Moral Conflict for the Film Librarian

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Introduction

The primary goal of this essay is to understand the basis for a moral conflict often faced by the film librarian, the conflict between maintaining the collection's balance of perspectives and adhering only to the parent company's often singular point of view. Special libraries, of course, by their very nature, collect and maintain one type of subject matter or material. Film libraries, for example, collect only films. However, selection principles regulating library acquisitions usually state that all library collections, including those of film libraries, should maintain a balance of perspectives, especially a balance of the theoretical, political, aesthetic, high culture with pop culture, etc. Yet, film libraries often owe their primary allegiance to the perspective of the parent company in which they are housed. This creates a moral tension for the film librarian who seeks both to maintain general library principles and allegiance to the parent company.

The goal here will thus be to understand the basis of the moral dilemma for the film librarian and to attempt to resolve the dilemma. This is done by introducing the often overlooked theory of the contemporary European philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. An effort will also be made to briefly compare Merleau-Ponty's theory to other theoretical approaches. The essay will conclude by suggesting the following ways to avoid the dilemma of balance versus company loyalty: 1) film librarians should promote niche market-
ing to counterbalance the popular mass marketing to ensure the continued production of a variety of films; 2) the National Endowment for the Arts should fund a variety of films and filmmakers; and 3) government agencies should play a role in regulating the concentration of control in a wide variety of industries, particularly those that deal with the media.

General Description

Library Principles

The following excerpts from "The Library Bill of Rights" assert the claim for a balanced collection. "Materials should not be excluded because of the origin, background, or views of those contributing to their creation." "Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all points of view on current and historical issues." "Libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their responsibility to provide information and enlightenment." "Libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned with resisting abridgment of free expression and free access to ideas." And listed under "Interpretations (Summaries)" is "Diversity in collection development," which states that "Libraries should have a professional responsibility to be inclusive, not exclusive, in collection development and in the provision of interlibrary loan. Access to all materials legally obtainable should be assured the user and policies should not unjustly exclude materials even if offensive to the librarian or user. A balanced collection reflects diversity of materials, not equality in number" (Eberhart, 1995, 418–419). Thus the principle of a balanced collection is clearly articulated by perhaps the field’s central document.

Three Types of Film Libraries

Turning to a more detailed description of the film library, for the purposes of this essay, three types should receive attention: the feature production library, the distribution film library, and the national archive library (Harrison, 1973, 20–26). The feature production library as its title indicates is a film library associated with a film production company, most of which use 35mm film to produce entertainment features usually over 3,000 feet. Libraries here primarily serve the production company for two main purposes, to rent or sell feature films for profit, and to produce elaborate shot lists of films so scenes can be reused in other films produced by the company. The distribution library stores feature films that have been purchased by a parent company from a production company. These "show" films are then distributed for entertainment
purposes. Distribution companies generally do not edit film as the production companies do. Their primary concern is renting whole feature films for profit. The film librarian's task is thus greatly simplified, for no detailed indexing or shot listing is here required. Since both production and distribution companies are primarily concerned with immediate profit and not with long term preservation, there has been some movement toward the establishment of national film archives to preserve film as part of the national heritage. Here one observes much more active acquisition procedures. Films are usually selected by a committee of experts for historical importance and content. Subject areas are usually general fiction and non-fiction films, television, science, and history. Film provides an invaluable record of all of these areas and selection principles must be carefully worked out.

Selection Principles and Ethical Issues

Selection principles are a vitally important part of library science and of the management of the film library. Since library space is not unlimited or ever expanding, principles must be developed to help decide, on the one hand, what to keep and maintain and, on the other, what to discard. This is especially important for film libraries because of the size of film canisters and the special temperature and humidity conditions within which they must be stored. Space is at a premium. Therefore, film libraries must place a primary emphasis on what to select, what to keep, and what to throw away (Hanford, 1986, 79–81).

Two widely accepted principles of selection used by film libraries are physical quality and relevance to the standing collection (Harrison, 1973, 36). The principle of physical quality focuses on the useable condition of the film. Is it viewable, or is it so damaged or brittle that viewing is impossible? Is the film scratched or bent beyond useable quality? The general practice in film libraries has been to avoid purchasing or collecting film that is beyond quality viewing.

Although the above criterion of good physical quality is widely adhered to in film libraries, the principle of relevance to the collection raises serious questions about how this principle is to be applied. In public and university film libraries, relevance to the collection is often broadly conceived in terms of the general library principles stated above, that is, in terms of a balanced collection. Public and academic general libraries often seek to have a balance of perspectives, say of political or religious perspectives, or of aesthetic styles, etc., that represent a cross section of many different points of view. Yet, another sort of balance often considered by public and university libraries is that between popular materials (such as Harlequin Romances and wild west novels) and quality materials (such as Tolstoy's Anna Karenina and Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front). Many libraries respond to the public thrust for
popular materials and yet also maintain some collection of more serious materials. Yet this adherence to a balanced collection is precisely what is not happening in film libraries. The recent move toward the concentration of film libraries in distribution companies results in the collection of only popular materials (Forbes and Pierce, 1994, 43, 49–50; see also E. Ewen and S. Ewen, 1982, 34 ff).

Special libraries often face just the opposite problem, that is, their user base is often so narrow that the closing of the parent organization usually means the closing of the special library housed within it. One thing that can be done to provide some assurance of the library’s continued existence is to link the library’s collection and services to a broader base of interests. This way if the parent organization does collapse, the library may stay in business by serving outside clients.

Conversely, the concern with the concentration of film libraries in distribution companies is not that the collection is too narrow, but that it is too broad. Or to be more precise, these film libraries distribute materials to the widest possible audience, yet this means they are often very narrow with respect to content. Movies with broad market appeal often aim at the lowest possible common denominator in the viewing audience. Hollywood films tend to be big budget films that focus on male action heroes. They are filled with car chase scenes, fist fights, gun battles, and, in general, gratuitous violence and, of course, sex! For the special librarian seeking to maintain a balance of perspectives, including a balance of high quality and pop films, the distribution company’s drive toward pop, mass market items presents a serious dilemma indeed, for mass market films are produced and collected to the exclusion of all else.

Now, if people want to see mass market movies, then this is certainly what the film library should provide. But this is not all that people want to see. There is also a market for more serious and thought provoking cinema. Specialty movie theaters in many major metropolitan areas primarily show more serious “art” films from smaller, independent U.S. and European production companies and have enjoyed some success over the years. Although it is true that they cannot match the viewership of theaters that show mass market films, they do have a niche in the market. These theaters are profitable. People do want to see better quality films. Therefore, the special librarian in the film library of a distribution company, could make the case to the parent organization that quality films do have a stable place in the market and can make money for the company. This is one way for the film librarian to resolve the dilemma of adhering to the “balance principle” while remaining loyal to the parent company and its needs. Before proceeding to offer other resolutions of this dilemma, it is necessary to here provide a discussion of the theoretical basis upon which the balance principle rests.
Why does this moral dilemma or conflict exist? The obvious way to answer this is to appeal to the traditional principles or laws of Western Aristotlean logic, particularly to the principle of non-contradiction (Copi and Cohen, 1998, 228–229). One cannot logically maintain that all libraries should adhere to certain principles and, at the same time and in the same respect, that special libraries should not. One cannot logically maintain “All x are y” and at the same time and in the same respect, “some x are not y,” for to do so would violate the logical law of non-contradiction. If all libraries are expected to adhere to the principle of a balanced collection, then special libraries are expected to adhere to the principle as well. The film librarian therefore cannot both maintain the principle of a balanced collection and adhere to the singular perspective of the parent company, which seeks to collect only mass market films.

Yet these logical principles themselves have been widely challenged by numerous contemporary and postmodern philosophies, for, it is claimed, the principles are too abstract and one-sided. Perhaps the answer to the question of what engenders the conflict and how it may be resolved lies elsewhere. In fact, it is the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty that best describes the dilemma and its resolution, for his works come between the extremes of 1) the traditionalist/modernist approach, which claims one abstract rationality for all, and 2) the postmodernist approach, which in many cases claims no rationality at all.

Merleau-Ponty does not reject traditional logic, but seeks to mollify its overly reflective and abstract nature by grounding it in the flow of prereflective and concretely embodied experience. He does not abandon the principle of non-contradiction or the more primary principle of identity or presence but takes them to occur in the flow of concrete perceptual experience and against a fluid background of difference. For example, the gestalt figure (or the concrete perceptually present) occurs only against a background of different elements. These elements, though not fully perceived, help articulate the foreground. By adhering to one perspective, that which reveals the foreground, one temporarily precludes at least most of what is given in the others, for they remain only implied in the background. One can shift perspectives (at first seeing in the famous gestalt figure the vase as the foreground, then seeing it slip into the background of two faces looking at one another), but one cannot simultaneously experience both as both foreground and background at the same time and in the same respect (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 113 ff, 131–132; see also Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 3–4, 275). Yet, there is at least a partial openness to other perspectives here because they are present in the original perspective as implied, as background elements. Moreover, not only are other points of view implied for me (I can shift my perspective from the foreground to the background), but the perspectives of others are also implied. First of all, my perception opens
upon a world that runs beyond me and includes others, that is, given within my experience is a world that others also perceive (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 135 ff). And secondly, since my consciousness is primarily experienced as being in and at the world through my body, I can empathize with the consciously engaged bodily actions of others. My gestures slip into theirs just as theirs can slip into mine, for there is a sort of “postural impregnation” or “gestural coupling” accomplished by human empathy (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 139, 143–145; see also Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 184–185; and Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 118). Yet again, one cannot simultaneously experience different perspectives, this time the different points of view of different human beings, even though they remain implied in one’s experience. While I take up one perspective the others are temporarily and partially excluded, even though they remain implied. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not deny the principles of traditional logic but corrects their abstract one-sidedness by situating them in a more concrete experience that is fluid, open, and relational. Two perspectives cannot be experienced at the same time, yet at the level of lived experience, one perspective often opens out to and implies others.

The film librarian’s moral conflict exists, then, because a logical conflict exists, either Aristotelian or now dialectical. The film librarian cannot collect a balance of views and, at the same time, collect only the perspective of the parent company. And since the logic of Aristotle is now widely regarded as too partial and abstract, since it does not capture the fluid openness and referentiality of concrete experience, which accommodates different perspectives, it is perhaps Merleau-Ponty’s more concrete and dialectical logic that best explains the dilemma.

However, in challenging the abstract truths of the traditional/modernist approach, Merleau-Ponty does not slip into the relativist position of the postmodernist philosophy of deconstruction. Deconstruction, as Derrida has articulated it, claims that there is no truth (no identity or presence). In fact, it is claimed that the golden age of language is over. The theory of language within which one word would refer to one concept or perceived object is no longer tenable. In Derrida’s deconstructionist theory of language, words simply defer to other words and so on ad infinitum (Derrida, 1973, 140). A culture’s language therefore is simply a play of elastic meanings, and truth is at best only an agreement among interlocutors. This view allows for a multiplicity of perspectives, but in doing so abandons any truth beyond simple linguistic agreement.

Again, Merleau-Ponty’s position here comes between modernism and postmodernism. For Merleau-Ponty rationality is not abstracted from the body and its engagement in the world, as the traditionalist/modernist often maintained. Nor is it simply the result of arbitrary agreements among interlocutors, as the postmodernist claims. For Merleau-Ponty rationality is the agreement of profiles, of mine within me as I actively open upon the world and of mine
with those of others as we actively open upon the world together (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, xix–xx). Rationality is based on an engaged bodily consciousness, on a consciousness that is not privately turned in on itself (as it is for much of the philosophical tradition) but that aims at a world outside of itself, a world that includes others (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 136, 141–142; see also Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 70, 429). Within Merleau-Ponty’s theory, then, my embodied, engaged consciousness opens to a shared world, a world that is the homeland for all perspectives. True, I can reflect, turn in on my individual perspective (for no one else sees exactly as I do), yet I individuate from a shared, common world. True, I tend to see the world through a veil of my own interests, yet the world is there for everyone to see—and this is given to me as well. True, language helps articulate the perceived world, but there is something there to be articulated. The perceived world may well be open to multiple interpretations, but these interpretations are not arbitrary, for some, in fact, fit and work better than others.

Merleau-Ponty’s position subsequently allows him to develop what he refers to as a lateral universal. There is no single preexistent scheme of abstract concepts or essences that all minds adhere to, for too many concrete differences exist between individuals and even between groups. What we find at the level of concrete experience are embodied human subjects who have similar bodies opening upon a similar world in similar ways. Thus, my perspective, even though not exactly the same as yours, is similar enough to yours for us to recognize the truth in each. Truth, then, is grounded in my concrete experience as I actively open upon the world and in the agreement of my perspectives with those of others. Truth involves three relationships: one between my embodied consciousness and the world, one between my lived embodied experience and a reflective awareness that compares and contrasts these experiences with the help of language, and one between my perspectives and those of other human perceivers, also brought to more complete expression by language, though not arbitrarily created.

Adhering only to one’s own perspective or only to the perspective of one’s vested interest group gives only a limited view. Truth is to be established by listening to all voices, to all points of view. It is established where these perspectives reflectively come together within me, and where they come together within a community of individuals seeking successful adaptation to each other and to a nature that is not arbitrarily conceived. It is thus Merleau-Ponty’s view that best explains the need for a balance of perspectives, for the traditionalist/modernist claimed its perspective as the one and only truth, and the postmodernist claims a relativism that results from a multiplicity of perspectives that really is a claim to no truth at all. Without a balance of different and yet overlapping perspectives, there is no truth, and without a balanced library collection, there is no means to get at the balance of perspectives, i.e., there is
no means to get at the truth, and this is why the principle of a balanced collection is fundamental for libraries.

In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy not only is truth based on this balance of perspectives but morality is as well. Morality involves recognizing other human beings as similar to oneself. In fact, the moral situation is one that recognizes all human beings as fully human and that ultimately recognizes the voice and participation of each human being. The most moral political situation is therefore a democratic one, for it allows the participation of each adult. Thus, just as we arrive at truth by listening to all voices and checking them against one another, just as we arrive at truth by finding the common element in all voices, by finding what all would freely consent to, so also we arrive at moral principles by listening to all voices and checking each against that of others. We arrive at morality by finding moral principles all would freely approbate.

The traditionalist/modernist moral position tends to assume one truth and one truth about morality. It may claim to listen to all voices, but it listens only insofar as these views are expressed in the principles of its form of rationality. That is to say, the traditionalist/modernist moral view tends to be an elitist and ethnocentric view, one that does not genuinely listen to those who think differently than it does. The postmodernist moral view, on the other hand, tends to be relativist and without a basis at all, for it claims that truth and morality are based merely on the linguistic agreement of interlocutors. Merleau-Ponty’s position is neither absolutist nor relativist, for it bases both truth and morality on a balance of bodily perspectives. Truth and morality are formed in my engagement with a stable (though not fixed) world and my engagement with similar (though not identical) others.

Hence, if Merleau-Ponty’s theory best explains the need for a balance of perspectives to establish the truth, it also best explains the need for a balance of perspectives to establish morality. Without recognizing all voices, i.e., without a balance of perspectives, there is no true morality. And without a balanced library collection as the means to showcase these different voices, there is no means to establish the truly moral society. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy thus provides the theoretical framework that is needed to support the librarian’s claim for a balanced collection.

A more distant argument for a balance of high quality and pop materials can be traced to the remote past of the Athenian writings of Plato and Aristotle. Plato argues that the human personality is composed of three basic parts: desire, spirit, and reason. Desire is explained as the biological urge for food, drink and sexual fulfillment; spirit is described as a sense of dignity and honor; and reason, in general terms, is characterized as the ability to grasp abstract concepts and to think rationally. Plato makes the case that the artists and rhetoricians of his day communicate using colorful, sensual images of sense particulars. Plato holds this form of communication in disdain because it does
not touch the human personality at the higher, more specifically human levels, the levels of dignity and rationality (Plato, 1956, 309, 312–315).

It is also appropriate to mention Aristotle's *Rhetoric* here, for although Plato outlines the general structure for criticism of what might be referred to as low art (images aimed at the desires and passions rather than concepts aimed at reflective thought), Aristotle conceives a framework for the positive characterization of what might be referred to as high art. Aristotle believes, contrary to Plato, that what art imitates is not sense particulars but the human character. He is thinking of theatrical productions in which actors portray certain character types and act out certain universal psychological challenges and conflicts. Viewing a play, then, can act as a catharsis for the viewer who is able to identify with the protagonist. This release of emotion can deepen the sense of and value for human life. Art for Aristotle is (or should be) dialogue and character driven, for it is this type of art that most informs the viewer of the depth and potentiality of the human personality. This type of art confronts the issues of human life head on, attempts to resolve them, and to elicit a deeper response from the viewer. Low art tends to be escapist, for it aims to stimulate the senses, often with little or no reflection (Aristotle, 1941, 1325–1332).

The problem with Plato and Aristotle is that their beliefs rest upon the theory that there is only one form of rationality — a form that is grasped only by a special few. As we have witnessed above, Merleau-Ponty does not challenge all rationality, as the postmodernists do, but broadens the notion of what counts as rational. Rationality is not some form, structure or essence already existing in the mind of God, in nature, or in the consciousness of the human mind. It remains to be established, and it is established by listening to all voices, by an agreement of profiles, of mine within me as I actively open upon the world, and of mine with those of others as we actively open upon the world together. We have seen that it is this notion of rationality that best makes sense of the requirement of a balance of perspectives, including high with low, for it neither assumes only one perspective nor reduces all of them to linguistic whim.

Moreover, arguments similar to those made by Plato and Aristotle (again, without necessarily making a reference to only one form of rationality and therefore consistent with Merleau-Ponty's broadened reconceptualization of reason) have recently been made by numerous authors writing about film and mass media in general. Stuart Ewen in his *All Consuming Images* claims that the colorful images of art, photography, and film give us aspect and not reality. They generally do not engage the higher human capacities of thought and reflection. These images, often violent or sexual in nature, aim at the visceral, the emotional, at the passions and desires. Additionally, in advertising these images are often very carefully researched and chosen to elicit a certain response, a certain kind of behavior — to buy into a product, program or idea. This behavior is often performed with little or no reflective awareness on the
part of the consumer (Ewen, 1988, see especially the following sections: “Skimmers of the World,” 24 ff, “The Triumph of the Superficial,” 32 ff, and “Consumer Engineering,” 43 ff; see also Moyers, 1994, and Postman, 1985, especially chap. 2).

According to Ewen, this mode of presentation, which uses images to aim at desires rather than concepts aimed at reason and reflective evaluation, has now become the principle means of public presentation. It is used to present the news—to capture the viewer. It is used to present political candidates—to capture votes. And, as was claimed above, it is used in most films—to capture the widest possible audience.

American citizens are increasingly presented with a certain world view. They are offered a world of images that aims at passions, desires, and the elucidation of certain forms of behavior that are favorable to fewer and fewer people who control these images. There has been an increasing concentration of control and distribution of images in the hands of fewer and fewer, larger and larger companies. These images therefore increasingly give us a world view that benefits a few, that does not represent a multiplicity of viewpoints or the means to try to critically bring them together. Concentration of control of images raises serious concerns about both democracy, for now the very ideas and images with which people think are controlled by fewer and fewer people, and about censorship, for the mass media now overwhelmingly portrays a world view favorable to those few who control it (Schiller, 1992, 1 ff; see also Schiller, 1989). These concerns should be foremost in the minds of all citizens, including librarians, but the latter concern of censorship should especially occupy the minds of all librarians who have pledged an allegiance to the free exchange of ideas (See Crawford and Gorman, 1995, 7–12). Although the complex issue of censorship, commercial or government, cannot be resolved in a short essay, the topic is raised here in the hope that librarians and all citizens will vigorously debate this trend toward the concentration of control of images in film libraries in particular and in the mass media in general. Our very notions of democracy depend upon it.

Merleau-Ponty’s theory has given us a deeper understanding of why a balance of perspectives is so important for our society and for the librarian. With this theoretical background we can now understand why the moral conflict exists for the film librarian specifically and the special librarian generally. If the parent company that houses the special library is only devoted to its own perspective, then it will exclude others. If the film librarian follows the mandate of the company, the library will collect only one type of film, rather than a balance of all types. Yet librarians are taught to respect the principle of collection balance. Thus there is a contradiction for the film librarian—who cannot do both, who must either abandon the principle to save his or her job, or leave the job based on the principle.
Merleau-Ponty's theory also suggests various means to resolve the conflict: if the film librarian maintains only the company perspective—which is partial, perspectival, imbued with self-interest, and aimed only at distributing mass market films—then the adherence to a balanced collection is abandoned. Yet to maintain a balance of perspectives, the film librarian does not have to abandon the company's point of view. It is one perspective that is to be balanced with others. The film librarian must place the perspective in abeyance, at least long enough to see others, but does not have to abandon it, only balance it with others. It was suggested above that the film librarian could promote niche marketing to its parent company. There is an audience for quality films. If this audience is tapped, profits can be elicited for the company—and they can thus be made maintaining a balance of quality and mass market films in the collection.

The only other option for the film librarian concerned with a balance between high quality films and low culture pop films is to defer to the national film archives to select and collect high quality material. It is here that selection principles have been carefully worked out and greater balance has been achieved in the collection. First of all, most archives insist on collecting all kinds of film and television programming. Even unreleased footage and non-transmitted programming should be considered for collection. In addition to a variety of films and programs, numerous perspectives should be considered when selection occurs. Different points of view should be considered from within the organization or studio as well as from without. Within the organization, the perspectives of critics, educators, area specialists, and scholars should be taken into account. Advisory committees often play a role in soliciting multiple views and in balancing them. They may also play an important role in working out specific selection criteria. Here is a sample of such criteria offered by advisory committees associated with the National Film Archives of Great Britain (Hanford, 1986, 79–81). Materials should be selected if they represent important historical developments in the history of the medium itself. New film and coloring techniques should be noted and preserved. Materials should be selected if they represent important historical figures or events, in all areas: science, art, entertainment, politics, sports, etc. Documentary films are particularly valuable for this purpose. Materials should be chosen if they display architectural constructions, buildings, machines, and technology. Materials should be selected if they show a certain geographic region during a particular time period. Materials should be sought that display exceptional quality of some sort—performance, direction, technique, etc. Although different criteria may be developed in different libraries for different purposes, those noted above criteria are an excellent starting point for the development of a balanced film collection. Yet a serious concern remains.

The problem with simply deferring to a national film archive to achieve a
A balanced collection is twofold. First, although Great Britain has established a national film archive, the United States has not. And second, even if such an archive existed in the United States, and even if it selected quality films, they would be so small in number that this practice would not affect the market. Film production and distribution companies will not produce quality films simply to sell a handful to film archives. Another possible solution is to encourage the National Endowment for the Arts to fund a variety of films and filmmakers. Although this would assure that at least some quality films would be produced, the current level of funding would not be enough to make a significant difference in the number of quality films. The film librarian is therefore left with the above mentioned options: pitch the idea to the parent organization that quality films are profitable, or explain the idea to the library community and to society at large that concentration of control of the mass media in the hands of fewer and fewer people seriously threatens the very principles of democracy and the free exchange of ideas. If the market alone does not provide a balance of perspectives (or if monopoly control of the market dramatically prevents this balance), this issue should be placed on the public agenda for immediate consideration and debate. It is not unreasonable to suggest that government agencies should play a role in regulating the concentration of control in a wide variety of industries, particularly those that deal with the media. Today, with all the fervor against “big government control,” the suggestion of more government interference is obviously not a very popular idea. Nevertheless, it deserves serious attention and debate. The U.S. has a long history of anti-trust laws. The government, in fact, is one of the few sources that has the power to regulate monopoly corporations. Moreover, if they are not regulated by government, which is supposed to represent all voices, then they will surely regulate much of our popular life, including our voices.

Bibliography

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