cause that had moved the caciques and Indians of the said province / of Timucua [---] the killings that they did and having risen up, but that he heard it said, not remembering by whom, that a soldier had
had unpleasantness with the cacique of San Martín, but he does not know if it originated from there, or what cause there was, more than that he knows that the said Indians killed Bartolomé Pérez and Estéban Solana, soldiers of this presidio, and Juan de Osuna, likewise a soldier, and another Spaniard and slaves who were in the hacienda La Chua, which is of Don Juan Menéndez. Although it was rumored and made public in this city that the cause for the said province of Timucua having risen up had been for the said Governor having commanded that a quantity of Indians should come to this city with the arms that they had, and that each one should bring provision for his person for the time that he might be in this city, due to having had order and advice from His Majesty that the English enemy was trying / [----] in order to set foot in [--] not having on that occasion the necessary provisions in the royal warehouses, this witness does not hold the said cause as foundation, nor enough that the said Indians should rise up, because it is not the first time that it was commanded that the said Indians should come to the aid of this post and bring provisions for themselves and for the infantry of this presidio, for having done so in the time that the Governor Damian de Vega governed, when this witness saw that not only did some Indians come to this city, but rather their villages remained almost depopulated without men, and the roads were full of those who went and came, some who brought provisions, through this city being
perishing, and others who returned. And likewise, this witness saw that it was done in the time of the Governor Don Luis de Rójas, when there was news of enemies, and they came to the defense of this post / [----] burdened for [---] What this witness feels is that a fixed or apparent reason cannot be given that the said Indians of Timucua had to rise up, and that in no time have the said Indians been more alleviated than in the government of the said Don Diego de Rebolledo, and he knows this as a resident, and having been born in this city, and this he responds. He likewise said that the said Governor looked so much after the said Indians that if there was some displeasure between some Indian and some soldier or another Spanish person, he took the side of the Indians, as he did when, having an Indian badly treated by Andres Hernández in his field, the said Indian came to complain about the said Andres Hernández, and then [the Governor] sent to call upon him and treated him poorly by word. And another Indian was impudent [?] with Captain Nicolás de Goyas, and he reprimanded the said captain. And [the Governor] also took a census of all the Indians of service that there were in this city, and one by one / [---- ] and saying [---] go to their villages [---] and it is that he wished to remain [---] paying them they remain [???], and this witness saw this, and it was after the said uprising, and this he responds."
Third Notebook: Verifications

The following testimony represents responses to follow-up questions regarding specific points raised by earlier witnesses in the secret investigation. In contrast to the testimony from the second notebook, these answers generally comprise more detailed information about a more restricted topic.

Captain Alonso de Argüelles, reformado (age 36)
May 11, 1660 (folios 9-11)

[Sergeant Major Juan Sánchez de Uriza] "says that this witness told him that after the tumult of the province of Timucua, the caciques and micos of the province of Guale had gone away displeased with the Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo for not having treated them as they wished, and for the said Governor having ordered to collect the arms that they and their Indians had, as they collected and brought / [----] This witness says that what he said was to say that the Governor took away the weapons of the Indians of Guale, and that it was just that they should be paid, and he did not say the rest that he was asked. And the taking away of the weapons by the Governor was after the uprising of Timucua, in order to arm the Indians from Apalachee who found themselves in this city and went with the infantry which left, with Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares as leader. And [--] arquebuses to some soldiers of this
presidio, because on that occasion there was a lack in this presidio. After the referred, the said Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo said to this witness that upon having money from the King, he would pay for the weapons that he had taken away from the said Indians of Guale, and that also it was not just that the said Indians should have firearms, and this he responds."

Juan Bauptista de la Cruz, interpreter (age 29)
May 13, 1660 (folios 24-33)
"by another name Nayo, soldier of this presidio and atigui, which means interpreter, of the language of the Indians of the province of Timucua ... Questioned if it is true that the Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares being the person who went as leader of sixty soldiers from this presidio to the uprising of the Indians of the province of Timucua, in the principal buxio of the village of Machava, of the said jurisdiction, having entered in it Lazaro, the cacique of Chamile, of the said jurisdiction of Timucua / [----] of San Pedro, Pedro, cacique of San Pablo, Molina, cacica of San Juan, Benito, cacique of Tarixica, and the [cacique] of San Lúcas, and the [cacique] of San Lorenzo, and Deonizio, cacique of Machava, and the cacica of San Juan Evangelista, and other principals and caciques of the said jurisdiction of Timucua, who had made forts in a palisade in a little forest [montecillo] next to the said village of Machava, and
the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares seeing them, he commanded them to sit, and being on the barbacoas, he admonished them and asked the said caciques and principals why they had risen up, giving them to understand it by means of this witness, as interpreter of the language of Timucua, and by Diego, native of the village of Mocoso in the province of Diminiyuti, who was raised in the [province] of Apalachee / [----] of the said language of Timucua, and the said caciques and Indians did not respond one thing, for which the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, by means of this witness and the said Diego, told them that it was necessary to apprehend them in order to investigate the case, and he apprehended all the referred and sent a message to the said palisade and forest where the rest of the Indians were, so that they should go away each one to his town, quiet and secure that he did not have to do them damage, and with the said prisoners they went to Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, declare if this is true, and the rest which happened about this, as cited in the statement of Captain Alonso de Argüelles in the secret testimony at folio 111, and Adjutant Francisco de Monzón in the said question at folio 147, and others / [----] witness left with [--] men, a little more or less, from this city, and for leader Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, for news having come that the province of Timucua was risen up, with order from the Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo so that he should go and
pacify them for good [effect], as will appear from the said order which this witness heard read. Having arrived at the village of Ybitachuco, of the province of Apalachee, which borders with [confina con] that of Timucua, there arrived an Indian named Francisco, who is mandador of the said province of Timucua, and today serves in San Pedro, and the said Sergeant Major commanded this witness and the said Diego Salvador, who today serves in the said province of Apalachee, as interpreters of the said language of Timucua that they should tell him what the said mandador said, and this witness and the said Diego said that the cacique of Chamile, named Lazaro / [----] and that an Indian had [--] as leader of the Spaniards, and [--] was waiting for hours in order to have himself beyond risk from the caciques and Indians of Timucua, who were risen up, who they feared might kill him, and that he took great pleasure that the Spaniards had gone, and that after he found out the news, he was with a good heart, and that [Cañizares] should send to tell him what he had to do, if the Spaniards had to go through Chamile or Machava so that he should be prepared to receive him. And the said Sergeant Major responded that he should advise the caciques who, according to the news, were in a palisade next to the village of Machava, of the province of Timucua, in a little forest [montecillo], and that he should send to tell them that he was not going to make war on them, but rather to pacify them, and that each one should go away
to his village, and that those who were guilty in the uprising of course were [----] does not know if the said Sergeant Major wrote something or not to the cacique of Chamile. With this, the said mandador went away, and the said reply he gave to the said Diego Salvador in the presence of this witness. Afterwards he was awaiting the reply, and he did not come until some days passed, the number of which [this witness] does not remember, when the said mandador returned with a message from the said cacique of Chamile, and by means of the said Diego Salvador and this witness, he gave it to the said Sergeant Major, saying that his cacique said that he could not do more than what he had done, which was to send to say to the caciques of the palisade what [Cañizares] had sent to say, and that he had not had any reply, and [he asked] if they had sent [a reply] from where they were. The said Sergeant Major sent to tell him that he had not had any reply / [----] [??] that he had sent to say that he urged brevity, because he wished to give account to the Governor. And the said Indian went away for his village with the said inquiry, and [Cañizares] was awaiting the reply some days, and having seen that he was not going, he commanded to march, and on this occasion the said mandador arrived and said that he was not carrying a reply from his cacique, but rather that he was going of his own will in order to be with the Spaniards. Then they marched the route of the said village of Machava and little
forest which is next to it, where the Indians who had made the palisade were, and being near, in view of it, the said Sergeant Major sent the said mandador, who is named Francisco Xiriba, so that he should tell the caciques who were in the said palisade that they should leave from it, having given him word of what they wished, and if they were at peace, or at war / [-----] with the reply [---] for which the said Sergeant Major ordered the people to divide, one part remaining with him, and with the other went Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who went marching up to one part of the forest and palisade where there appeared to be many people, and the said Sergeant Major marched for the middle of the forest. And having begun to enter in it, there was a rumor, which [this witness] does not remember with certainty what was said, more than that the said Sergeant Major ordered that they should turn back and come back outside the forest, and thus it was executed. And being outside the said forest, the cacica of San Juan Evangelista came forth from the said palisade, and behind her the cacique of the said village of Machava, and both arrived to where the said Sergeant Major was and said that they were / at peace [---] and that for that night they could not leave, and that they would send some Indians who might carry them firewood to the buxio, and that the following day all would leave and go there. Diego Salvador was given to understand this in the presence of this witness, and the said Sergeant Major told
them "What good news!" With this the said cacique and cacica went away for the said palisade, and the said Sergeant Major with his people went away for the principal buxío of the said village of Machava, where they made a guard corps [?]. The said cacique and cacica did not send firewood like they said, but the cacique of the village of Pachala brought firewood and water with some Indians [?]. And that same night in the small hours an Indian arrived who said that the said cacique of Chamile had sent him, and that he was going to find out if it was true what there / [----] the caciques of the palisade [--] that the Spaniards had made war on them and had killed many people, and that they should aid them, and that the Indians who found themselves in the said village of Chamile and the village of Arapaxa said that they wished to go to help those of the palisade because they had relatives [there], and that those of his village of Chamile wished to find out if it was true. Diego Salvador was given to understand the said message in the presence of this witness. The said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares told the said Indian that he should see if it was true, and that all was false and a lie, and that he should go and tell his cacique that he told him that he should come to see, with which the said Indian went away. The following day, the said cacique of Chamile went to the said village of Machava, and having / [----] and spoken with the said Sergeant Major, he told him that the said Indians of the
palisade had sent to say what is referred above, and the said Sergeant Major told him that it was a lie, which he saw now, and all this by means of the said interpreter in the presence of this witness. And with the same [interpreter], he responded and said to the said cacique that he should go to where the said caciques were and tell them that as they had not fulfilled what they had agreed, and that unless they left for good [effect], it would be for bad [effect]. And the said cacique went away with the said message to the said palisade and returned that same day, and said that they said that they would leave in peace, and the following day the said cacique of Chamile returned with a second message in the same form, and then there came forth the cacique of San Pedro, named Diego, and the cacique of the said village of Machava, named Deonizio, and the cacica of [----] of Tari, named [---] and the cacique of San Lúcas [---] San Juan, and the [cacique] of San Pablo, whose name [this witness] does not know, and these three were not principal caciques, but rather caciquillos, and likewise two cacicas, one from Santa Ana, and another from Niayca. All arrived at the said buxio, and another two Indians who they said were servants of the said [caciques], where, being before the said Sergeant Major, who had already given order that all the soldiers should be with caution, and at their posts, he commanded them to sit on the bárbarcoas, and all being there, he asked them why they had risen up, and what cause there
was for having killed the Spaniards. One of the said caciques, [this witness] not remembering which, responded that they had no more reason than what the said cacique of San Martín had told them, that the Spaniards wished / [----] they wished to embark to sell them, so that they should be slaves, and to present most of them to the King so that they should be his slaves, and that discussing this, and making a consultation about it in the village of San Pedro, next to the [village] of Santa Catalina, two young boys [mozuelos] left and killed the soldier who went with cargos of provisions for the Indians who had to come to guard this city, which he brought from the village of Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, and that with this occasion, they had gone away to gather themselves at the said forest. And the said Sergeant Major asked them who was the Indian who had killed the soldier, and they responded, saying the name, which this witness does not remember, and that he was in the palisade. Then the Indians from Apalachee, to whom the said Sergeant Major had earlier given the order and sign, so that upon making it / [----] make them prisoners [---] chains. And afterwards [---] commanded the cacique of Santa Catalina, named Diego Egua, to go to the palisade where the Indians were and bring the killers imprisoned. And having gone, he returned and brought he who had killed the soldier, and another who had helped to kill a black man from La Chua, the hacienda of Don Juan Menéndez, and being before the said
Sergeant Major, they took the confession of he who had killed the soldier. He confessed to having killed him, named Bartolomé Pérez, a soldier of this presidio, in the village of Azile, because one time he had gone to Apalachee and entered in the house of the soldiers in order to warm himself, and the said Bartolomé Pérez told him to leave, throwing him out, and that he did not want him to warm himself. For that, he had killed him, and in order to be a noroco. All of this passed / [----] Salvador, atiqui, in the presence of this witness, and it was what happened and what [this witness] understood, as an interpreter. The said Sergeant Major ordered the said Indian garroted, and ordered the people to march and go to the said village of Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, where, having arrived with the said caciques imprisoned, they placed them in the buxio and placed guards, and sent news to the said Governor of what he had performed. Afterwards, he left in search of the cacique of San Martín at the place which is called Aramuqua, where they said he had withdrawn, but they did not find him. From there they went to his village, but they did not find him there either, with which they returned to the said village of Ybitachuco. After some days, the cacique of San Pedro, who was then [cacique] of Santa Catalina, named Diego Egua, advised the said Sergeant Major how he was sending imprisoned the said / [----] the said Governor Diego de Rebolledo went and made a case against the prisoners, and
took their confessions and declarations by means of Clemente Bernal, the principal cacique of Mocama and San Juan del Puerto, and by means of the said Diego Salvador and this witness as *atiguis* and interpreters. And he did justice to the cacique of San Pedro, the [cacique] of Machava, the [cacique] of San Martín, the [cacique] of San Francisco, the caciquillo of San Lúcas, and the cacique of Tari, and two Indians, as will be on record in the case which passed before Juan Moreno, notary public, to whom is referred. [This witness] does not know any other cause which the said Indians of Timucua had to rise up more than that which was stated above, which one of the said caciques said to the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares when all arrived at the said *buxio*, and this he responds."

**Sergeant Pedro Texeda (age 32)**

May 14, 1660 (folios 43-4)

[Manuel Calderón] "says that Captain Agustín Pérez being in the province of Apalachee, Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo sent messengers to its Lieutenant through different parts, so that it should not happen that the Indians should intercept them, and among them went this witness, Adjutant Francisco Sánchez, Ensign Juan Bauptista Terraza, and Bartolomé Francisco, and that he did not know the orders that he carried, declare what it was, and what happened on the said road and journey. This witness said that it is
true that by order of the said Governor, this witness with
those who were questioned about, Ensign Juan Bautista
Terraza\textsuperscript{11}, who today serves in Apalachee, going as leader,
left from this city / [----] with letters from the said [---]
for Antonio de Sartucha, who was Lieutenant of the said
province, and for Captain Agustín Pérez and some religious,
and escorting five Indians who had come with letters of news
of the uprising, so that the Indians should not encounter
them. Likewise [the Indians] had come to find out it the
cacique of Ybitachuco, who is the principal of the said
province of Apalachee, was imprisoned or not, because the
said Indians of Timucua had put out a rumor that he was
imprisoned, so that by this route they would bring the
Indians of the said province of Apalachee to their devotion,
so that they would join with them, which was public among
all, and the Indians of the said province. And with the
said letters, by divergent roads the arrived at the said
village of Ybitachuco, of the said province of Apalachee and
gave them over, and likewise the [Indians] who they carried
from the said cacique of Ybitachuco for his heirs and
principals, with which they were enlightened / [----]
Timucua [---]. Asked if he knew or heard it said what cause
had moved the said Indians for the said uprising, he said
that he heard it said that it was for having commanded the
principal Indians who had to come for this city to bring the
provisions which were necessary for their persons, as aid
from the news that had come of the enemy, and this he responds."

Sergeant Manuel Gómez, reformado (age 27)
May 15, 1660 (folios 49-50)
[Don Juan Joseph de Sotomayor] "says that this witness is executor of Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, who died in the province of Apalachee, and that as such he will give a copy of his papers, and especially a case which he made against an Indian of Timucua who he hanged before this witness who is cited, declare if he has it in his power or knows of it, and with whom are his papers. He said that the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares, by a memorial which he made in the province of Apalachee, in the village of San Luis de Niayca, being sick, from which he died, he left it [?] to father fray Pedro Vásquez, religious of the order of San Francisco, to the Squad Leader Andres Pérez, and to this witness for his [--], and all the papers which he left remain in the power of the said Squad Leader Andres Pérez, and this witness did not read any papers, and thus does not know of the case of which he was questioned, and this he responds."
Clemente Bernal, cacique (age 70)

May 16, 1660 (folios 64-6)

"...principal cacique of the village of San Juan del Puerto, province of Mocama, and its jurisdiction...Asked about what some witnesses in the secret testimony say, that he was one of the interpreters who found themselves at the case which Don Diego de Rebolledo made against the caciques and Indians of Timucua, say and declare what happened and what he knows with regard to the uprising which the said caciques and Indians of Timucua made, and for what cause it was, and the rest which he had known and understood. This witness said that he was in his village at the time of the uprising of the province of Timucua, and he did not know one thing about it until the Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo sent to call upon this witness, writing him with a soldier, giving him account of the said uprising, and that he should come immediately to this city, and thus he did, placing himself on the road. He came to this city and was in it some days until the said Don Diego de Rebolledo / [----] province of [--], and he took with him this witness, interpreter of the said language of Timucua. Having arrived at the village of Yvitachuco, province of Apalachee, he saw that there were imprisoned in the buxio of the said village, and with guards, the cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas Menéndez, the cacique of Tari, the cacique of Machava, the cacique of San Francisco, the [cacique] of San Pedro de Potoxiriva, whose
names [this witness] does not remember, and three particular Indians, all of the said province of Timucua. This witness knew for a public matter that the said imprisonment was for having risen a tumult and rebelled and killed some Spaniards, and that for the said uprising, the cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas Menéndez, had made a meeting of caciques in the said village of San Pedro de Potoxiriba, the cause which moved him, according to what he said, was a letter that he said he had intercepted from the said Governor / [----] he said he wrote it, and that in it, the sending to call upon the principals and the rest of the people of the said provinces of Apalachee and Timucua for the aid of this city was in order to make them slaves, and not because there was news of enemies, and that an Indian who knew Spanish had read the said letter. This witness did not know or hear any other cause with regard to the said uprising. The said Governor made a case against the said caciques and Indians and took their confessions by means of this witness, as an interpreter, and Diego Salvador, an Indian who serves in Apalachee, and Juan Baúptista de la Cruz, a soldier of this presidio, interpreters of the said language of Timucua. [The Governor] did justice to the guilty, and in all this witness said to refer to the said case, and what he has said and signed in it as an interpreter, and that what he said and declared then is the
truth / [----] in anything [---] detriment, and this he responds."

Juan Alejo, Indian prisoner (age 34)
May 17, 1660 (folios 66-70)
"...an Indian who said he is named Juan Alejo, and is a Christian / [----] Luis, province of Diminiyuti\textsuperscript{13}, and native of the village of Santa Lucía, two leagues from it, which borders with [confina con] the province of Timucua, and at the present said he serves in the fort of this presidio at forced [labor], serving in the construction of His Majesty, by sentence which Don Diego de Rebolledo, who was Governor and Captain General of this city, pronounced for having killed, in the company of an Indian named Antonio, a Spaniard named Francisco Vásquez and Gerónimo, an Indian from Tabasco, servants of Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez, who served in his hacienda La Chua ... Asked about the citation of Captain Alonso de Argüelles in the ninth question of his statement which is in the secret testimony at folio 108, in which he says that this witness, in company of Juan Pasqua, brought to this city for the Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo a letter from father fray Alonso Escudero, declare if it is true, and if he knows what it contained. He said that it is true that this witness brought a letter for the Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo from the father fray Alonso Escudero, who served in the
village of San Pedro of the said province of Timucua, and in his company came the Indian Antonio, son of the cacique of the village of Chamile, and not Juan Pasqua, as he was questioned. The said father gave him the letter in the village of San Pedro, and its cacique and the [cacique] of San Martín, who were there, gave him another for / [----] they gave him after [---] in the said village of San Pedro, that the cacique had received a letter from Captain Agustín Pérez which told him to go for Apalachee and which advised in it that he should send his people to Apalachee for corn, so that they might come with him to this city, and this as he has said, he heard it said in the said village, because this witness did not see the letter which it was said the said Captain Agustín Pérez had written. This witness having come to this city in company of the said Indian Antonio, he turned over the said two letters to the said Governor, and after this he gave to this witness a sealed letter so that he should give it to the said Captain Agustín Pérez. He did not know if another went within. Likewise he gave him a sealed paper for the said cacique of San Pedro, and with them, [this witness] went away in company of the said Indian Antonio. Going on his journey, they passed by the village of San Martín / [----] then called San Juan de Guacara, and they met four Indian men, two named Lorenzo, and the other an Indian woman, natives of the village of Santa Fé. And the names of the other two he does not remember, only that
they were natives of the said village of San Martín. They said to this witness and his companion that they had killed Estéban Solana, and that the said cacique of San Martín said that upon meeting Spaniards, they should kill them. And the said four Indians came for San Martín, and this witness and his companion proceeded with their journey for the village of San Pedro. Having arrived at a place which is called Calacala, before arriving at the said river, they met Francisco Vásquez, a Spaniard, and Gerónimo, an Indian, native of Tabasco, who had gone to bed, speaking about how the night was. This witness drew near where were the said Francisco Vásquez and the said / [----] the said Gerónimo [- -], and with a stick which this witness and his companion carried in their hands, they struck them a blow in the head, and repeated with another, with which they killed them. And the said Antonio removed the scalp of the said Gerónimo and placed it (?) in a cloth [pañón]. From there, proceeding on the journey past the said river of San Juan de Guacara, they met with the said cacique of San Martín, named Lúcas, and with him came four Indians, one of them his mandador named Lorenzo, and he other a principal who was sacristan, whose name [this witness] does not remember, and another two who he did not know. And the said cacique asked this witness what news there was in St. Augustine, and what had the Governor said, and this witness told him that [he had said] nothing, and that he was carrying letters from the Governor,
and he took them and read one and placed them in his pocket [faldrique]. He also asked them if they had / [----] and Gerónimo and [--] responded [?] yes, and that they had killed them, and the said Antonio showed him the scalp. And the said cacique said that it was well done, and that although he had commanded that they should kill all the Spaniards, he had not commanded that they should remove the scalps, and he ordered him to bury it, and thus he did at one side of the road. And the said cacique commanded that this witness and his companion should go to the village of San Pedro and tell the cacique what they had done, and how he went for La Chua in order to see if there were some people to kill, and that he should send more people of his vassals. He also wrote there a letter which he gave to this witness for the said cacique of San Pedro. He said the referred to the said cacique and turned over the letter to him, and he opened and read it, and said to his people / [---] people that [---] follow the said cacique of San Martín, he should do it, and some of the Indians went in search of him, and of what [this witness] remembers of their names, they were Lorenzo, Thomas, and Matheo. This witness does not know if others went, nor the cause for which the said Indians of Timucua rose up, and only heard it said that Estéban Solana coming from the village of Ybitachuco, province of Apalachee, with Indians in order to come to this city with corn, he had said on the road that there they did
not have to have more caciques than him, and this he responds. He said that although he is serving in the said fort by the case which the said Governor made about the said death, not for this has he neglected saying the truth."

Francisco Pasqua, Indian prisoner (age 35)
May 17, 1660 (folios 70-72)
"...an Indian who said he is named Francisco Pasqua, and who is usually called Juan Pasqua, and he said he is a Christian, baptized in the village of San Luis in the province of Diminiyuti, and native of the said village / [--] by a case which the said Governor Diego de Rebolledo made about having killed a black man in the hacienda of La Chua...[regarding the same testimony by Captain Alonso de Argüelles] ...he said / how [--] although in this [--] persons call him Juan Pasqua, and that this witness did not bring one letter to the said Governor from father fray Alonso Escudero, nor from any other person, nor went from this presidio for the province of Timucua in company of Juan Alexo. The cause of having been condemned to forced [labor] in the fort was because this witness being in this city in the diggings, he had finished, and the person with whom he was, who was Magdalena de Uriza, told him to go away, and thus he picked up the road and arrived at San Francisco Potano, village of the province of Timucua, where he found its cacique, and the [cacique] of San Martín, named Lúcas
Menéndez, and this [cacique] told him that he should not pass from there, and thus he remained, and he ordered him to go with him to the hacienda of La Chua, and that if he did not do it, he had to punish him, and thus the said two caciques, with twenty of their Indians / [----] from the said village of San Francisco. Having arrived at the said hacienda of La Chua, the said caciques and Indians killed a soldier named Osuna and the rest of the people of service who were in it, and the said cacique of San Martín sent this witness to go to kill a black man of the said hacienda who was in a hut apart, and this witness went and killed him. From there, all went away for the village of San Martín, and then went to the village of Santa Elena de Machava, where apart from the said two caciques, the cacique of Machava and many others of the said province of Timucua gathered, where he heard it said that they had killed other Spaniards, and this he responds. He was questioned by means of the said interpreter if he knows for what cause the said caciques and Indians did the said killings and had the tumult among them. He said that he did not know, nor heard it said."

Adjutant Francisco Romo de Uriza, reformado (age 25)
May 17, 1660 (folios 75-7)
[regarding the testimony of Salvador de Pedrosa, folio 74]
"...this witness says that he went with the said Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares for the pacification of the
Indians of the said province who had risen up and done some killings of Spaniards and persons of service who were in the hacienda of La Chua / [-----] of Apalachee [--] [?] the religious who were there [?] and soldiers of the presidion, who [this witness] does not remember, that the cause for the said Indians of Timucua having risen up had been because an order had been sent that the principals and caciques should come to this city burdened with corn, due to the news which had come of the enemy. And this witness heard Sergeant Major Don Juan Menéndez say that being in his hacienda La Chua at the time that the cacique of San Martín and other Indians had killed his people, they had said that he should go away to Spain and not come until six years had passed, because until then they had to be with a bad heart for the evil which had been done with them, and this he responds."

Sergeant Major Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, ref. (age 43) May 18, 1660 (folios 80-91) [regarding the testimony of Sergeant Major Juan Sánchez de Uriza, folio 49] "...this witness said that it is true that on many occasions he has said it, and thus has felt it, because in the twenty-four years that he has been in this presidio, and five of them governing these provinces, and he has recognized the nature of the Indians, and that they do not look at or agree with reason, but rather charm [aquello] which they see, and those who give them gifts [?], and this
make them form complaints, as has been done since the first was founded [??], and according to the news which this witness has, there is a Cédula from His Majesty which will be found in the Contaduría, in which he commands that all the expenses which are made with the caciques and the rest of the principal Indians when they come to render obedience, [a new Governor] recently entered in the government, and on other occasions, should be paid from his Royal Hacienda, without touching the situado of the presidio, with certification of the quantity which the said expenses amount to each year that the Royal Officials of this presidio give. Those of Mexico remit the rest of the quantity from the situado [??]. This witness has seen that this has always been observed and guarded, only the said Don Diego de Rebolledo left off doing it by saying that the said Cédula only spoke about the infidel Indians who / [----] in the years [--] and obedience to His Majesty, or similar treatments. This witness sometimes made a petition with the said Don Diego de Rebolledo as soon as he entered in the government so that he should not alter the matter, but that he should treat them as before, giving something to each one, by knowing the nature of the said Indians as is stated above, and that the said Cédula was obtained [?] in the early years of the foundation of this city, and for that it spoke in that manner. Nevertheless, this witness does not know that said Don Diego had given anything, and that if he
did so, it will be seen in the Contaduría. For this reason this witness heard it said by Don Juan Menéndez, Don Antonio Menéndez, and Sergeant Major Adrián de Cañizares that the cacique of San Martín, who is the principal of Timucua, and the [cacique] of Santa Cruz de Tari gave / [---] Rebolledo [---] give them gifts, nor had given anything when they came to render obedience, and that he only treated well the Indians of the coast, because they bring amber, and likewise for having commanded that the caciques, principals, and norocos should come to this city and carry the provisions which each one should have to eat on the road and in their stay of one month in this city, without occupying others of the common people, so that they might not make fault in the diggings of their corn fields and sown ground [?], because it is an injury to them to command the caciques, principals, and norocos to carry burdens, and in no way if they do not carry burdens, nor are accustomed to it. This witness does not know that it was suitable to summon the said Indians for the aid of this presidio for having to make war in case the occasion should arrive with / [----] they guard [---] had to be [---] Indians [---] by absense [??] they were of importance, and he knows that in that occasion there were not provisions in the presidio, not even those necessary for the infantry, and this he responds."
Ensign Luis de Biana, reformado

May 20, 1660 (folios 101-3)

[regarding the testimony of Sebastián Rodríguez, folio 93]

"...in which he says that this witness told him that a soldier had struck the cacique of San Martín, who is of those of Timucua, in the face with a piece of meat or a slap, one of the two things, declare who was the soldier and for what cause. He said that he has not said what he was questioned about in the form which is referred, and that what happened was that this witness coming with the Indians of / [----] Timucua [--] and in the company of Captain Agustín Pérez with those from Apalachee, upon crossing the river of San Juan de Guacara, which is crossed in canoes, due to many coming, they stayed more than one day, and this witness said to the Ensign Don Cosme Catalan, who was coming in the company of the said Agustín Pérez, that he should cross to the other side of the river and order preparations to be made to eat, in order to find it done when they might finish crossing, which he thus did. Upon crossing with a boat-load to where the said Don Cosme Catalan was, in his presence one of the digging Indians gave complaints to this witness of how the said Don Cosme had struck him in the face with a piece of meat because it was not well cleaned. And this witness reprimanded the said Don Cosme, who then came with the rank / [--] Agustín Pérez likewise reprimanded him. Coming [?] for this city, and having arrived at the village
of San Martín, of those of Timucua, its cacique asked this witness if it was true that a soldier had struck an Indian in the face with a piece of meat, and this witness told him that the said Indian had told him so, but that he had not seen him struck, and the said cacique said that this was not well done, and this witness told him that the soldier who had done it had not walked among them, and thus had done it ignorantly. The said Indian whom the said Don Cosme had struck in the face with the meat was of the jurisdiction of Apalachee, and this he responds."

[regarding the testimony of Bartolomé Entonado, folio 220] "This witness said that what he has said has been that the Governor Don Diego de Rebolledo coming visiting the villages of the province of Apalachee, arriving at the [village] of San Luis, of the said jurisdiction, and having visited it, wishing to leave in order to come to another village, and not giving him Indians so that they might bring his clothes, and they only had prepared women to carry his clothes and that of the infantry in order to pay them later on, the said Governor, seeing the referred, ordered the caciques of the said village of San Luis apprehended because they had sent the women, and he held them prisoners one hour / [----] principals of the said village of San Luis [---] Ynixa, which is Sergeant Major, he did not only apprehend only the caciques, which they call caciquillos, of the jurisdiction of the said village, and then they brought Indians so that
at his charge and that of the soldiers they should carry [the clothes] to another village which is two leagues from there, from where the said Indians and the Governor returned another time to the said caciquillos. After freeing them, with good reason he told them that he had done that because they had ordered the women to carry burdens, having ought to have ordered their Indians, and that if they did that when he was coming, it would be when a soldier will pass. And this happened after the uprising of Timucua, and this he responds."

Notes

1. While Lieutenant Governor of Havana, Don Diego Ranjel had conducted the residencia of former Governor Don Diego de Villalua (Ranjel 1656).

2. The term principales refers to the highest-ranking members of aboriginal society, including caciques and their immediate subordinates, both male and female.

3. This seems to refer to a lack of expansion in the mission frontier, indicating that few or no new missions had been founded in some time.

4. The name "San Martín" had been scratched out here, and replaced with "San Francisco" above.

5. The text here employs the 2nd-person plural, indicating that Don Juan spoke to the Indians in the familiar.

6. This passage seems to refer to the endeavors of the rebels of Timucua to engage the support and aid of the Indians of Apalachee.

7. The term garitas signifies small watch-towers or bastions placed at strategic points on the outer wall of a fort, and thus the phrase garitas de flechas may refer to positions on the Timucua palisade wall from which arrows could be fired.
8. Since several other witnesses confirm that the cacique of San Francisco de Potano was not among those in the palisade, this must be the cacique of San Francisco de Chuaquin, who Fray Juan Gómez de Engraba (1657b) later described as one of the rebels.

9. The name of this village was originally written as San Matheo, but this was crossed out (here and below on the same page) and replaced with San Lúcas. These are the only two references to the mission of San Matheo in the entire documentary record prior to 1657, when San Matheo is mentioned for the first time with 7-8 satellite villages during the Rebollodo visitation of Timucua following the rebellion (Rebolledo 1657c). Although Fray Juan Gómez de Engraba (1657b) listed San Matheo as one of the rebel caciques, none of the numerous witnesses during the Rebollodo residencia mentioned this name. The replacement of the name San Matheo with San Lúcas in this instance suggests that Calderón later corrected his initial statement.

San Lúcas was described by Juan Bautista de la Cruz (1660) as a minor cacique, or caciquillo, and the appearance of San Lúcas as a satellite of San Matheo in the 1657 visitation indicates that it was the cacique of San Lúcas, and not that of San Matheo, who rebelled and was hanged. It is entirely possible, moreover, that San Lúcas was the original mission center prior to the rebellion, but with the hanging of its cacique, another cacique, that of San Matheo (which may have only been a satellite of San Lúcas prior to that time) rose to preeminence over the cluster of satellite villages in that area.

10. Based on the fact that all other testimony indicates that this incident occurred in the principal buxio, or council house, of this town (probably Ivitachuco), Cruz's testimony constitutes good evidence that the soldiers in the Apalachee garrison (such as Pérez) were quartered in the council house, although the Lieutenant probably had a separate house (see Hann 1988:196-7). The fact that the Indian readily entered the structure, and was offended by being expelled, further suggests that this was the council house, where visitors were commonly housed (Hann and Shapiro 1990).

11. This testimony was verified many years later in the service record of Ensign Terraza (Arguelles et al. 1678), where further details of the journey were provided.

12. These papers were never found during the residencia, and thus may have been lost or destroyed during the intervening years following the Cañizares' death in 1657.
13. The province of Diminiyuti was also known as Acuera, located to the south of the Timucua province. Missions had been established in this province prior to 1630 (see Chapter Six).
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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Anthropology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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