You are hereHome › College of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities (CASSH) › Reubin O'D. Askew Department of Government › Cuzán, Alfred › Fiscal policy and presidential elections Primary tabsView (active tab) RoMEO Style APAChicagoHarvardIEEEMLATurabian Choose the citation style. Cuzán, A. G., & Bundrick, C. M. (2000). Fiscal policy and presidential elections: Update and extensions. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30(2), 275-289. doi:10.1111/j.0360-4918.2000.00112.x Download PDF Fiscal policy and presidential elections Details Type Academic Journal Article Title Fiscal policy and presidential elections: Update and extensions Contributor(s) Cuzán, Alfred G. (author)Bundrick, Charles M. (author) Located In Presidential studies quarterly ISSN 0360-4918 Volume 30 Issue 2 Start Page 275 End Page 289 Date 2000 DOI 10.1111/j.0360-4918.2000.00112.x Abstract This article updates, deepens, and extends previous articles published in this journal on the relation between focal policy and presidential elections. It presents evidence that is consistent with the view that voters reward fiscal frugality and punish focal expansion. The relationship is robust with respect to economic conditions, presidential incumbency, number of consecutive terms in the White House by presidents of the same party. and war. An intriguing finding is that, when fiscal policy is controlled for, incumbency advantage practically disappears. It is hoped that these findings will stimulate more political scientists, especially students oft he presidency, to pay more attention to the role fiscal policy in presidential elections.