FIDEL CASTRO: A MACHIAVELLIAN PRINCE?

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Preface

Two versions of this essay are in print. A short version appears in the Proceedings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 1999, Volume 9, pp. 178-191. An extended version was published by the National Endowment for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (Coral Gables, Florida, 1999). In light of the renewed interest about Cuba prompted by the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Castro regime announced by President Obama, I post the latter here with a few alterations, corrections, and additions, including more recent references and a few “postscripts” in the footnotes.

A number of people, some of them regrettably no longer living, kindly read original drafts of the essay and offered encouragement and suggestions. Many thanks to Luis Aguilar León, Marvin Alisky, Charles W. Anderson, Ernesto Betancourt, James and Marian Busey, Juan Caballero, Juan del Aguila, Art Doerr, Barry Evans, Edward Gonzalez, Yvon Grenier, James A. Hall, Brian Latell, Michael Ledeen, Adolfo Leyva, Carlos Alberto Montaner, Jorge Pérez-López, Enrique Pumar, Mauricio Solaún, Gordon Tullock, James W. Witt, José Zayas, and Eduardo Zayas-Bazán. It goes without saying that responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation rests on me.

June 26, 2015

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1. **Introduction: Machiavelli and Castro**

This is an exploratory essay on whether Fidel Castro qualifies as a Machiavellian prince. Much of *The Prince* deals with the problem of how a man can raise himself from private fortune or even obscure and abject origins to a position of undisputed political primacy as conqueror or founder of a new state or regime. Clearly, Fidel Castro accomplished that feat. The questions that concern us here are the following: Can Castro’s success be credited to Machiavellian methods in all or most important respects? Did he violate any of Machiavelli’s maxims? Since, as we shall see, although abiding by most precepts, he disregarded several, and scorned one particularly important admonition, what does that tell us about Machiavellism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the kind of “prince” Fidel Castro is?

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2 Surprisingly, although a number of authors have used the term “Machiavellian” to characterize Castro (see note 4), it appears that no one has seen fit systematically to analyze his conduct in light of *The Prince*. A key-word search of computerized data bases turned up nothing. Also, I consulted Jorge Domínguez and Edward González by e-mail, and neither could cite any previous effort to establish Castro’s Machiavellian credentials. [Postcript: Although Castro retired in 2008, as far as I know he is still alive, so I have retained the present tense when referring to him.]
Machiavelli and Castro make a good match. Fidel Castro’s spectacular rise from relatively obscure origins in Cuba’s most remote province to absolute ruler of the Island and, moreover, someone to be reckoned with by the great powers of the world,\(^3\) an achievement out of all proportion to the country’s size or wealth, is one of the most remarkable political stories in the history of Latin America, a tale inspiring admiration in some quarters and indignation in others. For his part, Niccolò Machiavelli, a man of modest family background who managed to wield but a limited amount of power in an appointive position in the Florentine Republic before his forced retirement after the Medicis regained control of the city in 1512, a most bitter change of fortune for a man who wanted more than anything else to be entrusted with public responsibilities, consoled himself with writing what is at once the most famous and the most infamous book on politics ever written (Mansfield 1998, vii). Both having risen from obscurity to fame and infamy alike, each a revolutionary in his own right, one as a practitioner and the other as a theoretician of a politics of maximum leadership, Castro and Machiavelli complement one another. Suggestibly, among the works kept in Castro’s small hut at his guerrilla camp in the \textit{Sierra Maestra} in 1958 was a copy of \textit{The Prince} (Quirk 1993, 71).\(^4\)

\(^3\) See Blight and Brenner (2002).

\(^4\) According to Pardo Llada (1989, 42), \textit{The Prince} was one of Castro’s favorite works as early as 1949. José Antonio Rasco, a classmate of Castro in secondary school and at university, says that from Machiavelli Castro “learned to justify everything,” and uses the term “Machiavellian” to characterize Castro’s conduct (Rasco 1999, 430, 432—my translation). Also, Georgie Ann Geyer remarks that, beginning in 1959, Castro “proceeded to transform [Cuba] with a wave of his ‘princely’ Machiavellian hand in a
This essay surveys Machiavelli’s treatise with interpretive and empirical ends in mind. That is, Machiavelli’s model is used as an aid to understanding how Fidel Castro became Cuba’s “revolutionary prince” (Geyer 1991). The analysis concentrates on the period encompassing the road to power and its early consolidation because, as we shall see, Machiavelli argues that self-made princes “acquire their principality with difficulty but hold it with ease” (Mansfield, 23). Reciprocally, Castro’s modus operandi is scanned for information helpful for empirically assessing several of Machiavelli’s most important prescriptions about what a ruler must do in order to make himself master of a state. These generalizations are gleaned primarily from The Prince, although a few correlative observations are extracted from two other works: The Discourses and The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca (henceforth Castruccio). On Fidel Castro I have relied

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manner never before seen in Latin America--or, for that matter, most of the world” (Geyer 1991, xv).

5 To minimize the probability of misinterpreting key passages on account of using a possibly faulty translation, I consulted several editions of The Prince. For quotations, I usually alternated between Mansfield (1998) and Skinner and Price (1988), retaining the latter’s English spelling of words (e.g., “honour,” “favour,” etc.). These translators, along with Codevilla (1997), are very self-conscious about language, each including an appendix (or, as in Codevilla, copious footnotes) on Machiavelli’s vocabulary. Also, Skinner and Price (1988) contains useful biographical sketches of the principal historical figures mentioned in The Prince.
for the most part on Robert Quirk’s biography (1993), although other sources also are cited.

I reiterate that this is an exploratory study. Throughout the paper, lacunae of uncertainty or doubt regarding the most appropriate interpretation or the actual facts of the case are identified, if nothing else to lay down markers around areas worthy of future investigation. It is hoped that those who know a lot more about either Machiavelli or Fidel Castro, and their number is no doubt embarrassingly large, will fill these gaps and correct all errors or, better still, do greater justice to the topic by taking it up themselves.

2. A Profile of the Machiavellian Prince

No single interpretation or simple summary of Machiavelli’s notorious tract is likely to satisfy all readers. The one offered here is admittedly selective. It abstracts from The Prince what is essential to my purpose, occasionally supplementing it with related passages found in The Discourses and Castruccio. This section begins with the qualities of the man who would be prince, and proceeds successively to examine the opportunities that enable him to seize control of a state and the methods required for achieving mastery over it.

Machiavelli dedicated The Prince, which he completed in 1513, to “His Magnificence Lorenzo de’Medici” (Skinner and Price 1988, 3; henceforth S&P). A member of an influential family of bankers, princes, and popes, Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino, at the time was absentee ruler of Florence. By proffering his “small volume” to one of the Medicis, Machiavelli was currying favor with the very family responsible for quashing the liberty of his homeland and forcing his retirement, not to mention his arrest and torture in the hope that they would restore him to a position of public service (Ridolfi 1963).
That Machiavelli made a “gift” of *The Prince* to a duke and sought the good graces of a noble family in a failed bid to return to public life should not hide the fact that he did not think that an aristocratic origin is necessary to a would-be prince. An obscure or even shameful origin is no impediment, provided the man “have no other object, nor any other thought, nor take anything else as his art but that of war and its orders and discipline,” for mastery of this craft “enables men of private fortune to rise” to princely rank (Mansfield, 58). Machiavelli offers several examples, including Agathocles the Sicilian, a former potter; Hiero of Syracuse, illegitimate son of a nobleman, who pursued a military career; and Francesco Sforza, a former mercenary, who made himself Duke of Milan.

Also, in the opening lines of *Castruccio*, the Florentine makes the following observation.

> Those who think about it . . . are amazed to find that all men, or the majority of them, who have accomplished great deeds in this world, and who have been outstanding among the men of their day, have both in their origins and their birth been humble and obscure, or have been afflicted by Fortune in an extraordinary manner. Because all of them have either been exposed to wild beasts or have had such base parents that, being ashamed of them, they have made themselves sons of Jupiter or some other god. . . .

Not a noble birth, then, but a certain greatness of spirit, aided by the goddess of fate, enables a man to achieve extraordinary things.

Many of the personal qualities that Machiavelli prizes in a would-be prince are subsumed under the multi-purpose term *vīrtū* which, depending on context, is variously translated to mean such things as ability, competence, ingenuity, or skill; audacity, boldness, courage, impetuosity, temerity, or valor; drive, energy, ferocity,

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6 Bondanella and Musa 1979, 519 (henceforth B&M).
The other indispensable quality is *prudenzia* which, again depending on context, is translated as cleverness, far-sightedness, intelligence, judgment, sagacity, shrewdness, or wisdom. A would-be prince displays these qualities from an early age, but they are cultivated and refined by the study of history and the practice of the military arts. A prince should diligently train for war, learning all he can about geography and terrain and tempering his men with hunting and field exercises. Also, he should study the biographies of great leaders in order “to imitate some eminent man, who himself set out to imitate some predecessor of his who was considered worthy of praise and glory, always taking his deeds and actions as a model for himself, as it is said that Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar imitated Alexander, and Scipio imitated Cyrus” (S&P, 53).

What relation there is in Machiavelli’s mind between *virtú* and *prudenzia*, on the one hand, and, on the other, the classic or Christian understanding of morality is a contested question. The term “Machiavellian” was coined by those who interpret the main message of *The Prince* to be that there is no necessary relation between the two, that the former may or should exist independently of the latter, or even transcend it.  

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7 As previously noted, Mansfield (1998, 113-140) and Skinner and Price (1988, 100-114) both include an appendix on the vocabulary of *The Prince*. The meanings listed here were drawn from all translations listed in the references.

8 For Mansfield, Chapter 15 of *The Prince*, where Machiavelli avers that “it is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity” settles the issue. This statement “contains a fundamental assault on all morality and political science, both Christian and classical, as
Be that as it may, without the attributes designated by *virtú* and *prudenzia* no man can become prince or, if he receives a state as a legacy or gift, preserve it for any period of time. But, although necessary conditions, these qualities are not sufficient for princely success. As intimated above, a man needs, in addition, to be favored or at least not rejected by what the Florentine calls *fortuna*. Machiavelli meant several things by this term, but the ones that most concern us here are the following: “a force or agent that intervenes in human affairs,” and “luck’ (which may be ‘good’ or ‘bad’): in other words, events or actions (especially those that are unforeseen) that affect us, either favourably or unfavourably, but which are often beyond our control; when they are inimical, it is frequently difficult to guard against them.” Natural forces, such as the weather, may randomly work for or against the prince’s plans. Similarly, other people “may (knowingly or unwittingly) promote or thwart our plans; they may oppose or attack us, show us favour, help us militarily or in other ways. Such ‘interventions’ are often unexpected or unpredictable, and they may or may not continue. Enemies may be won over; friends or allies may either cease to favour us or become unable to help us” (S&P, 105).

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understood in Machiavelli’s time.” Machiavelli “says that no moral rules exist, not made by men, which men must abide by.” However, Mansfield admits “that the prevailing view among scholars of Machiavelli is that he was not an evil man who taught evil doctrines, and that he does not deserve his infamy” (Mansfield 1998, 61, x, xi, viii. See also Codevilla 1997, vii-xiii-xviii). A much more sympathetic interpretation of Machiavelli is offered by DeGrazia (1989). See also Lester Crocker’s “Introduction” to the 1963 edition of *The Prince*, and Isaiah Berlin’s erudite essay (Berlin, 1992). For an unapologetically admiring interpretation, see Ledeen (1999).
Machiavelli anthropomorphizes *fortuna* as “a woman,” partial to the young, the bold, and the impetuous, who “is the arbiter of half our actions” (S&P, 87, 85). Without *fortuna* in his corner, a man of sterling *virtú* and impeccable *prudenzia* will see his indefatigable efforts come to naught. This was the fate of Cesare Borgia, the Duke of Valentino, whose actions, more than anyone else’s, Machiavelli held up as an example worthy of emulation by any “new prince.” Although “the duke” “had laid for himself great foundations for future power,” “his orders did not bring profit to him,” but “it was not his fault, because this arose from an extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune” (Mansfield, 27).

But, however important the role played by *fortuna* in human affairs, Machiavelli was scornful of those who would let themselves “be governed by fate” (S&P, 84). For one thing, it was his contention that *fortuna* was sovereign over only half of our actions, the rest remaining under the control of men’s free will. Striving to owe as little as possible to luck, a would-be prince trusts only in his own *virtú* and resources. Like an engineer building dykes and dams to control a flood-prone river, a would-be prince takes every precaution against the vagaries of fortune. Neither does he count on the favors of others: his objectives are tailored to what he can accomplish with his own capabilities and no one else’s.

If one considers the careers of the most outstanding examples of self-made princes, namely “Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus and others of that stamp,” “it will be seen that they owed nothing to luck except the opportunity to shape the material into the form that seemed best to them. If they had lacked the opportunity, the strength of their spirit would have been sapped; if they had lacked ability, the opportunity would have been wasted” (S&P, 20). What these exemplars have in common is that they were
outstanding innovators, conquerors or founders of new states or regimes, biblical, mythological, or legendary. It was their exceptional virtú that prompted them to seize by the throat the opportunities that luck presented to them in order to introduce a new political order. Moses found his people “enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians”; Romulus “was exposed at birth at Alba”; Cyrus “found the Persians discontented under the rule of the Medes, and that the Medes” themselves had been rendered “soft and weak because of the long peace”; and Theseus “found the Athenians dispersed.” “These opportunities, then, permitted these men to be successful, and their surpassing abilities enabled them to recognise and grasp these opportunities; the outcome was that their own countries were ennobled and flourished greatly” (S&P, 20).

But they had to take those opportunities by force. This is because “taking the initiative in introducing a new form of government is very difficult and dangerous, and unlikely to succeed.” Persuasion will accomplish nothing, because those who “profit from the old order” will “attack the innovator” while potential beneficiaries of the incipient regime will lend him only lukewarm support, “partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws on their side, partly from the sceptical [sic] temper of men, who do not really believe in new things unless they have been seen to work well.” However, if founders have “sufficient forces to take the initiative, they rarely find themselves in difficulties. Consequently, all armed prophets succeed whereas unarmed ones fail. This

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9 In the last paragraph of the penultimate chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli pronounces that “fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down.” Which prompts Mansfield to observe that Machiavelli “makes the politics of the new prince appear in the image of rape” (Mansfield, 101, xxiii).
happens because, apart from the factors already mentioned, the people are fickle; it is easy to persuade them about something, but difficult to keep them persuaded. Hence, when they no longer believe in you and your schemes, you must be able to force them to believe.” But having braved danger, overcome difficulties, defeated enemies, and “extinguished those envious of their success,” great innovators have no difficulty holding on to their principalities, remaining “powerful, secure, honoured and successful” (S&P, 20-21).

Although “a less important example than the eminent ones already discussed,” Hiero of Syracuse “is certainly worthy of mention in this context.” He, too, rose from private station to become ruler of his country. Apart from the opportunity, “his success owed nothing to luck. For when the Syracusans were in desperate straits, they chose him as their general; afterwards he was deservedly made their ruler. . . . He disbanded the old army and raised a new one; he abandoned the old alliances and formed new ones; and as soon as he possessed his own troops and had reliable allies he could build any edifice he wanted upon this foundation. Thus, it was very difficult for him to attain power, but not to keep it” (S&P, 22).

The would-be prince need not wait for opportunity to call on him, however: cunningly, he can conjure it up himself. Agathocles the Sicilian, having risen through the ranks to become commander of the army, usurped control of the state in a stunning massacre: “one morning he assembled the people and the Senate of Syracuse as if he had to decide things pertinent to the republic. At a signal he had ordered, he had all the senators and the richest of the people killed by his soldiers. Once they were dead, he seized and held the principate of that city without any civil controversy.” Although Agathocles’ “savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, do not
permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men,” a review of “the actions and
devotion of this man will see nothing or little that can be attributed to fortune. For as was

10 As indicated earlier, Machiavelli means many things by virtú, and his intended
relation to the classical or Christian understanding of “virtue” is disputed. Other sources
translated this phrase as “conduct and career” (S&P, 31), “deeds and the life”
(Mondanella and Musa, 104), and “conduct and valor” (Crocker 1963, 36). In “A Note on
Translation,” Mansfield says that he “sought to be as literal and exact as is consistent
with readable English,” that he takes “very seriously the translator’s obligation to present
a writer’s thought in his own words, insofar as possible,” and that he “kept virtú as
‘virtue,’ so that readers of this translation can follow and join the dispute over the
meaning Machiavelli attaches to the word. If his use of it sounds strange, as it did when
he wrote and still does today, then let the reader wonder at finding something strange. It
is not the translator’s business to make everything familiar” (Mansfield, xxv). It is,
indeed, strange that, in the Mansfield translation, Machiavelli both affirms and denies
that Agathocles had “virtue”: “Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one’s citizens, betray
one’s friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can
enable one to acquire an empire, but not glory. For, if one considers the virtue of
Agathocles in entering into and escaping from dangers, and the greatness of his spirit in
enduring and overcoming adversities, one does not see why he has to be judged inferior
to any most excellent captain. Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together
with his infinite crimes, do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent
men” (Mansfield, 35). In other translations, this paragraph, although less confusing, is
also contradictory or, at best, ambiguous (S&P, 31; Bondanella and Musa, 104; Crocker
said above, not through anyone’s support but through the ranks of the military, which he had gained for himself with a thousand hardships and dangers, he came to the principate and afterwards he maintained it with many spirited and dangerous policies” (Mansfield, 34-35).

For a would-be prince, then, force is the indispensable resource. But not any force will do. Cesare Borgia’s initial conquests were made with mercenary and auxiliary troops. A quick study, he immediately discerned their liabilities, and as soon as possible replaced them with home-grown troops loyal only to himself. Similarly, Hiero of Syracuse, had the mercenaries “all cut to pieces. Thereafter, he made war with his own troops and not foreign ones.” The Biblical David also abided by this principle, declining to employ Saul’s weapons in slaying Goliath. “In short, weapons and armour belonging to others fall off you or weigh you down or constrict your movements” (S&P, 50).

However, force alone is not enough: it has to be complemented by fraud. A successful prince is one who has the astuteness necessary “to get around men’s brains” (Mansfield, 69). This is particularly true of a new prince. As Machiavelli declares in The Discourses:

I hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place from small beginnings without using fraud or force, unless, indeed, they be given, or

1963, 36). Whether Machiavelli intended such ambiguity, as Codevilla (1997, xxix-xxxii) contends, is an intriguing question. Yet, Machiavelli may be on to something. It explains how it may be possible for one both to express grudging admiration for the audacity of a Hitler, a Stalin, or a Castro, yet condemn him for his many crimes. On the first two, see Overy (2006).
take by inheritance the place to which some other has already come. Force, however, will never suffice by itself to effect this end, while fraud often will, as any one may plainly see who reads the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles of Sicily, and many others like them, who from the lowest or, at any rate, from very low beginnings, rose either to sovereignty or to the highest command.

This necessity for using deceit is taught by Xenophon in his life of Cyrus; for the very first expedition on which Cyrus is sent, against the King of Armenia, is seen to teem with fraud; and it is by fraud, and not by force, that he is represented as having acquired his kingdom; so that the only inference to be drawn from his conduct, as Xenophon describes it, is, that the prince who would accomplish great things must have learned how to deceive. Xenophon, moreover, represents his hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire Cyaxares, king of the Medians, in a variety of ways; giving it to be understood that without such deceit he could not have reached the greatness to which he came. Nor do I believe that any man born to humble fortunes can be shown to have attained great station, by sheer and open force, whereas this has often been effected by mere fraud, such as that used by Giovanni Galeazzo to deprive his uncle Bernabo of the State and government of Lombardy.¹¹

¹¹ The quote is from the Gutenberg.org edition, Chapter XIII “That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force,” paragraphs 1 and 2. 
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827.html I am not sure what to make of Machiavelli’s claim that “fraud alone” can suffice to seize a state. Neither Agathocles nor Cyrus relied exclusively on fraud. As we saw earlier, Agathocles employed
The ability to dissemble enables a new prince to dispose of rivals one at a time. In 193 AD, emperor Pertinax was murdered by the praetorian guard, and Julianus elevated to the throne. On the pretext of avenging Pertinax, Lucius Septimius Severus “without revealing that he wanted to become emperor,” rushed his army to Rome. Once there, “the intimidated senate elected him emperor, and had Julianus killed.” However, Severus had to contend with two rivals, Nigrinus and Albinus, commanders of the Asian and Western armies, respectively.

Since Severus thought it would be dangerous to reveal his hostility to both men, he decided to attack only Nigrinus and to trick Albinus. Accordingly, he wrote to Albinus, saying that the senate had chosen him emperor, and that he wanted to share the office. And he sent Albinus the title of Caesar, saying that by decision of the senate Albinus should join him as co-emperor. Albinus thought all this was true. But when Severus had defeated and killed Nigrinus, and the eastern part of the Empire was calm, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, showing little gratitude for the benefits he had received, had treacherously attempted to kill him, and that it was therefore necessary to go and punish his ingratitude. Then Severus attacked Albinus in France, where he deprived him at once of his position and his life (S&P, 69).

deception to lure to their deaths those he wanted eliminated. For his part, Cyrus’ conquests were military in nature, even if he used guile to take the enemy by surprise. The examples in the paragraphs that follow also demonstrate that fraud is used not by itself but as an aid to the decisive use of lethal force.
Treachery enables the new prince to draw dangerous enemies and malcontents into deadly traps. This is how Cesare Borgia dealt with the Orsinis, one of the powerful Roman factions who had turned against him. Resorting to “trickery” he “so cleverly concealed his intentions that the Orsini leaders, through the person of Signor Paolo, became reconciled with him. The Duke [i.e., Borgia] treated Paolo very courteously and generously, giving him money, fine clothes and horses, in order to reassure him. Their naivety was such that it brought them to Senigallia, and into the hands of the Duke,” who had them strangled (S&P, 25).

An almost identical example is given in the Castruccio. The powerful Poggio family had originally supported Castruccio, but coming to the conclusion that “it had not been rewarded according to its merits,” they conspired with other families to stir up a rebellion and drive him out of Lucca. One day when he was away on a military expedition they “assaulted Castruccio’s lieutenant in charge of justice and killed him.” They were about to incite a general rebellion when “Stefano di Poggio, a peace-loving old man who had taken no part in the conspiracy,” used his authority to compel them “to lay down their arms, offering himself as mediator between them and Castruccio in order to obtain their goals.” Returning to Lucca, Castruccio placed his armed supporters in all the strategic positions. Stefano di Poggio, believing that Castruccio was under an obligation to him, went to find him and begged him on behalf of his family (but not on his own account, thinking that he needed no such mercy) to make allowances for youth and to remember the old friendship and the obligation owed to their family. To this Castruccio replied graciously and told him not to worry, saying that he was happier to see the disturbances quelled than he was angry over their beginning; and he asked
Stefano to bring them all to him, saying that he thanked God for the opportunity to demonstrate his clemency and good will. When they had all come forward, trusting in the word of both Stefano and Castruccio, they were imprisoned and, together with Stefano, executed.\(^{12}\)

The adroit combination of force and fraud displayed by Severus, Cesare Borgia, and Castruccio is the art of imitating “the fox and the lion, because the lion does not defend itself from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves. So one needs to be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to frighten the wolves. Those who stay simply with the lion do not understand this” (Mansfield, 69).

A new prince wanting to impose a tyrannical regime cannot do so without employing harsh methods. As Machiavelli puts it in the *Discourses*,

> Whosoever becomes prince of a city or State, more especially if his position be so insecure that he cannot resort to constitutional government either in the form of a republic or a monarchy, will find that the best way to preserve his princedom is to renew the whole institutions of that State; that is to say, to create new magistracies with new names, confer new powers, and employ new men, and like David when he became king, exalt the humble and depress the great, “filling the hungry with good things, and sending the rich empty away.” Moreover, he must pull down existing towns and rebuild them, removing their inhabitants from one place to another; and, in short, leave nothing in the country as he found it; so that there shall be neither rank, nor condition, nor honour, nor wealth which its possessor can refer to any but to him. And he must take example from Philip of

\(^{12}\) B&M, 529-530.
Macedon, the father of Alexander, who by means such as these, from being a petty prince became monarch of all Greece; and of whom it was written that he shifted men from province to province as a shepherd moves his flocks from one pasture to another.\textsuperscript{13}

The “shrewd ruler” of an absolutist regime, i.e., a tyranny, “must try to insure that his citizens, whatever the situation may be, will always be dependent on the government and on him; and then they will always be loyal to him” (S&P, 37).

Any “prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are held good, since he is often under a necessity, to maintain his state, of acting against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion.” Although he should “not depart from good, when possible,” he also needs to “know how to enter into evil, when forced by necessity” (Mansfield, 70). However, to be effective, cruelties have to be “well used. Those can be called well used (if it is permissible to speak well of evil) that are done at a stroke, out of the necessity to secure oneself, and then are not persisted in but are turned to as much utility for the subjects as one can. Those cruelties are badly used which, though few in the beginning, rather grow with time than are eliminated” (Mansfield, 37-38). Relatedly, while it is “desirable” for a prince “to be both loved and feared,” “it is difficult to achieve both and, if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved. . . . For love is sustained by a bond of gratitude which, because men are excessively self-interested, is broken whenever they see a chance to

\textsuperscript{13} The gutenberg.org edition, Ch. XXVI, “A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken Possession, ought to make Everything new,” first paragraph.
benefit themselves. But fear is sustained by a dread of punishment that is always effective” (S&P, 59).

The trouble the Poggi family caused Castruccio is representative of what a new prince can expect from many of his original supporters once he has seized control of the state.

Since this matter is important, I do not want to fail to remind any ruler who has recently gained power through being favoured by the inhabitants that he should be well aware of the reasons why those who helped him to gain power acted as they did. If it was not from natural affection for him, but only because they were discontented with the previous government, it will be very difficult and troublesome to keep them friendly, because he will not be able to satisfy them. Considering the reason for this (in the light of instances drawn from ancient and modern history), it is clear that it is much easier to win over men who are hostile to him because they were content under the previous regime than it is to keep attached to him those who became friendly towards him and helped him to become ruler because they were disaffected.\(^{14}\)

Ironically, then, new rulers “have often found that men whom they had regarded with suspicion in the early stages of their rule prove more reliable and useful than those whom they had trusted at first” (S&P, 74).

If a new prince acquires office with the backing of his fellow citizens, his position will be more or less secure depending on whether this support rests primarily on “the great” or on the people.

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\(^{14}\) S&P, 74-75.
He who comes to the principality with the aid of the great maintains himself with more difficulty than one who becomes prince with the aid of the people, because the former finds himself prince with many around him who appear to be his equals, and because of this he can neither command them nor manage them to suit himself. But he who arrives in the principality with popular support finds himself alone there, and around him has no one or very few who are not ready to obey. . . . The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by it; but from the great, when they are hostile, he must fear not only being abandoned but also that they may come against him, for since there is more foresight and more astuteness in the great, they always move in time to save themselves, and they seek rank from those they hope will win. Also, the prince always lives of necessity with the same people, but he can well do without the same great persons, since he can make and unmake them every day, and take away and give them reputation at his convenience.\textsuperscript{15}

It being difficult to maintain the great loyal to him, a new prince should seek the support of the people even at the expense of the great, but not the other way around. However, even as one favors the people it is not impossible to avoid totally alienating the great, “and wise princes have thought out with all diligence how not to make the great desperate and how to satisfy the people and keep them content, because this is one of the most important matters than concern a prince. . . . I conclude that a prince should esteem the great, but not make himself hated by the people” (Mansfield, 74-75).

\textsuperscript{15} Mansfield, 39-40.
Keeping the people content is relatively easy “since they want only not to be oppressed” (S&P, 36). All the prince need do is respect their women, refrain from taking their property, and hold the line on taxes. “If the vast majority of men are not deprived of their property and honour they will live contentedly, and one will have to deal only with the ambition of a few men, which can be easily restrained in various ways” (S&P, 64). Also, “he should encourage the citizens to follow quietly their ordinary occupations, both in trade and agriculture and every other kind, so that one man is not afraid to improve or increase his possessions for fear that they will be taken from him, and another does not hesitate to begin to trade for fear of the taxes that will be levied” (S&P, 79). For if men “find that their affairs are flourishing, they are content and do not seek changes. Indeed, they will do everything possible to defend a new ruler, as long as he is not deficient in other respects” (S&P, 83).

A prince must avoid hatred and contempt. If he is widely hated, he would have reason to “be afraid of everything and everyone” (S&P, 66). If he is despised, particularly by his soldiers, this will encourage conspiracies to overthrow or assassinate him. To avoid being hated by the people, he should keep taxes low, as was noted above. But this means that he should not care to acquire a reputation for generosity but, instead, ought to spend moderately. If, in a vain attempt to be thought of as liberal, he were to “spend lavishly and ostentatiously,” he would inevitably “be compelled to become rapacious, to tax the people very heavily, and to raise money by all possible means. Thus, he will begin to be hated by his subjects and, because he is impoverished, he will be held in little regard.” On the other hand, if a prince spends moderately, even to the point of miserliness, “he will be acting generously towards the vast majority, whose property he does not touch, and will be acting meanly towards the few to whom he gives nothing”
Parsimony, however, is required only with respect to what belongs to the prince or his subjects. When it comes to the property of others, a prince “should be as open-handed as possible.” In the field, especially, he should support his army “by looting, sacking, and extortions” (S&P, 57).

Other ways of avoiding hatred include esteeming, or at least “not mak[ing] the great desperate” (Mansfield, 74), taking care to “guard against doing grave injury to anyone of those whom he uses and has around him, in the service of his principality” such as bodyguards (Mansfield, 78-79). Another ruse is to “have anything blameable administered by others” while reserving to himself the granting of “favors” (Mansfield, 75). Also, “one should note that hatred is acquired through good deeds as well as bad ones . . . . For when that community of which you judge you have to maintain yourself is corrupt, whether they are the people or the soldiers or the great, you must follow their humor to satisfy then, and then good deeds are your enemy” (Mansfield, 77).

Just as it is important for a prince not to be hated, so it is not being held in contempt. “What makes him contemptible is to be held variable, light, effeminate, pusillanimous, irresolute, from which a prince should guard himself as from a shoal. He should contrive that greatness, spiritedness, gravity, and strength are recognized in his actions, and he should insist that his judgments in the private concerns of his subjects be irrevocable. And he should maintain such an opinion of himself that no one thinks either of deceiving him or of getting around him” (Mansfield, 72). Poverty, too, renders a prince contemptible, which is another reason for practicing parsimony. So does being unarmed, “[f]or there is no proportion between one who is armed and one who is unarmed, and it is not reasonable that whoever is armed obey willingly whoever is unarmed, and that someone unarmed be secure among armed servants. For since there is
scorn in the one and suspicion in the other, it is not possible for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the military, besides other unhappiness, cannot, as was said, be esteemed by his soldiers nor have trust in them.”¹⁶

Regarding his ministers, a prince must select them carefully because “the first conjecture that is to be made of the brain of a lord is to see the men he has around him; and when they are capable and faithful, he can always be reputed wise because he has known how to recognize them as capable and to maintain them as faithful. But if they are otherwise, one can always pass unfavorable judgment on him, because the first error he makes, he makes in this choice” (Mansfield, 92). Also, even as he shuns flatterers, a prince must lay down conditions under which only certain people can proffer advice. For if everyone can do so, he becomes contemptible. Instead, a prudent prince must pick wise counselors “and only to these should he give freedom to speak the truth to him, and of those things only that he asks about and nothing else. But he should ask them about everything and listen to their opinions; then he should decide by himself, in his own mode; and with these councils and with each member of them he should behave in such a mode that everyone knows that the more freely he speaks, the more he will be accepted. Aside from these, he should not want to hear anyone; he should move directly to the thing that was decided and be obstinate in his decisions” (Mansfield, 94).

To be esteemed, a prince should, like King Ferdinand of Aragón, execute “great enterprises” which keep “the minds of his subjects in suspense and admiration, and occupied with their outcome” (Mansfield, 87, 88). Above all, it is important to emerge triumphant from trials or from a struggle with great enemies:

¹⁶ Mansfield, 58.
Without doubt princes become great when they overcome difficulties made for them and opposition made to them. So fortune, especially when she wants to make a new prince great—since he has a greater necessity to acquire reputation than a hereditary prince—makes enemies arise for him and makes them undertake enterprises against him, so that he has cause to overcome them and to climb higher on the ladder that his enemies have brought for him. Therefore many judge that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity for it, should astutely nourish some enmity so that when he has crushed it, his greatness emerges the more from it.\textsuperscript{17}

In the area of interstate relations, a prince should act like “a true friend and a true enemy, that is,” committing himself “without any hesitation . . . in support of someone against another” (Mansfield, 89). Neutrality is neither always safe nor dignified. However, “a prince must beware never to associate with someone more powerful than himself so as to attack others, except when necessity presses” (Mansfield, 90).

In acquiring esteem, appearances are as important as deeds, if not more so. A prince should seem to be exceptionally merciful, trustworthy, upright, humane and devout. And it is most necessary of all to seem devout. In these matters, most men judge more by their eyes than by their hands. For everyone is capable of seeing you, but few can touch you. Everyone can see what you appear to be, whereas few have direct experience of what you really are; and those few will not dare to challenge the popular view, sustained as it is by the majesty of the ruler’s position. With regard to all human actions, and

\textsuperscript{17} Mansfield, 85.
especially those of rulers, who cannot be called to account, men pay attention to the outcome. If a ruler, then, contrives to conquer, and to preserve the state, the means will always be judged to be honorable and be praised by everyone. For the common people are impressed by appearances and results. Everywhere the common people are the vast majority, and the few are isolated when the majority and the government are one.\textsuperscript{18}

A prince must, above all, “contrive to achieve through all his actions the reputation of being a great man of outstanding intelligence” (S&P, 77).

\section*{3. Fidel Castro: Made in the Machiavellian Mold?}

In this section, what seem to me to be the main events in Fidel Castro’s march through history are given a Machiavellian interpretation. That is, I place Castro’s activities within the Florentine’s theoretical framework, seeking to make sense of them in terms of the latter’s concepts and generalizations. First, the high points of Castro’s political career are traced through time, from his obscure origins and early display of \textit{virtú} through the struggle against Batista, the conquest of Cuba, and so on down to recent times. Next, the circumstances surrounding Castro’s quick consolidation of power are examined in greater detail through the Machiavellian prism presented in the previous section. Wherever his actions do not appear to fit the Machiavellian mold, the discrepancy is noted for subsequent discussion. Unless otherwise noted, all factual material is drawn from Robert Quirk’s \textit{Fidel Castro} (Quirk 1993).

\textsuperscript{18} S&P, 62-63.
In keeping with Machiavelli’s observation about the undistinguished origins of most men who have accomplished great things, Fidel Castro’s antecedents are, if not humble, certainly obscure and, at least by the standards of the times when he was growing up, shameful. His father, Angel Castro, hailed from a poor family in a remote village in Galicia, Spain. Having little education, as a young man he worked as a day laborer. In 1898, he enlisted in the Army and was shipped to Cuba, then a Spanish colony going through the throes of a struggle for independence that culminated in the Spanish-American War. After Cuba became independent, Angel settled in Oriente province, the farthest from the capital city of Havana. This was the most rugged part of the Island, the cradle of many a political rebellion, and one with the heaviest concentration of blacks. Starting as a day laborer for the United Fruit Company, by dint of hard work, shrewd investments, and harsh management (he packed a revolver when in the field supervising his workers, most of them black), Angel made himself a rich man without, however, shedding his rustic ways. His rambling country house was built on stilts, in the style of an army barracks. Underneath was a shelter for farm animals. Married to a schoolteacher who bore him several children, Angel subsequently took as mistress one of the servant girls, Lina Ruz. Fidel Castro was the third child born out of that illegitimate union. After divorcing the first wife, Angel married Lina, but several years would go by before the children were baptized. This unconventional family background would haunt Fidel Castro for years to come. From high school through university, many of his classmates regarded him as a parvenu, a boor, uncouth and unclean. They nicknamed “bola de churre” (“ball of dirt”). In time, Fidel Castro would take his revenge on all those “señoritos” who had scorned him as a youth.
From an early age Castro gave evidence of exceptional *virtù*, and not a little *prudenzia*, exhibiting such qualities as audacity, spiritedness, tireless energy, and single-minded determination to impose his will on others, as well as shrewdness in recognizing opportunities and astuteness in manipulating people. Even as a child he acted with surprising temerity. Sent to Santiago de Cuba, Oriente’s largest city, to live in the home of the Haitian consul while attending school, he was threatened with enrollment as a boarder whenever he misbehaved. Wanting to escape the authority of his guardian, one day he behaved so badly that the consul made good on his threat. But living at school did not stop him from quarreling with students and defying authority. One day he hit a priest with a piece of bread. Another time, in retaliation for punishment meted out by one of his teachers, he overturned desks and incited his classmates to go on strike. Apprised that Fidel and his two brothers were the school’s biggest bullies, Angel brought them home. But Fidel threatened to burn down his parents’ house unless they sent him back.

At school, Castro hungered for recognition. An indifferent scholar, he sought leadership in sports, striving to become the leading athlete, the captain of the team. At Belén High School in Havana (he had moved to the capital with one of his sisters) he tried out for the basketball team but was turned down. Refusing to give up, for a whole year he practiced daily into the night, becoming so proficient that he not only made the team but was chosen as its head. At university, where politics, not sports, was the path to recognition, he “leaped precipitately” into the arena but “was defeated in his initial attempt and was never able to win an important office” (Quirk, 22). An alternative avenue was political gangsterism, a baneful legacy of the 1933 revolution against Gerardo Machado. He joined one of the action groups, revolutionary organizations “ostensibly dedicated to social reforms” but in actuality “little more than coteries of ‘gangsters’ with
no detectable ideology” (Quirk, 22-23). Led by politicians dangling offers of government appointments, these bands employed terrorist methods against their rivals on and off campus. In time, Castro acquired his own small following of hangers-on. He carried a pistol, and twice was suspected of murdering members of a rival faction, but the cases were not pursued, supposedly for lack of evidence. In 1947, at age 20, Castro joined the 
*Cayo Confites* expedition to overthrow the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in the neighboring Dominican Republic.\(^{19}\) The following year found him in Colombia’s capital, where he participated in an attack on a police station during the days of mob violence known as the *Bogotazo*.

Graduating with a law degree, Castro threw himself into politics as a member of the reformist Ortodoxo Party, the leadership of which, however, kept him at arms’ length. Undeterred, in 1951-52 he campaigned tirelessly for the party’s nomination for one of the congressional seats from Havana province, writing thousands of letters and making countless speeches seeking voter support. When the Ortodoxo Party’s leader, Eduardo Chibás, died of a self-inflicted wound, Castro tried to convince José Pardo Llada, a leading member of the party who was in charge of the funeral, to exploit the outpouring of public grief in order to seize power by diverting the procession from the cemetery to the presidential palace, seizing the building, whereupon Pardo Llada was to proclaim himself president and appoint Castro chief of the military.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\) There is some doubt as to the year of Castro’s birth, whether it was 1926, 1927, or 1928 (Quirk, 3). I have taken the middle number.

\(^{20}\) Pardo Llada also says that, years later, he learned that President Prío had given strict instructions to the soldiers not to fire on the crowd in case of disorder, that he preferred
In March 1952, only a few months before the scheduled elections, former dictator-president turned presidential candidate Fulgencio Batista, seeing his come-back bid going nowhere, staged a bloodless coup d'etat. Fidel Castro reacted almost immediately, publicly calling on the people to fight and filing suit against the usurper, demanding that he be tried and sentenced to a hundred years in prison. The following year he staged an ill-fated attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba in which dozens of his followers died in battle or were summarily executed after capture. This was a macabre baptism in blood for his 26th of July organization, which he would name after the day of what turned out to be a massacre for many of his men. Taken prisoner and put on trial, he acted as his own defense counsel, using the occasion to launch a tirade against the dictatorship. Some time later, now in prison, he wrote a manifesto on his political goals, what in the mythology of the revolution became his “History Will Absolve Me” speech. Whatever it was he actually said in court, he was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years behind bars. At the Isle of Pines prison, he organized his fellow Moncada inmates into study groups, with him assuming the task of political education. One day, when one of his men spotted Batista in the prison courtyard, Castro led the group in singing his organization’s revolutionary hymn, infuriating the president, who decreed stern punishment.

In 1955, Batista, newly inaugurated for a four-year term after holding an election the outcome of which was never in doubt, amnestied the Moncada prisoners. Upon his release, Castro, now a celebrity of sorts among certain circles, resumed his public

to resign the presidency than ignite a civil war. In other words, Castro’s proposed stunt just might have worked (Pardo Llada 1989, 70-73.).
campaign against the dictator, characterizing him as “‘conceited, vain, dishonest, and corrupt,’ and his language as ‘coarse, minacious, and vulgar’” (Quirk, 85). But as the government, in retaliation, tightened the screws of censorship, and the Ortoodoxo Party leaders continued to shun him, Castro left the country for Mexico. There he recruited men, raised money (making two trips to the U.S. for the purpose), purchased weapons, was briefly jailed when these were discovered, and bought a yacht, the Granma. Late the following year, he sailed for Cuba, squeezing 82 men, weapons, and munitions aboard the vessel, designed to carry only twelve persons. The landing was a failure (most of the men were captured or killed and a few escaped, and almost all the weapons and equipment were lost), but Castro and a remnant of less than two dozen followers made their way to the rugged mountains of the Sierra Maestra, at the easternmost tip of the Island, from where he carried on the campaign against Batista.

The better part of two years were spent mostly in recruiting and training guerrillas, raising money and acquiring weapons, struggling to keep control of the 26th of July underground, resisting proposals to enter into unity pacts or coalitions of anti-Batista groups, condemning conspiracies to stage a pre-emptive coup against Batista that would bring to office a provisional government outside his control, staging hit and run attacks on small military outposts, and waging an international propaganda campaign that widely exaggerated the size of his forces and the scale of government attacks against him, all the while projecting a message of moderation and benevolence. The propaganda war began with an interview with New York Times reporter Herbert Matthews, who was presumably taken in by Castro’s ruses and assurances. Matthews’ articles turned Castro

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21 Ironically, these terms apply to Castro just as well.
into an international sensation, and many other journalists from around the world sought to visit him in the *Sierra*.\(^{22}\)

When the dictatorship collapsed following Batista’s New Year Eve’s flight in January 1959, Fidel Castro became the man of the hour, lionized by vast multitudes during his week-long trek (reminiscent of Mussolini’s “March on Rome”) to and upon arrival in Havana. Denying that he had any political ambitions, while still in the *Sierra* he had appointed a provisional president, Manuel Urrutia, an obscure but honest judge, who in turn named him commander in chief of the Cuban armed forces. Like Hiero of Syracuse, Castro quickly dissolved the old army, executing many of its officers and men, replacing it with a new one loyal to himself. Within a year he had discarded the provisional president and cabinet, brought the communists aboard his regime, purged his own organization of anti-communists and democrats, and began to revolutionize the entire Island in his own image, rapidly assuming total control of economy and society while ruthlessly repressing all dissent (Clark 1990, 52-84; Cuzán 2012). Henceforth, even as with almost every passing year his subjects had less to eat, endured greater hardships, and enjoyed fewer amenities, Castro went on accumulating power and the titles to adorn it like no man in Cuba’s history, and none in Latin America, had ever attained.

Also like Hiero, Castro dumped the country’s former allies in favor of new ones. Almost from the beginning he engaged the United States in a war of words. He defeated a U.S.-sponsored landing of fewer than 1,500 Cuban exiles, boasting he had scored a great victory against “imperialism.” Audaciously thrusting Cuba into the thick of the Cold War, he embraced the Soviet Union and declared his undying allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, adroitly maneuvering a seemingly reluctant Moscow into guaranteeing his

\(^{22}\) See De Palma (2007).
survival and underwriting his regime with massive subsidies. During the October Missile Crisis, he tried, in Khruschev’s own words, “to lasso” the Soviets into “a war with America,” even advising them “to use nuclear weapons” if the U.S. were to invade the Island (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 307, 314; Blight and Brenner, 2002). When Khrushchev made a pact with President Kennedy to withdraw the missiles without consulting him, Castro flew into a rage, refusing to allow international inspection of the missile sites, as agreed upon by Moscow and Washington. Also, he tried, unsuccessfully, to dissuade the Soviets from removing another strategic weapon, long-range bombers. In order to mollify him, in 1963 the Kremlin gave him the red carpet treatment during a month-long visit to the USSR, coddling and showering him with honors and encomiums. As well as becoming an actor in the Cold War, Castro projected himself abroad by promoting “revolutionary internationalism” on three continents, hosting conferences of practicing and would-be revolutionaries from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. At the Tricontinental and OLAS meetings, as well as at other gatherings, the institutional and organizational bases for Cuba’s support for “armed struggle” in many countries were laid or strengthened. Intent on turning the Andes Mountains into another Sierra Maestra, and contemptuous of the timid orthodox communist parties of Latin America, Castro proclaimed that the duty of every revolutionary was to wage revolution. Numerous insurrectionary groups sprouted throughout the region, the leaders training and taking their cues from Cuba. Although all but one of these organizations failed in their ultimate

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23 According to Mesa-Lago, between 1960 and 1990 the Soviets subsidized the Castro regime to the tune of $65 billion (cited in Pérez-López 1999, 116). This does not include military assistance.
objectives, the one exception being the Sandinista National Liberation Front, they still managed to wreak havoc in many countries, from Argentina to Venezuela.

In the 1970s, in the wake of the sudden collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa and the unrelated overthrow of Ethiopia’s Emperor Selaissie, Castro boldly leaped into the continent, intervening in the domestic and international politics of multiple countries. He shipped thousands of troops on Soviet planes to Angola to prop up the Marxist-Leninist MPLA regime when it came under siege from the combined forces of rival factions and South Africa. He tried to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia, two newly-minted “socialist states” disputing control over the Ogaden, and when that failed he threw thousands of Cuban troops into the fight on behalf of Addis Ababa. Castro crisscrossed the continent, visiting countries from Angola to Tanzania and from Algiers to Mozambique, everywhere being greeted like a potentate, lavished with praise and decorations. On a visit to Libya, Muammar Qaddafi extolled him as an “obstinate adversary of American imperialism and one of the most ferocious enemies of imperialist expansion in the world’.” In Algiers, responding to reporters’ questions about his

24 The most ignominious failure being that of Ernesto Ché Guevara, an Argentinian who had attached himself to Castro in Mexico, went with him to the Sierra and rose to prominence in the rebel army. After the seizure of power, Guevara became bothersome to Castro and was given a number of assignments away from the center of power, including a trip around the world (Pardo Llada 1989, 140). He once burst out in front of Padilla that he “lived with a broken heart” (Padilla 1989, 140-141—my translation). Eventually, Guevara decided to leave Cuba to promote revolution elsewhere, first in Africa, then in Bolivia, where he was hunted down, captured, and shot (Quirk, 582).
impressions in southern Africa, Castro averred that “One could say that I discovered Africa, just as Christopher Columbus discovered America” (Quirk, 760, 766). At the end of the decade, his assiduous courting of the Third World was rewarded with his election as chairman of the Organization of Nonaligned Nations, whereupon Castro hosted one of its meetings in Havana.

In the 1980s, as well as resisting Gorbachev’s pressures to embark on the path of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, he publicly warned that such reforms were dangerous and violated socialist principles. And in the face of a new rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, he criticized the Kremlin’s flagging commitment to proletarian internationalism. As the empire that Stalin built began to come apart at the seams, Castro defiantly proclaimed “Socialism or death! Marxism-Leninism or death!” (Quirk, 827). Remarkably, his regime survived the severe economic contraction caused by the end of subsidies and barter relations from the “Warsaw Pact” and the shift toward markets in central and Eastern Europe. In 1998, he apparently gambled that the international acceptance that would accrue from a visit by Pope John Paul II was worth the risk of any potential threat to his regime, and if that is the case subsequent events appear to have proven him right. As the century drew to a close, even as he resisted repeated calls to democratize and defied criticisms of continued repression of dissent, Castro was invited to Ibero-American summits and hosted one in Havana in November 1999. Having spent nearly half a century as absolute ruler of the island, Fidel Castro, old and ill, in 2008 handed the reins to his younger brother Raul.

4. *Fidel Castro’s Machiavellianism: An Analysis*
The foregoing has been a hasty survey of what seem to me to be the highlights of Fidel Castro’s career, in the course of which he emerged from provincial obscurity to become master of Cuba and play a part in international power politics, his voice heard and his bearded visage recognized around the world. In this narrative one discerns many of the manifestations of virtú and prudenzia that Machiavelli admired: audacity if not temerity, a spirited constitution, great stamina, strength in the face of adversity, and also shrewdness in manipulating people, even world figures, as well as sagacity in identifying opportunities and exploiting them to the fullest. Now I will retrace my steps, filling a few blanks in the chronicle, pausing to examine with greater care a number of critical junctures along the way to see how well Castro’s methods match those of Machiavelli’s prince.

As well as being well endowed with virtú and prudenzia, Fidel Castro has received many favors from fortuna. Living dangerously, more than once he escaped death through chance or the intervention of others, factors which also made a difference in other ways, as well. Take the Moncada attack. The mission was suicidal: something like half of the insurrectionists paid with their lives (Pardo Llada 1989, 116; de la Cova). Castro may very well have minimized the personal risk to himself, staying “well back” of the fray, not firing a shot, and withdrawing hastily from the scene (Quirk, 55). Nevertheless, his life was at great risk, spared through the timely intervention of others. His neglected wife, Mirta Díaz Balart, a sister of one of Batista’s officials, sought help from Havana’s archbishop, who in turn telephoned his counterpart in Santiago, who asked the army commander in the region to spare the lives of any other attacker who surrendered or was captured. The commander grudgingly agreed. When a squad of soldiers came upon Castro “asleep on the floor of a peasant hut,” the lieutenant in charge, knowing very well
what his fellow soldiers back in the barracks would do to Castro if he fell into their hands, whispered to him not to reveal his name and over his protests ordered his men to take him not to the Moncada but to police headquarters (Quirk, 55-56; see also Pardo Llada, 112-116).

The other dramatic escape occurred at the landing of the Granma. Having received intelligence that the expedition was on its way, some 1,000 of Batista’s soldiers were in the area, waiting for the yacht to reach shore. Upon landing, Castro chanced to run into a peasant who led them away from the dragnet and into the Sierra, where he was taken in by Crescencio Pérez, something of an outlaw with contacts and influence in the region. “More than any other single individual he was responsible, in December 1956, for preventing the complete collapse of Fidel Castro’s July 26 movement” (Quirk, 126).

Fortuna smiled on Castro in other ways, too. Although sentenced to spend fifteen years behind bars at La Cabaña, an antiquated fortress crowded with prisoners and vermin, the Minister of the Interior sent him and his men to be confined in the hospital ward of the Model Prison in the Isle of Pines, instead. There (until he provoked Batista with the aforementioned singing of a revolutionary anthem, after which stunt he was confined in solitary) Castro enjoyed many amenities, including excellent food, fine cigars, plenty of books, and time to think, read, and write letters smuggled to his wife, mistress and supporters on the outside. During his exile in Mexico, he met wealthy Cuban emigrants who helped him, introducing him to important personages in the country, including “former president Lázaro Cárdenas and the painters Diego Rivera and David Alfaro Siqueiros” (Quirk, 88). What other doors these men opened for him can only be surmised. Also, during the struggle against Batista, fortuna conveniently cleared the field of would-be rivals, men who had distinguished themselves in the fight against the
dictatorship, such as university leader José Antonio Echevarría and Frank País, the head of Castro’s 26th of July organization in Santiago, both killed by the Batista police. Also eliminated was Camilo Cienfuegos, a popular member of Castro’s revolutionary armed forces, who in October 1959 vanished into thin air when the small plane he was flying in lost contact with the ground and was never heard from again.\textsuperscript{25}

It seems, then, as if Castro was favored by fortune. From a strictly Machiavellian point of view, in fact, Castro may have trusted too much in luck. Both the Moncada attack and the Granma landing were poorly planned, botched operations, and they were not the last (in 1958, he placed all his hopes in a general strike which fizzled out). It seems as if he thought that such lighting strikes would spark a popular uprising that would bring down the dictatorship at one fell swoop. Castro refused to take responsibility for the Granma fiasco, cursing his bad luck for having “landed ‘in a terrible place, in a real swamp’” (Quirk, 123). That showed a lack of gratitude, for as we have seen fortuna was partial to him. But then, he was young and exceptionally bold or downright

\textsuperscript{25} The fate of Camilo is a mystery. Quirk thinks that the Cessna in which he was flying was accidentally shot down by a Sea Fury fighter belonging to Castro’s air force, which mistook Camilo’s small plane for that of an exile group that had been engaged in economic sabotage (Quirk, 272). On the other hand, Clark, suspects foul play, pointing to the “suicide,” only days after Camilo’s disappearance, of the chief of the Camaguey airport control tower, who was an eye-witness to the take offs of both the Cessna and the Sea Fury, as well as the “accidental” shooting of a commander close to Camilo who had set out to investigate his death (Clark 1990, 70).
impetuous, two qualities that, according to the Florentine, the goddess of fate finds attractive in would-be princes.  

When discussing the biblical, mythological, and legendary exemplars of a new prince, Machiavelli noted that, while leaving little to chance, they had the sagacity to recognize the opportunities fortune offered them, and the energy and spiritedness to exploit them. Fortune’s greatest gift to Castro was that within the space of a year Eduardo Chibás killed himself and Batista staged a coup. The first event left the Ortodoxo party leaderless and the second dealt a mortal blow to Cuba’s fledgling democracy. Chibás’ death created a leadership deficit among Cuba’s reformists and Batista’s usurpation changed the rules of the political game, from one based on the

26 “Fortune is a woman,” declared Machiavelli, and one can’t help noticing how Castro has been favored by the female sex throughout his life. His mother dotted on him, as did several sisters. He married into a good family, and his wife continued to be loyal to him long after he ceased paying her much attention. Another woman from high society became his mistress, comforting him by correspondence while in prison. Teresa Casuso took pity on him when she visited him in a Mexican jail and after his release gave him free use of her apartment. After the rebel victory she accompanied him on trips abroad. Celia Sánchez picked up where his mother left off, performing other duties as well. Many others served him faithfully. And countless anonymous women, procured by his security guards wherever he went, at home or abroad, catered to his lustful appetites in one-night stands (Quirk, 15).

27 In 1950, Cuba ranked fourth on the Fitzgibbon Democracy Index, after Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica (Kelly n.d., Table 1).
counting of votes, to one of violence and war. The combination of the two conditions biased the political struggle in the direction of the most aggressive and daring of men. Castro fit the bill perfectly. Frustrated in his attempt to exercise leadership at the university and within the Ortodoxo party, Batista’s coup handed Castro the excuse to break out of the legal constraints under which his violent temperament had long chafed. He gambled his life on the *Moncada* attack, winning instant national recognition.

The second gift of fortune was Batista’s amnesty. Feeling politically secure, Batista pardoned the *Moncada* prisoners after having ruled out that very possibility only months earlier. Actually, the amnesty was only symptomatic of the kind of dictator Batista was, one who wanted to preserve constitutional formalities. Between 1954 and 1958, Batista seemed to be caught in a vicious circle in which he suspended and restored, and again suspended and restored constitutional guarantees, never following one or the other policy consistently. Every time he restored constitutional guarantees, a storm of criticism would break out anew, and the courts would start granting writs of habeas corpus in favor of political prisoners. When, in 1957, on orders from the military commander in Oriente province, who was intent on choking off Castro’s sources of supplies for the *Sierra*, “more than a thousand families were rounded up and moved to concentration camps,” “widespread criticism of the army’s ruthless tactics forced the president to order their release” (Quirk, 138).

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28 A decade letter, Castro would employ these very tactics on a much larger scale to “cleanse” the Escambray Mountains of anti-communist guerrillas (Clark 1990, 97, 614-615; Encinosa 1995, 59-61). The army “forcibly” relocated “large numbers of peasants” from central Cuba to Pinar del Río, the westernmost province (Quirk, 661). Of course, by
corruption and nepotism, poorly trained and led, rife with conspiracies, and had no will to fight. A self-made prince himself, having risen from sergeant to general to president during the 1930s and 1940s, Batista had long ago gotten in the habit of thinking, in Machiavelli’s laconic phrase, “more of amenities than of arms,” a sure way, he said, for a prince to lose his state (Mansfield, 58). As Quirk puts it, “The Bolivian army that destroyed Guevara’s guerrillas in October 1967 would have crushed Fidel Castro’s ragtag army early on” (Quirk, 208). Fortune favored Castro when he paired him off against Batista and not against a more ruthless and vigorous adversary.

Castro, by contrast, seems to have developed a passion for military matters early on, and never to have lost it. Since childhood, he exhibited a fascination with weapons, from slingshots all the way to nuclear missiles. “His life, as a child and as a revolutionary, was one long love affair with firearms” (Quirk, 10). Castro himself recounts that in the sixth grade, when sent to his room to study, he would, instead, play imaginary war games: “I’d start off by taking a lot of little scraps and tiny balls of paper, arranging them on a playing board . . ., setting up an obstacle to see how many would pass and how many wouldn’t. There were losses, casualties. I played this game of war for hours at a time’” (Quirk, 13-14).

then no domestic criticism was allowed and whatever came from abroad was ignored or peremptorily rejected. Be it noted that, according to Jorge Edwards, a Chilean diplomat, he first ran afoul of the Castro regime when he chaired a panel of judges that awarded the Casa de las Américas literary prize to Norberto Fuentes for his collection of short stories on the war in the Escambray against anti-Castro guerrillas. See Edwards (1973) and Fuentes (1968).
Like a would-be prince, who Machiavelli says must supplement the study of war with that of the lives of men worthy of emulation, even as a child Castro was also interested in geography and history, “particularly the accounts of wars and battles, and stories about Cuba’s great men, revolutionaries such as José Martí, Antonio Maceo, and Calixto García, who had fought for independence against the Spanish. And about the brave and noble Spartans who had died holding back the Persian hosts at Thermopylae” (Quirk, 13). While at university, he began to collect books on Benito Mussolini, and before leaving on the Cayo Confites expedition willed to José Pardo Llada his twelve volumes of the Italian fascist’s writings. In prison, he read a biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. Castro identified with the Corsican who made himself emperor of the French, admiring not only his military campaigns but his artful speeches, too. Also, to his mistress he wrote admiringly of Marx and Lenin, noting “I laugh and enjoy myself when I read them. Both were implacable, and they put fear into the hearts of their enemies. Two genuine prototypes of the revolutionary!” (Quirk, 69).

During his first year in the Sierra, Castro developed the life-style and tactics that were to mold his battle plans for the months to come. He and his men moved incessantly, to improve their stamina, he said, and to preserve security. Guillermo García, nearly a

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29 In a letter to his mistress, Castro sounded like Machiavelli when he compared Napoleon to other conquerors: “I shall always think of [Napoleon] as the best . . . . You must remember that Alexander inherited the powerful throne of Macedonia from his father. Hannibal was given an army, tempered in battle, by his father. And Julius Caesar owed much to his patrician forebears. Napoleon was indebted to no one, only to his own genius and his indomitable will” (Quirk, 64).
decade later, spoke in admiration of Castro’s prowess. “Fidel had never been in these mountains before. But in six months he knew the whole sierra better than any guajiro who was born there. He never forgot a place that he went. He remembered everything—the soil, the trees, who lived in each house. In those days I was a cattle buyer. I used to go all over the mountains. But in six months Fidel knew the sierra better than I did, and I was born and raised there” (Quirk, 128-129).

Even heavily discounting this account for hyperbole born of sycophancy, the point is well taken. As Machiavelli advises, Castro spent time training his men to endure physical hardships and becoming intimately familiar with the terrain where they operated, two basic conditions for the successful waging of war. He would put this training to good use in turning back the army’s (one and only) timid offensive in the area in mid-1958.

As we have seen, a Machiavellian prince knows how to imitate the lion and the fox, the lion “to frighten the wolves” and the fox “to recognize snares” (Mansfield, 69). There is a certain ambiguity in this precept, however. Take the lion first. If, by imitating it, Machiavelli simply means being proficient in the art of war, then we have established that Castro accomplished that. But perhaps Machiavelli means something more than war-making. The signature of the king of the jungle is not ferocity, a quality shared with other beasts, but its fearsome roar. It could be, then, that what Machiavelli means is that a prince must periodically threaten potential enemies with violence. If this is the case, Castro passes the test with flying colors, for roaring ferociously has been one of his specialties. As a child he threatened his parents with burning their house down if they did not return him to school. While in prison, Castro learned that his brother-in-law had arranged a sinecure for his wife at the Interior Ministry, in which he served as under-
secretary. Outraged at the damage done to his “reputation and honor,” he threatened to kill him (Quirk, 76-77). Learning that his wife had divorced him, in a letter to one of his sisters he thundered: “One day I’ll be out of here, and I’ll get my son and my honor back, even if the earth is destroyed in the process” (Quirk, 79). When his call for the 1958 general strike went largely unheeded, Castro, blaming the 26th of July National Directorate, summoned them all to the Sierra for a dressing down, threatening to shoot anyone who did not show up. When a letter allegedly from his brother Raúl Castro to Ché Guevara commenting favorably on Stalin and communism fell into the hands of the government and was made public, Castro exploded. He “walked back and forth, ‘like a caged lion.’ He threatened to kill Raúl: ‘I don’t give a fuck if he is my brother, I’ll shoot him!’” (Quirk, 162). After the rebel victory, he had hundreds of Batista’s soldiers summarily shot and organized show trials for others. When the pace and lack of due process of the executions drew criticism from Mexico and the United States, Castro angrily rejected their objections, blurring out that if the U.S. were to dare to intervene in Cuba, “200,000 gringos would die” (Quirk, 224). This was less than two weeks after his triumphal entry into Havana, long before the Bay of Pigs, the Missile Crisis, and countless other smaller confrontations with the U.S. In the years to come, Castro’s bellicose rhetoric, directed mostly at Washington and his own subjects, would escalate to apocalyptic proportions.

As for the fox, Machiavelli says that it “recognizes snares,” but in all his examples the protagonist is not avoiding traps but drawing others into them. Machiavelli’s “fox” is an active deceiver who astutely “gets around men’s brains” (Mansfield, 69). It is not so much the fox but the spider that best illustrates what Machiavelli has in mind. And here again Castro earns only the highest marks. An incident from his personal life sets the
stage. As he prepared to sail for Cuba from Mexico, he wrote to his ex-wife asking her to allow his son to visit him, promising “on his honor ‘as a gentleman,’ to return him to her custody within two weeks. It soon became evident, however, that Castro had no intention of keeping his word. . . . In a letter to Mexican newspapers he explained that he could not permit Fidelito ‘to fall into the hands of my most ferocious enemies and detractors, who in an act of extreme villainy . . . outraged my home and sacrificed it to the bloody tyranny, which they serve’” (Quirk, 115).

During the struggle against Batista, Castro repeatedly tried to drive a wedge between the dictator and the armed forces. From the *Moncada* manifesto to messages sent to various officers only weeks before Batista’s flight, Castro affirmed many times that his fight was against the dictator, not the soldiers. Shortly after the rebel victory, while still in Oriente, Castro expressed to *Moncada* commander José Rego Rubido the hope “that his men and the soldiers of Batista’s army could be comrades” (Quirk, 211). Also, in a meeting with Air Force pilots, he assured them they had nothing to fear from “‘revolutionary justice’” (Bernal 1999, 392). But in a matter of days officers and men of the armed forces were being summarily shot (Raúl Castro had around seventy soldiers tried and executed just on one day). And when, less than two months after the rebel victory, a revolutionary tribunal found forty-three members of the Air Force (including mechanics) not guilty of war crimes, Castro angrily ordered a new trial, at which the men were duly found guilty and sentenced to long prison terms. The revolutionary commander who presided over the first trial was later found dead, presumably a suicide.

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30 To recover Fidelito, his mother had to have him kidnapped from Castro’s sisters while on an outing in a Mexico City park.
Other alleged war criminals and sundry Batistianos would suffer similar or worse fate, some after enduring the humiliation of a show trial.

From the time Batista seized control of the government until he fled the country, in countless manifestos, speeches, and interviews with Cuban and foreign journalists, Castro repeatedly gave assurances that at the top of his agenda was the restoration of the 1940 Constitution and the holding of elections. After his release from the Isle of Pines, he wrote that “There can be no other formula, no other national solution, than general elections, as soon as possible, and with complete guarantees for everyone” (Quirk, 84). Also, time and again Castro denied that he had ambition for office. In 1958, less than a year before seizing power, he wrote to the National Directorate of the 26th of July organization that “I’m sick of having my motives misrepresented. I’m not meanly ambitious. I don’t believe I’m a caudillo, and I don’t want to be one. I’m neither irreplaceable nor infallible. I don’t give a shit for all the honors or the responsibilities. It disgusts me to see men running after those chimeras” (Quirk, 162).

As we have seen, Castro picked an obscure if honorable judge, Manuel Urrutia, to fill the post of provisional president. One of Urrutia’s first acts was to restore the 1940 constitution and schedule elections in eighteen months. However, he did not stay around long enough to implement that decree. Initially, Castro feigned subordination to the civilian government: “No act of ours will ever interfere with or detract one iota from the authority of the president. . . . We have no ambitions” (Quirk, 222). But, even as he professed disinterest in power, he proceeded to undermine the position of his nominal superiors. As Quirk tells it, “. . . Though Fidel Castro continued to reiterate his respect for elections and democratic institutions and his loyalty to Urrutia, with every press conference and in every public utterance his words sapped the authority of the
president.” The provisional government was scarcely five weeks old when the Prime Minister, José Miró Cardona, resigned. “A spokesman at the presidential palace announced to a surprised Cuban people that Fidel Castro would take his place” (Quirk, 227).

Within five months, Urrutia, too, was gone. Castro got rid of him in a deft maneuver that combined the fox (or rather, the spider) and the lion in one virtuoso act. One day in July he stunned the country by pretending to resign his post, disappearing for 24 hours, during which time thousands of his supporters were mobilized to plead that he come back. Castro reappeared in front of television cameras to accuse President Urrutia of having charged the government of being communist, an attitude that “bordered on treason’ . . . ‘I am not a communist,’ Castro said, ‘and neither is the revolutionary movement. But we do not have to say we are anticommunists, just to curry favor with foreign governments’” (Quirk, 251). While Castro was still speaking, a threatening crowd gathered in front of the presidential palace to demand Urrutia’s ouster. The hapless president escaped through a back door. Disguised as a milkman, he requested asylum in the Venezuelan embassy.31

A few days later, declaiming before a crowd of hundreds of thousands of cheering supporters, Castro repudiated elections and representative institutions. He characterized the event, which would be replicated countless times in the life of the regime, wherein he

31 As editor of Revolución, the newspaper which shocked the country by headlining Castro’s fake resignation, Carlos Franqui was an accessory to what amounted to a coup. In one of his memoirs, he confesses that this affair left a “bitter taste” in his mouth, and a case of “bad conscience” (Franqui 1981, 83).
worked himself into a frenzy speechifying for hours on end before an assembly that unanimously applauded his lines and chanted adulatory slogans in unison, as a “real democracy” (Quirk, 253). As Quirk puts it, “To Castro democracy consisted in discussing problems that vexed the leadership and in shouting approval of his decisions in the plaza” (Quirk, 649).

Urrutia was not the last of Castro’s pre-revolutionary supporters to be discarded once his usefulness had been spent. Recall Machiavelli’s observation that it often happens that a new prince finds his most reliable and useful followers not among those who had helped him gain control of the state, but among those whom he had initially viewed with suspicion. In Castro’s case, the list of people he used on his way to power, only to be discarded or crushed (exiled, imprisoned, or shot) is very long. A few of the best-known names (all of whom ended up in exile, some after spending time in prison, unless otherwise noted) will suffice for illustration: Luis Conte Agüero, Miguel Angel Quevedo, José Pardo Llada, Mario Llerena, Humberto Padilla, and Carlos Franqui, who propagandized for him; businessmen and politicians like Justo Carrillo, José "Pepín" Bosch, and former president Carlos Prío, who raised or gave out of their own pockets tens of thousands of dollars to his movement or to him personally; Felipe Pazos and Rufo López-Fresquet, economists who served in the first years of Castro’s regime; Teresa Casuso, who opened her apartment to him while in Mexico; Costa Rican president José Figueres, who allowed a shipment of arms to be flown from his country to the Sierra, whom Castro ridiculed at a mass meeting; and Sierra comrades Hubert Matos (sentenced to 20 years in prison), Humberto Sorí Marín (shot after having fled and come back, supposedly on a mission to assassinate Castro), and Ché Guevara, whom Castro sent away on a good will tour around the world, then on a mission to Africa, and finally to
his death in Bolivia. Although a special case, because he was discarded much later, is Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez, who as a youth joined Castro in the Sierra, attended a Soviet military academy, rose through the ranks to command large numbers of troops in Angola and Ethiopia and, in 1989, was “designated ‘an exceptional warrior of the fatherland’” only six months before being put on trial on corruption and drug-trafficking charges, convicted, and shot (Quirk, 828).

These are only the best known names. Countless other minor figures were thrown overboard when they no longer served Castro’s purposes. In fact, even before the rebel victory, Castro was already looking to shed the 26th of July organization, which he was finding difficult to control. Once in power, he cut it down to size, elevating, instead, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), a Moscow-line communist party, which after having kept to the sidelines for most of Batista’s dictatorship (it had served on his cabinet in an earlier government), sent one of its top cadre to the Sierra late in 1958. After the rebel victory, it was the PSP which put itself unconditionally under Castro’s command. As well as easing his turn toward the Soviet Union, the PSP facilitated Castro’s annihilation of civil society—the take-over of agriculture, industry and commerce, labor unions, the press and cultural organizations, the university, and countless other institutions—until the entire country lay at his feet. In the next few years, purged of recalcitrants and malcontents, i.e., anyone who demurred from Castro’s dictates, the two organizations were fused under him as the Cuban Communist Party.

Castro’s discarding of old friends once victory was achieved and the unmaking of a general of Ochoa’s stature brings to mind another of Machiavelli’s precepts, the one regarding where a new prince should look to for support, the people or “the great.” He noted that one who acquires a state with the help of “the great” cannot rule as he pleases,
because he is surrounded by equals who are not in sufficient awe of him, whereas one who relies on the support of the people finds all but a few ready to obey. Therefore, a prince wanting to exercise absolute mastery of the state should seek to reduce dependence on the great, placing his regime, instead, on a popular footing.

From the beginning, Castro set out not just to reduce the power but to mow down any and all of Cuba’s “great,” until no one was left standing that would not bow down to him. The first of the “great” to go had to be the greatest of all, i.e., the United States, under whose economic and political shadow Cuba had acquired independence from Spain and relative prosperity. If he could “unmake” the United States’ position in Cuba, no one else would be able to resist him, not the landowners, not the sugar industrialists, not the labor unions, not the professional associations, not the University of Havana or the student union (FEU), not the Catholic Church, in short, no one else would be able to stand between him and absolute power. It was a risky venture, but Castro had taken deadly gambles before, and he was willing to roll the dice again. In the process of

32 The expulsion of American influence from the Island is reminiscent of previous purgations in the history of the Spanish-speaking world, such as Ferdinand of Aragón’s “expelling the Marranos from his kingdom and despoiling it of them,” noted by Machiavelli (Mansfield, 88).

33 Franqui relates that, at the beginning of the confrontation with the United States, when many of his inner circle feared an American invasion and the PSP and the USSR were counseling moderation, Castro plunged ahead, predicting that the Americans would not invade: “No. No. They will not invade. We took them by surprise. They do not react
“unmaking” the U.S. in Cuba, Fidel Castro replaced it with another foreign “great,” namely the Soviet Union. But Havana being so far from Moscow, whatever position it would attain in Cuba, whose value was primarily strategic, would depend on keeping Castro happy, supplying him with vast quantities of weapons (since childhood his favorite toys)\(^{34}\) and catering to his Napoleonic ego. Thus, for the purpose of aggrandizing his personal power, Castro’s decision to “unmake” the U.S. and “make” the USSR in Cuba makes perfect Machiavellian sense.

There was another Machiavellian reason for taking on the United States: it was a singular enemy, one much resented in intellectual circles in Latin America and around the world, and if Castro emerged victorious from the encounter, it would be to his everlasting glory. Recall that, according to Machiavelli, when \textit{fortuna} wishes to make a new prince great, she finds formidable enemies for him to overcome so that their very opposition to him provides the ladder he climbs to a radiant reputation. A new prince with a gargantuan appetite for glory, it was Castro’s fortune to find in the United States a ready-made, worthy (if vacillating) enemy against which to prove his mettle.\(^{35}\) In the end, rapidly.” Franqui added, “We Cubans know the \textit{yankis}” (Franqui 1981, 141—my translation).

\(^{34}\) For an inventory of the “huge amount of military technology” supplied to Castro by the Soviets (and China) by April 1961, see Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 99. But this was a down payment. A lot more was to come.

\(^{35}\) For an interesting psychological interpretation of Castro’s attitude toward the United States, called “the hubris-nemesis complex” by their authors, see Gonzalez and Ronfeldt (1986).
having been left stranded in an impoverished Island by the historical wave that swept communism out of Europe, the fact that he remained a thorn that the United States never managed to pull out of its side may turn out to be his only claim to fame.\textsuperscript{36}  

Having destroyed Cuba’s pre-revolutionary “great,” and made and unmade new ones at will, did Castro follow Machiavelli’s advice for winning the support and avoid incurring the hatred of the people? All they want, said Machiavelli, is to be left alone to prosper in peace. If the prince refrains from taking their property and encourages them to pursue productive occupations, if they do not hesitate to improve or increase their possessions for fear of confiscation or higher taxes, in short, as long as they find that under the rule of the prince their private affairs are thriving, they will be content and will defend him. Thus, Machiavelli advised, a prince should keep taxes low and abstain from taking the property of his subjects, but he can do this only if he is very thrifty with his own money, even to the point of incurring the charge of miserliness.  

Castro scorned this advice. From the moment he rode into the capital, he acted with complete disregard for the property of others. Having settled himself in a luxurious

\textsuperscript{36} Which leads me to believe that those who think that lifting the U.S. embargo would induce Castro to want to have better relations between the two countries are mistaken. He has little to gain, and a great reputation to lose, by improving relations with the U.S. Any American concession will in all probability be interpreted by Castro as another victory, to be trumpeted accordingly. [Afterword: in December 2014, Castro’s brother Raul, who succeeded him as “president,” agreed to restore diplomatic relations with the United States. Whether Fidel Castro himself would have done is one of those questions we will never be able to answer to everyone’s satisfaction.]
suite in the Havana Hilton, Castro would “eat what he wanted, whenever and wherever he wanted it, and not worry about paying for it. He never brought cash. Like a reigning monarch, he lived completely outside the money economy” (Quirk, 232). Publicly professing poverty, he had “access to any number of residences. As Cuba’s Maximum Leader he in fact owned anything he wanted to call his own” (Quirk, 251). Beginning with the expropriation of the holdings of real or alleged *Batistianos*, then of anyone who left the country, large landed estates, the sugar mills, American companies, and so on down

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37 The lack of separation between what is public and what is Castro’s (reminiscent of what was common in Machiavelli’s own time) dates back to revolutionary days. He “controlled all the monies” raised through or by the July 26 movement; there was “no treasurer and no accounting.” In the Sierra, the revenues raised through “revolutionary taxes” in areas of guerrilla operations were kept in “a mysterious box that contained the ‘treasury’ of the Rebel Army,” under the exclusive control of Celia Sánchez, Castro’s intimate confidante. Guevara, too, refused to account for money sent to him by the underground, which he placed in the hands of his mistress (Quirk, 102, 154, 200).

38 I.e., Batista, his friends, business partners, and anyone else who had done business with the regime, a category elastic enough to encompass a great many people, hundreds of businesses, and countless assets, including luxury items left behind by those who fled in a hurry (Quirk, 246).

39 Castro appointed himself first president of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA), which was initially envisioned as “the government within the government” (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 42). In its first year of existence INRA carried out a
the line, through the revolutionary offensives of the 1960s, progressively more and more property, large and small, was confiscated until practically the entire country came under the control of a panoply of agencies of the party-state, all subject to the will of its lord and master.

Neither has Castro practiced thriftiness. On the contrary, he recklessly squandered vast resources, domestic and foreign, on a series of projects lacking economic rationale, zigzagging from crash industrialization to attempting to harvest ten million tons of sugar, draining the Zapata swamp, breeding a new hybrid of cattle, producing more milk than Holland, making better cheeses than France, and other fantasies (Alvarez 2014). Practically every year since 1959, while Castro regaled his subjects with hallucinatory visions of great abundance in a future that never arrived, new restrictions were imposed on consumption,\textsuperscript{40} new sacrifices required, greater “discipline” demanded. Nor did he allow the people any quiet, or to live in peace. Hundreds of thousands of youths were sent to fight and many of them to die in far-away wars and other conflicts of his own choosing. Decade after decade, Cubans woke up to a new crisis, or another paroxysm of cruelty, thousands of thugs mobilized to stamp out yet another internal enemy, “‘common scum’, ‘lumpen’, ‘bums, loafers, and parasites’,” to be spat on, beaten, and dragged through the streets, their honor and dignity trampled underfoot (Quirk, 808).

\textsuperscript{40} Montaner (1981: 150) includes a table showing that, as early as 1962, the amount of meat, rice, starches, and beans to which Cubans were entitled according to the ration book was below that allotted to black slaves in 1842, during the Spanish colonial period.
In short, Castro did just the opposite of what Machiavelli advised a prince to do in order to avoid being hated. On the contrary, he has done many things which the Florentine thought incur hatred, not just among the “great,” as Castro himself expected, but among the people at large: he did not respect their property or their honor, or allow them any peace and quiet. Neither did he cease being cruel. Thus, a student of Machiavelli would have reason to suspect that Castro is hated by the majority of Cubans. This hypothesis, however, goes against much of the conventional wisdom in the press and in academia which, at least until recently, has perceived Castro as popular with the masses, even if he is hated in Miami. If the conventional wisdom is true, then Machiavelli was wrong on an important point of political psychology. Or, it could be that whether the subjects love or hate the prince is contingent on a number of other conditions that are independent of how he treats their property and their honor. Or, conceivably, Machiavelli’s insight is correct and those who believe that Castro is not hated but loved are being taken in by appearances, by what they see with their eyes, not by what they touch with their hands, to paraphrase the Florentine.

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41 From the Isle of Pines prison, he wrote to his mistress that “I would sincerely love to revolutionize this country from one end to the other! I feel certain that this would bring happiness to the Cuban people. I would not be stopped by the hatred and ill will of a few thousand people, including some of my own relations, half the people I know, two-thirds of my legal comrades, and four-fifths of my former schoolmates!” (Quirk, 66).

42 As early as the 1990s, while Castro was still in charge, the conventional wisdom was no longer so sure that Castro was popular. This is evident in the careful wording that characterized explanations offered by seasoned Cuba watchers as to why Castro survived
In any case, whether Castro is loved or hated by the majority of Cubans is a question that cannot be determined at this point because, on account of widespread fear of the regime, it would be nearly impossible to get honest answers from his subjects. However, Mussolini’s ignominious death at the end of a rope, his body mutilated; the sudden collapse of communism in Europe; and the (to many journalists and academics) surprising defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections should give pause to those who believe too readily in the illusions of popularity which totalitarian regimes manage to project (Cuzán 2015).

If whether Castro inspires love or hatred among his subjects is unsettled, there can be no doubt that he is feared. Machiavelli said that a prince cannot control and should not rely exclusively on the love of his subjects, but he can on their fear, which is “sustained by a dread of punishment that is always effective” (S&P, 59). Beginning in the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Take the following example: “Whether he [Castro] could any longer win an election—or, more to the point, an approval rating—is open to question. Even so, there remains a significant reservoir of support, if only because many Cubans see no alternative to the Revolution and because many have a vested interest in its survival” (Smith 1992, 97). “Any longer,” “significant,” “many”—these are hedge words, the observer no longer being confident that Castro commanded even majority support. By contrast, Carlos Alberto Montaner boldly contends that “The overwhelming majority—I dare say eighty percent—hates Castro and communism” (Montaner 1996, 61—my translation). See also my own estimate of the percentage of the vote that the Cuban Communist Party would receive in a genuinely free election (Cuzán 2014).
1959, with the wholesale execution of Batistiano soldiers and police, eventually thousands of people were sent to the *paredón*, and tens of thousands to serve long prison terms under subhuman conditions for opposing the regime, or simply criticizing it. Merely laughing at someone’s satirical impersonation of the Maximum Leader risks a jail term. The Island is blanketed with informers, in the neighborhood, at work, and in the street. A political police trained in the techniques of the KGB can pick up anyone, at any time, for any reason, hold him incommunicado, and interrogate him at will until he signs a suitable confession. There is no independent judicial authority that will issue writs of *habeas corpus* on behalf of political prisoners, as there was under Batista, or defense counsel that can do anything beyond pleading for clemency from the court, the guilt of the accused being assumed. Reporting news of natural or man-made disasters or the outbreak of an epidemic, let alone of the corruption that pervades the regime (Payne 1996), or giving that information to the foreign press, is a punishable offense. A politically incorrect remark can get one fired, and since there are few sources of

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43 *Paredón* (“to the wall”) means execution by firing squad. The word derives from the practice of having the condemned man stand in front of a wall, although being tied to a stake or a pole will do just as well. During the early years of the regime, crowds would yell “*paredón, paredón*” on cue to terrorize whatever class, group, or individual was the target of Castro’s ire at the moment. Franqui estimates that there were 10,000 executions in the first 30 years of the regime (1988, 350), or an average of almost one per day.

employment other than the party-state, especially for professionals, dissimulation is the order of the day (Planas 1992).

Nor does anyone dare display contempt for Castro, in the sense of treating him with disrespect or disdain. To avoid being despised, Machiavelli advised, a prince must be well armed, something Castro has always taken care to do. His early obsession with guns has been noted. While in the Sierra, he sought to monopolize all weapons, and to leave none in the hands of the July 26th urban underground. Castro usually packed a pistol, and was protected by hundreds of security guards armed to the teeth. Machiavelli also warned against “being considered inconstant, frivolous, effeminate, pusillanimous and irresolute” (S&P, 64) adjectives that, to the best of my knowledge, nobody has used in describing Castro.

In addition, Machiavelli counseled the prince to avoid becoming impoverished, which would cause him to be held in little regard. This was another reason, apart from avoiding hatred bred of the necessity for higher taxes, for being cautious about spending money. In the case of Castro, though, we have noted that he’s been ever the spendthrift, even as Cuba was ruined. A question that comes to mind, though, is whether he himself

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45 Pre-Castro Cuba was “a middle income economy,” with an “income per capita [that] was fifty to sixty percent of European levels. It was close to the highest in Latin America and was about thirty percent of the US.” Then, Cuba’s per capita income was approximately the same as Italy’s, probably higher than Spain’s or Portugal’s, similar to those of Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela. After more than half a century under the rule of the Castro dynasty, it is lower than it was in the 1950s; relatively, it “occupies a position similar to the poorest countries of Central America” (Ward and Devereux, 2010:}
is poor. At home he enjoys countless privileges and *Forbes* magazine once ranked him as one of the richest rulers in the world. If this is the case, then perhaps he need not fear being despised on that account. I say perhaps, because the condition of the country will, to some extent, reflect on the reputation of the prince. Other things equal, one would expect the rich ruler of a rich country to command more respect than the rich ruler of a poor country.

But there is one maxim for avoiding contempt that Castro has never minded. *Contra* Machiavelli, Castro’s pattern has been to pick ministers primarily for their loyalty, even if they are not all that competent, to presume he knows more about everything that authorities in their respective fields, to disregard the advice of experts or to get angry with them when they contradict him, and obstinately to plunge into a project or campaign which specialists warn him has no chance of success. Then, when the undertaking fails, he finds scapegoats among those who were put in charge of its implementation. Such behavior does not breed respect. This suggests that not all sources of contempt are equally dangerous for a prince.

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46 On Fidel Castro’s wealth, see Werlau (2007). On the many privileges enjoyed by Castro and his ruling clique, see Clark (1999).

47 For an illustration, see the case of the British geneticists Thomas Preston and Malcolm Willis. In 1965, Castro “invited them to Havana to direct the newly founded Institute of Animal Sciences,” one of his pet projects. After several years they became totally disillusioned. They spoke of Castro as “an amateur geneticist getting his kicks from a multi-million dollar experiment,” who had set himself up as an expert and imposed his
As well as avoiding contempt, a prince should acquire esteem. This he does by undertaking great enterprises, such as defeating a formidable enemy. Castro can lay claim to something along those lines, for he did thwart U.S. efforts at overthrowing him, and has gotten away with insulting in the coarsest terms American presidents from Kennedy to G. W. Bush. This has made him a venerable figure in anti-American circles around the world, not excluding certain habitats within the United States itself, such as the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem and campus niches populated by leftist academics.48

‘ignorant policies’ on the scientists.” They “expressed their contempt for the ‘low level’ of research in Cuba, which they attributed to Fidel Castro’s ‘combination of ignorance and stubborn determination to have the last word.’ He would rather make a mistake than listen to outsiders.” Willis complained about many of his students, “‘political types’ [who] don’t have the mental energy for really detailed effort. They go into politics to get easy kudos and perks. They are the ones who are sent abroad on conferences. They can’t risk sending the bright people out of the country. They won’t come back. The deadheads have to come back because they would starve anywhere else. The keenest party people are the worst’” (Quirk, 626-627).

48 On Castro’s mid-decade visit to Harlem, see Solomon (1996). She notes that, at that event, only journalists hand-picked by the regime for their “historic presentation of Cuba,” i.e., puff pieces on Castro and his regime, were allowed. As for academics, be it noted that the Latin American Studies Association, which in the 1970s and 1980s condemned every one of the region’s right-wing regimes, and even some democratic ones, for violating human rights and academic freedom, has maintained a studied silence.
Another way suggested by Machiavelli is for the prince to give the appearance of being “merciful, trustworthy, upright, humane, and devout,” especially the latter. When he arrived in Havana, Castro wore a medallion of Cuba’s patroness, the Virgen del Cobre.\footnote{He later discarded it and launched a vicious attack on the Catholic Church, confiscating its schools and other properties, expelling many priests and nuns, and thereafter keeping it at the margin of society. In 1998, during Pope John Paul II’s visit to Cuba, Catholics crawled out from the virtual catacombs to which they had been banished for four decades, although the Church still lives under many restrictions.} When circumstances called for it, Castro occasionally put on the mask of benevolence and humanity, particularly with foreign visitors, especially women reporters, with whom he could be quite affable, charming, and even candid. Intermittently, in a show of magnanimity, he released and shipped out of the country (he never allowed them to stay behind) a handful of prisoners whose plight had come to the attention of some foreign dignitary. In speeches and in press interviews, Castro frequently expressed heated indignation at what he said are the lies, injustices, mean ambitions, and other dishonorable acts on the part of others, all the while protesting his own truthfulness and generosity. And he never ceased to speak pious words on behalf of the world’s poor, proclaiming to be their champion.

An example of his hypocrisy and unctuousness is drawn from an October 12, 1979 speech at the United Nations. In the usual sultanistic style in which he traveled, “Fidel Castro had driven from Kennedy Airport in a Lincoln Continental, followed by forty-
seven other luxury cars that brought in the rest of his large party.” At the podium, he declared with a straight face: “I speak on behalf of the children of the world, who don’t even have a piece of bread. I speak on behalf of the ailing who lack medicine, on behalf of those who have been denied the right to life and human dignity.” The peroration is worth quoting at length:

I warn that if we do not eliminate our present injustices and inequities peacefully and wisely, the future will be apocalyptic. The sound of weapons, the threatening language, and arrogance in the international scene must cease. Enough of the illusion that the problems of the world can be solved by nuclear weapons. Bombs may kill the hungry, the sick, the ignorant, but they cannot eliminate hunger, disease, or ignorance. Nor can bombs destroy the just rebellion of the peoples. And in that holocaust the rich, who stand to lose the most in this world, will also lose their lives.

Let us bid farewell to armaments and concentrate in a civilized manner on the most urgent problems of our time. This is the responsibility, this is the sacred duty, of every statesman. And this is the basic premise for human survival.50

5. What Kind of “Prince” is Fidel Castro?

Table 1 compares the Machiavellian prince and Fidel Castro on twenty-three items discussed in Sections 2-4. Note that on 19 of 23 characteristic qualities or behaviors, Castro matches the Machiavellian prince. Two items are in doubt: whether he is loved by his subjects and whether he avoided contempt by not falling into poverty. Also, there are

50 Quoted in Quirk, 801-802.
two unambiguous discrepancies: against Machiavelli’s advice, Castro did not seek to avoid hatred by being thrifty and respecting the property and honor of his subjects, nor did he avoid contempt by appointing competent ministers and shunning flatterers.

Taking up the items on contempt first, note that Machiavelli offered yet a third way for avoiding being despised, namely to be well armed. That Castro always was. Since there is little evidence that he is held in contempt by the generality of men, least of all by his subjects, it would appear that if a prince is armed, ferocious, and cruel (and Fidel Castro is all three), he will be feared. And this will offset any contempt derivative from his country being poor, the incompetence of his ministers, the flatterers and sycophants that serve him, and the wrongheadedness of his policies.51

The other two items are not to be disposed of so swiftly, however. Rather, they raise theoretical and interpretive issues that are central to the question that serves as the title of this paper, i.e., is Castro a Machiavellian prince? It is true that Machiavelli did not think that being loved was all that important to a prince. In his mind, while it is good for a prince to be both loved and feared, if one is to be lacking, let it be love and not fear, because the prince cannot make his subjects love him, but he can control whether they fear him. But if love is not important, avoiding hatred is, because unless this is done, the prince can never be secure in his position.

Now, these two passions being the reverse of one another, the subjects cannot both love and hate the prince. If the Cubans love Castro, they do not hate him, and vice

51 Postscript: There is but one protection against an unavoidable source of contempt, the bodily and mental decay that accompanies old age, and that is to stay out of public view, something that for the most part Castro has been doing since he retired.
versa. If they love him, as the conventional wisdom wents, then Machiavelli was wrong in his understanding of political psychology. If they love him, then contra Machiavelli, a prince can confiscate property wholesale, render everyone insecure in his possessions, make it impossible for anyone to prosper on their own even as he squanders resources on irrational projects and distant wars, never deliver on promises of plenty, but repeatedly demand more sacrifices, constantly disturb their lives, giving them no peace—and still they will not hate but love him. Or, perhaps Machiavelli is not wrong in general but either Cubans are a peculiar people or they derive so much vicarious pleasure from his glory that it makes up for their penury. Or perhaps there are some contextual conditions in the Cuban case that neutralize, refract, or reverse the normal relationship between a prince doing these things and the people hating him for it.

On the other hand, suppose that, contra the conventional wisdom, Cubans do not love but actually hate Castro, as Machiavelli would have one expect, only their hatred is well hidden, dissimulated for fear of punishment. Then this means that Machiavelli was wrong in believing that, along with contempt, hatred was dangerous to a prince, that he underestimated how much fear a modern prince can inspire in his subjects, so much that he can be widely hated and not lose his state.

Or does it? There is another possibility: that despite their many similarities, Machiavelli’s prince is fundamentally different from the kind of “prince” Fidel Castro is. Nowhere in *The Prince* does Machiavelli use the word tyrant or tyranny. The closest he comes to it is in the last two paragraphs of Chapter IX, where he briefly discusses the “absolute regime.” There he says that such a regime is very difficult to establish, and that any prince that wishes to do so must keep the people dependent on him. By contrast, the *Discourses*, which is about republics, contains more references to tyrants and tyranny.
than to princes or principalities. It is that work, in fact, that supplied the passage quoted in Part 2 of this paper, discussing what a new prince who wants to found a tyrannical regime must do, i.e., make the rich poor and the poor rich, build and unbuild cities, change their names, create new authorities, move people about from place to another, in sum, in true revolutionary fashion, to leave nothing intact, and to allow no rank, institution, or wealth to exist that does not depend on him. Machiavelli goes on to opine that “These indeed are most cruel expedients, contrary not merely to every Christian, but to every civilized rule of conduct, and such as every man should shun, choosing rather to lead a private life than to be a king on terms so hurtful to mankind.”

But didn’t Castro turn Cuba’s social and economic hierarchy upside down, making the rich poor and at least a few of the poor relatively “rich”? Didn’t he shift people about, establish new ruling structures, break up and rename old provinces and create new ones? If he did not literally “unmake” Havana, didn’t he ruin it simply by not keeping it up and failing to make new investments in infrastructure, letting large sections of it deteriorate, go to pieces, and waste away? Didn’t he leave nothing intact in Cuba’s society,

Gutenberg.org version, Chapter XXV, third paragraph. As Olschki (1945: 37) puts it, “tyranny is always condemned by Machiavelli. The popular view that The Prince was written as a manual for tyrants is based on a superficial knowledge of the book.” Ledeen (1999: 173) agrees: “Machiavelli hates tyrants with all his soul; he spares no epithet in denouncing them, and devotes much energy to analyzing how to remove them.”

In a telephone interview with a reporter, Guillermo Cabrera Infante lamented that “Of Havana nothing is left even in Havana, it is destroyed, as if it had been bombed from within, of the buildings all that is left are the shells, the facades, behind which there is
economy, and state, allowing no rank, institution, or wealth to emerge that was not recognized as being granted as a privilege, and subject to recall at any time by him? Didn’t he, in fact, set out to do just that, as he revealed in the letter he wrote from prison to his mistress, where confessed that he “would sincerely love to revolutionize this country from one end to another!”?

I conclude, then, that Castro, although matching the Machiavellian prince in most respects, is fundamentally different from him. Machiavelli’s prince is not a tyrant as the ancients understood the term. Fidel Castro is.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machiavelli’s <em>Prince</em></th>
<th>Fidel Castro</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humble or obscure origins</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterized by <em>virtú:</em> audacity, courage, energy, spiritedness, strength</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterized by <em>prudenzia:</em> astuteness, cleverness, sagacity, shrewdness</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored by <em>fortuna:</em> luck, intervention by others, opportunities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies history, modeled himself after great men</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relies on own resources, especially military</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engages in military exercises, acquires practical knowledge of terrain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imitates the lion: roars ferociously to scare his enemies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imitates the fox: “works around men’s brains” to deceive them</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolved old army and built a new one loyal to himself</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanged country’s old allies in favor of new ones</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared himself for one of two states in conflict, did not stay neutral</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discarded many of those who supported his seizure of the state</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found reliable servants among those he had initially viewed with suspicion</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not rely on the “great” for support; made and unmade the “great”</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired esteem by nurturing an enmity, defeating a great enemy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects appearance of humanity, benevolence, piety</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoids contempt by being well armed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instills fear in subjects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is loved by subjects</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoids contempt by not falling into poverty</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoids contempt by appointing competent ministers and avoiding flatterers</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoids hatred by keeping taxes low and respecting property of subjects</td>
<td>No</td>
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